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Abbreviations  
 
 
AACM — the Australian Agricultural Consultancy Management Company. An advisory 
group formed in Adelaide in 1965 by Philip Young and Newton Tiver. The company quickly 
grew, aided in part by contracts with government agencies such as the DAA. By the mid-
1980s, AACM employed up to sixty consultants on agricultural projects in more than twenty 
developing countries.  
ABSCHOL — from ‘Aboriginal Scholarships’. Abschol was a student body established 
under the auspices of the National Union of Students in 1951 to boost Indigenous enrolments 
in tertiary education. Abschol’s mandate expanded to encompass broader pro-Aboriginal 
causes throughout the 1960s and early 70s, when ‘branches’ operated on many university 
campuses. In 1969 the Gorton Government began its own Indigenous scholarship program, 
rendering Abschol’s administration of its own scholarship program redundant. 
ABTF — The Aboriginal Benefits Trust Fund (ABTF) was a Commonwealth Government 
fund established by Minister for Territories Paul Hasluck in 1952. Under the terms of the 
ABTF, companies mining on Aboriginal Reserves were to pay royalties to the Fund for the 
use of Aboriginals, although at that point they owned neither the reserve land nor the 
minerals contained therein.  
ADC — the Aboriginal Development Commission. The ADC was established in 1980 by 
the Fraser Government. It absorbed some ‘development’ functions from the DAA, including 
pastoral operations. The Commission assisted Aboriginal people to acquire land, to engage 
in business enterprises, and to obtain finance for housing and other needs. 
AIATSIS — the Australian Institute of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Studies 
(originally known as the Australian Institute of Aboriginal Studies, or AIAS), was 
established in Canberra in 1964. The Institute is Australia's foremost resource for 
information about the cultures and societies of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples. 
ALFC — the Aboriginal Land Fund Commission was an impartial and expert statutory body 
established by the Whitlam Government under the terms of the Aboriginal Land Fund Act 
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(1974). The Commission was established to provide a means by which non-reserve land 
might be purchased for Aborigines. The need for such purchases had been originally flagged 
by former Prime Minister William McMahon at the behest of the CAA. 
ALP — the Australian Labor Party is a major political party founded in the 1890s by striking 
pastoral workers. Historically, the party’s principal focus was upon the rights of workers and 
it remains closely aligned with various labour unions.  
 ALRA — Aboriginal Land Rights (Northern Territory) Act. ALRA provides the basis upon 
which Aboriginal people in the Northern Territory can claim rights to land based on 
traditional occupation. Although the Whitlam Government appointed Justice Woodward to 
chair the Aboriginal Land Rights Commission and develop the Act, ALRA was passed 
eventually by the Fraser Government on 16 December 1976. 
BTEC — Brucellosis and Tuberculosis Eradication Campaign. A national initiative that 
successfully eradicated tuberculosis and brucellosis from Australian cattle between 1970 and 
1997. 
CAA — The Council of Aboriginal Affairs (1967–76) was established by the Government 
of Harold Holt in response to the ‘Aboriginal’ referendum of that year. Three members 
comprised the Council—H.C. ‘Nugget’ Coombs, Barrie Dexter and W.E.H. Stanner. The 
Council’s purpose was to provide policy advice on Aboriginal issues directly to the office of 
the Prime Minister. Its recommendations were broadly resisted by successive Coalition 
Governments until the election of the Whitlam ALP Government in December 1972. 
CLC — Central Land Council. Established as a statutory body in 1976 under the Aboriginal 
Land Rights (Northern Territory) Act 1976 (ALRA) to represent the land-related interests of 
traditional owners of the southern part of the Northern Territory. 
CDEP — Community Development Employment Projects. A federal government-
subsidised employment scheme established in 1977 to bolster the lack of employment 
opportunities for Aboriginal people. Via CDEP, participants sacrificed their right to 
Unemployment Benefits, the total of which was paid to organisations plus capital costs, so 
that they might administer CDEP programs in which a subsidised allowance was paid to 
staff. 
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CLP — The Northern Territory Country Liberal Party is an Australian Northern Territory 
political party affiliated with both the National (formerly ‘Country’) and Liberal Parties of 
Australia. The CLP was the dominant force in NT politics from its inception in 1974 until 
the turn of the century. 
DAA — the Department of Aboriginal Affairs was a Commonwealth agency formed in 
1972. Notwithstanding the creation of the Aboriginal Development Commission in 1980 
(which assumed land and development functions from it), the Department was responsible 
for administering the nation’s Aboriginal affairs until 1990. 
DE(NT) — the NT Division of the Commonwealth Department of Education. DE(NT) held 
responsibility for schooling children in the Northern Territory after the Education Branch of 
the Northern Territory Administration (in the Commonwealth Department of the Interior) 
was decommissioned by the Whitlam Government in 1973. DE(NT) thus operated in remote 
NT communities prior to the transferral of this responsibility to the NT Department of 
Education (NTED) after Territory Self-Government. 
DCGC — the Daguragu Community Government Council. DCGC was established in 1983, 
taking over responsibility for the provision of some municipal services at the Wave Hill 
Welfare settlement and Wattie Creek from the Department of Aboriginal Affairs. From that 
time until its abolition in 2008, DCGC was the Gurindji local government body 
administering services to and (via an elected council board) guided by the people of 
Kalkaringi and Daguragu. 
DPP — the Northern Territory Department of Primary Production was established in 1979 
and took responsibility for managing and supporting the NT’s rural industries.   
FCAA/FCAATSI. Federal Council for Aboriginal Advancement/The Federal Council for 
the Advancement of Aborigines and Torres Strait Islanders. The FCAA was established in 
1958 in Adelaide, merging a number of organisations lobbying for Aboriginal rights. In 
1964 it changed its name to the ‘Federal Council for the Advancement of Aborigines and 
Torres Strait Islanders’. From its inception until its demise in 1978, FCAA/FCAATSI 
comprised Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal activists working together for the improvement 
of conditions for Aboriginal people.    
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GDT — ‘GDT’ was the registered cattle brand used by the Muramulla Company to identify 
their cattle. GDT stands for ‘Gurindji Daguragu Territory’.  
MLA — A Member of the (NT) Legislative Assembly (See NTLA).  
NACC — the National Aboriginal Advisory Consultative Council. The first government-
created body of elected Aboriginal representatives to provide advice to the Commonwealth. 
Established by the Whitlam Government in 1973.  
NGO — A Non-Government Organisation. NGOs may be privately or government-funded. 
They continue to play a large role as service providers in Aboriginal affairs in Australia, as 
intended by the Whitlam Government (1972–75). 
NLC — Northern Land Council. Established as a statutory body in 1976 under the 
Aboriginal Land Rights (Northern Territory) Act 1976 (ALRA) to represent the land-related 
interests of traditional owners of the ‘Top End’ of the Northern Territory. 
NTDCD — the Northern Territory Department of Community Development. The NTDCD 
was formed after Self-Government in 1978. Its responsibilities included social welfare and 
local government.  
NTED — the Northern Territory Education Department took responsibility for the provision 
of school education in the NT under the terms of NT Self-Government from the 
Commonwealth Department of Education (NT Division) in 1979.  
NTG — the Northern Territory Government was formed after the Fraser Government’s NT 
Self-Government Act was passed in 1978. The NTG replaced the NTLA and assumed many 
functions of a state government, directly funded by the Commonwealth. 
NTLC — Northern Territory Legislative Council. The NTLC was a partly-elected 
governing body of the Northern Territory from 1947 until its replacement by the fully elected 
Northern Territory Legislative Assembly (NTLA) in 1974.  
NTLA — The Northern Territory Legislative Assembly is a unicameral (‘one-house’) 
legislature formed after the 1974 federal election. Members with full voting rights at a 
federal level oversaw the transition of the Northern Territory to Self-Government in 1978. 
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NTSG — Northern Territory Self-Government. In 1978, under the Commonwealth’s 
Northern Territory Self-Government Act, the Northern Territory Legislative Assembly 
assumed the power to make its own Acts of Parliament. Although the Commonwealth 
retained a right of veto, the increased political and financial ‘rights’ which the NT accrued 
under the Northern Territory Self-Government Act are popularly understood as conferring 
the Territory’s status as a ‘state-like’, ‘self-governing’ jurisdiction in its own right. 
NUAUS — the National Union of Australian University Students. Established in 1937 at 
Adelaide University to represent the interests of tertiary students, the NUAUS campaigned 
for a variety of causes, particularly in the 1960s. The NUAUS established Abschol (see 
above).  
OAL — Office of Aboriginal Liaison. The OAL was established within the NT Chief 
Minister’s Department after Territory Self-Government at the behest of its first Chief 
Minister, Paul Everingham. In addition to emphasising the importance of education and 
training, which Everingham believed were key to Aboriginal self-management, the new 
OAL acted to address a wide range of issues troubling Aboriginal communities. 
QC — Queen’s Counsel. Senior lawyers appointed by the legal profession in various 
Commonwealth countries, including Australia. 
TB — a colloquialism for tuberculosis. 
TMPU — Town Management and Public Utility.  Town Management and Public Utility 
functions were transferred to the new Northern Territory Government under the terms of the 
NTSG Act on 1 July 1979. TMPU became an important funding stream in the local 
government Community Government Councils established soon afterwards under the 1978, 
NT Associations Incorporation Act (AIA). 
VRD — Victoria River Downs station adjoins the Daguragu Land Trust. VRD is owned by 
the Hooker Pastoral Co. and was originally more than 20,000 square kilometres in area. VRD 
and the surrounding area, including Wave Hill Station and the Gurindji’s land, is often 
referred to as ‘the VRD area’.  
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Map 1. Wave Hill Area, Northern Territory of Australia. (Courtesy of Les Thomas) 
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Map. 2. Approximate country of Gurindji and surrounding language groups. (Courtesy of 
Felicity Meakins: Meakins and Nordlinger, 2014). 
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Map 4. Wattie Creek Village, October 1970. With thanks to Hannah Middleton. (Courtesy 
of Les Thomas)  
KEY: Gurindji Camps (2–18 people) 
1. Horace Wulmun, 2. Barry Kadija (ex-Victoria River Downs), 3. Lupngiari (Captain 
Major), Amy Wurrumak, 4. Freddy Algy, 5. Pincher Nyurrmiarri, ‘Big’ Blanchie Bulngari, 
6. Vincent Lingiari, ‘Little’ Blanchie Jingaya, 7. George Nidgi, Marie Djaban, 8. Steven 
Ngalngayarri, Vera Dulngarri, 9. Nugget Jinypal, Alice ( ) 10. Jerry Rinyngayarri, Melva 
Nanaku, 11. Tommy Wodjabunga, 12. Long Jack Jurumbak, Elsie Likapal, 13. Donald 
Nangiari, Kitty Nanaku, 14. Snowy Yalugura, Theresa Yupuny, 15. Mick Rangiari, Lizzie 
Wapngarri or Ngilyawarru, 16. Hobbles Danayarri, Lizzie Wartalilla, 17. Long Johnny 
Kijngayari, Polly Lajayi, 18. (Wanga) Bill Nurnngayarri, Mildred Jiwij, 19. Abschol 
House 1., 20. Abschol House 2. 
NB: In some cases the names of individuals may be misspelt, missing or wrongly included. 
In these instances, I apologise to the families of those concerned.  
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Map 5.  Local land tenure, 1975. Daguragu Pastoral Lease 805 (formerly part of Wave Hill 
Pastoral Lease 529), is shaded in pink. This area was subsequently the subject of the 
Gurindji’s ALRA Land Claim. The inset square within P/L 805 contains the Gurindji’s earlier 
Special Purpose Lease (SPL 353) surrounding Daguragu homestead. Source: NTAS, NTRS 
246, PL, Part2. 
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Abstract  
 
In 1973, a newly-elected Australian Labor Party government led by Gough Whitlam 
described its new Aboriginal Affairs policy as one of Aboriginal self-determination. The 
policy proclaimed its intention to assist Aboriginal groups to achieve their own goals, and 
used the Northern Territory (over which the Commonwealth then had full control) as a 
proving ground for its implementation. Subsequently renamed self-management by the 
Fraser Government (1975–83), the policy was adapted in small but significant ways by every 
federal and Northern Territory Government in the period of this study (1973–86). 
The thinking of those who had formulated self-determination policy had been 
influenced by the situation and ambitions of the Gurindji people. The group had come to 
public attention following their Wave Hill Walk-off protest action of 1966, led by Vincent 
Lingiari. In the years afterwards, Lingiari and other Gurindji leaders articulated a number of 
goals, the achievement of which they saw as fundamental to their society’s wellbeing and 
viability. Those goals were: official recognition of their traditional rights to land; their 
operation of a cattle enterprise on that land; their establishment of an independent 
community there also; and the operation in that community of a ‘two-way’ school.  
This thesis recognises an apparent confluence of shared intentions among Gurindji 
leaders and government agencies in the self-determination era, and describes a zone of 
parallel Gurindji and government activity: ‘Gurindji self-determination’. Finding that three 
of Gurindji self-determination’s four goals were not or only fleetingly achieved, the task of 
this thesis is to identify the causes of this broad failure and singular success. To do this, the 
thesis draws on detailed empirical data, the policy history of the preceding decades, 
anthropological and ethnographic studies, and political theory.  
This thesis finds that Gurindji self-determination’s failure was caused by inchoate and 
emergent differences between the aims and methods of government agencies and the 
Gurindji. Equally, young Gurindji people’s social reform agendas were an important and 
unanticipated contributor to the failure of Gurindji self-determination. Increased cash 
incomes and broader policy shifts associated with ‘equal rights’ enabled younger Gurindji 
to conduct this reformation.  
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Introduction 
 
This thesis attempts to explicate the outcomes of the Aboriginal self-determination policies 
initiated by Australian governments in the 1970s–80s for the Indigenous Gurindji language-
speaking group of the Northern Territory of Australia. Equally, it seeks to articulate the 
parallel social ambitions of Gurindji people, and their creative responses to government 
activity. By these means, this work shows how broadly speaking, the anticipated outcomes 
of self-determination policy and the goals of Gurindji elders failed.  
Once predominantly residents of Wave Hill cattle station, the Gurindji people are 
renowned for the action initiated by their male leaders on August 23 1966: the Wave Hill 
Walk-off. Today, Gurindji people predominantly live at Daguragu and the neighbouring 
community of Kalkaringi, both situated on their traditional land some eight hundred 
kilometres south of Darwin. (See Map 1).  
Key to this thesis’ findings are the two communities’ disparate origins and modes of 
development. Both communities obtained their enduring form, their names and basic 
demographic composition during the 1970s, and were profoundly influenced in other ways 
by that era’s government policies of Aboriginal self-determination and self-management.  
The Gurindji were a gerontocratic, and if not strictly patriarchal, then a politically 
androcentric society. To an unusual extent among Aboriginal groups, an individual—
Vincent Lingiari—was acknowledged as the Gurindji’s final arbiter, though he included and 
relied upon a small coterie of others in his decision-making. The goals of these men and 
those goals’ mediation by the Australian state are the topic of this thesis.  
The Gurindji leaders consisted mainly of the sons of two families: ‘Long Johnny’ 
Kijngayari and his brothers Pincher Nyurrmiyarri and Mick Rangiari, and brothers Jerry 
Rinyngayarri and Donald Nangiari. Of these, only Nangiari and Rinyngayarri were 
traditional patrilineal ‘owners’ of Daguragu. Nangiari and Rinyngayarri relied on Lingiari, 
Rangiari, Nyurrmiyarri, Kijngayari and others to ‘manage’, or supervise and organise ritual 
for that country. The roles of these four men as ‘managers’ or ‘workers’ was inherited by 
virtue of their marriages to a group of ‘owner’ women that included three sisters—‘Big 
Blanchie’ Bulngiari (Pincher Nyurrmiarri’s wife), her sister ‘Little Blanchie’ Jingaya 
Introduction 
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(married to Vincent Lingiari) and Rangiari’s wife, Lizzie ‘Ngilyawarru’ Wapngarri.1 Sandy 
Moray (Tipujurn) was another traditional owner of the Daguragu/Wattie Creek area, but 
died in the late 1960s. Moray had nominated the site for occupation.2 These traditional 
owners of the Wattie Creek area were among the ‘track mob’ who established the village of 
Wattie Creek/Daguragu, yet collectively the group’s traditional lands stretched for hundreds 
of kilometres beyond the boundaries of Wave Hill Station. For clarity regarding place 
names, the following table provides an overview of the naming of the two Aboriginal 
communities on which this thesis is focused. 
Wattie Creek/ Daguragu  Wave Hill Welfare Settlement/ 
Kalkaringi 
Wattie 
Creek 
1967–1972. Wave Hill Welfare 
Settlement 
1956–1973 
Daguragu 1973–present Libanungu 1973–1976 
Kalkaringi 1976–present 
Table 1. Common names of the predominantly Gurindji communities at Wave Hill. 
Commonly conceived of as a long-term industrial action, the Wave Hill Walk-off 
comprised the Gurindji leaders’ renunciation of the pastoral-industry dictated terms under 
which they and their forebears had lived and worked since the late 19th Century. The elders’ 
motivation for this act also entailed a number of nascent collective aims by which they 
sought to ensure the long-term integrity and wellbeing of their society. At the community 
they founded for this purpose in 1967 (then known by European Australians as Wattie 
Creek), the self-styled ‘track mob’ sought to regain control of their traditional land and to 
create an autonomous community and cattle operation.3 After five years’ governmental 
indifference and/or hostility to their ‘separatist’ agenda, they were officially supported to do 
so under the ALP’s policy of Aboriginal self-determination after the Australian Labor Party 
government of Gough Whitlam was elected in December 1972. In a rare confluence of 
                                                 
1  The English words ‘manager’, or ‘worker’ and ‘owner’ have been adopted by Ngumpit to broadly 
convey the complementary nature of their customary relationships of intermarriage in relation to land, 
ceremony and each other. See Patrick McConvell, ‘Neutralisation and Degrees of Respect in Gurindji’, 
The Languages of Kinship in Aboriginal Australia, Sydney, Oceania Linguistic Monographs (1982) 
86–106, pp. 93; Lyn Riddett, Personal Communication, 20 September 2014. 
2  Minoru Hokari, ‘From Wattie Creek to Wattie Creek: An Oral Historical Approach to the Gurindji 
Walk-Off’, Aboriginal History, 24 (2000), 98–116, p. 103; Michael George, Interview by Charlie 
Ward, Kalkaringi, 27 October 2010. 
3  For a detailed account of these events including many statements from their Gurindji protagonists, see 
Frank Hardy, The Unlucky Australians, Sydney, Nelson, 1968 (2006 edn, Melbourne, One Day Hill). 
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governmental intentions with publicly articulated, collective Indigenous aspirations, 
government fieldworkers implementing self-determination policy attempted to assist 
Gurindji people to achieve their leaders’ aims. As was the case in other parts of Australia’s 
north and centre, the results of this undertaking were unexpected by both their local 
Indigenous and governmental protagonists.  
   In the Gurindji’s case, the practical forms which their non-Indigenous support and 
their own efforts took were complicated by local circumstances. For several decades prior 
to the 1960s, Australian governments had maintained a regional presence at the Wave Hill 
Welfare Settlement, situated eight kilometres from Daguragu. At the time of the Wave Hill 
Walk-off, the Welfare Settlement was administered by the Northern Territory 
Administration of the Commonwealth Department of the Interior. The Settlement, as it 
was known, then comprised a small school, a police station and a Welfare Branch ration 
depot. Twenty modern houses were built there by the Gorton Government in 1969, and 
then under the social policies of the Whitlam and Fraser Governments, the Settlement 
expanded massively. As this thesis describes, the proximity of the two communities and 
Kalkaringi’s continuing status as the regional locus of governmental and non-Indigenous 
power complicated the efforts of Gurindji leaders and their government interlocutors to 
realise ‘Gurindji self-determination’ at Daguragu. 
 
In 2004, I was employed by Daguragu Community Government Council as a planning 
consultant, and I have enjoyed intermittent professional and research engagements with 
Kalkaringi-based organisations and Gurindji people in the years since. The Walk-off 
leaders’ historic, proactive assertions of independence and autonomy created a type of 
foundation mythology which Daguragu and Kalkaringi’s Gurindji residents mostly seem to 
enjoy and promulgate. However, by the time of my employment and presence among the 
Gurindji the Walk-off leaders’ descendants had largely disengaged from their communities’ 
managerial and political processes. Hence after living and working at Kalkaringi and 
studying the group’s famous Wave Hill Walk-off for a year in 2004, the commonly 
triumphal rendering of Daguragu’s origins raised more questions for me than it answered. 
To understand the evolution of the Gurindji people’s incongruent situation, I felt I 
needed to understand not only the Gurindji communities’ origins but their subsequent 
development. This led me to research and write my Masters’ thesis, titled: ‘Tracking Wave 
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Hill: Following the Gurindji Walk-off to Wattie Creek, 1966–1972’.4 That project left me 
with much unused research material and the substance of my curiosity unassuaged. For these 
reasons I formulated the questions at the heart of this thesis and resolved to answer them as 
a doctoral project. Although my focus has expanded and shifted marginally at times, this 
doctorate has been guided by my desire to answer the following questions: 
• Was the Australian government’s vision of a self-determining Aboriginal 
constituency realised by the Gurindji?  
• Conversely, was the realisation of the Gurindji vision regarding their independent 
homestead, their school, land rights and cattle enterprise thwarted or supported by the 
actions of the public service charged with operationalising self-determination?  
• Furthermore, how influential were changes within Gurindji society on the outcome of 
these interactions?  
As I will show in this thesis, on numerous occasions in the late 1960s and early 70s, the 
senior men of Daguragu iterated their desire to self-manage, or at least manage on their own 
terms, what I term the pillars of Gurindji self-determination: a Gurindji cattle company, their 
community of Daguragu, their land rights, and their anticipated school. I therefore correlate 
Gurindji self-determination with Gurindji independence. But what was the elders’ vision of 
their ‘independence’ exactly? As I understand it, the primary instantiation of Gurindji 
independence sought by the elders was that Gurindji people should occupy all the primary, 
in-community positions involved in operationalising each of the four pillars, as well as the 
attendant physical and menial roles. This extended to management: not only did they intend 
for their main services to be operated by Gurindji people, they also sought to avoid the 
influence at Daguragu of European Australians (‘kartiya’) over their affairs, either from afar 
or by visiting authorities. For this reason among others, they also sought to control the access 
of kartiya to their community. In summary, Gurindji independence may therefore be glossed 
at this point as a physical lack of kartiya at Daguragu, and their general absence from 
Gurindji affairs, regarding the four ‘pillars’ of Gurindji self-determination in particular.  
Was this independence attained? Was Gurindji self-determination a success? 
Regarding three of the four measures—a cattle enterprise, Gurindji schooling and Gurindji 
local government—I have judged the answer to be negative, or at least ‘not for long’. Why 
                                                 
4  Charlie Ward, ‘Tracking Wave Hill: Following the Gurindji Walk-off to Wattie Creek, 1966–1972’, 
Unpublished Masters Thesis (Flinders University, Adelaide, 2012). 
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then, did these three pillars of Gurindji self-determination fail? My argument is that in all 
these matters, dissociative intergenerational Gurindji social dynamics and systematised 
misunderstandings between Gurindji leaders and their government interlocutors effectively 
derailed Gurindji self-determination’s potential to succeed. In contrast, Gurindji land rights, 
the fourth pillar, can be regarded as an enduring success. The reasons for this anomaly are 
many, but I will show that most significantly, the possession of rights differs categorically 
from the responsibilities entailed by the operation of the enterprises, organisations and 
services required by the Gurindji’s proposed cattle operation, their school, and their 
independent homestead.  
The process of writing this thesis has been unusual in that I have produced a book during 
my candidature which draws upon much of the same research as that which informs my 
doctorate. A Handful of Sand: The Gurindji Struggle, after the Walk-off (Clayton, Victoria, 
Monash University Publishing, 2016) comprises my account of the Gurindji people’s 
engagement with settler society, focusing particularly on their then leaders’ efforts to realise 
their social aspirations for the group at Daguragu in the 1967–86 period. My periodisation 
and approach to these issues in this thesis differs significantly from the book’s, however. 
While readers will at times recognise events depicted in A Handful of Sand, there I have 
largely constrained myself to chronology-based description. In contrast, in this thesis I 
provide the argument and information necessary to properly contextualise the developments 
I describe at Wave Hill. I then interpret and explicate them within the framework of the 
arguments I advance in Part One.  
As I have foreshadowed, two parts comprise this thesis. Part One provides the 
background, context and analysis that is necessary to comprehend developments I describe 
in Part Two, the ‘Zone of Enablement’ at Wave Hill in which Gurindji elders and public 
servants sought to realise the pillars of the elders’ vision. Similarly, in Part One, I argue that 
‘Gurindji self-determination’ was influenced profoundly by Gurindji people’s dissociative 
social dynamics in the period, and I illustrate the implications of that dissociation for the 
Aboriginal Affairs bureaucracy and for Gurindji elders in Part Two. Here, it is only 
necessary to state that the 1970s created opportunities for (particularly younger) Gurindji 
individuals to force disaggregative social change that they had long desired, and that this 
had serious implications for self-determination policy’s communalising agenda, and that of 
Gurindji elders. 
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In Chapter One of this thesis, I provide the legislative and political background to 
the Whitlam Government’s policy of Aboriginal self-determination and its ideological 
successors, thereby describing the Commonwealth and Northern Territory governmental 
frameworks and ideological environment relevant to this inquiry. Chapter Two describes 
the other protagonists of ‘Gurindji self-determination’—primarily the group of Gurindji 
stock workers and their families who conceived and led the Wave Hill Walk-off, but also 
members of other Aboriginal groups residing at Kalkaringi. In Chapter Two I make the 
case that neither the Whitlam Government nor Gurindji elders knew which methods they 
would require to achieve their social aspirations for Gurindji society. I argue that although 
the methods of both parties were significantly inchoate, sufficient congruence between 
governmental and Gurindji aspirations may be discerned to formulate ‘Gurindji self-
determination’ as a subject/object of inquiry.  Chapter Three then provides a more detailed 
history of the origins and intentions of self-determination policy as it was formulated by the 
Council of Aboriginal Affairs (1966–76) and the Whitlam Government (1972–75), showing 
how both the newly-created sector of Aboriginal organisations and the Department of 
Aboriginal Affairs were given responsibility for remedying Aboriginal disadvantage by 
operationalising the policy. It then describes how remote social and employment realities 
forced the Fraser Government and the Northern Territory’s Everingham Government to 
adapt their self-determination policies during the late 1970s in key ways, while largely 
seeking to retain the policy’s earlier rhetoric. Building on the work of other scholars, 
Chapter Three also demonstrates that new governmental rationalisations of Aboriginal 
collectivity were self-determination policy’s definitive trait. Drawing upon political theorist 
Chandran Kukathas’ notion of dissociation as a ‘right’ within pluralistic liberal democratic 
nations, I then show how self-determination policy’s communalising intentions were both 
powerfully resisted, and adapted in unforeseen ways, by Gurindji and other Aboriginal 
individuals. Chapter Four builds on the preceding chapters to explain why, when the 
cumulative effects of social liberal policies in the 1950s–70s at Wave Hill culminated in 
young Gurindji people’s receipt of increased cash incomes provided by the social policies 
of the Whitlam Government, younger Gurindji individuals found it useful to dissociate from 
the older generation in unprecedented ways. I show that this process of intergenerational 
dissociation was also assisted by increasing exposure to ‘western’ culture and alcohol. In 
Chapter Four I also draw on the sociological concept of ‘social closure’ to demonstrate that 
Gurindji people employed a range of techniques to enable their ‘disappearance’ from the 
space as governable subjects of policy. 
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In Part Two I show how the dynamics and factors I have articulated in Part One 
affected the efforts of both Gurindji elders and their bureaucratic interlocutors to realise the 
main pillars of the elders’ social vision at Wave Hill: Land Rights; the Muramulla Cattle 
operation; Gurindji-controlled schooling; and most importantly, the independence of their 
homestead and later community, Daguragu. Chapter Five describes the Gurindji elders’ 
famous campaign for their land rights. It also shows why categorical and practical 
differences between the exercise of legal rights and the operational requirements of the other 
pillars of their social vision ensured that the Gurindji’s possession of land rights by the 
Aboriginal Land Rights (Northern Territory) Act 1976 was an anomalous success. I show 
that these categorical and practical differences are demonstrated by the Gurindji elders’ 
apparent belief that when the Muramulla Company received significant government funding 
and a pastoral lease in 1975, that they possessed the property rights they aspired to. The 
rights of a pastoral lessee allowed them to grow a large herd of cattle and to employ their 
own young men to work their stock: crucial elements of their social vision. Chapter Six, 
which with Chapter Seven analyses the Gurindji elders’ Muramulla cattle company, shows 
how and why this misapprehension came about: how successive governments supported 
Aboriginal groups’ cattle-related entrepreneurial ambitions, and why that aim was central 
to the elders’ vision of ongoing Gurindji social and economic maintenance. While Chapter 
Six provides the reader with an account of the Muramulla Company’s fifteen-year history, 
it is in Chapter Seven (Muramulla II), that I analyse and explicate the employment, 
communication and governance problems that would complicate and eventually thwart the 
Company’s operation as a vehicle for the Gurindji elders’ plans.  
In Chapter Eight, my focus shifts to the educational and pedagogical trope of the 
elders’ social vision. There, I provide evidence that Gurindji elders saw their management 
of a primary and perhaps secondary school at Daguragu as a key component of their vision 
for Gurindji social and cultural maintenance. Unlike the other elements of the Gurindji 
elders’ vision explored in Part Two, Gurindji people were unable to attempt this experiment: 
a school at Daguragu was never built. Chapter Seven thus explores the reasons for this 
failure of federal and Territory governments and the Walk-off leaders, and its implications 
for the elders’ social project.  
The Gurindji elders’ ultimate aim was to make an autonomous Gurindji enclave at 
Daguragu, sustained by their cattle operation. It is thus to Gurindji independence that this 
thesis’s analysis finally cleaves. Treating ‘independence’ as the intended outcome of the 
composite elements of Gurindji self-determination which I have already addressed, 
Introduction 
8 
 
Chapter Nine is primarily descriptive, laying the groundwork for what follows. It describes 
relevant intentional statements by the Gurindji, and illustrates the thinking behind 
incorporative and communalising governmental responses to this aim. To demonstrate the 
continuing though frequently unaligned efforts of the elders and their government 
interlocutors to realise an independent Gurindji society, Chapter Nine provides a description 
of the first three local council-type bodies created by DAA officers at Wave Hill under the 
rubric of self-determination. I argue that these bodies failed to engage the Gurindji’s 
political leadership because their structures failed to acknowledge the practices and plural 
sources of Aboriginal power at Wave Hill; an error whose remedy I show in Chapter Ten. 
There, I demonstrate how a Daguragu-based council incorporated in 1977 managed to 
recognise Wave Hill’s extant Aboriginal power dynamics, and how that body and its 
successor comprised the Australian state’s most effective effort to actualise Gurindji self-
determination. In Chapter Ten I show too, though, that the Council’s Aboriginal 
management was badly compromised by insufficient and mostly inadequate non-Indigenous 
support. I also argue that the dissociative agenda of young Gurindji adults and elements of 
Gurindji socialisation rendered professional Aboriginal peer-management untenable. With 
these factors limiting the functionality of the Council and Gurindji people’s engagement 
with it, I show how the idiosyncrasies of ‘adapted’ Aboriginal self-determination policy 
characterised the operations of both the Daguragu Council (1977–1982) and the Daguragu 
Community Government Council (1982–86). Having demonstrated how and why 
‘independence’ of the type envisioned by the Walk-Off leaders was never realised, the body 
of this thesis ends. 
The Conclusion summarises the insurmountable difficulties faced by ‘Gurindji self-
determination’s’ protagonists, and places the dissociative Gurindji social developments of 
the period within their ethnographic, historical, and nation-wide context. Finally, a broader 
analysis of the independence envisioned for the Gurindji by their government interlocutors 
concludes the work. 
A Note on Methods and Methodology 
By combining my own historical assessment with extant anthropological and political 
theoretical analyses, this study contributes to current understandings of a government 
policy. It does so by contextualising my own oral historical and archival research regarding 
the Gurindji group’s social and political dynamics in the period with anthropological 
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literature regarding the social structure of other traditionally-inclined Aboriginal Australian 
groups in remote Australia. I demonstrate that the Gurindji people’s apparent responses to 
self-determination policy in the period were motivated by their own social priorities, and 
that liberal government policies and economic developments in the 1950s–80s, including 
self-determination, created the preconditions which enabled Gurindji people to achieve their 
individual rather than collective goals.  
To uncover source material that might illuminate and profitably inform my analysis 
of events at Kalkaringi and Daguragu in the period, I have employed several orthodox 
methods of historical research. Predominantly, this has consisted of reading government-
produced archival records held by the National Archives of Australia’s Darwin repository. 
Small though important additions to this material include government land administration 
records held by the Northern Territory Archives Service (NTAS) and the current NTG 
Department of Infrastructure, Planning and Logistics. Oral History interviews recorded by 
the NTAS Oral History Unit were also very useful, particularly regarding the operation of 
the Muramulla Company and Daguragu Community Government Council in the 1980s. The 
private collections of former public servants and activists have provided me with important, 
unofficial perspectives on events at Kalkaringi and Daguragu, as have the interviews I have 
conducted with a large number of non-Indigenous and Gurindji individuals who were 
involved with ‘Gurindji self-determination’. Records created by Kalkaringi’s Baptist 
Ministers, now held by Global Interaction, also enabled me to incorporate Christian 
perspectives on alcohol use by Gurindji people, and Gurindji social dissociation.  
As readers might note, the firsthand reports of Gurindji individuals are largely lacking 
from this list. While primary sources of information on Gurindji self-determination have 
been plentiful, the archive informing this research predominantly reflects the views of non-
Indigenous government and non-government staff, and this archive therefore does not 
necessarily provide an accurate representation of Gurindji views. Unfortunately, non-
Indigenous voices are heavily over-represented. The disparity between amply documented 
non-Indigenous views and poorly documented Gurindji ones has significant implications 
for my analysis. Before detailing the methodological steps I have taken to ameliorate it, I 
will briefly outline the reasons for its existence. 
Unlike those kartiya in the period who were attempting to create a historical, self-
determining Gurindji subject, my study has the great benefit of hindsight. The advantage of 
being able to interpret the opinions of the Gurindji’s non-Indigenous interlocutors by 
contextualising them with others is considerable, however my analysis is unavoidably 
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compromised by its reliance on scant and tendentious representations of Gurindji people. 
This situation may be attributed to both the Gurindji leaders’ illiterate status and the 
articulative practices of government. This thesis will show that the leaders’ illiteracy had a 
critical effect on their responses to the opportunities and responsibilities that self-
determination policy offered.  
The elders’ illiteracy has also affected this analysis in significant ways. Unlike the 
voluminous documentary archive I have collated detailing non-Indigenous public servants’ 
endeavours, which I have frequently been able to supplement with oral history interviews 
conducted with those same public servants, no equivalent resource produced by or for 
Gurindji leaders exists. English was the third or fourth language of most of these men, and 
they did not write. Almost without exception, the elders’ words were recorded in the 
language of the dominant culture. This occurred because they were summarised, evoked and 
occasionally transcribed in English, by European Australians. So that this study would not 
be unduly compromised by the omission of the Gurindji leaders’ ‘authentic’ voices, I have 
had to rely on my critical incorporation of relevant secondary (non-Indigenous) written 
transcripts and summaries, of statements made by Gurindji men in interviews, meetings and 
consultations. I have been unable though to supplement these sources with my own oral 
history interviewing of the period’s Gurindji leaders. Bar one, the leaders of the Wave Hill 
Walk-off were deceased by the time I began my research. The disparity in this regard 
between Lingiari’s coterie and their urban, non-Indigenous governmental advisers, whom I 
interviewed in great numbers, is pronounced. In general, it is explained by the fact that the 
Gurindji leaders were not only much older than their record-keeping kartiya interlocutors 
during the historical period under review, but that they also had a far shorter life expectancy.  
Regarding the opinions of Gurindji women or ‘new generation’ Gurindji, the situation 
is more complex. Scarcely any extant primary evidence from these groups or their 1970s 
antecedents exist from which I might elucidate an account of the younger or female 
Gurindji’s worlds in those years, in English or otherwise. Those with the means to do so 
saw no reason to identify or record the opinions and beliefs of the male Gurindji leaders’ 
wives or sisters, or of the young men and women reshaping Gurindji society, whose 
in/activity and opinions largely and paradoxically excluded them from the self-determining 
Gurindji subject sought by government bureaucrats. As such, the materials I draw on to 
support my thesis regarding the younger Gurindji’s approach to their elders’ collective 
political aims in the period are meagre, though they include my interviews of that 
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generation’s Gurindji leaders (mostly female), who came of age in Daguragu and 
Kalkaringi, after the Walk-off.  
The question of Gurindji peoples’ attitudes to, and abilities regarding, their own self-
management also raises methodological issues. In my explication of ‘Gurindji self-
determination’, what is the unit of measure by which ‘self-determination’ should best be 
assessed? The Aboriginal ‘community’ had been chosen by the Whitlam Government as its 
primary subject/object of self-determination, yet bureaucratic experience and subsequent 
analysis has shown that ‘communities’ can be viewed in a number of ways:  as ensembles 
comprising traditional owners, and/or housing and infrastructure, community councils, 
and/or co-residents.5 An equivalent problem therefore confronted the staff of the DAA: who 
or what is an ‘Aboriginal community’? The incommensurability and contradictions of such 
groupings belied a common supposition of bureaucrats in Aboriginal Affairs: that the 
residents of a community were or would become socio-politically harmonious and 
homogenous. Experience has repeatedly revealed this assumption as erroneous.6 Does the 
term ‘community’ have utility as a marker of Gurindji self-determination, then? This is a 
problem of representation that has political and narrative implications. As noted already, the 
origins and founding principles of Kalkaringi and Daguragu differed fundamentally, and 
were at times overtly oppositional. Although the interaction of ‘the Gurindji’ and the state 
transformed both communities into governmental artifices, it was how this occurred that 
illuminates each community’s heterogeneity and the divergent, even contradictory ways in 
which ‘Gurindji self-determination’ was enacted. ‘Self-determination’, in other words, 
always demanded that the loose idea of a Gurindji ‘community’ be given operational 
meaning in various contexts: the ‘homestead’ of Daguragu, or the settlement of Kalkaringi, 
or the Muramulla Company, for instance. 
                                                 
5  The indeterminability of who or what an Aboriginal ‘community’ refers to has been discussed by 
many writers: See Barry Smith, ‘The Concept “Community” in Aboriginal Policy and Service 
Delivery (Darwin, Dept. of Social Security, North Australia Development Unit, 1989); Elspeth 
Young and Kim Doohan, Mobility for Survival: a Process Analysis of Aboriginal Population 
Movement in Central Australia (Australian National University, North Australia Research Unit, 
Darwin, 1989); Tim Rowse, Remote Possibilities: the Aboriginal Domain and the Administrative 
Imagination (North Australia Research Unit, Casuarina, NT, 1992), pp. 22–25. 
6  Often such assumptions are guided by a belief in the strength and cohering effects of ‘traditional’ links 
between residents of a community and the country on which the community is located. In the face of 
community disharmony, this is seen as the result of the breakage of those links by colonialization. See 
for instance, Sarah Davies, ‘Appropriate Planning for Aboriginal Self-determination’ (Unpublished 
PhD Thesis, University of New South Wales, Sydney, 1995), pp. 44–58. 
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In preference over a chimeric, undefined Gurindji ‘community’, the unit of analysis I 
have adopted in this work has been ‘the Gurindji’. As described in Chapter Two, this 
descriptor is the gloss commonly applied to the core group, later self-described as the ‘track 
mob’, which left Wave Hill Station in 1966 and which later sought to establish an 
independent homestead at Wattie Creek. The focus of this work is therefore predominantly 
on the efforts of these people themselves to realise their own self-determination. Because 
‘self-determination’ is ultimately a form of governance or quasi-governance however, any 
attempt to effect this style of self-rule requires of its protagonists (and their analysts) a 
subject/object. In the case of the Gurindji, this was predominantly the ‘community’ of 
Daguragu, which for various reasons I, like many of the Gurindji’s governmental 
interlocutors in the 1970s, choose to describe as a ‘homestead’. The repossession of their 
land and the operation of a cattle enterprise are also significant amongst the vehicles by 
which the track mob sought to operationalise their independence, and they are therefore also 
the subjects of my analysis in Chapters Five, Six and Seven respectively.  
Further complicating the Gurindji’s self-determination at Daguragu, and therefore this 
analysis, is the fact that it could not be affected in isolation, due to a range of factors—as 
the track mob and their DAA advisors discovered. Firstly, the region’s administrative centre 
was at nearby Kalkaringi, and the Gurindji’s government interlocutors were also responsible 
for supporting that settlement’s self-determination. Secondly, the smallness and isolation of 
both populations determined that it was uneconomical financially and in terms of 
administrative and human resources for the two populations to be governed separately—
although this was briefly attempted. Thirdly, the proximity of the two settlements and 
Kalkaringi’s status as the local service providing centre meant that by choice or necessity, 
residents of Daguragu—for whom Gurindji leaders were largely responsible—were often at 
Kalkaringi. As were a number of Warlpiri families who also resided at the ex-Welfare 
Settlement. These factors therefore required Gurindji self-determination’s proponents to 
take responsibility for the management of Kalkaringi also. 
Amidst the powerful processes of change that occurred in Kalkaringi and Daguragu during 
the 1970s and 80s, I posit that Daguragu’s raison d'être—the ‘track mob’s’ control over the 
terms of their own existence—became even more important to local people after the kartiya-
led development of Daguragu’s housing and infrastructure. While participation in their own 
self-directed, small scale community development initiatives had provided many of the 
group with a sense of purpose and pride in the late 1960s and early 70s, by the end of that 
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decade, Daguragu’s development had largely become the preserve of government and its 
quasi-governmental Aboriginal sector subsidiaries. This thesis argues that ironically, as a 
means of re-asserting control over their circumstances, Daguragu’s residents withdrew from 
that process of development, including the programs, courses, training and other practices 
of the non-Indigenous domain. 
To this point I have been discussing the challenge of developing an accurate and 
plausible account of Gurindji self-determination, as the group’s elders might have 
recognised it. Yet this group were more amenable to interlocution by those agents of the 
state engaged in that endeavour than some of the other Aboriginal residents of Wave Hill. 
What of the individualistic and dissenting responses of Gurindji youth, resisting both their 
leaders’ and governments’ political imperatives? For purposes of historiographical 
explication, the Gurindji’s conduct of ‘official’ self-determination-type activities and their 
own ‘traditional’ cultural and recreational activities were almost mutually exclusive. Very 
few records of unofficial, ceremonial and/or private Gurindji activities exist, and therefore 
as an historiographical undertaking, my assessment of how and when Gurindji people were 
able to exercise their autonomy in ways that were significant to them is conjectural—except 
when they did so in relation to the activities, organisations, businesses and programs deemed 
significant by their recordkeeping, non-Indigenous interlocutors. This inquiry is therefore 
affected by the same problem of articulation which hampered the efforts of Gurindji elders 
and the Gurindji’s interlocutors alike: that of identifying and cultivating a self-determining 
Gurindji subject. For the staff of the DAA and Wave Hill’s Aboriginal organisations, a 
narratable social actor of this type was imperative to justify and rationalise their work. 
Similarly, my historical analysis of Gurindji self-determination presupposes a narratable 
Gurindji subject, yet even cursory extant written accounts show that Gurindji people 
adopted a diverse range of attitudes regarding the collective aims of their elders.  
For the reasons I have outlined above, my assessment of the extent and parameters of 
the lived domain that Gurindji people maintained ‘outside’ of the realm of governance is 
conjectural, in that elements of my argument about endogenous dissociative factors 
impeding Gurindji self-determination have been gleaned by reading the archive for its gaps 
and elisions. The motivations of intergenerational differentiation among the Gurindji, as its 
protagonists understood them, are ones I must largely adduce. To remedy these limitations, 
I draw on ethnographic analyses of other remote Aboriginal groups in the period, 
particularly those describing elements of Aboriginal community life conducted beyond the 
influence of policy. My assertions about Gurindji social dynamics are therefore based on 
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the assumption that they were largely equivalent to those observed in other remote 
Aboriginal groups, notably those of Wik and Pintupi people.  
Note to the reader 
As can be expected of a region and a formative period in which various Indigenous and non-
Indigenous individuals, groups and agencies interacted closely, the politics of Wave Hill 
resulted in a complex process of naming and re-naming local places. A note of explanation 
is therefore required regarding the names used in this thesis. The European name of ‘Wave 
Hill’ was applied to the pastoral lease and operations of William Buchanan by stockman 
Sam Croker in 1882.7 In the century that followed, it became common for local Aboriginal 
people and European Australians to refer to the internally situated (now neighbouring) 
‘communities’ of that area by the same name as that used for the area itself: Wave Hill. In 
this thesis then, when referring to both Kalkaringi and Daguragu (or the Wave Hill Welfare 
Settlement and Wattie Creek, as they were known in the late 1960s and early 70s), I term 
them Wave Hill’s communities, or simply ‘Wave Hill’. I use the name ‘Wave Hill Station’ 
when referring to the eponymous, then Vestey Company-owned cattle enterprise which the 
majority of Gurindji people left in 1966.  
In contrast to the Gurindji’s later government interlocutors, I also describe the 
settlement established at Daguragu by the Aboriginal workers who left Wave Hill Station a 
‘homestead’ rather than a ‘community’. To name the site of the Gurindji elders’ desired 
independence a ‘homestead’ rather than a ‘community’ is more accurate in two ways. 
Firstly, I believe that the vision the Gurindji leaders sought to create at Daguragu was 
inspired by the large homesteads which they had seen throughout their working lives. 
Secondly, more than a community, a ‘homestead’ accurately describes Daguragu’s status as 
the residential hub of a pastoral lease. 
Well-informed readers will also note that although the Wave Hill Welfare Settlement 
was officially renamed ‘Libanungu’ by the Whitlam Government in 1973, I do not use this 
name in this thesis. Because the name never gained popular currency among residents and 
was abandoned by officials in favour of ‘Kalkaringi’ in 1976, I have chosen not to use 
‘Libanungu’ for the sake of clarity.  
                                                 
7  Bobbie Buchanan, In the Tracks of Old Bluey: The Life Story of Nat Buchanan (Rockhampton, 
Central Queensland University Press, 1997, 2006 ed), pp. 104–105. 
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Also, the distribution of government funding comprises an important part of the 
history of Gurindji self-determination, and this analysis therefore makes reference to 
financial figures. Dollar amounts are provided in their historic value, followed by their 
current (2017), approximate equivalent. This amount is provided in brackets in each 
instance. In other words, financial values in this book have been cited in the following form: 
$AUD original amount ($AUD 2017 value). These figures have been calculated using the 
Australian Bureau of Statistics’ Australian Consumer Price Index Calculator.8  
Finally, in light of the many varied non-Indigenous actors in the story of Gurindji self-
determination, and their frequently uniform, cumulative effects on Gurindji people, at times 
in this text I use the same descriptor for them as the Gurindji themselves: kartiya.   
 
 
                                                 
8  Australian Bureau of Statistics’ Australian Consumer Price Index Calculator, ABS Online 
<http://www.abs.gov.au/websitedbs/d3310114.nsf/home/Consumer+Price+Index+Inflation+Calcula
tor> [accessed 28 March 2017]. 
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Ch. 1 The Political and Legislative 
Landscape 
 
 
 
 
Gurindji people were the intended subjects of many reformist government policies 
and pieces of legislation in the 1973–86 period. Their responses to these policies are 
the subject of this thesis. To chart the ways in which the remedial intentions of 
government officers and various agents of the state affected the Gurindji’s affairs, it 
is thus necessary to consider the policy intentions of government, the mutable political 
environment, and legislation of particular relevance to the Northern Territory’s remote 
Aboriginal people in the period. 
This chapter is thus divided into two parts. As the Commonwealth Government 
administered the Northern Territory directly from 1911–1978 and self-determination 
policy originated under its authority, the Commonwealth Government’s activity is the 
preserve of the first. The first part will describe the three federal governments to hold 
office in the 1973–86 period: Gough Whitlam’s Australian Labor Party (ALP) 
Government (1972–75); the Fraser Coalition Government (1975–83); and the ALP 
government of Bob Hawke (1983–86), and their activities in the domain of Aboriginal 
affairs. These include the Commonwealth’s development of self-determination and 
self-management policies, the bureaucratic apparatus it employed to implement the 
policies, and important pieces of related legislation, such as the Aboriginal Land 
Rights (Northern Territory) Act 1976 (ALRA).  
The Northern Territory attained Self-Government in 1978. As the Gurindji were 
(and are) also subject to the policies and legislation of the Northern Territory 
legislature regarding remote Aboriginal people, equivalent developments in Territory 
politics and administration must also be considered. These will be described in the 
second part of this chapter.  
1.1.1 Commonwealth Governments and Self-determination, 1972–75 
At the Launceston conference of the ALP in the winter of 1971, the party adopted a 
suite of progressive policies aimed at improving the position of Aborigines in 
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Australian society. Most of these policies were based on the recommendations of the 
Council for Aboriginal Affairs, which had long been ignored by the incumbent 
Coalition McMahon Government and its predecessor.1 The election victory of the 
ALP under Gough Whitlam’s leadership on 2 December 1972 after twenty-three years 
of coalition rule thus re-organised the national debate on Aboriginal issues, and the 
subjection of the Gurindji people to progressive ‘self-determination’ policies began 
soon afterwards. In the following chapter, I will provide a brief genealogy of these 
policies’ Australian development. 
Upon taking office, Prime Minister Whitlam acted immediately to create a new 
Ministry of Aboriginal Affairs, and appointed a long-term activist and former teacher, 
Gordon Bryant, as its Minister. Whitlam named an ex-diplomat and member of the 
Council of Aboriginal Affairs (CAA) Barrie Dexter, as the secretary of a large new 
Department of Aboriginal Affairs (DAA). To students and academics gathered at 
Monash University in 1973, Dexter used the (CAA-drafted) words of former Prime 
Minister McMahon to illustrate the Commonwealth's shift away from assimilation-
oriented policies. Stating that the new government’s policy initiatives were ‘based on 
recognition of Aboriginals as a distinctive cultural and ethnic group with the right to 
determine its own future’, Dexter went on: 
[...] Previously an overall goal, namely ‘assimilation’ was set, and policies and 
programs were designed to achieve it. Now we no longer presume to know 
either the destination or even the direction. 2  
In the same month, the Prime Minister outlined his vision of the government's new 
policy, highlighting its intentions to remedy Aboriginal people’s lack of economic and 
political power. According to Whitlam, the goal of his government's Aboriginal policy 
was ‘to restore to the Aboriginal people of Australia their lost power of self-
determination in economic, social and political affairs’.3 He went on:  
                                                 
1    Barrie Dexter, Pandora’s Box: The Council for Aboriginal Affairs, 1967–76 (G. Foley and E. 
Howell, eds.), (Southport QLD, Keeiara Press, 2015), pp. 337–339.  
2  Barrie Dexter, ‘The Commonwealth Department of Aboriginal Affairs—Its Functions and 
Underlying Principles: An Address at a Seminar on Aboriginal Affairs, Monash Centre for 
Research into Aboriginal Affairs, 9 May 1973’, in Seminar on Aboriginal Affairs (Monash 
Centre for Research into Aboriginal Affairs 1973), p. 1. 
3  Edward Gough Whitlam, ‘Statement by the Prime Minister, the Hon. E. G. Whitlam, Q.C., M.P., 
to the Ministerial Australian Aboriginal Affairs Council in Adelaide on 6 April 1973’, (1973). 
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My government is anxious that 200 years of despoliation, injustice and 
discrimination have seriously damaged and demoralised the once proud 
Aboriginal people. The government […] accepts responsibility for their 
active and progressive rehabilitation […]. We will not rest until they 
have taken up, as a distinctive and honoured component of Australian 
society, the position to which their rights as the first Australians entitles 
them.4 
It is worth noting that in this initial framing, Whitlam emphasised the new 
policy’s ‘rehabilitative’ and ‘restorative’, or remedial intentions. The markers which 
he deemed necessitated this were not overtly named in this speech, but from the 
Department of Aboriginal Affairs’ subsequent foci, we can infer that economic and 
cultural marginalisation and relatively high unemployment in comparison to the 
greater population were high among the issues that authorities believed warranted 
such attention. I term this ‘restorative’ impulse, justified by the Keynesian precepts of 
Whitlam’s social policy, one of remedial liberalism in this thesis.  
Whitlam’s vision was complex, if not contradictory. Noting that his government 
intended ‘to assume full responsibility for policy in respect of Aboriginal Affairs’ 
from the states, he announced that it would also ‘seek to devolve [responsibility for 
implementation] upon a wide range of Commonwealth, state and local authorities, as 
well as upon organisations of Aborigines themselves’.5  
The new government would focus its commitment through activity in five areas. 
Land rights, a topic of high importance to the Gurindji, was named as a key focus. The 
Prime Minister thought that land would provide Aboriginal people ‘with a base for 
their economic and social development’, while Barrie Dexter also believed that ‘in 
Aboriginal Affairs, the land issue is fundamental’.6 The inclusion of Aboriginal 
opinion in decision-making, as conveyed by Minister Bryant’s proposed National 
Aboriginal Consultative Committee (NACC), was to be a definitive trait of the 
Whitlam Government’s new agenda, as was bilingualism in education and the 
promotion of Aboriginal languages. The government also announced that the 
                                                 
4  ibid.  p. 2.  
5  ibid.  p. 2. 
6  Australian Institute of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Studies (hereafter AIATSIS), 
Jeremy Long Papers, Manuscript Collection, ‘CAA to Minister, Draft’, CAA 1970–73, Box 5, 
Folder 50; Whitlam, op. cit.  
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incorporation of Aboriginal groups was crucial to its vision. Whitlam envisaged that 
Aboriginal corporate bodies would ‘form consultative council[s] with which the 
government will confer on matters affecting Aborigines’, and Dexter similarly 
intended that the same bodies would become the vehicle by which Aboriginal people 
would ‘achieve their social and economic goals’.7 Lastly, Whitlam’s agenda included 
its intention to ratify Convention No. 107 (Indigenous and Tribal Populations) of the 
International Labour Organisation. All the foregoing would be supported by a massive 
increase of funding for ‘programmes of socially valuable special work projects, 
vocational training, and grants and loans in support of enterprises’.8  
To achieve this extensive reform agenda, the Whitlam Government employed what 
Indigenous policy historian Tim Rowse has described as a ‘communalising’ 
rationality.9 In addition to the new government instrumentality of the Aboriginal 
company, a new governmental denomination of Aboriginal sociality was created, if 
not clearly defined: the Aboriginal ‘community’. Former government settlements and 
church missions, and the Aboriginal people that inhabited them, were reimagined in 
this way, and staffed by Department of Aboriginal Affairs ‘community advisors’. 
Whereas the assimilationist policies of preceding coalition governments had focused 
on the integration of Aboriginal individuals with the Australian mainstream, under 
self-determination, significant emphasis was placed on encouraging those individuals 
to ‘develop’ communities, with which they were encouraged to identify.10 Self-
identification of Aboriginal people as members of a national pan–Aboriginal 
demographic was also encouraged and steps were taken to mould Aboriginal people 
as a political constituency. As anthropologist Gillian Cowlishaw describes, under the 
new policy, ‘Aboriginality was not now to be broken up into autonomous self-policing 
individuals, but into autonomous self-policing communities’.11 In other words, self-
determination policy signalled a denominative shift in governments’ approach to 
                                                 
7  Whitlam, op. cit.; Long Papers, op. cit. 
8  Whitlam, op. cit. 
9  Tim Rowse, ‘Culturally Appropriate Indigenous Accountability’, American Behavioral 
Scientist, Vol. 43, No. 9 (2000) 1514–1532, p. 1515. 
10  For a convincing problematisation of these assumptions, see Patrick Sullivan, All Free Man 
Now: Culture, Community and Politics in the Kimberly Region, North-western Australia 
(Aboriginal Studies Press, Canberra, 1996), p. 11. 
11  Gillian Cowlishaw, 'Erasing Culture and Race: Practising “Self-Determination”', Oceania, 68 
(1998) 145–169 (p. 150). 
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Aboriginal Australians. I shall return to this theme, for it had important implications 
for the social project of the Gurindji elders. 
Exactly how the Whitlam Government would implement its new policy had to 
be resolved. Plans were made within the DAA eight weeks after its inception to 
convene a small group of staff and other experienced field workers. Their purpose was 
to ‘consider the approaches, methods and techniques which will need to be adopted to 
implement policy directives in the manner expected by the new government’.12 On the 
DAA’s behalf, the Australian National University’s (ANU) Centre for Continuing 
Education (CCE) facilitated a series of seminars in a spirit of open inquiry and 
experimentation in the small township of Batchelor.  
High among the government’s proposed new ‘approaches, methods and 
techniques’ were those belonging to the study of community development, a technique 
of social work. Community Development was then a relatively new field, hitherto 
driven predominantly by practitioners in the United States and Britain. In Australia, 
social work in Aboriginal contexts had been performed mostly by Methodist Church 
practitioners in the southern cities.13 Some of these individuals, such as Rev. Jim 
Downing, Ken Nowland and Rev. Bernie Clarke, had employed Community 
Development methods on church-administered settlements in the Northern 
Territory.14 The term ‘self-determination’ itself had been introduced as early as 1969 
by Jim Downing to describe a strategy of encouraging Aboriginal governance capacity 
through communication, consultation and community development.15  
Similar though more prescriptive experiments had already been conducted on 
government-run Aboriginal settlements by the Northern Territory Administration 
(NTA) throughout the 1960s. Aboriginal ‘village councils’ were then common in the 
NTA’s Welfare Branch and mission  settlements alike and it was officially 
                                                 
12  AIATSIS, Jeremy Long Papers, ‘Proposed New Policy Outline’, ‘Batchelor Training Seminar’, 
Box 5, Folder 48. 
13  See, for example: Jim Downing, Ngurra Walytja: Country of My Spirit (Darwin: North 
Australian Research Unit, Australian National University, 1988), p. xi; Ted Noffs, Wikipedia, 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ted_Noffs. Accessed 7 June 2013. 
14  Ken Nowland, Self-Determination—Is It Happening? : Kimberley 1984, Nungalinya 
Occasional Bulletin; No. 28 (Casuarina, N.T: Nungalinya College, 1985), front matter; Bernard 
Clarke, Larrpan Ga Buduyurr: The Spear and the Cloud (Tranmere, South Australia, 2010), p. 
144. 
15  Jim Downing, ‘Consultation and Self-Determination in the Social Development of Aborigines’, 
in A Question of Choice: An Australian Aboriginal Dilemma ed. by Ronald M. Berndt 
(Nedlands, W.A: University of Western Australia Press, 1971), p. 61. 
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acknowledged that ‘Aborigines are showing a great interest in [the councils’] 
operation, and are participating actively in managing settlement and mission affairs’.16 
Nonetheless, the adaptation of community development methods by the Whitlam 
Government’s ‘people-focused’ departments was a radical philosophical departure 
from the paternalist precepts underlying the integration-oriented policies of the NTA.  
In contrast to the assimilationist views of many Native Affairs Branch and early 
Welfare Branch staff, the DAA’s CCE trainers were informed by the writings of 
radical Latin American and American theorists such as Paulo Freire, Saul Alinsky, 
Jack Rothman and Daniel Thursz, and the work of these authors was known to at least 
some senior DAA staff.17 Alinsky was a pioneer of the post-World War II Chicago 
school of community organising, a milieu now credited with underwriting much of 
modern political ‘grassroots’ activism.18 The relevance of these theorists’ ideas of 
social empowerment—with their origins among the vastly divergent circumstances of 
Brazilian campesinos and urban African Americans—to Australia’s remote 
Aboriginal groups such as the Gurindji, remained to be seen.  
In accordance with the emancipative precepts of community development, the 
‘syndicates’ of the DAA’s Batchelor seminars decided that after the initial phases of 
self-determination’s implementation, the Department’s new field staff would no 
longer be needed.19 The premise that a measure of self-determination’s success should 
be its agents’ withdrawal was reaffirmed in a DAA seminar on community 
development in November 1977.20 More broadly, it was departmental policy that the 
                                                 
16  Department of Territories Annual Report 1964–65, cited in Peter Loveday, ‘Local Governance 
in Aboriginal Communities from the Assimilation Period to the 1970s’, 'That Community 
Government Mob': Local Government in Small Northern Territory Communities, ed. by Jackie 
Wolfe, (Darwin, Northern Territory, Australian National University, North Australia Research 
Unit, 1989), pp. 13–35 (p. 17); Murray Seiffert, Gumbuli of Ngukurr: Aboriginal Elder in 
Arnhem Land, (Brunswick, Victoria, Acorn Press, 2011) p. 193.  
17  AIATSIS, ‘Community Development 1973-74’, MS 2534, Box 6, Folder 60. 
18  See Elizabeth Sommerlad, A Training Course in Community Development for Field Workers 
in a Tribal Aboriginal Context, Occasional Papers in Continuing Education, No. 6 (Canberra: 
Centre for Continuing Education, Australian National University, 1975), p. 11; Saul Alinsky, 
Rules for Radicals: A Practical Primer for Realistic Radicals (New York: Random House, 
1971). 
19  This decision was also arrived at subsequently in a community development seminar held by 
the DAA in November 1977. See Elizabeth Sommerlad, ‘Community Development in the 
Northern Territory’, Aboriginal News, 1, 5 (1974), pp. 18–19; Department of Aboriginal Affairs, 
DAA Annual Report 1977–78 (Canberra, Australian Government Publisher, 1978), p.1. 
20  DAA, op. cit. p. 12. 
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entire DAA would withdraw from Aboriginal communities and eventually disband 
when Aboriginal residents were able to successfully manage their own affairs.21 
While it was intended that the Department’s Community Advisors would use a 
community development, capacity-building approach in their work with Aboriginal 
people, the administrative means by which the DAA chose to support its activity (and 
engage Aboriginal residents) was via funded, activity-based projects in communities. 
These projects were to be formulated on an individual basis, through processes of 
close consultation and collaboration with local leaders and residents. In terms of their 
intended outcomes, the Department classified them as either ‘social’ or ‘economic’, 
and established eponymous funding streams accordingly.22  
The Department deemed ‘social’ projects to be those with intangible, or at least 
less measurable, outcomes. These were frequently intended to improve the social 
and/or cultural wellbeing of participants, and included outcomes such as non-
commercial gardens or art and craft workshops. ‘Economic’ projects, on the other 
hand, were those designed to produce an economic income inter alia, and the Gurindji 
people’s Muramulla Cattle Company would become an example. In practice, many 
DAA projects produced both economic and ‘social’ outcomes for their Aboriginal 
participants, though not necessarily those intended by officials. How Departmental 
staff framed, developed and delivered these projects, with (or without) Aboriginal 
participation at Wave Hill, and the effects of these activities, are topics I shall explore 
in Chapters 6–7 (on the Muramulla cattle project) and Chapters 9–10 (on the 
establishment of ‘representative’ local governance bodies).  
In addition to the ‘soft power’ of community and economic development-
inspired programs, the Whitlam Government shared the CAA’s opinion that 
Aborigines required special legislation to advance their interests. Extant Acts of 
association were deemed inadequate, for example, to support the government’s vision 
of incorporated Aboriginal groups representing their members’ interests in the 
community at large and liaising with government. At the same time as the Whitlam 
Government took action to create Aboriginal Land Rights and land fund legislation 
(processes I shall describe later in this chapter) then, it also sought advice on drafting 
special legislation, by which groups of Aboriginal people might incorporate.  
                                                 
21  DAA, op. cit. p. 2. 
22  Darwin, NTAS, Barry Hansen [former DAA (NT Division) Economic Section head], Interview 
Recorded by Charlie Ward, September 2012, NTRS 3609, BWF 39. 
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These developments had great potential relevance for the Gurindji: as 
governments from this point attempted to involve Gurindji people more in managing 
their own affairs, public servants put considerable effort into formulating ‘Aboriginal’ 
organisations.  By doing so, the state sought to solicit and create (according to its own 
measures) a representative, authentic—and most importantly, an accountable—
Aboriginal constituency. The Whitlam Government’s main endeavour in this regard 
was to draft the Aboriginal Councils and Associations Act (1976), or ACAA, which 
was passed into law by the Fraser Government and enacted on 26 January 1977. 
Although Gurindji organisations were not incorporated under the ACAA but under pre-
existing legislation (and later, under other, Northern Territory laws), Whitlam and 
Fraser’s ACAA heralded the beginning of a longstanding trend by which, for various 
purposes, subsequent governments attempted to create an Aboriginal legal subject 
‘legible’ to the state. The responses of Gurindji people to these governmental 
overtures and their effects on the Gurindji’s own self-determination goals in the 1973–
86 period will be discussed in Chapters 9–10.   
Although the Whitlam Government achieved much in the way of social reform, by 
1975 high levels of unemployment and inflation and a huge budget deficit had 
damaged its popularity.23 A shambolic image of the government was effectively 
cultivated and exploited by the ambitious new leader of the Opposition, Malcolm 
Fraser. At his direction, in mid-October 1975 the Liberal-National coalition refused 
to pass the government’s money bills in the hope of forcing the Prime Minister to an 
election. When Whitlam refused to go to the polls, his government was dismissed by 
the Governor General John Kerr, on 11 November 1975. Malcolm Fraser was 
endorsed by Kerr as a ‘caretaker’ Prime Minister until an election could be held; when 
this occurred on 13 December 1975, the Liberal-National Country Party Coalition 
won overwhelmingly.24 Whitlam had been resoundingly rejected by Australian voters. 
The ‘Dismissal’, as it became known, remains the only constitutional crisis in the 
history of Australia’s federation.  
                                                 
23  ‘Australian Political Chronicle, July-December 1975’ Australian Journal of Politics and History 
(22, 1, 1976) 74–130, p. 77–78. 
24  Australia, Parliament, Federal Election Results 1901–2010, Research Paper No. 6 (2011–12), 
www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Parliamentary_Departments/Parliamentary_Library/pubs/
rp/rp1112/12rp06, Accessed 12 November 2013. 
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As highlighted by the Fraser Government’s subsequent passage of Whitlam’s 
ACAA and ALRA legislation, much of the impact of the Whitlam Government’s self-
determination policy occurred as a result of the bipartisan support Whitlam’s reforms 
garnered from subsequent federal governments, after his own term in office. 
1.1.2 The Aboriginal Land Fund Commission and the Aboriginal Land Rights 
(Northern Territory) Act 1976 
When the Whitlam Government introduced its new participatory policy for 
Aborigines in December 1972, issues of land were critical to the government’s reform 
program and the aims of Gurindji elders. So that I may explain the effects of the former 
on the latter in Chapters 5–7 of this thesis, I will now outline relevant aspects of the 
federal government’s activity regarding Aboriginal land and land rights in the period.  
Days after Whitlam’s election, the CAA’s Nugget Coombs suggested to the new 
Prime Minister that a Royal Commission into Traditional Aboriginal Land Rights 
should be held.25 Whitlam accordingly appointed Justice Edward Woodward to lead 
an enquiry.26 Woodward was a former QC who had represented Yolngu plaintiffs in 
their ground-breaking Supreme Court challenge to prevent mining on Yolngu country 
in north-east Arnhem Land, by recognition of their traditional rights (Milirrpum v 
Nabalco Pty Ltd, 1971). Woodward’s brief was not to establish whether, but how the 
traditional rights of Aboriginal people over land could be incorporated into extant 
Australian law and tenure. During the commission’s hearings, Gerry Brennan QC 
presciently advised Justice Woodward that: 
This [the ‘Woodward Report’] will for all time mark the high-water mark of 
possible Aboriginal aspirations. Whatever your Honour does not recommend in 
favour of Aborigines at this stage will never be granted.27 
In his Second Report (1974), Woodward’s recommendations—which were 
accompanied by drafting instructions later accepted by the Whitlam Government—
included the following: 
                                                 
25  Tim Rowse, Obliged to Be Difficult: Nugget Coombs’ Legacy in Indigenous Affairs (Cambridge 
University Press, 2000), p. 117. 
26  Sir Edward Woodward, One Brief Interval: A Memoir (Carlton, Vic: Miegunyah Press, 2005), 
pp. 97–106, p. 133. 
27  Cited ibid., p. 141 
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The transfer of Aboriginal reserves and missions [and other designated areas] to 
full Aboriginal ownership; the establishment of land trusts to hold title, and 
Land Councils to consult with Traditional Owners and other Aboriginal people 
and to help in all things to do with land; the payment of mining royalties to 
Aboriginal people; the requirement of permits to have access to Aboriginal land; 
the purchase of more cattle stations; the leasing of land in towns for a [range of] 
purposes; and the leasing of village areas for Aboriginal communities living on 
cattle stations.28 
When the Whitlam Government was dismissed on 11 November 1975, the Northern 
Territory Land Rights Bill containing these recommendations was before parliament, 
requiring its last reading. The bill lapsed when parliament was dissolved, and among 
the members of the CAA, who saw the Council’s work towards land rights as its 
primary purpose, there was a sense of terrible disappointment.29 
Despite the unpopularity of ALRA among sections of the Coalition’s support 
base, the incoming Fraser Government promised to support the Bill’s passage, and 
tabled it before federal parliament for a second time in June 1976. The Liberal party 
had promised that it would continue Whitlam’s policies unaltered, but in Fraser’s new 
version of the Bill, the powers proposed by Woodward for the Land Councils were 
radically curtailed, and their proposed powers transferred to the Minister and the 
DAA. New Aboriginal Affairs Minister Ian Viner suggested specifically that instead 
of the Land Councils, Aboriginal Legal Services could prepare land claims.30 The 
right of Aboriginal people to claim land on a ‘needs’ basis, as well as on the grounds 
of traditional rights, had also been removed from Fraser’s version of the bill. The 
previously recognised rights of Traditional Owners to veto mining and to claim ‘town’ 
land were also lacking.31  
                                                 
28  Justice Woodward, Second Report, April 1974 (Canberra, Government Press, 1975) , cited in 
Ross Howie, 'Northern Territory', in Aboriginal Land Rights: a Handbook, ed. by Nicolas 
Peterson (Canberra: Australian Institute of Aboriginal Studies, 1981), pp. 28-52, (p. 29). 
29  Barrie Dexter, in ‘Seminar of the Fortieth Anniversary of the 1967 Referendum: Transcript, 22 
June 2007’, (Parkes, Canberra: Office of Evaluation and Audit (Indigenous Programs), 
Department of Finance and Administration, 2007), p. 9. 
30  Hon, Ian Viner, cited in Geoff Eames, ‘Land Rights or a Sell Out? An Analysis of the Aboriginal 
Land Rights (Northern Territory) Bill, 1976’ (Alice Springs, IAD Press, 1976), p. 7.  
31  Eames, ibid., pp. 8–9. 
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Fraser’s revised bill aroused strong opposition among pastoralists, fishermen 
and miners—those with commercial interests in the Territory’s land and seas. From 
other quarters, some missionaries and anthropologists criticised it because they felt it 
compromised the interests of Aborigines.32 Elements of the bill were condemned by 
County Liberal Party (CLP) members of the Northern Territory Legislative Assembly 
(NTLA). The criticisms made of it within the Assembly played to the fears and 
misconceptions of the NT’s non-Indigenous residents.33 These arguments are explored 
more in Chapter Five. While Aboriginal Land Rights was hotly and publicly contested 
by the Aboriginal Land Councils (represented by the CLC) and the NT’s CLP 
politicians, the broader debate was informed by the vexed relationship between the 
legislatures of Canberra and Darwin.  
After much acrimony, the Aboriginal Land Rights (Northern Territory) Act 
1976 (ALRA) came into effect on 26 January 1977. Under the terms of the legislation, 
the Territory’s Aborigines would be able to make land claims before an appointed 
Land Rights Commissioner, who would be able to advise the Minster to award the 
claimants a new type of inalienable tenure created under the terms of the Act: 
Aboriginal freehold title. This title, once awarded, would be vested on behalf of 
Traditional Owners in special Aboriginal Land Trusts that would be administered by 
the Central and Northern Land Councils.34 The NT legislature remained resistant to 
the powers vested in the Commonwealth and the Land Councils under the Act, and as 
a result, conflict between Darwin and Canberra legislators over land rights continued 
until the mid-1980s. Negotiations about the Territory’s Self-Government were also 
affected by the dispute, as I shall explain later in this chapter. 
While the Woodward Royal Commission’s work was underway during 1973–74, the 
Whitlam Government was also busy designing the means by which non-reserve land 
might be purchased for Aborigines. At the behest of the CAA, the need for such 
purchases had been originally flagged by former Prime Minister William McMahon, 
                                                 
32  Geoff Eames, 'The Central Land Council: The Politics of Change', in Aborigines, Land and Land 
Rights, ed. by Marcia Langton and Nicolas Peterson (Canberra: Australian Institute of 
Aboriginal Studies, 1983), pp. 268-–277, (p. 273). 
33  Northern Territory, Legislative Assembly, Hon Rupert Kentish, Parliamentary Record–First 
Assembly. Part One–the Debates, 18 November 1976 (Darwin, NTLA Printer, 1977), pp. 826–
827. 
34  Two other Land Councils, those of the Tiwi and Anindilyakwa peoples, were inaugurated 
subsequently. 
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and the desirability of their proper conduct was now highlighted by the Department 
of Aboriginal Affairs’ inexpert handling of such matters. The solution chosen by the 
Whitlam Government was the establishment of a fund to be managed by an impartial 
and expert statutory body—the Aboriginal Land Fund Commission (ALFC). This 
body was created under the terms of the Aboriginal Land Fund Act (1974), as I shall 
describe in Chapter Five, and one of the ALFC’s first jobs was to fund the purchase 
of the Gurindji’s excision from Wave Hill Station.35 
1.1.3 The Fraser Government and Self-management, 1976–83 
Although it continued many of the Whitlam Government’s Aboriginal Affairs policies 
in little-altered form, certain differences in ideological (and hence financial) emphasis 
and administrative method distinguished the Fraser Coalition Government’s approach 
from that of its predecessor. Arguably, it was also during the Fraser Government’s 
tenure that the practical limits of self-determination policy’s implementation became 
clear. Upon taking office, Fraser’s immediate goal was to reduce what he saw as the 
previous government’s waste and profligacy, not least in the Department of 
Aboriginal Affairs. To initiate this process, Fraser ordered a review of the 
department’s expenditure by David Hay, a former Administrator of Papua New 
Guinea. In combination with the proposed ‘trimming’ of $7 million ($43 million) from 
the DAA budget in the 1976–77 financial year—immediately evidenced by ‘austerity 
measures’ resulting in the closure of facilities on bush communities—rumours about 
the extent of government funding cuts abounded.36  
But what were the new government’s broader policies for Aborigines? 
Surprisingly, for it resisted progressive reform during the Gorton–McMahon era, 
Fraser’s Liberal Country Party Coalition was broadly sympathetic to Whitlam’s ‘self-
determination’ policy, though it didn’t proclaim itself as such. Instead, the government 
branded its own approach one of ‘self-management’. This, it said, was designed to 
‘develop Aboriginal self-sufficiency and […] represent initiatives that Aboriginals 
themselves believe will enhance their dignity, self-respect and self-reliance’.37 
                                                 
35  See Ian Palmer, Buying Back the Land: Organisational Struggle and the Aboriginal Land Fund 
Commission (Canberra, Aboriginal Studies Press, 1988), p. 42. 
36  David Broadbent, ‘The Blacks Take a Battering’, The Age, 2 December 1976. 
37  Cited in Department of Aboriginal Affairs Annual Report 1975–76, Australian Government 
Publishing Service, Canberra, 1976), p. 5. 
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Further, like Whitlam’s ALP, the Coalition recognised that ‘Aborigines must play a 
leading role in their affairs’.  
‘Self-management’ differed markedly from the coalition’s ‘Assimilation’ 
policies of the previous decade. Much like ‘self-determination’ before it, Fraser’s 
policy recognised the unique culture(s) of Aboriginal people, and aimed to foster this 
recognition among the public, in part by introducing ‘Aboriginal history and culture 
[in all Australian schools] as a full subject in education programmes [from] primary 
school onwards’.38 As I have described, the new government also intended to continue 
the Whitlam Government’s work towards land rights, promising that ‘traditional 
Aboriginal owners [will] gain inalienable title’ to their lands.39 In this thesis I shall 
argue that with small though important changes of ideological emphasis, Fraser’s self-
management policy was a continuation of the self-determination policy he inherited 
upon taking office.   
Despite his party’s pro-Aboriginal rhetoric, Fraser’s appointment of a junior 
non-cabinet minister, the solicitor Ian Viner, reflected the fact that the government no 
longer saw Aboriginal Affairs as a priority. Tellingly, the suggestions that Aborigines 
comprised something of a ‘special case’ that flowed freely during the Whitlam 
Government’s first year ceased. Now, expenditure on Aborigines would not be 
apportioned to remedy their relative disadvantage, but merely assessed ‘within the 
context of overall budget allocations’.40 Fraser hastened the Department’s return—as 
one journalist put it—to ‘the fringe settlements of the bureaucracy’.41  
The direct, extensive influence of Fraser’s self-management policy on the 
Gurindji’s affairs was relatively brief. As a result of the Northern Territory Legislative 
Assembly’s accumulation of powers (culminating in the Territory’s Self-Government 
in 1978), most functional responsibilities for Aboriginal communities were transferred 
to the new Northern Territory Government less than three years after Fraser came to 
power. In terms of the Gurindji’s affairs, the only notable exception to this was that 
responsibility for funding their Muramulla Gurindji Cattle company was retained by 
the Commonwealth. In 1980, many ‘commercial’-type functions supported by the 
                                                 
38  ibid., p. 7. 
39  ibid., p. 6. 
40  ibid., p. 5. 
41  Bruce Juddery, ‘Disillusionment Likely Among Aborigines’, Canberra Times, 2 July 1976. 
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Department of Aboriginal Affairs were transferred to a new Commonwealth statutory 
body, the Aboriginal Development Commission.  
1.1.4 The Aboriginal Development Commission, 1980 
In November 1978, Prime Minister Malcolm Fraser replaced his Aboriginal Affairs 
Minister Ian Viner with another West Australian solicitor, Fred Chaney. At the time 
of the transition, the Aboriginal Affairs portfolio was undergoing significant change. 
The DAA had been the subject of considerable discontent from various quarters 
throughout its existence, and the Fraser Government’s response was to restructure. 
According to Chaney, the government’s intention was to establish a new statutory 
commission that would conduct several ‘development’-type functions hitherto 
undertaken by the DAA, the Aboriginal Land Fund Commission and/or the Aboriginal 
Loans Commission (ALC).42 The resultant body would be known as the Aboriginal 
Development Commission (ADC), and it was designed to offer the government tighter 
controls over funding and a greater say to Aboriginal people about the direction of 
government activity.43 The ADC was headed by the senior Aboriginal bureaucrat 
Charles Perkins and was designed to assist the self-management and self-sufficiency 
of Aboriginal people through land acquisition, business enterprises, and housing.44 
The majority of its Commissioners’ positions were reserved for Aboriginal people, 
and under the Aboriginal Development Commission Act 1980, the powers of the 
Minister were curtailed.45 From 30 April 1980 when the ADC Act came into effect, 
government-funded commercial enterprises (such as the Gurindji’s Muramulla 
Company) came under the domain of the new ADC. By this time DAA founding 
secretary Barrie Dexter had resigned. The Department’s new Secretary Tony Ayers 
oversaw the transfer of responsibilities to the ADC.46 
                                                 
42  Hon FM Chaney, ‘Establishment of the Australian Aboriginal Development Commission […], 
Press Release, 2 September 1979. 
43  Lyndall Ryan, ‘Aboriginals and Islanders’, in From Fraser to Hawke, ed. by Bryan Head and 
Allan Patience (Melbourne, Longman Cheshire, 1989), pp. 394–408 (p. 405). 
44  Department of Aboriginal Affairs Annual Report 1983–84, (Australian Government Publishing 
Service, Canberra, 1984), pp. 9–10. 
45  ‘Aboriginal Development Commission’, Aboriginal News, Vol. 3, No. 9 (Canberra, Department 
of Aboriginal Affairs, 1980), p. 3. 
46  Ryan, op cit., p. 404. 
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1.1.5 The Hawke Government, 1983–86 
On 5 March 1983, the Fraser Government lost power to the Australian Labor Party 
led by Bob Hawke, and Aboriginal Affairs Minister Fred Chaney was replaced by the 
ALP’s Clyde Holding. The Hawke Government announced a return to ‘self-
determination’ policy and a large increase to funding for Aboriginal groups, though 
in practice little of Fraser’s policy regime was changed during the Hawke 
Government’s first and second terms.47 In light of this and the fact that most 
responsibilities for Territory Aborigines had been transferred to the NTG, the Hawke 
Government’s Aboriginal Affairs polices were of marginal importance to the Gurindji.  
1.2.0 Northern Ambition: the Rise of the Northern Territory 
Government 
Like other residents of the Northern Territory, Gurindji people these days are 
‘governed twice’, by the Commonwealth and Northern Territory Government, but 
until 1978 this was not the case. From 1911–1978, the NT was federally administered, 
though during this time it accrued more ‘state-like’ powers at the behest of its 
Commonwealth-appointed administrators and elected representatives in the federal 
parliament, particularly after World War Two. The Territory’s increasing executive 
independence culminated in 1978, when it became a self-governing (though largely 
federally funded) entity with its own judiciary and independent legislature. As a result 
of this accretion of power during the period of this study, the Gurindji were 
increasingly affected by the policies and legislation of the NT’s Darwin-based 
Legislative Council (1947–74), its Legislative Assembly (1974–78), and finally, its 
unicameral Parliament (1978–). Like many of the other processes of social, economic, 
political and technological change which I argue shaped the response of Gurindji 
people to self-determination policy, this transfer of power to Territory authorities 
reached its apogee during the period of this study.  As I will argue in Chapters 9–10 
of this thesis that the increasing executive ‘reach’ of NT legislators had a critical 
impact on the Gurindji’s achievement (or not) of their self-determination-like goals, 
it is necessary to explore these governmental developments and their political context 
here. 
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Tensions between Darwin and the then new Commonwealth Government began 
in 1911, when South Australia ceded responsibility for Territory affairs to the 
Commonwealth.48 From this time until the Federal Government’s ‘second tier’ 
Northern Territory Legislative Council (NTLC) was created in 1947, the NT was 
controlled by Canberra’s legislation. Perceptions in the Territory of federal 
interference were later exacerbated by the structure of the NTLC itself, which 
comprised a mix of (federal) government-chosen members and popularly-elected 
representatives.49 To remedy the perceived meddling of their ill-informed and distant 
Commonwealth masters, northern politicians promoted greater executive 
independence for the NT. Increasingly, ‘Self-Government’ for the Territory, or even 
statehood, were the foci of Territorian ambition, and when the Whitlam Government 
came to power in 1972 it established a Parliamentary Joint Committee on the Northern 
Territory (PJCNT) to investigate how progress towards these goals should proceed.50  
The Joint Committee found that the first step for the Northern Territory to 
assume greater control over its affairs should be for its Legislative Council to 
transition into a Legislative Assembly (NTLA), which would be entirely elected by 
NT voters.51 A federal bill was passed in 1974 to put this into effect. To contest the 
first NTLA election on 19 October 1974, members of the NT Country and Liberal 
parties formed a coalition affiliated with their national counterparts. The resulting 
amalgam, the Country Liberal Party (CLP), returned 90% of its candidates, while the 
NT branch of the ALP failed to win a single seat.52 The CLP won multiple and 
successive elections subsequently, and the party’s long-term domination of the NTLA 
provided conservative interests with a stronger platform to assert their authority over 
the Gurindji and other Aboriginal groups.53  
                                                 
48  Dean Jaensch and Deborah Wade-Marshall, Point of Order!: The Legislative Assembly of the 
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During the remainder of the NTLA’s first term (1974–77), CLP leader Dr Goff 
Letts led negotiations with Canberra about increasing executive power for the 
Territory, and tensions between federal politicians and their NT counterparts 
continued. After Letts lost his seat in the second NTLA election of August 1977, he 
was replaced as leader by a brash 35-year old lawyer, Paul Everingham. Under 
Everingham, the CLP-dominated Assembly maintained pressure on the Federal 
government to further the Territory’s constitutional development. The wishes of the 
Assembly were realised when the Commonwealth government passed the Northern 
Territory (Self-Government) Act in 1978.  
1.2.1  Northern Territory Self-Government, 1978 
The passage by the federal parliament of the Northern Territory (Self-Government) 
Act 1978 (hereafter the NTSG Act) marked the culmination of a decades-long 
campaign. Although the NTLA had already accrued the power to ‘make laws for the 
peace, order and good government of the Territory’ upon its inception in 1974, Self-
Government conferred further (but not total) ‘executive authority’ and other 
responsibilities upon it.54 Under the Self-Government Act, the NTLA assumed the 
power to make its own Acts of Parliament but remained subservient to the 
Commonwealth, which retained a right of veto.55 Control of Aboriginal Affairs, 
uranium mining and national parks remained in Canberra under the Act, but 
confusingly the work of the Commonwealth departments of Health and Education, 
then active in Aboriginal communities, was transferred to their NTG equivalents.56 
Responsibility for essential and other services in remote communities were also 
transferred. Although the Commonwealth’s role in Aboriginal communities was 
greatly reduced, federal bureaucrats stipulated that NT policies must ‘pay due regard 
to Aboriginal views, needs and circumstances’—though what this meant was not 
defined.57   
The impact on the Gurindji of these and other simultaneous administrative 
changes regarding Aboriginal communities in the Territory was significant. While the 
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federal government was ‘devolving’ some powers to the new NTG under the 
requirements of Self-Government, the federal Department of Aboriginal Affairs was 
also ‘devolving’ power to Aboriginal communities—as intended by its self-
determination and self-management policies. Hence on 1 July 1978—the same day as 
the Northern Territory assumed Self-Government—many administrative functions at 
Wave Hill, for instance, were handed over from the DAA: not to the NT Government, 
but to Daguragu Council.58  
The NTG also took responsibility from the Commonwealth for the provision of 
essential services in remote communities on 1 July 1979, and the Majority Leader (and 
now Chief Minister) of the NT, Paul Everingham, lobbied hard for Town Management 
and Public Utility (TMPU), housing, cultural, recreation and sporting functions to be 
transferred to his government also.59 The last of these were transferred from the 
Commonwealth to NTG control in 1980. As a result, from this time Aboriginal 
community councils received a significant proportion of their (federally-sourced) 
funding directly from the Northern Territory Government; a development which made 
them increasingly dependent on it. Regardless of the new NTG’s espousal of its belief 
in Aboriginal ‘self-management’, federal authorities were ‘profoundly suspicious’ of 
its attitude towards Aborigines.60 
Like other endeavours requiring co-operation between the NT’s previous 
legislatures and the Commonwealth, the official transfer of responsibility for essential 
services in Aboriginal communities from the DAA was marked by conflict, this time 
in the form of an argument between Chief Minister Everingham and Fraser.61 In light 
of the Everingham Government’s newly-enhanced powers and the challenges these 
created for Gurindji leaders then endeavouring to contribute successfully to ‘their’ 
community organisations, the new Northern Territory Government’s approach to 
Aboriginal affairs also requires analysis here. 
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1.2.2 The Northern Territory Government and Aboriginal self-
management, 1978–86 
On coming to office on 13 August 1977, Everingham’s CLP majority found itself in 
an awkward position. Compelled for political reasons to limit the scope, if possible, 
of its federal counterpart’s locally unpopular federal Aboriginal Land Rights 
legislation, the Everingham Government was also aligned with, and required the 
support of, the same government that introduced the new law. This created something 
of a double-bind. Also, navigating the tension between local anti-Aboriginal rights 
sentiment and—especially after Self-Government in July 1978—fulfilling its duties 
towards the Territory’s Aboriginal citizens created a separate, though related, set of 
political problems. As I will show in this thesis, the efforts of NT CLP governments 
to navigate these issues both influenced and complicated their involvement in 
Aboriginal affairs between 1978 and 1986.  
Perhaps for the sake of expedience, the Everingham Government announced its 
support for the federal policy of self-management early in its incumbency. For the 
new Chief Minister, like Malcolm Fraser, the emphasis was to be on the practical and 
economic ‘self-reliance’ and ‘self-sufficiency’ of remote Aborigines.62 According to 
policy analyst Will Sanders, Everingham saw: 
[…] self-management as Aboriginalisation of the workforce in government 
and government-supported activities in those areas which impinge on the lives 
of Aborigines, and which in the past have been undertaken largely by 
whitefellas. […] For the government it ultimately means that that no longer 
will whitefellas be needed to support the servicing of Aboriginal communities. 
This is the self-reliance.63 
At Everingham’s behest, an Office of Aboriginal Liaison (OAL) was established 
within the NT Chief Minister’s Department. In addition to emphasising the 
importance of education and training, which Everingham believed were key to 
Aboriginal self-management, the OAL acted to address a wide range of issues. To 
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improve relationships between Aboriginal people and the police, for example, the 
OAL collaborated with the Territory’s Whitlam Government-created Aboriginal 
Legal Aid services, and established a Liquor Commission that would take into account 
the wishes of local stakeholders, including Aboriginal groups, in its efforts to regulate 
the Territory’s liquor trade. Annual conferences in which senior NTG public servants 
and OAL staff liaised with Aboriginal leaders and community council staff were also 
held.64  
At the same time, the NTG rhetorically promoted self-determination and self-
management’s standard themes—the Aboriginalisation of community councils, those 
councils’ concurrent assertiveness against domineering whites, and bilingual 
education.65 Yet other factors complicated the CLP’s delivery of its self-management 
policies. Differences of opinion and operational styles between Office of Aboriginal 
Liaison staff (tasked with promoting self-management within the NTG) and the NT 
Department of Community Development (whose job it was to implement most NTG 
policy in Aboriginal communities) undermined the government’s activities. Similarly, 
without a designated functional department for Aboriginal Affairs, many of the 
Everingham Government’s professed goals for Aborigines were promoted within 
‘universal’ policies, and/or were to be self-administered by Aboriginal groups lacking 
the requisite resources. As I will show, at times Aboriginal decision-making, the over-
arching goal (and operational method) of self-management and self-determination 
policy, was subsumed by other considerations within the NTDCD and other NTG 
departments.  
In light of the complex political and operational environment confronting the 
Everingham Government, it is unsurprising that critics discerned a disingenuousness 
to the Chief Minister’s positions on ‘Aboriginal’ issues. Like the Fraser Government’s 
interpretation of Whitlam’s self-determination policy, Everingham’s reframing of 
self-management included subtle shifts in emphasis that allowed for government 
activity on Aboriginal communities to vary quite significantly from ‘official’ policy 
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aims. According to the ALP MLA for the Victoria River, Jack Doolan, Everingham 
made:  
[…] statements to the press and the Assembly which purport to indicate that 
he has a genuine concern for the Aborigines in the Northern Territory, yet he 
continues to instruct officers of the [NTG’s] departments to oppose the concept 
of land rights. […] It is my belief he is the prime mover and the chief instigator 
of most of the racial tension that has been occurring in the Territory.66    
The Everingham Government’s stance towards the federal government’s 
implementation of ALRA remained openly antagonistic. The alienation of pastoral 
leasehold land by Aboriginal groups under the Act caused the Everingham 
Government special concern.67 
After Paul Everingham resigned on 16 October 1984 to pursue a career in 
federal politics, Ian Tuxworth became the second Chief Minister of the Northern 
Territory, and the policy direction of his government (October 1984—May 1986) in 
Aboriginal affairs varied little from that of his predecessor. Although the NTG’s 
aspirations in Aboriginal Affairs were more commonly implied than stated, the 
Everingham and Tuxworth Governments remained nominal proponents of ‘enabling’ 
Aboriginal policies. The outcomes, though—and even, to an extent, the intentions—
underlying the NTG’s ‘self-management’ policies during 1978–86 were ambiguous. 
These dynamics were constitutive of the ‘adapted’ form of self-determination policy 
that I argue was adopted in the period.  
1.2.3 The NTLA, the NTG and Aboriginal Land Rights, 1977–86 
To understand the means by which the Gurindji achieved their land rights victory (the 
topic of Chapter Five), it is necessary to explore related, contemporaneous political 
and policy processes in the NT. When the Fraser Government’s Aboriginal Land 
Rights (Northern Territory) Act 1976 came into effect on 26 January 1977, the 
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acrimony among NT Country Liberal Party politicians that had accompanied its 
development intensified. The CLP NTLA majority were strident in their opposition to 
the Act and chose to prioritise perceived ‘Territory interests’ over political loyalties.68 
Attempting to harness widespread fears among non-Indigenous Territorians that 
ALRA would introduce a form of ‘apartheid’ to the NT, the NTLA moved to draft its 
own ‘complementary’ legislation to diminish the Act’s powers.69   
The first land claim under ALRA was heard at Borroloola in October 1977, and 
an inordinate amount of the Northern and Central Land Councils’ energies that year 
were spent defending their legislative charter. Country Liberal Party legislators argued 
that the Land Councils’ white advisers were manipulating Aboriginal people for their 
own, supposedly socialist, ends.70 It was understood by the Land Councils that the 
CLP’s complementary legislation, if passed, would wrest control over entry to 
Aboriginal land, sacred sites, pastoral properties and ‘wildlife and the territorial seas’ 
from the Commonwealth, rather than let that authority pass to Aboriginal Traditional 
Owners recognised by the Act.71 The CLP’s proposal to delegate decision-making 
powers about the right of entry to Aboriginal land to an NTLA-appointed council of 
‘authorised Aboriginals’ was particularly objectionable to the Land Councils.72 In 
contrast to the CLP though, the NT branch of the Australian Labor Party saw land 
rights as a federal responsibility, and opposed Everingham’s lobbying Canberra on 
the issue.73  
Exacerbating this thinly-disguised contest over the NT’s land base was the long-
term power struggle between Darwin authorities and the federal government described 
earlier in this chapter. Although the relationship of the two legislatures had improved 
somewhat since the demise of the Whitlam Government, it remained parlous.74 Such 
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accusations about federal indifference or ignorance on land rights and other issues 
were common.  
After Paul Everingham’s election as Majority Leader of the NTLA Second Assembly 
on 13 August 1977 (and his Chief Ministership under the terms of Self-Government 
soon afterwards), the campaign of the CLP to undermine the powers won by 
Aboriginal people over land under ALRA intensified—even as Everingham publicly 
declared that ‘without land rights, self-management and self-sufficiency for 
Aboriginals are merely empty phrases’.75 Evidence of the new NTG’s intentions were 
displayed in March 1979 when it rezoned large areas of land around the Territory’s 
major towns, in some cases doubling their size.76 The government claimed that the 
move was merely to provide for future population growth, but to many observers, the 
primary effect of Everingham’s gazettals was that they prevented the areas being 
claimed under ALRA by virtue of Aboriginal traditional rights. To many, it was a 
declaration by his government of a campaign to frustrate and resist Aboriginal 
aspirations to land. Although such actions directly contradicted the political impulse 
underlying the federal government’s support of Aboriginal Land Rights in the 
Territory, the Fraser Government lacked the will to force a confrontation on the 
issue.77  
In the early 1980s, the campaign of the Northern Territory Government to 
weaken the powers of the federal government and Aboriginal Land Councils as 
bestowed by ALRA continued.78 In November 1982 the NTLA passed a resolution 
detailing its concerns about the federal Act. In this the NTLA emphasized the fact that 
some land being claimed under ALRA was set aside for public purposes such as 
National Parks and stock routes; that under the Act an increasing amount of land in 
the Territory could potentially revert to administration by the Commonwealth; and 
that ‘the open-ended nature of the claim system’ led to the ‘opportunity for repeat 
claims’.79 Also high among Chief Minister Everingham’s concerns—which were 
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aired in national newspaper advertisements and via an address at the National Press 
Club—was that the Act diminished the NT’s development and business potential.80 
These concerns were shared by Ian Tuxworth, Everingham’s successor. As a result, 
the NTG wished to replace inalienable freehold Aboriginal title (as awarded under 
ALRA) with perpetual lease title similar to pastoral properties purchased on behalf of 
Aborigines—such as the Daguragu leasehold.81  
Such were the attitudes of the NTG to ALRA and Aboriginal Land Rights in the 
Territory in the mid-1980s. Further consideration here of the NTG’s land rights 
politics in the period is unwarranted: the Gurindji people were awarded inalienable 
freehold title under ALRA in May 1986, the point at which this study ends.  
1.2.4 The NTG’s Community Government Scheme (1986) 
As I shall show in Chapter Ten, of greater consequence to the Gurindji’s self-
determination-type aims than the NTG’s Land Rights-related activity during the late 
1970s and early 1980s was that legislature’s reforms to the administration of local 
government. Conducted under the name of ‘Community Government’ by the 
Gurindji’s intermediaries in the NT Department of Community Development, these 
reforms were the latest in a succession undertaken to develop local government 
arrangements in the Territory.  
Residing in far-flung church-run missions, Welfare Branch settlements and 
(more recently) DAA-administered pastoral lease excisions, many Aboriginal people 
in the NT had already been subject to similar experiments in governance. As a part of 
the paternalist regulation of their affairs by the Commonwealth or Christian missions 
in the 1960s, authorities of the NTA’s Welfare Branch and missionaries had created—
and in most cases subsequently restructured—a number of local, community council-
type representative bodies in Aboriginal settlements. As a result of federal self-
determination and self-management policies, this activity had intensified in the 1970s. 
Increasingly, council-type groups were being incorporated by government officials 
for local Aboriginal decision-making and co-operative commercial activity 
purposes.82 Various pieces of legislation were used, including the NT Associations 
                                                 
80  Central Land Council, Aboriginal Land Rights in the Northern Territory: ‘A Question of 
Justice’ (Alice Springs, Central Land Council, September 1982). 
81  Budden, op. cit., p. 1. 
82  Loveday, op. cit. p.16–19. 
Ch.1 Policy and Legislation   
41 
 
Incorporation Ordinance (1963), and later the Whitlam and Fraser governments’ 
Aboriginal Councils and Associations Act (1976).  
When the Everingham Government inherited responsibility for local 
government after the NT Self-Government Act was passed in 1978, its concerns about 
the delivery of municipal services extended beyond issues of community governance 
on Aboriginal settlements alone. In locations as varied as Darwin, remote ‘mixed’ 
towns like Kalkaringi and small Aboriginal communities like Daguragu, the NTG 
found that discrepancies between extant council-like bodies and the fact that none had 
been designed for ‘full’ municipal functions were problematic. As a result, the CLP 
embraced the idea of developing legislation to standardise the diverse assortment of 
council-like associations then comprising the Territory’s local government sector, and 
divest more power to it.83 
Complete uniformity, the Everingham Government decided, would be 
inappropriate. Two types of local government authority would be created. One, for the 
Territory’s medium to large towns, would involve full municipal government. The 
second would be promoted for use in small to medium Aboriginal population centres of 
80 to 1,400 people, and be known as ‘community government’. It was touted that 
Community Government legislation allowed Aboriginal communities a greater degree of 
choice regarding the functions they wished to perform, and the conditions they would 
perform them under.  
The Community Government provision for Aboriginal communities was contained 
in Part XX of the NT Local Government Act (1978), which eventually passed into law, 
with revision, as Part VIII of the NT Local Government Act (1986). While Part XX of the 
1978 Act was inoperative for some time, its advocates maintained that its purpose was to 
give councils incorporated under it an increased ability to choose the functions and 
powers they employed, the form of their own elections and structure, and the boundaries 
of their municipal areas.84 Although the increased powers bestowed under Part XX of the 
NTG’s 1978 Act and Part VIII of the 1986 Local Government Act were merely modified 
                                                 
83  Previously, the CLP had dismissed the possibility of introducing uniformity to the 
administratively and demographically diverse, isolated population centres of the NT via the 
generic type of legislation utilised in the states (e.g. Victoria’s Local Government Act 1958). 
Hon Jim Robertson, cited in Jackie Wolfe, 'That Community Government Mob': Local 
Government in Small Northern Territory Communities (Darwin: Australian National 
University, North Australia Research Unit, 1989), p. 37. 
84  ibid.  
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versions of the broader reforms the NTG sought to apply in larger, predominantly non-
Indigenous Territory towns, in Aboriginal communities they were promoted as fulfilment 
of the NTG’s policy of Aboriginal self-management.  
As I have indicated, these measures were an interim step in the NTG’s larger (and 
longer) process of local government reform. As the developmental phase of the reforms 
was completed and the Local Government Act NT (hereafter LGANT) was passed into law 
in 1986, when this study ends, the final outcomes of the reforms are beyond the scope of 
this thesis. Instead, what I am concerned with here is the relationship between the NTG’s 
Community Government reforms at Wave Hill during 1978–86 and their effects on the 
Gurindji’s contemporaneous self-determination-type goals. I shall examine this issue in 
depth in Chapter Ten.  
1.2.5 Conclusion 
In this chapter I have described some of the policies that Northern Territory and 
federal politicians and bureaucrats designed and implemented in the period of this 
study, and several pieces of related legislation. I have included these laws and political 
developments on the basis of their significant impacts, as I perceive them, on the 
Gurindji people’s politics of enablement in the period. By doing so I have provided 
the governmental context necessary to understand the dialectic of a reformist 
Australian nation-state with the aspirational aims of Gurindji leaders at Kalkaringi and 
Daguragu. This exercise is essential to the arguments I shall develop in Chapter Three 
on the quotidian effects and overall purpose of ‘incorporation’ as a governmental 
technique at Wave Hill; in Chapters 9–10 on the efforts and outcomes of Gurindji 
leaders and public servants to create an effective Gurindji ‘community’-type council; 
and similarly, in Chapters 5–7 on the interaction of the Gurindji gerontocracy and the 
state regarding the Gurindji’s land and land use.
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Ch. 2 Gurindji society and the goals of 
Gurindji elders 
 
 
 
 
 
This work is a study of governmental and Gurindji interaction. Having described the 
relevant political developments in the period and related policies and legislature, it is now 
necessary to explicate the Gurindji subject of this thesis. With whom at Wave Hill was 
the government interacting? Who were the Gurindji and what did they want? I devote the 
first part of this chapter to describing the Gurindji group’s social organisation, their social 
diversity, and their coexistence with neighbouring groups. Having defined my Gurindji 
subject, I then frame them as political actors in ‘Wattie Creek’s Founding Visions’ and 
onwards by describing the Gurindji leaders’ articulation of their ‘community 
development’-type plans. These plans—recognition of their land rights, operating a cattle 
enterprise, overseeing a ‘two-way’ school in their own independent community—
comprise the four pillars of what I term ‘Gurindji self-determination’: the zone of shared 
activity in which Gurindji leaders and public servants worked towards the achievement 
of the leaders’ aims. The chapter ends by exploring both the apparent confluence between 
the aims of Gurindji leaders and those of Aboriginal self-determination policy, and the 
limitations of such a comparison. I argue that both Gurindji leaders and their government 
interlocutors brought erroneous assumptions about each other’s goals and methods to the 
projects comprising Gurindji self-determination. We will see in Part Two of the thesis, 
‘The Zone of Enablement’, that the outcomes of this for those projects were profound. 
When non-Indigenous Australians began to perceive the capability of Aboriginal 
people to exercise political and economic power in the late 1960s and early 70s, outsiders 
knew little about the society or language of Gurindji people. One reason for this is that 
among Northern Territory Aboriginal groups, anthropologists had paid Gurindji people 
comparatively little attention. With few exceptions, this trend has continued in the 
intervening decades. My own enquiries with the residents of Kalkaringi and Daguragu 
have focused on historical and political, not ethnographic, matters. To formulate a 
classical Gurindji subject for the purposes of this thesis however, it is necessary that I 
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draw on the Gurindji ethnographic canon. Before doing so, it is necessary that I describe 
the fragmentary archive that informs it. 
The attention paid by anthropologists to the Gurindji has been spasmodic and 
infrequent. In 1934, WEH Stanner spent a small amount of time with some Gurindji 
people, but he did not publish from his observations.1 Mervyn Meggitt had a similarly 
brief stopover with some Gurindji people on Limbunya, a station neighbouring Wave 
Hill, in 1953, and produced five pages of ‘Notes’ about the Aboriginal people he 
encountered there. These appeared in the anthropological journal Mankind.2 
In between these visits, two (later) well-known Australian anthropologists, Ronald 
and Catherine Berndt, conducted considerable ethnographic research with the Gurindji 
on Wave Hill Station in 1946. Commissioned by the Vestey Company to advise on how 
the health of the company’s Aboriginal workforce could be improved, the Berndts’ 
relationship with their employer deteriorated and the report they provided to the company 
was never published.3 With the exception of Catherine Berndt’s pioneering 1950 account 
of the ceremonial life of Gurindji women, Women's Changing Ceremonies in Northern 
Australia, nothing else was published from the Berndts’ study until 1987.4 The book by 
the Berndts that resulted then, End of an Era: Aboriginal Labour in the Northern 
Territory, was sociological rather than culturally ethnographic. By that time, the 
Gurindji’s Wave Hill Walk-off had brought them to national attention, and as a result 
their interlocutors’ interests were primarily political.5  
                                                 
1  (Four decades after his visit, AIATSIS published a cursory account). See WEH Stanner, Report on 
Fieldwork in North Central and North Australia, 1934–35 (Canberra, AIATSIS, 1979). 
2  Mervyn Meggitt, ‘Notes on the Malngjin [sic] and Gurindji Aborigines of Limbunya, N.W. 
Northern Territory’, Mankind; Sep 1, 1955, 5, 2 (45–50), pp. 48, 50. 
3  A digest of the report was published contemporaneously, in which the stations and employing 
agencies that informed the Berndts’ research were dis-identified.  See RM and CH Berndt, ‘Native 
Labour on Northern Territory Cattle Stations’, The Aborigines’ Protector (Association for the 
Protection of Native Races, Sydney, Vol. 2, No. 2, October 1946) 9–18; Geoffrey Gray, ‘Abrogating 
Responsibility? Applied Anthropology, Vesteys, Aboriginal Labour, 1944–46’, Australian 
Aboriginal Studies, Vol. 2, 18–26. 
4  Catherine H. Berndt, Women’s Changing Ceremonies in Northern Australia (Paris, Hermann, 
1950). 
5   In contrast, Gurindji leaders were very clear that they wished to teach kartiya about Gurindji 
culture. See Charlie Ward, ‘Following the Leaders: the Role of Non-Indigenous Activism in the 
Development of Wattie Creek, 1969–73, Journal of the Royal Australian Historical Society, Vol. 
100, Pt. 1, 2014, pp. 69–92 (pp. 84–86); Lyn Riddett, “‘Getting Grown-up’ at Wattie Creek", 
Overland, 146 (1997), 68–71; ‘The Strike That Became a Land Rights Movement: A Southern Do-
Gooder Reflects on Wattie Creek, 1966-74’, Labour History, 72 (May 1997) 50–65. 
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As authors of the only significant published description of the Gurindji, it is likely 
that the Berndts contributed to a perception that Aboriginal people with long cattle 
industry experience had ‘lost’ much of their traditional culture. Presented in the 
essentialist terms of the day, their published and personal observations on this topic may 
have dissuaded others in the discipline from studying the Gurindji.6 Catherine Berndt 
wrote in Women's Changing Ceremonies that ‘culture contact’s real and ultimate effects 
[on Gurindji culture] are proving on the whole to be discouraging and deleterious’.7 In 
End of an Era, the Berndts wrote of their perception forty years earlier that: ‘the local 
people thought of themselves as station people, well-versed in the ways of Europeans’, 
and that, “the practicality of continuing [‘ceremonies and rituals as part of the living 
culture’] was increasingly being questioned in a multitude of small ways”.8  
The Berndts described a society that was not only adaptive and externally curious, 
but one characterised by internal tension. Both these traits were subsequently significant 
to Gurindji self-determination. In the Berndts’ anthropological accounts, younger 
Gurindji people can be observed interrogating their society’s social practices and values. 
This reformism and the social critique underlying it are indicators of long-running social 
tensions among young Gurindji regarding their elders. These tensions fuelled a major 
dissociative project which the younger generations enacted in the 1970s. I describe this 
project’s indifference to the communal self-determinative aims of Gurindji elders and 
bureaucrats in Chapters Three and Four, and show its profound effects on Gurindji self-
determination in Part Two. 
When Hannah Middleton, the only other anthropologist to live with the Gurindji 
people arrived in 1970, she did so through her contacts in the union movement, and had 
overtly political as well as ethnographic, interests.9 Middleton’s active contribution to 
the national Aboriginal Land Rights campaign while she conducted her fieldwork at 
Wattie Creek was in stark contrast to the Berndts’ earlier decision not to conduct political 
advocacy. In 1979, Middleton published a labour-historical, Marxist treatise of why the 
land rights campaign to which she had contributed had been defeated (as she saw it).10 In 
                                                 
6  Berndt, 1950, op. cit., pp. 43, 67–69; Gray, op. cit., p.35. 
7  Berndt, ibid.  
8  Berndts, 1987, op. cit., p. 204. 
9  Darwin, NTAS, Hannah Middleton, Interview Recorded by Charlie Ward November 2009, NTRS 
609, BWF 2. 
10  Hannah Middleton, But Now We Want the Land Back- A History of the Australian Aboriginal 
People (Sydney, New South Wales, New Age Publishers, 1977). 
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her book But Now We Want the Land Back, the Gurindji were not presented in 
ethnographic terms. For my purposes here, Middleton’s published work on the Gurindji 
has been bolstered by my interview with her in 2009, ongoing personal communication, 
and unpublished reports produced at the time of her fieldwork.11  
The above account describes anthropologists’ engagement with the Gurindji people 
predating the period of my study. Of greater use to me in informing my understanding of 
traditional and twentieth century Gurindji society have been the work of two ‘outliers’ 
of that discipline: the linguist Patrick McConvell, who lived at Daguragu in 1974–75, 
and who has since continued working with Gurindji people and publishing on the 
Gurindji language; and the economic historian Minoru Hokari, who quickly formulated 
a deep insight into Gurindji society and (oral) ‘historiography’ in the 1990s. Also of great 
use are the writings of the anthropologist Deborah Bird Rose, who through her work 
describing the Gurindji’s consanguineous Ngarinyman neighbours at Yarralin, provides 
a detailed description of Ngumpit, including Gurindji, culture.12 
A growing number of written materials co-authored by Gurindji individuals on 
physical or ecological aspects of Gurindji culture exist but are of little use to me in 
describing or formulating a rounded Gurindji subject for the purposes of this study.13 The 
transcribed testimony of Gurindji elders given during their Daguragu land claim (1981) 
comprises the bulk of verbatim written material dictated by Gurindji people about their 
cosmology, land and ceremonial life.14  
2.1.0 Formulating a Gurindji subject 
The Northern Territory was occupied by Indigenous people prior to the incursion of the 
European pastoral industry in Australia’s north. In country near the headwaters of a river 
re-named by Captain J. C. Wickham after Queen Victoria, several groups speaking a 
language called Kurrurrinyji dwelt. Many Kurrurrinyji, or Gurindji people, as they are 
                                                 
11  Hannah Middleton, ‘The Gurindji at Wattie Creek’, Abschol and the Anthropological Society of 
Victoria (Conference Proceedings, Melbourne, 9 December 1970); NTAS, Middleton, op. cit. 
12  Relevant work by these authors is listed in the bibliography of this thesis. 
13  Gurindji women working with Summer Institute of Linguistics staff produced a series of Gurindji 
language ‘readers’ in the 1970s–80s that are held by the AIATSIS library, Canberra. See also 
Felicity Meakins et al., Gurindji to English Dictionary (Batchelor, NT, Batchelor Press, 2013). 
14  Patrick McConvell and Rod Hagen, A Traditional Land Claim by the Gurindji to Daguragu Station, 
(Alice Springs, N.T., Central Land Council, 1981); Daguragu Land Claim: Aboriginal Land Rights 
(Northern Territory) Act 1976 (Canberra, Australian Government, 1981). 
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commonly referred to now, lived around a tributary of the Victoria River that they knew 
as Jiyul, and were known as the Jiyiljurrung.15 Europeans later named Jiyul Wattie Creek. 
Other Gurindji groups such as the Pirlingarna and Yilyilyimawu people lived primarily 
on neighbouring stretches of the Victoria River.16  
Surrounding the Gurindji were Malngin and Wanyjirra peoples, to the northwest 
and southwest respectively, and Bilinara and Ngarinyman people, both of whom lived to 
the Gurindji’s north. Like the Gurindji, all these groups spoke their own dialect of the 
Ngumpit language subgroup.17 All Ngumpit people had extensive shared language and 
ceremonial responsibilities, and intermarriage was practised between them according to 
classificatory prescriptions which I describe below. The respective grammars and 
material cultures of Ngumpit groups are, and were, very similar.  
After European settlement, the numbers of Ngumpit were reduced and 
neighbouring clans were compelled to reside semi-permanently on Wave Hill and other 
stations. As a result, many practical and even nominal distinctions between Gurindji 
people and their neighbours were subsumed, and ‘Gurindji’ came to refer to the people 
of a larger area.18  
2.1.1 Classificatory social systems 
By providing the following description of Gurindji cultural and linguistic practices, I 
intend to convey the relevant intrinsic cultural and social determinants of a Gurindji 
person’s life during the period of my study. My description of these elements of culture 
as ‘traditional’ should not be taken to imply that they are no longer practiced, and/or that 
they are currently insignificant to Gurindji people. No research has been undertaken on 
these matters.  
In Ngumpit society, an individual’s interpersonal relationships are determined by 
their genealogical positions within a number of socio-religious systems. The patrilineal 
clan is the largest unit of social organisation. The males of each such clan are descended 
from a known ancestor or group of brothers.19 Traditionally, each such clan group was 
                                                 
15  McConvell and Hagen, op. cit., p. 14. 
16  ibid.  
17  Felicity Meakins (Linguist of the Gurindji language), Personal Communication, 30 July 2015. 
18  McConvell and Hagen, op. cit., p. 12. 
19  Patrick McConvell, ‘Neutralisation and Degrees of Respect in Gurindji’, The Languages of Kinship 
in Aboriginal Australia (Sydney, Oceania Linguistic Monographs, 1982) 86–106, p. 92. 
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responsible for the maintenance and health of their estate, or area of land, partially 
through the performance of songs and ceremonies associated with the ‘dreaming’ 
being(s) traversing their country.20 The interpersonal relationships and ceremonial 
responsibilities of Gurindji individuals were and are determined by their genealogical 
positions within a number of socio-religious classificatory systems. Their membership of 
their patrilineal clan group determined each individual’s status as ngurramala (‘owners’) 
of their clan’s country, and that country’s songs. Each ‘owner’ group also required a 
group of male (matrifiliate) ‘policemen’ or ‘workers’ (kurtungulu) to organise the rituals 
associated with the ngurramala group’s estate and its dreaming knowledge.21 This 
system of mutual dependence and support (for each ‘owner’ was commonly a ‘worker’ 
for another clan’s country, and vice versa) was commonly repeated across the Northern 
Territory.22 In Aboriginal English and anthropological discourse (in which the translation 
is contested), the Gurindji’s kurtungulu are now commonly known as an area’s 
‘managers’.23   
Coexisting with the binary social categorisation of ‘owners’ and ‘managers’ among 
the Gurindji is another, more differentiated, classificatory ‘skin’ system. In this, 
(variations of which were once found among Aboriginal groups all over the country), 
every individual is placed in a relationship type with others by virtue of their membership 
of various ‘skin’, or subsection groups. In the case of the Gurindji’s (Ngumpit) system, 
there are eight subsections, with a variant determined by gender. Subsection membership 
is determined by the subsection of the parent of the same sex.24 Each ‘skin’ pair entails 
specific reciprocal economic obligations and rights for both parties, and a particular 
relationship expressed through behaviour and language. These relationship types include 
mali ‘avoidance’ relationships; joking relationships that include humorous obscenity; and 
sharing relationships. The form of the relationship between any two individuals is hence 
determined by the ‘skin’ group each belongs to.25 Despite the demise of the Gurindji’s 
                                                 
20  ibid., pp. 92–93. 
21  McConvell, op. cit., p. 93. 
22  L. R. Hiatt, Arguments about Aborigines: Australia and the Evolution of Social Anthropology 
(Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp. 31–32. 
23  Kenneth Maddock, ‘“Owners”, “Managers” and the Choice of Statutory Traditional Owners by 
Anthropologists and Lawyers’, in Aborigines, Land and Land Rights. ed. by Nicolas Peterson and 
Marcia Langton (ed.), (Canberra, Australian Institute of Aboriginal Studies, 1983), pp. 211–225. 
24  McConvell and Hagen, op. cit., pp. 20–22. 
25  Richard Broome, Aboriginal Australians: Black Responses to White Dominance, 3rd edn (Crows 
Nest, N.S.W, Allen & Unwin, 2001), p. 20. 
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hunter-gatherer economy, these ordered patterns of domestic economic interaction 
persist (with modification) at Wave Hill in contemporary times.26  
It is the economic element of Aboriginal classificatory kinship systems which anthropologist 
Nicolas Peterson described as ‘demand sharing’ in the broader Australian context. Peterson argues 
that the importance of this system to Indigenous Australians is fundamental:  
The central reason for the persistence of sharing in the Indigenous Australian 
context is that it underwrites a relational ontology in which sharing has a profound 
significance for the nature of personhood. The most important form of this sharing 
is demand sharing, that is responding to requests, which is intrinsic to the 
Indigenous domestic moral economy.27 
It is unnecessary to articulate the particularised form of demand sharing determined by 
each relationship pairing in Gurindji society here. For my purposes in this thesis, I merely 
wish to note that traditionally, the social and economic demands that Gurindji kinship 
placed on all individuals were prescriptive, particular and unavoidable, both determining 
significant life events such as the identification of a person’s potential marriage partners, 
and shaping quotidian aspects of social interaction.28 In the relationship between an 
individual and her or his mother’s brothers, for instance, a Gurindji person was (and still 
is, in different ways) expected to demand food, money and/or property of them. 
According to Patrick McConvell, in the early 1980s:  
[…] Such articles are sometimes returned but often they are not. The relationship 
is asymmetrical in that the [uncle] is supposed to tolerate such acts without 
retaliating or resisting, although it is appropriate for him to abuse the [niece or 
nephew] jokingly in strong terms.29    
By such means, classificatory ‘grandparents’, for example, might be expected to provide 
for their ‘grandchildren’ as a general principle, and as a vital obligation in certain 
                                                 
26  Pers. Obs; Nicolas Peterson, ‘Demand Sharing: Reciprocity and the Pressure for Generosity 
among Foragers’, American Anthropologist, New Series, Vol. 95, No. 4 (Dec. 1993), pp. 860–
874; Nicolas Peterson, ‘On the Persistence of Sharing: Personhood, Asymmetrical Reciprocity 
and Demand Sharing in the Indigenous Australian Domestic Moral Economy’, The Australian 
Journal of Anthropology, 24 (2013) 166–176. 
27  Peterson, 2013, ibid., p. 167. 
28  Hiatt, op. cit., pp. 43–46; McConvell, op. cit., pp. 93–99. 
29  McConvell, ibid., p. 97. 
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situations. The dictates of the kinship system allowed interaction and mixing between 
some (classificatory) individuals of the opposite sex, but not others. It should also be 
pointed out that in pre-contact times, Aboriginal people spent most of their time in small 
bands, so their classificatory ‘patrons’ were few. In contemporary settled life however, 
the number of individuals included in a skin system—and to whom a person is 
obligated—would commonly be far in excess of their extended family of biological 
relatives. 
The Gurindji have modified demand sharing’s specific requirements to suit their 
changing circumstances: the exigencies of cattle industry work and life between 1882–
1965, and ‘community’ life and politics after 1966.30 Kinship-determined behaviour 
could be modified, but not abandoned. The particular rights and obligations determined 
by the classificatory system comprised Gurindji relationships. This is validated 
linguistically: the Gurindji language has no words for the overall category of skins, or 
subsections.31 This omission signifies the pervasiveness of the subsection system in all 
aspects of Gurindji life. During the period of this study (1973–86), younger Gurindji 
individuals with a ‘mali-rlang’ avoidance relationship—biological siblings, for 
instance—were attempting to moderate the terms of that avoidance in the more ‘liberal’ 
and novel circumstances of community life.32 The implications of this struggle for the 
collective agendas of their elders is a topic I shall return to later. 
The social behaviour dictated by the Gurindji kinship system was (and is) of 
primary importance to Gurindji people.33 An inverse corollary of this is that historically, 
when they dealt with Europeans not accorded a skin, local people were left without an 
apparent template for communication. In addition to the usual difficulties caused by lack 
of a common language, this left Gurindji people in a compromised position, dealing with 
kartiya. Similarly, when Gurindji individuals faced novel employment situations (such 
as those created by their participation in the new Aboriginal community organisations of 
self-determination), the interactions and/or exchanges this required differed radically 
from those dictated by Gurindji kinship. As a result, that system’s ubiquity—and the 
failure of the bureaucracy to adapt its modes of program delivery to accommodate it—
                                                 
30  See Darwin, NTAS, Gavin Perry, Interview Recorded by Charlie Ward, August 2014, NTRS 3609, 
BWF 61.  
31  McConvell, op. cit., p. 89. 
32  Middleton, 1970, op. cit., p. 7. 
33  The subsection system remains the primary determinant of Gurindji social life, though I infer that 
it has been modified over time to better suit modern circumstances. Meakins et al., op. cit., p. 11. 
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complicated and undermined the Gurindji’s efforts to achieve economic and political 
independence during 1973–86.    
2.1.2 Status, age and knowledge  
While their kinship system regulated interaction between individuals in classical Gurindji 
society, a legal and cosmological system of secret/sacred ceremonial knowledge 
underpinned it. The broad features of this system are those recognisable among other 
Australian Aboriginal groups. Religious knowledge was highly-valued, mostly gender-
specific, and imparted to novitiates during rituals that marked each period of a Gurindji 
person’s life.34  
Religious knowledge was also land-related. As has been documented of other 
Aboriginal groups, the cosmological realm was immanent to the Gurindji in their 
empirical landscape, and all Gurindji adults had a responsibility for nurturing and 
maintaining various tracts of land, and particular animals and/or plants within it, by 
ceremonial and practical means. Those with the most knowledge regarding these 
responsibilities (and the ceremonies by which that knowledge was gleaned) had a 
measure of authority over those younger (and less knowledgeable) than themselves.35 
The Gurindji’s was, in effect, a gerontocratic society.   
In the Gurindji world, over-arching social authority was wielded by older, socially 
mature men whose predecessors had imparted to them the most restricted of secret/sacred 
knowledge, via lengthy and physically exacting rituals.36 Calling this clique a social 
‘elite’, linguist Eric Kolig writes generally of Australian Aboriginal groups that: 
[…] It was the task of the elite, with their knowledge, to see that the aberration was 
checked and rectified. Thus the power of the elite was vitally important, and the 
others freely bowed to it for their own good, since, as we remember, the aberration 
and violation of laws might jeopardise the cosmic status quo […]. The sacred 
nature of the elite’s power meant that opposition to that power, encapsulated in 
certain decisions, was sacrilegious and had to be dealt with accordingly.37  
                                                 
34  Debbie Bird Rose, Dingo Makes Us Human: Life and Land in an Aboriginal Australian Culture 
(Melbourne, Cambridge University Press, 1992), p. 114. 
35  Bird Rose, op. cit.  p. 122. 
36  Erich Kolig, ‘An Obituary for Ritual Power’, in Michael Howard (ed.), Aboriginal Power in 
Australian Society (St Lucia, Queensland: University of Queensland Press, 1982) 14–32, p. 24. 
37  ibid.  p. 23. 
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As interpreters (and often enforcers) of law, elders maintained their authority and 
that of Gurindji law in pre-contact times by punitive means involving social expulsion, 
controlled fighting and/or physical punishment.38 Historian Richard Broome records that:  
Many tribes practiced a form of settlement by ordeal in which, when tempers were 
cooled days after [a transgression], the injured party (under supervision of the 
elders) was allowed to throw spears at the alleged offender. Usually only a thigh or 
flesh wound resulted and then a dance of reconciliation followed to end the affair. 
In some groups, duels would be fought until blood was drawn, or in serious 
disputes, until a death resulted.39  
My conversations with Gurindji people and their interlocutors indicate that the Gurindji 
‘legal’ system followed similar lines.40 Such discipline, as I understand it, was usually 
enacted by older female relatives (in the case of female miscreants), or similarly by older 
men on errant boys.  
In their many decades based on Wave Hill Station, the Gurindji were largely able 
to continue their most important ceremonies, and as a corollary, the authority of older 
men remained paramount. This was described to me by Gurindji elders Jimmy Wavehill 
and Michael George: on the station and in the stock camps, younger Gurindji were strictly 
controlled by both older Gurindji men—some of whom were promoted within the 
station’s staffing arrangements as far as Aboriginal people were allowed—and European 
station management.41 Similarly, when the people conducted ceremonies on their 
traditional country in ‘holiday’ time during the wet season, the Gurindji elders’ control 
of the young people was uncompromising.42  
                                                 
38  Danielle Loy (Dir.), Bush Law [featuring Billy Jampijinpa Bunter] (Sydney, Australian 
Broadcasting Commission, 2010); Department of Aboriginal Affairs, Daguragu—Book of the 
Community (NT Division of the Department of Aboriginal Affairs, 1977, p. 9; Darwin, NAA, 
‘Council Meeting […] 15 May 1978’, Wave Hill Social Club, E460, 1981/100. 
39  Broome, op. cit., p. 24. 
40  Jimmy Mangayarri in Minoru Hokari, Gurindji Journey: A Japanese Historian in the Outback 
(Sydney, University of New South Wales Press, 2011), p. 237; Darwin, NTAS, Bryce Fardell, 
Interview Recorded by Charlie Ward, March 2010, NTRS 3609, BWF 13; Darwin, NAA, 
‘Disturbance at Wattie Creek’, E460, 1978/1035. 
41  In the male domain of the station’s stock camps, the skills of the Gurindji stockmen were valued 
highly by all, which tended to reinforce the older men’s standing among their sons and nephews. 
Jimmy Wavehill, Personal Communication, 11 July 2013; Interview with Michael George, 27 
October 2010. 
42  George, ibid.  
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Even during the Gurindji’s decades in the mainstream cattle industry, those 
oppressed by the gerontocracy sought to take advantage of their changed conditions. As 
early as the mid-1950s, young Gurindji men on Limbunya, a station neighbouring Wave 
Hill, had become openly resistant to the physical ordeals associated with initiation, and 
argued with their elders that the wounds they accrued during such ceremonies interfered 
with stock work.43 Nonetheless, the authority of older, over younger, Gurindji men (and 
similarly women) remained paramount, though contested, until at least the 1980s. 
2.1.3 Gender and the Gurindji 
Issues of gender differentiation inform my androcentric portrayal of the Gurindji people 
in this thesis, and effected the Gurindji’s efforts to create an independent homeland in 
the 1970s. They therefore require addressing here.  
As has been acknowledged of other Aboriginal groups, the classical knowledge 
and responsibilities of Gurindji men and women were distinct and complementary. 
According to Deborah Bird Rose, writing of Ngumpit people at nearby Yarralin:  
[…] While men promote the value of their own knowledge and ritual, they do not 
do so by denigrating women’s knowledge, and the reverse is equally true. The 
division of labour in daily life is clearly complementary and non-hierarchical; so 
too, in my experience, is the organisation of gender-specific domains.44 
Bird Rose summarises the gender relationship among the Gurindji’s kin as one of 
differentiated interdependence.  
As among their Ngumpit relatives, the economic, legal, religious and pedagogical 
roles of men and women at Wattie Creek/Daguragu differed. In ‘public’ situations and 
meetings with kartiya, men and women tended to gather separately.45 Each gender also 
had their own secret/sacred ceremonies, sites and dreaming stories.46 According to 
Catherine Berndt, Gurindji women were responsible for a large number of tjarada 
(jarrata) and jawalju ceremonies which were sponsored by Ancestral beings and often 
concerned with ‘love magic’.47 While Jawalju ceremonies were entirely secret women’s 
                                                 
43  Anthropologist Mervyn Meggitt was also given to understand that the number of old men skilled 
and authorised to make sacred objects was in decline. Meggitt, op. cit., pp. 48, 50. 
44  Bird Rose, op. cit., p. 28. 
45  John Hamilton, ‘Dreamtime at Wattie Creek’, The Age, c. June 1970. 
46  Berndt, 1950, op. cit. 
47  McConvell and Hagen, op. cit., p. 53. 
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business, in many jointly-held ceremonies, women were both organisers and performers 
of the opening, ‘public’ phases.  
 The western concept of gender ‘in/equality’ among the Gurindji, and its 
relevance is a vexed one that has been long-discussed in the literature regarding other 
Australian Aboriginal societies.48 While little has been written specifically on the status 
of men and women in Gurindji society, anecdotal evidence suggests that the situation 
conforms to that of other Australian Aboriginal language groups. As I have noted above, 
women had their own secret/sacred ritual responsibilities, and the maintenance of these 
was integral to the Gurindji social and cosmological order. This gave women a powerful 
footing in the valorised ceremonial domain. Girls were frequently promised to older men 
as marriage partners, though many were subsequently able to indulge in clandestine (or 
in some cases, eventually publicly sanctioned) affairs with men of their own age. Of other 
groups, some anthropologists have argued that there were advantages in this for the 
mothers of female children, and it appears likely that older Gurindji women were either 
supportive of the male gerontocracy’s management of female sexuality, or reconciled to 
it.49  
Regardless of Gurindji gender differentiation, the political authority of older, 
ritually-advanced men and their domination of public forums and interaction with kartiya 
was paramount. Senior men were the main decision-makers regarding matters affecting 
the group as a whole. As a corollary of this, and their ritual power, senior Gurindji males 
dominated collective social and discursive space; the voices of younger men, women and 
young women were subsumed. In 1970 for instance, young Gurindji men would not 
speak in a meeting of older men unless coerced by a classificatory uncle to do so.50 As 
noted in the Introduction, Gurindji male dominance has important implications for this 
inquiry.  
In writing about Gurindji people and their opinion(s), my reliance on a historical archive 
dominated by the voices of older men creates a number of problems. Regardless of the 
gender-differentiated society I have described above, very few archival materials 
                                                 
48  Hiatt, op. cit., pp. 63–70; Phyllis M. Kaberry, Aboriginal Woman: Sacred and Profane (London, 
George Routledge, 1939); Diane Bell, Daughters of the Dreaming (Minneapolis, University of 
Minnesota Press, 1993). 
49  Darwin, NTAS, ‘Child Bride Allegations’, Aboriginal Tribal Marriages, NTRS 366/P2, AD 82/ 
0114; Discussion of the reasons for this support are given in Hiatt, op. cit., pp. 69–70. 
50  Middleton, 1970, op. cit., p. 8. 
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describing the position(s) of Gurindji women in the period exist; my oral history 
interviews with a small number of Gurindji women have done little to fill this gap. Some 
of the Gurindji-cultural reasons for this gender-imbalanced archive I have alluded to, 
though the effects of these have been compounded by extraneous factors.  
To the Gurindji’s European bureaucratic, media and activist interlocutors in the 
late 1960s and 1970s (who were themselves almost exclusively male and from another 
male-dominated society), the older Gurindji men’s monopolisation of the group’s public, 
English pronouncements matched the whites’ expectations about social conduct. Due to 
this similarity between the two cultures, the Gurindji’s (male) interlocutors made little 
discernible effort to obtain the opinions of Gurindji women or young people.51 The older 
Gurindji men’s relative volubility and their interlocutors’ sexism thus contributed to the 
archival creation of a apparently unitary, normative (senior male) Gurindji ‘group’.52 As 
a result, in almost all ‘representative’ accounts of Gurindji opinion, the diversity of 
Gurindji society, and in particular the voices of women, were rendered imperceptible. A 
unitary ‘Gurindji opinion’ could be more readily harnessed by their governmental 
interlocutors to self-justify their own actions. This homogenisation suited the 
interlocutors’ own political, bureaucratic or media-related purposes comprising self-
determination policy’s operationalisation. 
During the self-determination/self-management period, female activists and (from 
the early 1980s) female bureaucrats began consulting with the Gurindji. The focus of 
these women (and that of some of their male counterparts) shifted towards advancing the 
development of a representative Gurindji ‘community’. Questions of women’s agency 
and the ‘voice’ of all Gurindji individuals became increasingly important to their 
interlocutors, and as a result the frequently divergent voices of Gurindji women became 
more discernible in their interlocutors’ writing in the 1980s. Gurindji women also 
increasingly asserted themselves against the authority of older men at the same time.  
                                                 
51  Instead it is likely that they unwittingly reified the old men’s status by exclusively soliciting their 
opinions. My thanks to Jan Richardson [Daguragu Council Clerk, 1985–86] for alerting me to these 
social dynamics. 
52  It should also be noted that a differentiated Gurindji group was also counter-productive to the 
political agenda of the male Gurindji elders. This was recognised by both their supporters and the 
elements of the Northern Territory Administration that were resistant to the elders’ aims. 
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2.1.4 The Gurindji and Indigenous others 
This thesis will demonstrate that Gurindji self-determination was complicated by the 
diversity of its Gurindji subject. Yet in addition to the plurality of opinions and interests 
among Gurindji individuals, the dissenting voices and divergent interests of the members 
of other Indigenous groups on Gurindji land also complicated the community work of 
Gurindji elders and bureaucrats. Foremost among the Aboriginal ‘outsiders’ at Wave Hill 
were members of the neighbouring Warlpiri language group. The Warlpiri are a more 
numerous group than the Gurindji, and Warlpiri traditional country includes much of the 
Tanami Desert, to the south of the Gurindji’s lands (See Map Two).  
Warlpiri families had made their own way to Wave Hill Station in the 1920s, 
particularly in the aftermath of the infamous Coniston Massacre in 1928, which occurred 
some four hundred kilometres to the south-east of Wave Hill Station.53 This initial 
cohabitation of Warlpiri and Gurindji people was amicable, however some Gurindji 
people criticised Warlpiri people for their inability or unwillingness to fully adapt to the 
conditions of modern station life.54 The group Vincent Lingiari led on the Wave Hill 
Walk-off in August 1966 included a number of Warlpiri families, and it is likely that 
these families were among the Warlpiri people who took up residence in the new houses 
built at the Wave Hill Welfare Settlement in 1969 (which the Gurindji ‘track mob’ 
refused to occupy), and who maintained a permanent presence at the Settlement 
(Kalkaringi) in the years afterwards.55  
The enduring presence of Warlpiri people in the county of their northern 
neighbours had also been guaranteed by the Commonwealth after World War Two, when 
the Native Affairs Branch of the Northern Territory Administration (NTA) established 
the Catfish Aboriginal Reserve in the upper Victoria River catchment in 1947. The 
reserve and its eponymous settlement (both soon re-named Hooker Creek, later 
Lajamanu) were established by the NTA to provide all the Aboriginal people in the region 
with alternative opportunities to those offered by the pastoral industry. In 1949, Native 
                                                 
53  The massacre occurred near the present-day community of Laramba. Peter Read and Engineer Jack 
Japaljarri, ‘The Price of Tobacco: the Journey of the Warlmala to Wave Hill, 1928’, Aboriginal 
History, 2, 2 (1978) 140–148. 
54  Ronald and Catherine Berndt, End of an Era: Aboriginal Labour in the Northern Territory 
(Canberra, Australian Institute of Aboriginal Studies, 1987), p. 204. 
55  A census of Aboriginal residents of the Wave Hill Welfare Settlement taken in 1967 names 
approximately 20 individuals among 100 as being Warlpiri. Darwin, NAA, Census Report Wave 
Hill 11, E944. 
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Affairs staff therefore relocated scores of Warlpiri individuals to the new reserve from 
the Warlpiri’s then home at Yuendumu, another government settlement some five 
hundred kilometres to the south.56 This forced migration was repeated after many of the 
people affected returned to Yuendumu on foot on several occasions. Later they accepted 
their permanent residence at Hooker Creek, on Gurindji land. Few Gurindji individuals 
resided at the Hooker Creek Settlement, which was re-named Lajamanu in the 1970s.  
Relations between the Gurindji and Warlpiri immigrants on the Gurindji’s country 
in the self-determination era were peaceable, yet the permanent residence of Warlpiri 
families on Gurindji land at Lajamanu and the two groups’ residence at Kalkaringi 
required considerable negotiation. As we will see in Chapter Nine, the law/ceremonial 
aspects of these negotiations were apparently resolved in 1974, however the practical 
implications of Warlpiri people living as ‘immigrants’ in a community over which 
Gurindji elders had responsibility remained problematic. We will see in the remainder of 
this thesis (particularly in Chapters Nine and Ten, which deal with the efforts of Gurindji 
leaders and their government interlocutors to create a representative Aboriginal political 
body), that the presence of Warlpiri individuals at Kalkaringi complicated such 
endeavours significantly.57 A lack of responsibility for the behaviour of Aboriginal 
‘visitors’ in the Gurindji communities impeded Gurindji elders’ and bureaucrats’ efforts 
to cultivate a cohesive collective social body at Kalkaringi and Daguragu. To the extent 
that self-determination policy sought to cultivate a series of cohesive Aboriginal polities, 
the heterogeneity of the Aboriginal population at Wave Hill was problematic. 
As we have seen in this region, there is a general correlation between a group’s 
shared language and the boundaries of the traditional country that those language 
speakers inhabit. Understanding this though does not tell us either how those groups are 
composed in regards of their members’ traditional estates. Neither does it inform us of 
the issues that might arise when speakers of different languages lived together on a 
language group’s country, as was evidently the case at Wave Hill after European 
settlement. The interrelationship of the Gurindji’s social organisation and their 
responsibilities for and rights over land are therefore topics that we must consider here. 
Like any system of property law, the customary approach of Indigenous Australians to 
                                                 
56  Peter Forrest, Upper Victoria River District Historic Sites Survey (National Trust of Australia, 
Darwin, Date Unknown), p. 64. 
57  Not least because those with cultural authority over Kalkaringi’s Warlpiri residents—and their 
visitors—frequently resided at Lajamanu. 
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the recognition and allocation of land rights is complex. Indigenous people’s customary 
practices of social organisation relating to their rights and responsibilities regarding land 
have also inevitably been affected by their radically changed circumstances resulting 
from colonisation.  
The notion of the ‘estate’ as the primary unit of Aboriginal land tenure was first 
put forward by anthropologist WEH Stanner. Since the 1970s, anthropologists have 
acknowledged the estate as a common land denomination among Aboriginal Australian 
groups, with regional variations in the application of the concept, and substantial 
modification in its application post-settlement.58 On each estate there are sites that the 
Traditional Owners are obliged to look after and this includes Traditional Owners having 
an acknowledged right to regulate others’ access to estates and to their sacred sites. These 
points were made by Justice Woodward in his Report on Aboriginal Land Rights.59 With 
variation from region to region of the relationship between sites and estates, and even the 
application of the estate concept itself, who may be said to possess an estate and how 
they do so are therefore matters requiring elaboration.   
An authoritative account of Aboriginal social organisation regarding land is 
provided by anthropologist Peter Sutton in his work Native Title in Australia.60 There, 
Sutton identifies ‘clans’ as the primary Aboriginal social grouping with landholding 
rights. In his ALRA report, Woodward advanced that membership of a clan was primarily 
determined by patrilineal descent, though this has been subsequently recognised as an 
inaccurate simplification. As I have mentioned, people with land rights bestowed by 
virtue of their patriline are referred to among the Gurindji as ngurramala. Although the 
clan denomination is recognised in much of Australia, one qualification of Woodward’s 
proposal has been the acknowledgment of the secondary estate rights of the matrifiliate 
group I described earlier: kurtungulu, ‘policemen’ or ‘workers’ to the Gurindji. The 
coexistence and interdependence of these social groupings indicate the plurality of 
Aboriginal rights to land: another fact recognised during ALRA’s operationalisation but 
not anticipated by the advice from Woodward. Regarding this plurality, Sutton argues 
that it is useful to distinguish between ‘primary’ and ‘non‐primary’ forms of connection 
                                                 
58  Peter Sutton, Native Title in Australia: An Ethnographic Perspective (Cambridge University Press, 
Melbourne, 2003), p. 69. 
59  Justice Edward Woodward, Aboriginal Land Rights Commission: First Report (Australian 
Government Publishing Service, 1973), p. 19. 
60  Sutton, 2003, p. 69. 
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or affiliation.61 Characteristically, the realisation of these rights are determined by virtue 
of context and negotiation, and among the Gurindji at least, ‘primary’ and ‘non‐primary’ 
connections are ascribed equal importance. The classical ‘ideal’ is rarely expressed, but 
rather lends itself to constant adaptation. 
How were these rights and relationships apportioned by the Gurindji then? Did 
Gurindji people’s agglomeration and partial containment for more than half a century on 
Wave Hill Station affect their land tenure? The Daguragu Claim hearings of July 1982 
shed some light on these matters. In his resultant report, Aboriginal Land Commissioner 
Justice Toohey notes that “though there is a very real sense in which the Gurindji have a 
deep, general attachment to the land under claim, the area can also be seen in terms of 
smaller ‘estates’ for which local descent groups have particular responsibility”.62 One 
such descent group were Bilinarra speakers, members of which were named as Group 1 
in the Daguragu Land Claim. This group’s land included much of the northern area of 
the claim. Although they had traditionally been socially separated from the Gurindji prior 
to settlement, the group’s numbers were subsequently depleted and its members 
identified increasingly with and among the larger Gurindji group.63 In the case of ‘Group 
12’ in the Land Claim, more radical accommodation to the exigencies of European 
settlement had been made. Due to Group 12’s almost ‘dying out’ for reasons unspecified 
in the Claim Book, the clan’s surviving membership at the time of the hearing consisted 
of a single female member. As this woman lacked children, the Group’s membership 
would conventionally have ended at this point, but the children of the woman’s mother’s 
brothers had in fact been admitted as members. Anthropologist Dr Robert Tonkinson, 
who advised on the claim, noted that while it was unconventional for individuals to claim 
primary responsibility for an estate on this basis, there were numerous grounds on which 
this could be done in ways ‘congruent with the Aborigine’s cultural values’.64  
As evidenced by these vignettes, Gurindji people were well-practiced at adapting 
their land tenure arrangements ‘among themselves’ to accommodate the dramatically 
changeable conditions of their lives in a postcolonial context. As Sutton describes, 
‘classical forms of land use, such as foraging, […] are sanctioned by custom but subject 
                                                 
61  Sutton, 2003, pp. 1–14. 
62  Aboriginal Land Commissioner, ‘Land Claim by Gurindji to Daguragu Station’ (Australian 
Government Publishing Service, Canberra, 1982), p. 10. 
63  Sutton, 2003, p. 13. 
64  Sutton, 2003, p. 23. 
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to sometimes rapid transformations’.65 Such accommodations show how mutability of 
tenure provided continuity and security both within and between remote Aboriginal 
groups.  
In the case of the Gurindji regarding their Warlpiri neighbours at Hooker 
Creek/Lajamanu and those Warlpiri residing at Kalkaringi, we will see in Chapters Nine 
and Ten that these matters acquired some significance. Acknowledging that residents of 
Aboriginal communities in post-settlement Australia (such as Kalkaringi’s Warlpiri) 
commonly live on country over which they do not hold customary rights, Sutton notes: 
‘It is possible for […] this arrangement to be codified under an agreement or 
determination’.66 In Chapters Nine and Ten, I will show that the exigencies of local 
governance as it was practiced in the self-determination era hastened such codification 
by Gurindji elders. 
2.1.5 The ‘New Generation’  
As we can see regarding their land tenure and kinship arrangements, Gurindji life in the 1970s–
80s was largely characterised by social change. The Gurindji’s social organisation, gender-roles and 
political cohesion were challenged in unprecedented ways during the period of this study. As I will 
make clear in Chapter Four, the availability of cash and alcohol were important factors used by 
younger Gurindji to distinguish themselves from their elders and the social order they espoused. 
Another dynamic of the growing ‘generation gap’ among the Gurindji was apparent to Wattie Creek’s 
elders by the late 1970s: the growing under-employment of young people. The reasons for this were 
many: the Gurindji population was getting younger—a trend that had only increased after their 1966 
Walk-off—while access to unemployment benefits had simultaneously increased, largely removing 
purely financial incentives to work.67 This ‘new generation’, as it eventually became known, was 
also attitudinally distinguished from its progenitors.68 Significantly, the formative years of Gurindji 
elders—and most of their adult lives—had until this time occurred within the pastoral industry. That 
industry had placed many demands upon older Gurindji people, some of which had inculcated 
amongst them a positive attitude to physical labour. In contrast, for the young people who had come 
                                                 
65  Sutton, 2003, p. 25. 
66  Sutton, 2003, p. 26. 
67  Hon Paul Everingham, ‘After Land Rights…Self-reliance’, Aboriginal News, Vol. 3, No. 6, 1979, 
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of age during the vastly altered circumstances of their society’s occupation at Wattie Creek, the 
necessity of performing hard physical work had been removed, and for many its merits were not self-
evident.69 To the consternation of elders and advisers alike, such novel attitudes limited both the 
number of employees working for local businesses and projects, and the amount of work performed 
by those employees.  
The rise of the Gurindji ‘new generation’ influenced both the ability of Gurindji 
leaders to advance their self-determination-type goals, and their ability to respond 
effectively to the federal and NT governments’ self-determination and self-management 
policy initiatives. For these reasons, social change and gender differentiation among the 
Gurindji form an important part of the story I will narrate in Part Two of this thesis.   
2.2.0 Wattie Creek’s founding visions  
In their early years at Wattie Creek, Vincent Lingiari, brothers Long Johnny Kijngayari, 
Pincher Nyurrmiyarri and Mick Rangiari, and brothers Jerry Rinyngayarri and Donald 
Nangiari articulated a set of goals for their homestead and their people’s future. As I also 
conveyed in the Introduction of this thesis, prior to and during the 1973–86 period, many 
of the goals or ‘visions’ described by these men remained consistent, and became subjects 
of the federal government’s self-determination policies.  
Before I outline these goals, some contextualisation is necessary. When and how 
the Gurindji leaders (and/or others) developed their collective aims has been the subject 
of extensive commentary and analysis, including my own.70 During 1969–72, Gurindji 
elders and their supporters held increasingly detailed and complex discussions about 
realising the Aborigines’ vision. The elders became increasingly proficient in 
communicating their goals in English (their third, fourth or fifth language), and their 
understanding of Australian political, parliamentary and legislative processes also 
increased—or so I surmise from the statements they recorded at that time. When, for 
instance, Lingiari directed activists to submit an application for a ‘business 
development’-type special purpose lease to the McMahon Government on behalf of 
                                                 
69  George, 2010. 
70  See, for example, Frank Hardy, The Unlucky Australians, Sydney, Nelson, 1968 (2006 edn, 
Melbourne, One Day Hill); Charlie Ward, 'Tracking Wave Hill — Following the Gurindji to 
Wattie Creek, 1966–72' (Unpublished MA thesis, Flinders University, 2012); Bain Attwood, ‘The 
Articulation of ‘Land Rights’ in Australia: The Case of Wave Hill’, Social Analysis, 44, 1 (2000), 
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Gurindji leaders, he was cognisant of the broad differences between leasehold and 
freehold tenure.71 Similarly, the growing depth of Mick Rangiari’s political analysis is 
shown by his contemporaneous opinion that the McMahon Government was attempting 
to undermine the land rights campaign associated with the Gurindji by delaying the 
supply of piped water to their camp at Wattie Creek.72  
When the self-determination policy period began in 1973, the Gurindji’s leaders 
already held clear views about the features—some extant/traditionally-based, and some 
untested—of the society they wished to create.73 It is necessary to provide evidence of 
these ambitions, for the means by which bureaucrats concerned with Aboriginal self-
determination recognised the Gurindji’s aspirations (or not), (mis)interpreted and 
apparently adopted them to justify federal and NT government program activity, are key 
themes of Part Two of this thesis. To understand the interpretation of Gurindji goals by 
their government interlocutors, we need to know who developed those goals and how 
they did so. In light of this, I will summarise the goals of Gurindji men as they articulated 
them in the period, and comment on the circumstances of their formulation.  
2.2.1 Land and land rights 
According to Gurindji accounts quoted in reportage after the Wave Hill Walk-off and in 
Frank Hardy’s detailed contemporaneous book The Unlucky Australians, by the mid-
1960s, Gurindji leaders were prepared to take action to access their traditional land.74 On 
the advice of then shadow Attorney General Lionel Murphy, Hardy sent a petition to the 
Governor General Sir Richard Casey, requesting that the government return the 
Gurindji’s land to them.75 It was marked with an ‘X’ by Vincent Lingiari, Pincher 
Nyurrmiarri, Long Johnny Kijngayari and Gerry Ngalgardji. To compose the petition, 
Hardy, school teacher Anne Jeffrey and her Welfare Officer husband Bill had translated 
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the Gurindji men’s statements from Aboriginal English. Similarly, in The Unlucky 
Australians and his own newspaper reportage, Hardy articulated the desires of the 
Gurindji men regarding their land in written English by drawing upon tape recordings he 
made. What had Lingiari’s coterie said to Hardy about land, though? 
According to The Unlucky Australians (1968), Lingiari reported after the Walk-off 
that before his people’s departure from Wave Hill he had ‘Bin thinkin’ this bin Gurindji 
country. We been here longa time before them Bestey mob’.76 Apparently, Hardy also 
recorded Pincher Nyurrmiarri, saying unprompted, ‘We want them Bestey mob bin go 
away from here […]. This is our country, alla this country bin Gurindji country’.77 
Gurindji oral historical accounts created since this time have maintained that reclaiming 
their land was an intention of the senior Gurindji men that pre-dated the Walk-off by at 
least several years, after a long gestational phase.78 
In Hardy’s account of the process by which the Gurindji’s desire for land was first 
enunciated to, by and/or among whites at Wave Hill in the summer of 1966/67, he goes 
to some lengths to dissuade sceptical readers that he might have inspired the Gurindji’s 
seemingly new desire for land himself. In The Unlucky Australians, Hardy professed his 
personal concern about such attributions, and relayed to his readers the summarised 
assurance Gurindji people used to assuage his own worry: ‘Very good, right way to have 
we own land’.79 Reassured of the Gurindji men’s independent goal of land reclamation, 
Hardy attributed ‘vaguely behind every thought [of the Gurindji] a desire to live alone in 
their own land’.80  Bain Attwood has argued in a detailed review that Hardy understated 
his role in developing the Gurindji’s germinal political program regarding their land 
rights.81  
                                                 
76  I have reproduced Hardy’s rendering of Gurindji pronunciation and Aboriginal English verbatim in 
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Once the Gurindji leaders had revealed their desire for land reclamation to Hardy 
and other kartiya, men such as Mick Rangiari and Captain Major (Lupngagiari) reiterated 
it in press reports and national speaking tours during 1968–71. Informed by the 
statements of Gurindji elders, journalists and activists framed the Gurindji’s landless 
situation as the subject of a national campaign for Aboriginal Land Rights.82  
In the Gurindji leaders’ conversations with kartiya about their broader goals, land 
remained a consistent theme. As growing numbers of individuals participated in pro-land 
rights campaigning—frequently conducted on the Gurindji’s behalf—activists went to 
increasing lengths to ascertain that they had up-to-date and reliable information about the 
Gurindji leaders’ land-related (and other) intentions. This was achieved to their 
satisfaction by consultative visits to Wattie Creek, and after 1969, via communications 
from a number of literate live-in assistants who were tasked with conveying the needs of 
the Gurindji leaders.83  
In my assessment of the bureaucracy’s endeavours to assist the Gurindji to realise 
their vision in Part Two of this thesis, such issues of interpretation will be critical. The 
purpose the Gurindji leaders wished to put their land to—as acknowledged by their public 
service interlocutors—provides something of a case in point. That purpose was to 
manage their own cattle.  
2.2.2 A Gurindji cattle operation 
Presumably to denote their perceived similarity and equality with surrounding 
pastoralists, in 1967 Gurindji leaders asked Frank Hardy to write a sign for them in 
English. On it, he painted the words ‘Gurindji Mining Lease and Cattle Station’. Earlier, 
Lingiari had announced his plans: ‘What about them bloody cattle? That bin the main 
one. What I bin thinking is we buy few horses and few cattle. Later on we trap cattle 
[…].84 Pincher Nyurrmiarri also thought the Gurindji could catch unbranded ‘cleanskins’ 
from their neighbours—a common practice in the industry—but Lingiari became wary 
of potentially violent, punitive repercussions if the Gurindji were accused of stealing 
stock from surrounding stations. Soon afterwards, he decided to ask the Northern 
Territory Administration for cattle instead: ‘we try to ask Welfare about pump and piping, 
                                                 
82  Ward, 2014, pp. 69–92. 
83  Ward, 2014, pp. 74–78. 
84  Hardy, op. cit., p. 180. 
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cattle and horses’.85 The Gorton Government’s refusal to support the Gurindji in this way 
became well known, though their leaders remained fixed on establishing and keeping 
their own cattle herd.  
In 1970, Pincher Nyurrmiyarri described the Gurindji’s land-use intentions: ‘We 
been trying to get this land back, you know, and put up block for live, and work the cattle 
and horses, so we can make money’.86 The Gurindji’s supporters mobilised to assist them 
to achieve this. Melbourne-based representatives of the student group Abschol 
conjectured that these would be significant undertakings, which they realised: 
[would] require firstly the granting of land, and then massive, but by no means 
impossibly large, support in the form of loans and grants from the 
Commonwealth.87  
If the Gurindji could get title allowing them to operate and maintain a small horse 
paddock and living area, activists reasoned that the Aborigines might then be able to 
obtain government support for a cattle-focused business venture. 88 They assumed this 
would give the elders the opportunity to realise their stock-related desires. Individuals in 
Melbourne and Darwin worked towards achieving these goals, and in late 1970, Gurindji 
elders incorporated to form the ‘Muramulla Gurindji Cattle Company’. As I have 
indicated, the elders were consulted and informed about this and other developments via 
their participation in many long meetings and correspondence translated for them into 
Aboriginal English. Nonetheless, they did not understand the full financial and legal 
ramifications of incorporation.89 Guided by assurances from Muramulla Board members 
that they envisioned ‘a big station […] same as other people have got it’, activists 
nonetheless lobbied politicians to support the Gurindji’s strong, though little-defined, 
cattle ambitions.90  
This lobbying had far-reaching, consequences. Troubled by the situation of 
displaced Aboriginal groups like the Gurindji—or its own lack of perceived action—the 
                                                 
85  Hardy, op. cit., pp. 204, 205. 
86  See Pincher Nyurrmiyarri, Pincher Numiari [sic] — Gurindji Plans and Attitudes: An Interview by 
Warwick Neilley (Abschol and Save the Gurindji Campaign, 1970), p. 4. 
87 Rob and Kay Oke, Paul Fox, David Twitt, What Now at Wattie Creek: Report of the Abschol Field 
Team (Melbourne, National Union of Australian University Students, 1970), p. 6. 
88  Cited in Rob Oke to Min. Nixon, 11 November 1970, Oke Personal Collection. 
89  Ward, 2014, op. cit., pp. 76–79. 
90  Committee of Muramulla Gurindji Company to Managing Director of Vestey’s, 12 December 1970, 
Oke Personal Collection. 
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McMahon Government launched an inquiry into the situation of Aboriginal people on 
cattle stations, chaired by psychologist Cecil Gibb. Although the resulting ‘Gibb Report’ 
was ambivalent on the issue of the viability of a Gurindji cattle enterprise, the federal 
Office of Aboriginal Affairs advised the government that it should act to purchase 
pastoral land for Aboriginal groups.91 The Liberal Country Party Coalition was slow to 
act on this recommendation, but a policy of returning such land to Aboriginal groups was 
adopted by the Australian Labor Party at its annual conference of 1971. When the ALP 
won the federal election of 2 December 1972, purchasing land for a Gurindji cattle 
operation was one of its goals. Gurindji men had already installed a large amount of 
fencing (albeit illegally) to keep their cattle, and requested their Adelaide-based 
supporters to apply for a ‘Gurindji’ cattle brand.92  
As I shall show in Chapter Five, under the auspices of the Whitlam Government’s 
self-determination policy, considerable effort was invested in creating the means by 
which groups such as the Gurindji could acquire leasehold or Aboriginal freehold land 
to operate subsidised cattle businesses. This support was central to the efforts of the DAA 
and other agencies to create a self-determining Gurindji agent, though I will argue that 
the terms of support offered by the state for a Gurindji cattle enterprise were a reflection 
of bureaucratic and political exigencies rather than the Gurindji’s own aspirations. The 
economic and managerial dimensions of the cattle business model advanced at Daguragu 
under the auspices of self-determination policy were also poorly understood by Gurindji 
elders, and often its proponents.  
2.2.3 ‘Two-way’ schooling at Daguragu 
As encapsulated in the Gurindji elders’ statements I have quoted above, a school was 
central to their vision. Although Gurindji children had only been schooled at the Wave 
Hill Welfare settlement since a classroom was built there by the Welfare Branch in 1961, 
the elders valued education highly. ‘I bin thinkin’ we should build school at Wattie Creek, 
                                                 
91  HC ‘Nugget’ Coombs, Kulinma, (Canberra, Australian National University Press, 1978), p. 167; 
Cecil Gibb et al, The Report of the Committee to Review the Situation of Aborigines on Pastoral 
Properties in the Northern Territory, (Canberra, Commonwealth Government Printer’s Office, 
1973), p. 88. 
92  Ward, 2012, pp. 174–75. 
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[our] own Gurindji school maybe, later on’, Lingiari said after the Gurindji’s departure 
from Wave Hill Station. ‘I got own teachers, Billy and Eddy’, he continued.93  
To the elders, a school of their own would not only provide young Gurindji with 
the skills to manage the facilities (and provide the services) they envisaged at Wattie 
Creek; it would also bolster their own efforts to exert control over young men. According 
to Lingiari in 1967, the provision of extant European schooling at the Welfare settlement 
was detrimental:  
’Nother thing worries me about them school childrens […]. They come here [to the 
Welfare settlement] to [kartiya] school. Well I might say you gotta do this way, 
dance that way—and them poor silly bugger in [kartiya] school mightn’t believe 
me, […] so I gotta hab my school Wattie Creek, teach ’em proper Gurindji way.94 
 
According to then brick layer Alan Thorpe, when he was employed by Abschol to support 
the Gurindji at Wattie Creek in 1971, the elders there:  
[…] Were always insistent that the kids were going to school. The kids would climb 
on the back of the [school] truck in the morning, and you’d see parents chasing 
them with a stick if they didn’t get on. The old people of Wattie Creek realised that 
Aboriginal people needed to get an education, otherwise white people would be 
running things for them forever.95  
In a letter dictated in 1971 by Muramulla Company Director Donald Nangiari to Barrie 
Dexter (then a member of the Council of Aboriginal Affairs, and Director of its Office), 
Nangiari stated that he wished to send his daughter Judith and another girl to ‘see what 
they can learn’ in Sydney, and return to Wattie Creek to teach ‘all children and middle-
aged […], so we can sign our name […]’.96 On the same day, Nangiari requested ‘a 
teacher here for the little children [and] middle-aged people’.97  
                                                 
93  Hardy, 1968 (2006), p. 179. 
94  ibid.  
95  Darwin, NTAS, Alan Thorpe, Interview by Charlie Ward, January 2010, NTRS 3609, BWF 9. 
96  Nangiari to Dexter, 23 August 1971, Oke Personal Collection. At this time, Abschol was attempting 
to promote the introduction of compulsory subjects on Ngumpit culture into the national school 
curriculum, also at the request of the Gurindji. See Ward, 2014, op. cit., pp. 69–92, p. 84–86; 
Lawson to Nangiari, 8 January 1972, Oke Personal Collection.  
97  Nangiari to Lawson [Abschol], 23 August 1971, Riddett Personal Collection. 
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Lingiari also recognised that the children of Wattie Creek would require vocational 
training. When discussing the independent small village he wanted to build, Lingiari said: 
‘I send maybe four people to Darwin. Two girl, two boy. One girl make ’em nurse, one 
girl make ’em teacher, one boy make ’em doctor, one boy make ’em carpenter’.98 A 
doctor and a nurse Health, education and trades/infrastructure: Lingiari’s list of 
professions reveals that the Gurindji elders had an accurate picture of the educational 
requirements that realising their independent society would require.  
The frequency and detail of their entreaties about education conveys that the 
Gurindji did not want a school in the same way that they wanted a laundry, a mechanical 
workshop or even a clinic—aims they announced in 1970 but had little to say about 
afterwards.99 Rather, Gurindji statements show that they identified the provision of 
western education at Daguragu to their youth—which they intended to supplement 
themselves with traditional lore and law—as integral to their plan of creating an 
independent Gurindji homeland for future generations. 
Although they did not explicitly say so, we may confidently surmise that to the 
elders, teaching the students ‘proper Gurindji way’ meant teaching them in Gurindji 
language. We may also surmise that they foresaw their children’s instruction by non-
Indigenous teachers in ‘kartiya way’ as occurring in English. When I gloss the elders’ 
educational vision as that of creating a ‘two-way’ school in this thesis, I am therefore 
referring to its bicultural and bilingual aspects. As we will see in Chapter Eight however, 
the elders’ envisaged combination of instruction in Gurindji and English only 
tangentially accorded with the Whitlam and Fraser Government’s later promotion of a 
‘Bilingual education program’ in some remote Aboriginal community schools.  
2.2.4 Wattie Creek/Daguragu, an independent homestead 
According to numerous oral histories collected from Gurindji men in the late 1990s by 
Minoru Hokari, the independence of the Gurindji’s village was a definitive feature of the 
vision inspiring Gurindji leaders prior to their Walk-off from Wave Hill Station.100 This 
is confirmed by older accounts. When the Gurindji leaders were camped adjacent to the 
Welfare Settlement in 1967, for instance, Frank Hardy was startled by the old men’s 
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rejection of any support, from the Welfare Branch or other Europeans. Mick Rangiari 
made clear then that Wattie Creek was to be an autonomous Gurindji enclave:  
Wattie Creek is own country. […] We want to see white people clear right out of 
Wattie Creek. We do own business. […] Only we say who can come there, that 
Bestey mob and Welfare not come there, only maybe one hour talk to we then go 
away. We work right way over there for wesel’.101  
Vincent Lingiari expanded:  
Wattie Creek is Gurindji country, we will live there. […] We have to work 
properly. Like kartiya—only now for we sel’. […] Work so we live good. Someone 
give you job, you do that job. Keep everything clean and tidy over there […]. 
Children come to school every day. They bin grow up right way, read and write 
proper way. Later on, others come back from Camfield and Montejinnie [stations]. 
All Gurindji together in we own country’.102 
In 1967, Lingiari was optimistic about his people’s anticipated autonomy:  
 
I got ebrything now, I bin reckon. I got ’em [Gurindji] motor mechanic, got ’em 
own fencing contractor, got ’em own teachers, got ’em own sign, got own Jesus 
man.103   
I have argued elsewhere that in terms of their program of physical development for 
Wattie Creek, at this time the Gurindji were outward-looking, materialist, and 
aspirational.104 Statements such as that made by Pincher Nyurrmiarri to Frank Hardy in 
1967 confirm this:  
We very happy back in we own country. We build ’em five house here, five more 
ober there [sic]. We fence ’em in horse paddock, build ’em airstrip, build ’em road, 
build ’em school, and maybe later on, proper press button toilet.105 
                                                 
101  Hardy, op. cit., p. 172. 
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103  Hardy, op. cit., p. 197. 
104  Charlie Ward, ‘The Gurindji Walk-off: Orality, Causality and some Counter-narratives from Wave 
Hill, 1966’, School of History Seminar Series, Australian National University, 26 September 2012. 
105  Hardy, op. cit., p. 196. 
Ch. 2 Gurindji Society and Goals 
70 
 
At the time, Nyurrmiarri and other Gurindji men had built the first five houses at Wattie 
Creek, relying only on a few tools given by outsiders. As Nyurrmiarri’s use of the 
collective first-person pronoun here indicates, the Gurindji intended to realise their goals 
themselves, or with the minimum assistance possible. I shall argue in this thesis that the 
autonomy of the Gurindji elders’ homestead—and any independent progress made 
towards it—was of equal or greater importance to them than the quotidian, physical 
measures of development favoured by government.    
2.3 Self-determination Policy and Gurindji Goals.  
Having outlined Aboriginal self-determination policy’s origins and initial intentions in 
the previous chapter, we can see that Gurindji intentions were consistent with those of 
the government’s policy. The Gurindji elders apparently represented an Aboriginal 
collective with an expressed interest in self-managing their economic, health and 
educative requirements. In many ways, the Gurindji represent the model of an 
aspirational Aboriginal group (Community Types Two and Three in Table 2), on which 
the policy was founded.  
It is no accident that the Gurindji elders’ goals were consistent and apparently aligned 
with those of Whitlam’s ALP in 1973, as the Gurindji’s situation had informed the Council 
of Aboriginal Affairs’ policy development, and Labor had largely adopted the CAA’s 
recommendations. In the remainder of this thesis, I thus refer to the Gurindji elders’ ‘self-
determination-like goals’, or even ‘Gurindji self-determination’. My justification for doing 
so does not rely on evidence of Gurindji people using, or even being aware of the phrase 
‘self-determination’, but rather draws on Gurindji statements about their aspirations of 
autonomy in the 1966–1982 period, and their willingness to accept government support 
ostensibly matching the achievement of those goals.  
Their land, a self-managed cattle operation, school, and an independent homestead 
were the four pillars of the Gurindji leaders’ vision. I have chosen to describe the Gurindji 
leaders’ ambitions in this way—as comprising a vision, rather than a plan—because 
while the elders’ sense of what they wished to achieve was clear, how they could do so 
was largely unknown to them. Their ignorance in this regard requires some explanation, 
because its repercussions were significant.  
The Gurindji leaders’ vision was of a novel hybrid homestead, in which Ngumpit 
and European modes of production and organisation were combined. Their decision to 
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include in this features that were extraneous or novel to their own experience—returning 
a profit on cattle, for instance, or operating a school—was presumably made on the basis 
of their observations of equivalent facilities and operations, mostly in the cattle industry. 
Yet in an important sense, their observation of these had been only partial. Like other 
Aboriginal people, the Gurindji elders had been employed only in subordinate roles that 
required no literacy (financial or otherwise), and only a modicum of numeracy during 
their lives in the cattle industry.106 As leaders of a new type of Gurindji society, this 
compromised their position significantly. 
The facilities on which Gurindji leaders modelled their own prospective kartiya-
type operations were dependent upon the health of the international beef market and/or 
subject to the demands of federal government administration—facts of which they were 
unaware. These linkages and dependencies of Wave Hill and other stations were 
maintained by correspondence, financial transactions, reports, acquittals and inspections 
by governmental and other interlocutors, and were wholly outside the Gurindji’s 
experience. What would have appeared to them as independent enterprises then, were in 
fact funded by absent company owners and/or subsidised and monitored by government 
agencies. The labour entailed by these operations was also necessary to operate the 
facilities the Gurindji elders wanted at Daguragu, though they had never done this kind 
of work themselves and its nature was not apparent to them. 
The elders’ situation while they were publicly articulating and refining their vision 
also diminished the likelihood that these dependencies and linkages would come to their 
attention. Living largely on their own terms, five miles from a remote government 
outpost (with a succession of handpicked ‘helpers’ effectively tasked with reducing their 
dependence on ‘Welfare’), the Gurindji were then operating with a degree of 
independence from the state perhaps unequalled by any other Aboriginal group in 
Australia. 
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If, as I contend, the previous curtailment of the Gurindji’s professional experience 
and self-imposed isolation had obscured from them that the type of enterprises they 
wished to create—and upon which they would stake their highly-desired independence—
was thoroughly embedded within the political economy of the Australian nation state, 
this raises a series of questions. How did the perceived and actual limits to Aboriginal 
independence afforded by self-determination and self-management policies differ from 
those anticipated by the Gurindji? Did the Gurindji’s interlocutors perceive or 
acknowledge any discrepancy in this regard between the terms of self-determination 
policy and the Gurindji’s vision? And as perceived and actual discrepancies between the 
Gurindji’s vision and those inherent in the policy implemented by their DAA 
interlocutors were realised (or not) during the development of the Gurindji’s community, 
what would the ramifications be for both parties, and for the community they collectively 
created? As noted, we are seeing that what the Gurindji wanted was consistent with 
government policy, but how they would get that remained an unanswered question. It 
would become apparent to staff in the Department of Aboriginal Affairs that self-
determination policy simply presupposed capacities in Aboriginal people that the 
Gurindji lacked: an issue pertinent to my argument in the following chapter. 
2.4 Conclusion  
In the foregoing, I have expanded upon the rather normative and reductive representation 
of ‘the Gurindji’ employed in both historical media reports and my opening chapters. My 
purpose has been to describe the diversity of the Gurindji population and the complexity 
of their inter-related social, religious and ‘legal’ structures. When, later in this thesis, I 
examine this society’s interaction with government agencies intent on assisting its ‘self-
determination’, the information I have provided here will be essential to understanding 
the responses of, and social effects upon, Gurindji people. Similarly, the causes and 
symptoms of social change among the Gurindji will be rendered comprehensible.  
My intention in this chapter has also been to establish that Vincent Lingiari and his 
coterie of male leaders were highly ambitious; that they held firm though untested ideas, 
which I have outlined, about the economic, social and political conditions of their future 
society. I have also attempted to show that they had identified several measures by which 
they believed that vision could be achieved. Those means, which were to them also 
measures of progress, were the return of their land, the possession and management of 
Ch. 2 Gurindji Society and Goals 
73 
 
their own cattle, the independence of their own homestead (including their control of the 
presence of ‘Welfare’ and Europeans), and a Gurindji-run school.  
In theory, these elements of the Gurindji’s vision would all fall within the policy 
ambit of the new Whitlam Government-initiated self-determination policy in the early 
1970s. Yet this policy, and the federal and NTG ‘self-management’ policies that followed 
it, were (or soon evolved to become) inherently contradictory, and apparently produced 
outcomes at odds with their rhetorically-stated intentions. To provide a fuller portrait of 
self-determination policy—before I show its effects on the Gurindji, and how it was co-
opted by them and the governments committed to its execution—is therefore my next 
task
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Ch. 3 Understanding a Liberalist Policy: 
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In combination with the analysis of Gurindji social dynamics and aspirations provided 
in the foregoing, this Chapter renders Gurindji self-determination’s un/realised forms 
(described in Part Two) comprehensible. Here I describe the ideological and theoretical 
dimensions of postcolonial governance within the Australian settler state relevant to my 
argument. To do this, I show how ‘self-determination’ (and its adapted version, ‘self-
management’) became phrases used by governments and those in the Aboriginal 
domain to describe variable programs, policies and approaches constituting Aboriginal 
governance. Drawing on scholarly analysis, I elaborate my own definition(s) of self-
determination in its various phases, and their points of intersection and elisions with the 
Gurindji people’s aspirations. Accepting self-determination policy’s portrayal as a 
‘communalising’, incorporative rationality by Tim Rowse and others, I argue that 
instead, the effects of social differentiation on Gurindji self-determination were 
comprehensive. I then show that individualistic and generation-specific responses of 
remote Aboriginal people to their situation in the 1970s are rendered comprehensible 
by political theorist Chandran Kukathas’s notion of the right of dis/association in a ‘free 
society’. I show why Gurindji society was predisposed towards novel forms of 
differentiation, and how aspects of government social policy in the 1960s–70s (hastened 
by technological and cultural impacts) created the economic and legal conditions in 
which this could occur. The chapter concludes with my consideration of Gurindji 
people’s use of dissociation as both a process with ‘incidental’ consequences for their 
self-determination, and as a tool of creative resistance used against the imposition of 
collective responsibility that the policy entailed. From this I develop the notion of 
‘disappearance’ as a dissociative technique used by Gurindji people to render elements 
of Gurindji sociality and agency unresponsive to the influence of governments. 
Ch. 3 Understanding a Liberalist Policy 
75 
 
3.1 The Policy’s Origins and Outcomes 
Although self-determination was seen by its proponents as a radical departure from the 
assimilation policy that preceded it, both were strongly influenced by social liberalism. 
Aboriginal policy scholar Tim Rowse has pointed to the continuities between the two 
policies. To Rowse, self-determination represented the ‘maturing of the governmental 
techniques of assimilation’, in which the policy came of age.1 Although assimilation 
policy initially denied equal rights to Aboriginal people, for the first time it had 
acknowledged their existence as individuals (and citizens) with the potential to hold 
equal rights, and gradually sought to bring about that formal equality. 
In devising the NT’s now-infamous Welfare Ordinance 1953 (NT), senior public 
servant Paul Hasluck had been concerned to provide a non-racial legislative framework 
to administer the affairs of Aboriginal individuals with a view to their assimilation. 
According to political scientist Will Sanders, by describing the Ordinance’s subjects as 
‘wards’ rather than Aborigines, ‘Hasluck intended to keep the way open for Aboriginal 
people to be treated, at least in principle, equally with other Australians’.2 Under the 
Ordinance, ‘special measures and tutelage applying to particular Aborigines would not 
be permanent and based on race, but temporary and based on need’, Sanders writes. At 
the time the Ordinance was framed, the policy informing it was viewed as highly 
progressive. Under Assimilation, voting rights, welfare eligibility, equal pay and the 
right to drink were extended to Aboriginal people for the first time. Like the self-
determination policies of Australian Governments which followed it, Assimilation 
policy was designed to foster a social, economic, discursive ‘place’ for Aboriginal 
people in the nation’s public life and to recognise their culture and humanity, albeit by 
different means. In remote Australia, Assimilation’s recognition of Aboriginal people’s 
rights within the settler society’s welfare, legal and economic systems created the pre-
conditions that increasingly enabled them to resist or ignore traditional social 
prescriptions, with less likelihood of repercussion from traditionalist sources. In the 
Gurindji people’s case, prior to 1966 they were shielded from the effects of these 
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and Reformer of Aboriginal Affairs’, in Paul Hasluck in Australian History: Civic Personality 
and Public Life, edited by Tom Stannage, Kay Saunders, Richard Nile (University of Queensland 
Press, St Lucia, Qld, 1998) 106–118 (p. 110). 
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changes due to their physical isolation and economic integration within the pastoral 
industry. 
 By the early 1960s, the race-based exceptionalism that Assimilation policy was 
designed to gradually extinguish had been problematised by a small but growing protest 
movement comprised mostly of non-Indigenous, urban activists. These activists largely 
agreed with Assimilation policy’s aims of formal equality, but complained that 
governments were too slow to implement it. Their nascent movement was increasingly 
concerned that the treatment of Aboriginal Australians paralleled that of Black South 
Africans and African Americans in the USA.3  
Later in the 1960s, most Australian governments and their advisors were 
cognisant of these criticisms and as a result removed or downplayed assimilation’s 
focus on cultural similarity as the policy’s end goal. While federal policy and those 
adopted by the states still aimed for equality of opportunity, they also recognised the 
value of Aboriginal cultural difference. This new approach was known as ‘Integration’, 
and was summarised by agricultural economist Henry Schapper in the following terms: 
For a policy to qualify as integration it must cater for real equal-life opportunities 
but, as distinct from assimilation, tolerate and value differences between persons 
with dissimilar ethnic heritage. As a final goal for Aborigines it means that they 
would be free and able to be equally and fully involved in various Australian 
communities whilst observing and practicing among themselves many of their 
own customs […].4 
In the same period, community-development-focused Christian social workers in 
Australia had begun to apply a new name to what they were attempting to achieve with 
Aboriginal communities: ‘self-determination’. A key difference between this and 
previous approaches to Aboriginal politics was that it purported to vest decision-making 
about the goals of community work with the relevant Aboriginal groups themselves. In 
a paper he delivered in 1969, social worker and theologian Jim Downing used ‘self-
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determination’ to describe a novel form of community development which ‘stems from 
the desire and intention of the community itself’.5  
The Council of Aboriginal Affairs’ governmental advisers presumably followed 
these developments, and as noted in Chapter One, radical self-determination-like 
policies were soon adopted on the CAA’s advice by the ALP. Proponents of the new 
policy direction thought that remote Aboriginal groups like the Gurindji were 
structurally disadvantaged in two ways. Firstly, as statements of the Whitlam 
Government make clear, many of its members believed that by virtue of their social, 
economic and political marginalisation, Aboriginal Australians were deserving of 
‘active and progressive rehabilitation’, or positive discrimination, as it would later be 
called.6 The Whitlam Government’s Aboriginal Affairs policies were partially intended 
to remedy Aboriginal disadvantage by increasing the employment of Aboriginal people 
within specially-created Aboriginal organisations and the public service. For members 
of the population at large unable to find employment, the Whitlam Government also 
intended to expand the ‘welfare net’. Regardless of their racial identity then, under 
and/or un-employed Gurindji people would be eligible to receive welfare benefits, and 
to apply for a range of new government-created jobs like other Australians.7 The 
outcome of the Whitlam (and later the Fraser) Governments’ remedialism was 
increased payments of cash to a greater number of individuals in Aboriginal 
communities.  
By increasing the wages and welfare entitlements paid to Aboriginal residents of 
the Northern Territory, these governments were continuing a long-running, though 
sporadic and un-coordinated trend. Will Sanders has described how historically, state 
(and Territory) governments had developed arrangements controlling the employment 
of Aboriginal workers by pastoralists, missionaries and others, though these 
arrangements rarely included wage payments in the form of cash. Neither had policy-
makers and governments considered remote Aboriginal people eligible for 
                                                 
5  Downing saw the highly consultative (and when possible, self-directed) model of community 
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Unemployment Benefits.8 As reformers moved to include the administration of 
Aboriginal welfare within ‘universal’ departments in the 1960s and 70s, the prospect of 
extending unemployment benefits to remote Aboriginal people re-arose.  
In 1972, the Australian Labor Party had adopted policies that remoteness (and the 
associated frequent lack of jobs) should not be an obstacle to Aboriginal people’s 
eligibility to Unemployment Benefits. The new Department of Social Security (DSS) 
saw its brief merely as the ‘general application of social welfare policies’ and initially 
refused to take any action resulting from a claimant’s Aboriginality.9 During 1973–75 
however, it emerged that senior bureaucrats within the DSS were reluctant to pay 
remote Aboriginal people Unemployment Benefits en masse due to the inimical effect 
they anticipated: widespread Aboriginal inactivity. As a result, the Department 
resolutely refused to acknowledge the work history of Aboriginal people under recent 
government-subsidised programs in its assessments of whether a person was ‘recently 
out of work’. This in turn had the effect of stymying the DAA’s agenda to disband 
below-award work programs: if acted upon, it would have led to significant Aboriginal 
unemployment. After the Fraser Government came to power however, labour costs rose 
sharply due to a global recession and the number of unemployed in Australia increased 
to over 500,000. As I describe in the following chapter, the new Department of Social 
Security eventually removed all distinctions between remote Aboriginal and 
mainstream populations regarding the administration of welfare payments. The 
Department accepted that not only were Aboriginal people entitled to payments despite 
the general unavailability of remote area work, but that there was also an onus on the 
Department to assist remote Aboriginal populations to access benefits.10  
In the following Chapter I will show that the monetisation of Gurindji society 
resulting from these changes critically impacted on their self-determination. Before 
issues of Aboriginal engagement and capacity forced self-determination policy’s 
                                                 
8  Will Sanders, ‘The Politics of Unemployment Benefit for Aborigines: some Consequences of 
Economic Marginalisation’, in Deborah Wade-Marshall and Peter Loveday (eds), Employment 
and Unemployment: a Collection of Papers (Darwin, North Australia Research Unit, 1985), 137–
162 (p. 117).  
9  Sanders, ibid., p. 138–139. 
10  William G. Sanders, ‘Access, Administration and Politics: the Australian Social Security System 
and Aborigines’ (Unpublished PhD thesis, Canberra, Australian National University, 1986), p. 
117. 
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adaptation in the latter half of the 1970s however, the Whitlam Government promoted 
self-determination as something of a panacea for Aboriginal aspirations.  
 3.2 A Short-lived Ideal: the Whitlam Government and Self-
determination 
The origins of what would become the Whitlam Government’s Aboriginal Affairs 
policy may be found within the writings of the Council for Aboriginal Affairs (CAA).11 
During 1967–76, the Council’s support body, the Office of Aboriginal Affairs, 
conducted research into Aboriginal issues, and on this basis the Council provided 
advice to Prime Ministers Gorton, McMahon, Whitlam and Fraser. The position of the 
Council on many issues was innovative and progressive, and since Aboriginal Affairs 
policy development was a low priority of the Coalition in the late 1960s and early 70s, 
the Council’s members found themselves and their work ignored and marginalised 
before Whitlam’s election.  
Once elected to government in 1972, the ALP under the leadership of Gough 
Whitlam adopted the Council’s advice immediately. An infamous ‘aura of possibility’ 
surrounded the new government and its idealism temporarily dominated the Aboriginal 
Affairs domain. High (and fearful) expectations characterised expectations about self-
determination policy after more than two decades of Coalition rule. As noted, in early 
1973, Barrie Dexter, the new Departmental secretary of Aboriginal Affairs, proclaimed 
that his department did not ‘presume to know either the destination or even the 
direction’ of Aboriginal policy.12 This statement, issued not as an admission of failure 
but as a commendation by a senior bureaucrat, indicates the enormity of the emergent 
possibilities many perceived for Aboriginal Affairs.  
Official rhetoric in 1972–73 also contributed to a public perception that with the 
support of the Whitlam Government, Aboriginal people were going to manage their 
own affairs. To self-determination policy’s adherents, including those in Whitlam’s 
cabinet and the DAA, this possibility represented self-determination’s ideal form. To 
help achieve this, the Whitlam Government created the National Aboriginal 
                                                 
11  Tim Rowse, Obliged to Be Difficult: Nugget Coombs’ Legacy in Indigenous Affairs (Cambridge 
University Press, 2000), p. 44. 
12  Barrie Dexter, ‘The Commonwealth Department of Aboriginal Affairs—Its Functions and 
Underlying Principles: An Address at a Seminar on Aboriginal Affairs, Monash Centre for 
Research into Aboriginal Affairs, 9 May 1973’, in Seminar on Aboriginal Affairs (Monash Centre 
for Research into Aboriginal Affairs 1973), p. 1. 
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Consultative Council (NACC), a representative body designed to advise policy-makers 
in Canberra on certain matters as to the ‘opinions’ of geographically constituted 
Aboriginal groups. At Batchelor in the NT, a Department of Aboriginal Affairs staffer 
told potential NACC delegates that:  
You will be able to decide your own future and resolve your own troubles 
[…]. When you eventually choose the man you want as your candidate, 
you will go to him with all your problems. We do not have to go through 
white people to get what we want.13  
Such separatist official rhetoric has not been repeated since the Whitlam Government’s 
time in office. That government’s efforts to enable a collective Aboriginal ‘voice’ in 
Australia’s political and civic discourse by means of national Aboriginal representation 
and the creation of Aboriginal ‘communities’ and organisations were also 
unprecedented, and afforded Aboriginal Australians a prominent place in the discourse 
surrounding their own affairs for the first time.  
One keen advocate of self-determination’s early ideals was the Whitlam 
Government’s first Minister for Aboriginal Affairs, long term activist and former 
teacher Gordon Bryant. As Minister, Bryant took up his role with gusto and an 
informality that refreshed and disturbed observers. Displaying his disregard for extant 
regulatory systems ensuring government accountability, the Minister’s preference was 
to make decisions personally—usually with the input of his advisors or Aboriginal 
friends—and leave the financial ramifications for others to deal with.14 Bryant’s 
approach to his ministerial duties encouraged lax financial administration among 
sympathetic and inexperienced sections of the new DAA. During 1973 at Daguragu, 
evidence of Bryant and the Whitlam Government’s activity and new direction was seen 
in the DAA’s uniformly positive responses to requests for assistance, usually rapidly 
followed by funding—an extraordinary achievement for a new department with huge 
responsibilities nationwide. Ironically, such responsiveness and largesse were 
symptoms of massively dysfunctional administration. According to the head of the 
southern branch of the Department’s NT Division John Cooke, the DAA: 
                                                 
13  AIATSIS, NACC Consultative Seminar Batchelor, PMS 645, p. 3. 
14  Peter Read, Charles Perkins: A Biography (Ringwood, Victoria, Penguin, 2001), pp. 169, 174. 
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[…] had no management services of its own until well into the latter half 
of 1973. The central office […] was obliged to rely for its management 
services on the understaffed and over-strained Management Services 
Branch of the Department of Environment and Conservation, which in turn 
had to rely [for financial services] on the Australian Government 
Publishing Service located in a third Department: Media. The new DAA 
therefore commenced operations with no staff of its own to handle its 
crucial management and financial functions.15 
While it struggled in a financial administration vacuum, the amounts of wage and 
program money disbursed by the Department were at an all-time high.  
Within this chaotic environment, Minister Bryant and others subscribed to the 
view that their frenetic activity was indicative of the Department’s new agenda to 
empower Aboriginal citizens. It soon became apparent that their mode of operation was 
not one that Australian governments could sustain. Less than a year after the election, 
on 7 September 1973, the secretary of the Department informed the Commonwealth 
Auditor-General Vic Skerma that relations with Bryant had broken down and he was 
unable to control the finances of his own department.16 Its secretary’s confession 
brought the issues beleaguering the DAA to a head. The Prime Minister and the 
government’s Aboriginal Affairs Committee registered their concern and an inquiry 
was launched.17 A disjuncture between the ideals of self-determination and its 
governmental foundation was emerging. Within ten months of his appointment, Bryant 
was sacked and replaced by a ‘due process’ man, Senator James (Jim) Cavanagh.18 
Years later, Bryant was unrepentant about his flawed performance: ‘If Whitlam had 
kept out of the road, within two or three years we’d have revolutionised the entire 
system’.19 
Bryant and Cavanagh’s approaches to ‘Aboriginal self-determination’ may be 
seen as characterising the policy’s two early, competing strains: Bryant was a proponent 
                                                 
15  Jack Cooke, DAA Regional Officer (South), ‘The Establishment of the Department of Aboriginal   
Affairs’, Unpublished, Cooke Personal Collection, p. 2. 
16  Read, op. cit., p. 175. 
17  ‘Aboriginal Affairs Inquiry Threatened’, Sydney Morning Herald, 18 October 1973. 
18  In the wake of Bryant’s sacking, those Aborigines who saw his availability and derring-do as a 
tangible sign of the government’s commitment to ‘getting things done’ and giving Aboriginal 
people more power, were outraged. ‘“PM Wasted Our Time”: Aboriginal Deputation’, Sydney 
Morning Herald, 19 October 1973. 
19  Read, op. cit., p. 156.  
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of self-determination’s ‘ideal’ (and idealistic) form, facilitating (he believed), 
‘Aboriginal control’. Cavanagh on the other hand, was cognizant and respectful of the 
operational parameters of government, apparently believing that Aboriginal self-
determination—in some form—could be fostered within them. This latter version of 
self-determination would outlive the Whitlam Government, and once shed of its 
idealism, would also be co-opted in various ways—as I will soon describe. The 
unchecked idealism of Bryant, his supporters and some within the government and 
bureaucracy—and the indeterminacy of their ideas about how Aboriginal people would 
manage their own affairs—was only possible as long as normal regulatory processes 
were suspended. In late 1973 with Bryant’s removal, the quotidian governmental limits 
of ‘self-determination’ became clearer. The Aboriginal control that self-determination 
policy proposed could not and would not entail any abnegation by the Australian 
Government of its own responsibilities. A perhaps predictable major constraint on self-
determination policy, originating within the political/financial machinery of 
government, had emerged. It would quickly force the policy’s adaptation. 
3.3 Adaptation: delimiting self-determination’s ideal 
Following the Whitlam Government’s mismanaged entry into the Aboriginal Affairs 
domain in 1972–73, the administrative apparatus of government reined in the DAA’s 
fiscal mismanagement and profligacy. This process continued in 1976–77, under the 
direction of the newly elected Fraser Government. Amid widespread funding cuts, 
DAA Secretary Barrie Dexter believed that the Aboriginal Affairs portfolio was 
targeted disproportionately for staff reductions, particularly of Aboriginal staff. These 
were reduced in number from 599 in October 1975 to 479 by 30 June 1976.20 The 
impact of this was to undermine both the ‘Aboriginalisation’ of the government’s 
workforce—a key part of Whitlam’s self-determination policy—and to reduce the 
Department’s contact with remote communities, thereby compromising its efforts to 
foster Aboriginal self-management in Australia’s north and centre. Intense scrutiny on 
the Aboriginal Affairs portfolio was maintained by the Fraser Government’s 
Administration Review Committee led by Sir Henry Bland in 1976. The Committee 
                                                 
20  Barrie Dexter, Pandora's Box: The Council for Aboriginal Affairs 1967-1976, ed. by Gary Foley 
and Edwina Howell (Southport, Queensland, Keeaira Press, 2015), p. 401. 
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announced an ‘inquiry into the Department of Aboriginal Affairs’, later reframed as a 
‘review of the delivery of [DAA] services’.21  
The ALP’s earlier focus on Aboriginal people determining their own future (at 
significant cost, if need be) was replaced by rhetorical emphasis on Aboriginal people 
becoming less dependent on government support. This subtle rhetorical shift would 
attain some significance by the turn of the decade. Describing the new variation of the 
policy, the DAA’s Annual report of 1976–77 read: 
We will act promptly to consider and where adopted to fund other proposals and 
innovation which extend Aboriginal self-management and develop Aboriginal self-
sufficiency.22 
Whether by design or accident, reformulating ‘self-determination’ into ‘self-management’ 
facilitated ambivalence and confusion regarding the policy’s intention whilst maintaining 
its overt association with social liberalism. This was politically convenient as it was 
emerging that the DAA would be unable and/or unwilling to operationalise ‘self-
determination’ in the manner originally intended by the Whitlam Government.  
By the late 1970s, a difficult reality confronted DAA bureaucrats working 
towards the Department’s intended withdrawal from remote communities. Staffers 
acknowledged privately that Aboriginal people were rarely managing ‘their’ recently-
created communities and organisations directly. Commenting on the DAA’s failure to 
realise its objectives, the Regional Director of the Department’s Central Australian 
office Bob Huey wrote to its Deputy Secretary:    
Frankly, the Department is kidding itself if it thinks that Aboriginals are 
effectively or meaningfully involved in the day-to-day management of their 
affairs.23  
Across the Northern Territory, it had become obvious that Aboriginal individuals 
willing or able to manage remote Aboriginal communities’ new organisations were 
lacking. A second major constraint on self-determination policy had emerged, this time 
                                                 
21  ibid.  p. 402. 
22  Department of Aboriginal Affairs Annual Report 1976–77, Australian Government Publishing 
Service, Canberra, 1976), p. 7. 
23  AIATSIS, Jeremy Long Papers, Huey [Central Regional Director] to Long [Deputy Secretary], 
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originating within its Aboriginal subject population. It too, would force the policy’s 
adaptation. 
By the late 1970s, ‘self-determination’ (now ‘self-management’) solicited the decision-
making of remote Aborigines, but functioned independently of their management. As I 
will show in Part Two, at Wave Hill authorities had incorporated several organisations 
to facilitate Gurindji self-determination. In every instance (and in a significant departure 
from the Gurindji elders’ vision), non-Indigenous employees comprised the managerial 
strata of these organisations. Although these organisations were supported by all-
Gurindji or all-local boards, in terms of self-determination’s early ideal and those of the 
Gurindji leadership, this situation comprised a significant failure. Not only had Gurindji 
people failed to take over Wave Hill’s organisations, but Aboriginal self-determination 
policy had created a new employment sector there for Europeans wishing—or not—to 
implement it. Of Kalkaringi and Daguragu, a DAA regional adviser commented:  
[…] It appears that there are so many well-intentioned Europeans helping 
Aboriginals on these two communities, I can see how [the DAA Community 
Adviser] has a fulltime job co-ordinating their efforts.24 
Nonetheless, in the discourse surrounding Aboriginal affairs, such organisations were 
now routinely described as ‘Aboriginal’ and ‘community-controlled’.  
Rather than acknowledging this widespread divergence from self-determination’s 
ideal via public admission or overt policy recalibration, government ministers and those 
within the new domain created to manage Aboriginal affairs glossed it over.25 After 
years of government rhetoric about Aboriginal empowerment, to openly acknowledge 
the failure of remote communities to self-manage, or to return to a regime of direct 
federally or Territory-managed Aboriginal communities became politically 
unthinkable. The management of nominally Aboriginal organisations by Europeans in 
remote communities became ‘Aboriginal self-management’ in practice. The 
                                                 
24  Darwin, NAA, ‘Westbury to Casey’, 19 July 1979, Wave Hill—Review of Projects, Part 2, E460, 
1981/89. See also Charlie Ward, A Handful of Sand: The Gurindji Struggle, after the Walk-off 
(Clayton, Victoria, Monash University Publishing, 2016), pp. 259–263. 
25  Various departments attempted to resolve the problem by providing extra training and Adult 
Education opportunities in Aboriginal communities in the 1978–86 period, though Kalkaringi and 
Daguragu’s Gurindji residents’ refusal of managerial work was generally unresponsive to 
educative intervention. I detail these belated efforts in Chapter Eight on Gurindji self-
determination and education. 
Ch. 3 Understanding a Liberalist Policy 
85 
 
Department of Aboriginal Affairs’ own self-withdrawal strategy also catalysed the 
creation of a European managerial class in the Aboriginal domain. Anthropologist 
Philip Batty argues that acknowledging the new class of non-Indigenous assistants 
working in Aboriginal organisations was broadly avoided by those within the sector 
because it could be viewed as: 
[…] an official refutation of the policies of Aboriginal self-determination and 
thus, a denial of the right of Aboriginal people to ‘determine their own affairs’. 
As a consequence, the position of and role of this non-Aboriginal administrative 
class has continued to occupy an ambiguous space in order to remain effective.26 
Thus far we have seen that self-determination policy, in its original formulation, 
was reconfigured to fit the financial and regulatory requirement of governments in 
1974–76, and that accommodations were made as a result of its Aboriginal subjects’ 
inability or unwillingness to accept its requirements. Other structural, less visible 
limitations of the bureaucracy and government also emerged by the late 1970s. The 
experience of the DAA had by then shown that when Aboriginal people had been 
afforded a measure of genuine control, letting them fail by supporting them 
inadequately (or even by letting them suffer the consequences of their own mistakes) 
could have detrimental political consequences.27 Aboriginal failure also had negative 
professional consequences for those employed to operationalise the policy. As 
anthropologist Lee Sackett describes of the situation in Wiluna (Western Australia), if 
Aboriginal organisations and their employees misused or wasted funds or resources, 
then the DAA officers with functional responsibility for the Aboriginal groups involved 
would suffer negative consequences.28 Departmental staff in such a situation might be 
passed over for promotion, or would be compared negatively to their peers, or at least 
would suffer criticism for ‘wasting’ government resources.  
These permutations of implementation also created important though little-
acknowledged constraints on the policy’s realisation. The realpolitik of Aboriginal self-
                                                 
26  Philip Batty, ‘Private Politics, Public Strategies: White Advisers and their Aboriginal Subjects’, 
Oceania, No. 75 (2005) 209–221 (p.216). 
27  Lee Sackett, ‘Welfare Colonialism: Developing Divisions at Wiluna’, in Going it Alone?: 
Prospects for Aboriginal Autonomy, Robert Tonkinson and Michael Howard, eds. (Aboriginal 
Studies Press, Canberra, 1990) 201–218 (p. 209); Darwin, NTAS, Ian Pitman [fmr Director, DAA, 
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28  Sackett, ibid.  
Ch. 3 Understanding a Liberalist Policy 
86 
 
determination policy by the late 1970s was that both the bureaucracy and the 
government of the day were concerned to maintain a controlling interest in remote 
communities, increasingly by proxy. In light of the many Aboriginal and Departmental 
constraints mitigating Aboriginal control, I refer to self-determination as it was 
practiced in the late 1970s–early 80s as its ‘adapted’ face.  
To this point I have been discussing self-determination policy as it was practiced. 
By way of clarification, it should be noted that while the practical reality of ‘self-
determination’ came to vary from the original meaning ascribed by its architects, self-
determination’s original vernacular meaning of ‘full Aboriginal control’ passed into 
ongoing use by activists and representatives of the Aboriginal domain as an ideal 
against which governmental performance could be measured. The Australian Human 
Rights Commission’s current definition of self-determination, for instance, is that of 
‘an ‘ongoing process of choice’ to ensure that Indigenous communities are able to ‘meet 
their social, cultural and economic needs’.29 By such discursive means, the ideal of the 
Whitlam Government has remained an important factor in Australia’s Indigenous 
Affairs, if not government policy. When used purely as a measure of (the lack of) 
governmental performance, ‘Aboriginal self-determination’ creates an impossibility for 
governments. If governments are active, they are seen as ‘interfering’ and ‘controlling’. 
If they are inactive, they are ‘neglectful’. Absolutist interpretations of Aboriginal self-
determination fail to acknowledge that in addition to the usual range of factors 
constraining governmental expenditure, all governmental measures and interventions 
will, if adopted by Indigenous constituents, further involve those constituents in their 
own governance.  
3.4 Identifying the self-determining subject 
Part Two of this thesis will illustrate the many ways in which Gurindji people at 
Kalkaringi and Daguragu adapted self-determination policy’s ideal in the 1970s–80s to 
their own interests and situation. Did their government interlocutors proactively adapt 
policy aims to the needs of local people, though? Did they gain a clear understanding 
of who those people were? Here I wish to show that while ‘ideal’ self-determination 
policy claimed itself amenable to the needs and interests of its Aboriginal 
                                                 
29  Australian Human Rights Commission, https://www.humanrights.gov.au/right-self-determination 
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subject/objects, in practice it was mostly only able to revise its expectations of 
Aboriginal people’s self-management ability downwards. This contradicted the 
policy’s initial formulation, in which Minister Bryant had proposed that Aboriginal 
groups would be able to decide the ‘pace and nature of their future development within 
the legal, social and economic restraints of Australian society’.30 Governmental rhetoric 
encouraging Aboriginal choice continued in the late 1970s, as this excerpt from a 
ministerial speech by Ian Viner shows:  
[…] direct involvement of Aboriginal people in decision-making processes, by 
encouraging them to establish the priorities of their needs and by their active 
participation in the coordination and use of Government and other resources 
entering their communities [emphasis in original].31  
In reality, there was little provision for the DAA to accommodate variation among the 
priorities of the Aboriginal people with whom it worked. The Department’s inflexibility 
was compounded by its founding agenda: to decommission itself and withdraw from 
the field, leaving Aboriginal communities (figuratively speaking, it had emerged) to 
manage themselves. A greater problem was the emerging diversity of Aboriginal 
‘communities’, the DAA’s generic subject/object of policy implementation, and the 
quotidian socio-political situations of Aboriginal people it was encountering on the 
ground.  
 As subjects/objects of governance, Aboriginal ‘communities’ were a recent 
construct, the properties of which were little known. If the DAA had conducted analysis 
of each Aboriginal community’s attitudes towards its own self-management, its 
research may have revealed that ‘communities’ fell broadly into the following types: 
 
                                                 
30  Centre for Continuing Education, ‘New Policies in Aboriginal Affairs: Report of the “Batchelor 
Seminars” 1973–74’ (Centre for Continuing Education, Australian National University, Canberra, 
1976), p. 4.  
31  Hon Ian Viner, the Minister for Aboriginal Affairs, ‘Address to National Press Club, 7 July 1977’.  
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Capacity 
(3) Communities that 
wanted more 
responsibility and 
were capable of 
exercising it 
(4) Communities that 
eschewed responsibility 
but were capable of 
exercising it 
(1) Communities that 
eschewed 
responsibility and 
were incapable of 
exercising it 
2) Communities that wanted 
responsibility but were 
incapable of exercising it 
  
Governmental Responsibility 
Table 2. Community Types—Aboriginal Self-determination Matrix 
The presence or absence of these qualities—local capacity and a desire for self-
management—were largely emergent. Only the engagement of members of each 
Aboriginal community in consultative processes and/or self-management itself could 
have revealed to their government interlocutors, which category a community belonged 
to. In the anomalous case of Wattie Creek/Daguragu, consultation conducted by the 
CAA in the late 1960s had revealed that the group (or at least its leadership) wanted the 
responsibility of self-management, in principle. This willingness determined that 
Daguragu was a Type Two or Type Three community. The enactment of self-
determination policy in the 1970s later revealed that the Daguragu group lacked the 
skills and motivation that self-management policy demanded of it, and was hence an 
example of a Type Two community. Kalkaringi was different, as I will show in 
Chapters Nine and Ten: consultation and protracted experience in the 1974–79 period 
would reveal that its residents eschewed responsibility, partly because in traditional 
Aboriginal terms they had no rights to local leadership—these belonged to the elders at 
Daguragu. Kalkaringi was therefore a Type One community: its residents were 
unwilling or incapable of exercising the administrative responsibilities that self-
determination policy demanded of them.  
In governmental terms, the differences between the two ‘communities’ were 
great, notwithstanding their close co-existence, shared isolation and the intermingling 
of their populations. Such permutations serve as an illustration of the extreme 
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heterogeneity of the many Aboriginal groups with which the DAA had to contend.32 To 
render Aboriginal people’s differences between and within their communities 
assimilable to the purposes of government, the Whitlam and Fraser Governments 
embraced the organisational trope of incorporation. 
3.5 Incorporation: a communalising measure.   
On 21 March 1968, H.C. Coombs suggested that the ‘Commonwealth should invite the 
Gurindji to incorporate and to get an adviser, subsidised by the government, to help them 
formulate their land claim’.33 Coombs’ advice serves to remind us not only how far 
governments would eventually travel to resolve the Aboriginal land question (see Chapter 
Five), but also how the tool of incorporation proved mutable to all social fields, not land 
lobbying alone.  
In the late 1960s, political scientist CD Rowley was at the forefront of the major shift 
then underway in social policy thought. His popular trilogy on Aboriginal Affairs, 
published in the 1968–72 period, gave considerable attention to the notion of connecting 
Aboriginal collectivism and governmental activity for mutual benefit through the 
mechanism of formal incorporation. Rowley wrote in 1972: 
[…] The Aboriginal company is as important as an objective as for what it may 
achieve. Such an objective completely reorients the whole approach of the 
government and the public service to Aboriginal Affairs. Instead of a disappearing 
liability, as in ‘assimilation’, the Aboriginal group is re-sited as an asset, to be 
endowed, by its own efforts, with enduring legal personality.34  
Rowley’s thinking was shared by the CAA, which had therefore sought advice from the 
Office of Aboriginal Affairs as to how incorporation could be best adapted to Aboriginal 
groups. Aboriginal incorporation was then adopted by the Whitlam-led ALP opposition 
                                                 
32  In the Gurindji’s case, the decision of successive governments to support Kalkaringi’s 
development determined the Gurindji’s dependence on the services of that community. This 
dependence, and the Daguragu elders’ partial responsibility for (and authority over) all the area’s 
Aboriginal residents, forced the elders to take responsibility for the community of Kalkaringi as 
well as that which developed at Daguragu. 
33  Cited in Tim Rowse, Obliged to Be Difficult: Nugget Coombs’ Legacy in Indigenous Affairs 
(Cambridge University Press, 2000), p. 44. 
34  Charles Rowley, Outcasts in White Australia (Penguin Books, Ringwood, Victoria, 1972), p. 425.  
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when formulating its Aboriginal Affairs policy in 1971. Political scientist Will Sanders 
describes the underlying governmental rationale: 
At the core of [self-determination and self-management] policies has been the idea that 
Aborigines themselves should be involved in the decision-making processes that affect 
their lives. At the regional and local levels this has led to the encouragement and 
funding of incorporated Aboriginal organisations, both to deliver specific services and 
to manage general Aboriginal community affairs.35  
Although extant legislation was used to incorporate Aboriginal groups (including the 
Gurindji people’s Muramulla Company) prior to the election of the Whitlam Government, 
that government’s efforts eventually culminated in the passage by the Fraser Government 
of the (Commonwealth) Aboriginal Councils and Associations Act 1976. As policy 
historian Tim Rowse has noted, as a purely statistical measure of Aboriginal self-
determination, incorporation was wildly successful. Since the Act took effect on 26 January 
1977, almost 3,000 Aboriginal corporations were registered in the first two decades of the 
ACAA’s operation.36 Rowse identifies the Whitlam and Fraser Government’s wholesale 
advancement of Aboriginal incorporation—and the resultant creation of thousands of 
Aboriginal companies comprising a large and enduring ‘Aboriginal domain’—as self-
determination policy’s distinguishing trait. As noted earlier, according to Rowse, under the 
rubric of self-determination, ‘governmental rationality [was] now not only individuating 
but also communalising and corporatising’.37  
While the ‘Aboriginal’ entities resulting from this ideological shift in policy 
purportedly provided Aboriginal people with a novel means of advancing their own 
interests, Aboriginal corporations also provided governments with a means of making 
Aboriginal people more accountable to the state. The new Aboriginal organisations created 
in the 1970s thus fostered the independence of their members while simultaneously 
transferring to them a measure of the responsibility for their governance. The work of 
Michel Foucault is useful in describing this paradoxical aspect of self-determination. 
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Focusing on the practices, tactics and strategies of power rather than its functions and 
preoccupation with ‘natural’ objects, Foucault recognised the ways in which the citizen 
subjects of nation states are recruited into their own self-governance. In the Kimberly 
region of Western Australia for instance, anthropologist Patrick Sullivan describes: 
‘Community representative organisations meet the need for a manifestation of autonomy 
while still presenting the means for administrative control’.38 For government bureaucrats 
focused on Australia’s remote north and centre, Aboriginal autonomy needed to be 
balanced with the governmental requirements of small, remote, unskilled populations. In 
time, as we will see, the practical considerations of implementation won out over the 
policy’s ideological detail. For later governments, it would emerge that their desire to 
abrogate responsibility for governing Aboriginal communities exceeded their concern 
about who those communities would be governed by. These tensions between 
governmental efficacy and local Aboriginal agency were prevalent within self-
determination’s governance organisations at Wave Hill. The double-edged nature of what 
Foucault termed ‘governmentality’ at Wave Hill is made plain in Part Two of this thesis, 
where I challenge the conventional wisdom that governments have been reluctant to give 
up their concern for the quality of Aboriginal self-management. To better explicate these 
dynamics there, I will draw on the scholarly analysis that follows. 
3.6 Adapted Self-determination: Organisational Analysis  
According to the self-determination policy of the Whitlam Government, Aboriginal 
communities would determine their own futures through their residents’ adoption and 
use of a governmental construct imbued with local aspirations: the incorporated 
Aboriginal organisation. Yet by the time that Northern Territory Self-Government 
occurred on 1 July 1978, the practical meaning of the phrase ‘self-determination’ had 
changed. Daguragu and Kalkaringi’s organisations, for instance, were managed not by 
Gurindji individuals but by European Australians. For the Gurindji elders, this variation 
from their own aspirations was blatant and problematic. They—though not the majority 
of the two settlements’ other Aboriginal residents, I argue—saw this compromise as 
deeply unsatisfactory, and a failure of their vision.39 Following NT Self-Government, 
                                                 
38  Patrick Sullivan, All Free Man Now: Culture, Community and Politics in the Kimberly Region, 
North-western Australia (Aboriginal Studies Press, Canberra, 1996), p. 30. 
39  Evidence shows that the Gurindji elders continued to aspire to Gurindji-control of their 
communities until c. 1980. I contend that after this time, their ambition about this matter was 
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the new Northern Territory Government’s initial work involved a large amount of 
capital investment on projects employing large numbers of non-Indigenous staff, 
compounding the elders’ sense of failure.  
In the main, Gurindji and Warlpiri individuals occupied only menial positions in the 
new organisations created at Wave Hill. A limited subset of ‘elders’ and occasionally their 
younger male relatives contributed to the governance of those organisations in an advisory 
capacity. The operation of these organisations thus necessitated the cultivation of cordial, 
if not close, working relations between their Aboriginal staff and the European Australians 
who managed them on the local people’s behalf.40 This hybridised form of organisational 
management was repeated throughout the plethora of organisations comprising the 
Aboriginal domain, and comprised an important factor in Gurindji self-determination at 
Wave Hill.  
The workings of Aboriginal organisations have been subject to much critical 
analysis, which I will draw upon for the insight it provides. Anthropologist Philip Batty 
has described the ‘intercultural partnerships’ between Indigenous and non-Indigenous 
collaborators created in Aboriginal organisations as ‘specific sites of administrative and 
cultural mediation, delineating the aspirations of Aboriginal people and government’.41 
According to Batty, in a practical sense, self-management required Aboriginal people to 
‘lease’ their Aboriginality to non-Indigenous staff, for essentially non-Indigenous 
purposes. By such means, the ‘Aboriginal management’ required by self-determination 
policy was solicited. 
Unlike Batty’s model of Aboriginality’s ‘leasing’, which focuses on the relationships 
created in this process, recent analysis by Tim Rowse and Elizabeth Watt examines the 
sociological dimension of these organisations’ composition and recruiting practices. In 
their chapter ‘“The North”: Colonial Hegemony and Indigenous Stratification’ in A 
Historian for All Seasons: Essays for Geoffrey Bolton, Rowse and Watt draw attention to 
the ways in which Australian historiography (particularly after the historian Geoffrey 
                                                 
challenged by their growing recognition (gleaned through bitter experience and protracted 
discussions with Stan Davey and Jan Richardson) of the alterity, the amount, and the 
unattainability of the knowledge required of them to operate in organisational management, and 
the likely deleterious effects on Gurindji relatedness and sociality if a Gurindji person were to do 
so. This matter is further discussed further in Chapter Ten. 
40  Elsewhere, it was also common for educated mixed race Aboriginal people to also be employed 
in the management roles of ‘Aboriginal’ organisations.  
41  Philip Batty, ‘Private Politics, Public Strategies: White Advisers and their Aboriginal Subjects’, 
Oceania, No. 75 (2005) 209–221 (p.216). 
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Bolton), like government policy, has differentiated and distinguished between Aboriginal 
people. In particular, they articulate a relationship between Aboriginal groups that self-
determination policy’s operationalisation necessitated: Aboriginal ‘trusteeship’.  Giving 
credence to the distinction of Bolton between ‘part-Aborigines’ of the southern portion of 
Western Australia and the more ethnically distinct and tradition-focussed ‘Aborigines’ of 
the north-west, Rowse and Watts see the transition from assimilation to self-determination 
policy as one in which a measure of responsibility for providing services to remote 
Aboriginal people was effectively transferred from the European to the Indigenous domain. 
Specifically, a measure of governmental responsibility was transferred from a class of 
European public servants and missionaries to a more dispersed network of Aboriginal 
organisations, often employing educated, urbanised Indigenous staff, usually of mixed 
descent.42 As much as this was officially rationalised, in the politics of pan-Aboriginalism, 
trustees with the identity ‘Aboriginal’ could make a strong claim to be in solidarity with 
those less acculturated Aboriginal people for whom they acted as trustees. In postulating a 
common Aboriginal interest, pan-Aboriginalism deflected questions about whether the 
interests of urbanised, often mixed descent relatives and advocates were identical to those 
Aboriginal people who are less sophisticated in Euro-Australian ways.43 In the first 
instance, this de facto Indigenous ‘trusteeship’ (a term adapted from the work of Tony 
Smith) resulted from self-determination policy’s intention to divest responsibility for direct 
governance of Aboriginal Australian to the new government-funded sector of service 
provision organisations.44  
Batty's ‘intercultural partnerships’ and Rowse and Watts’ ‘trusteeship’ are 
complementary descriptions of (adapted) self-determination’s mode of enablement. At 
Kalkaringi and Daguragu, rather than a transfer of responsibility for service provision 
to the Indigenous employees of Aboriginal organisations, ‘Aboriginal’ service-
providers employed non-Indigenous managers. If anything, due to the elders’ history in 
the pastoral industry and their lack of formal education, the Gurindji’s dependence on 
                                                 
42  Tim Rowse and Elizabeth Watt ‘“The North”: Colonial Hegemony and Indigenous Stratification’ 
in Stuart Macintyre, Lenore Layman and Jenny Gregory (eds) A Historian for All Seasons: Essays 
for Geoffrey Bolton (Clayton: Monash University Publishing, 2017), pp. 204-235. 
43  Charlie Ward, A Handful of Sand: the Gurindji Struggle, After the Walk-off (Clayton, Victoria, 
Monash University Publishing, 2016), pp. 152-154. 
44  Tony Smith ‘Indigenous Accumulation in the Territory in the Early Years of “Self-
Determination”: 1968-75’, Australian Economic History Review, 42, 1 (2002); Tony Smith, 
‘Welfare, Enterprise and Aboriginal Community: The Case of the Western Australian Kimberley 
Region, 1968–1976’ Australian Economic History Review, 46, 3 (2006). 
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non-Indigenous labour was greater than that of the Indigenous leaders of other 
communities. Few mixed descent Gurindji were then in residence in the Gurindji 
communities, and those that were had no particular skills to differentiate them from 
their ‘full’ Gurindji relatives. The labour aspect of governance in the period at Wave 
Hill was thus constituted by Rowse and Watts’ ‘trusteeship’ in modified form. Under 
that modification, trusteeship for the governance and management of Kalkaringi and 
Daguragu was extended beyond the realm of staff of mixed descent to a large number 
of non-Indigenous staff. The mantle of Indigeneity, or in this case ‘being Gurindji’ for 
the purposes of self-determination, was effectively extended for certain purposes to the 
non-Indigenous management of Gurindji organisations. In Batty’s exposition of 
‘intercultural partnerships’, he makes a similar point. According to that model of 
mediated Indigenous agency, Gurindji authority was effectively ‘leased’ from Gurindji 
leaders by their non-Indigenous staff, functioning as the ‘trustees’ of Gurindji self-
management. These dynamics characterised the operations of the organisations I shall 
discuss in Part Two: Libanungu and Daguragu Councils (various iterations 1974–82), 
the Wundamarie Housing Association (est. 1974), and the Muramulla Company (est. 
1970, funded 1975).  
While the intersection of governmental remedialism with local social realities 
shaped the incorporative tools of governance at Wave Hill, the same local organisations 
in which this occurred were formed on the basis of the ‘interests’ of Kalkaringi and 
Daguragu communities. Organisations often did not know how to implement the wishes 
of Gurindji people, especially when their opinions differed about what they wanted. 
Gurindji leaders and governments espoused obeisance to the Gurindji’s supposed 
collective interests, yet even in-principle agreement among the Gurindji group about 
the methods to best realise those interests, and/or the form of an effective collective 
effort to do so remained largely out-of-reach. The collective subject of homogenous 
‘communities’ presupposed by self-determination policy were in fact revealing 
themselves to be disparate, diverse collections of individuals, unfamiliar with 
democratic representative processes. Individual ‘self-determining’ Gurindji subjects 
were in other words impeding, challenging and undermining the ‘communal’ self-
determination proposed by governments. To understand these dynamics (the effects of 
which I demonstrate in Part Two), I therefore now wish to explore the ways in which 
Gurindji individuals co-opted, and were affected by, self-determination policy. 
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3.7 Individualising corollaries 
To assess self-determination policy’s outcomes among and for the Gurindji, it is 
apposite to identify the features of the Aboriginal person/subject it solicited. What 
personal qualities did self-determination policy’s various programs, job positions, 
associations and corporations demand? Although H.C. Coombs, C.D. Rowley and 
others had been concerned to blunt the ‘European’ exigencies of these governmental 
tools for their Aboriginal subject/objects, fundamental assumptions were nonetheless 
reflected in their design and expectations. Self-determination policy assumed that in 
sufficient numbers, Aboriginal individuals would: 
a) lack other commitments or pursuits that might wholly or at times preclude 
them from fulfilling the requirements of the policy; 
b) recognise the merits of its programs and/or organisations, and identify with 
and commit to them for their purported benefits; 
c) maintain aspirational, energetic hard work on a routine-basis, linked to or 
reconcilable with policy aims; and 
d) have the skills to take up managerial or at least midlevel positions in 
incorporated councils, companies and associations. 
The programs and organisations inviting Aboriginal participation under the terms of self-
determination increased markedly from the number provided under earlier policies of 
Assimilation. The assumptions made of their Aboriginal subjects by both policies’ 
programs and organisations varied little, however. Finding that the Gurindji people’s 
operation of ‘Gurindji’ organisations fell far short of their expectations, in the late 1970s, 
many of the Gurindji’s government interlocutors opined that more ‘non-Indigenous 
supervision’ was needed to realise the type of social projects and organisations that 
Gurindji self-determination required. The experience of DAA staff apparently revealed to 
them that remote Aboriginal people’s lack of western education and their socialisation had 
rendered them resistant to, and/or incapable of conceding to, the requirements of self-
determination policy. When DAA advisers called for more non-Indigenous supervision, 
they were responding to what they saw as the failure of Gurindji leaders to live up to ‘self-
determination’ policy—in their capacities and in their aims. 
My description of the political/organisational domain in Kalkaringi and Daguragu 
communities in Chapters Nine and Ten makes clear that while self-determination policy’s 
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communal and incorporative intent was far-reaching and transformative in its impact, local 
people used other financial aspects of government policy for opposing ends: to facilitate 
dispersal and disaggregation. In light of the extant tensions I will soon describe within 
Gurindji society, this is not surprising. But did self-determination policy itself facilitate 
these individualising processes? In his book Traditions for Heath, Tim Rowse explores the 
ways that the policy constituted Aboriginal individuals:  
Australian governments deal with Aboriginal people of Central Australia as if they 
were individuals (accountable as individuals in processes of law, and enjoying 
entitlements as individuals in social security schemes). […] These ‘objects [which 
are also subjects] of government’ are constituted discursively and non-
discursively.45 
The primary means by which self-determination constituted the Gurindji as individuals was 
by awarding them welfare payments and/or employment and remuneration on an individual 
basis. These aspects of the policy I describe as self-determination’s individualising face.  
As I have described, self-determination policy was concerned to create a communal 
Aboriginal subject whose individual members identified with their ‘communities’ and were 
amenable to political self-representation. Yet financial aspects of the social policies of the 
Whitlam Government and its predecessors created the conditions necessary for a major, 
divergent assertion of individual rights within Gurindji society. As Part Two of this thesis 
will show, the effects of the ‘individualisation’ that Gurindji people conducted were many, 
and mostly operated counter to self-determination’s stated aims. To understand why the 
Whitlam Government’s social policies had individualising as well as communalising re-
constitutive effects on Gurindji society, it is salient first to consider that tensions between 
communalism and individual rights present a paradox within the liberal project of universal 
social justice and equality. For liberalist governments, discursive if not legal 
accommodation must be made for marginalised groups, and those groups’ individual 
members. This creates a potential conflict of loyalty for individuals. Under democratic 
liberal rule, ethnicity-defined and/or other minority groups hold the legal right to 
associate—and to practice any and all sub/cultural behaviour they might wish to, within 
the laws of the nation-state. The Australian Aboriginal experience with self-determination 
                                                 
45  Tim Rowse, Traditions for Health: Studies in Aboriginal Reconstruction (North Australia 
Research Unit, Casuarina, NT, 1996), p. 11. 
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policy illustrates however that once so enfranchised, individual members of minorities may 
utilise their newfound rights to challenge the sub/cultural values of the minority groups to 
which they belong.  
To contextualise these dynamics within the Gurindji group in the 1970s–80s, in the 
remainder of this thesis I will adopt political theorist Chandran Kukathas’ concept of the 
individual’s right of dis/association within a ‘free society’. In his book The Liberal 
Archipelago: A Theory of Diversity and Freedom, Kukathas assesses the place of authority 
in a free society. Stimulated by questions similar to those guiding the academics and 
bureaucrats formulating Australian Aboriginal Affairs policy during the mid-Twentieth 
century, Kukathas finds that ultimately the allocation of authority determines how a 
‘diversity of people(s) [can] live together freely given their differences’.46  Viewed through 
this frame, self-determination policy can be seen as a product of the Australian nation’s 
reassessment of Aboriginal authority, and its subsequent recognition and re-visioning of its 
relationship with that authority by a variety of new means. As I have already indicated 
however, that recognition and re-visioning was somewhat speculative and initially agnostic 
about its intended outcomes. This thesis is testament to the fact that its effects were also 
unanticipated.  
Self-determination policy professed a loyalty to Aboriginal authority, and yet in the 
Gurindji’s case at least, the authority of their leadership was undermined in several ways 
by the policy’s indirect effects. Those I specifically address in this thesis are: increased 
cash incomes, the penalisation of Gurindji gerontocratic punitivism, an increased 
dependence on locally-based non-Indigenous staff for the provision of services, and the 
differentiation of younger Gurindji from their elders. In each case, the causes of the 
Gurindji elders’ disempowerment resulted from the removal of measures that differentiated 
their society from the mainstream. This accords with Kukathas’s conception of a ‘free’ or 
liberal society, in which special treatment on the basis of race or other distinguishing traits 
is to be avoided. Yet while self-determination policy followed this precept in some regards, 
in practical terms its effects frequently inhibited the agency of endemic leadership.  
Arguably more deleterious in its effect on Gurindji gerontocratic power than the self-
determination policy era’s removal of Aboriginal ‘special measures’ though, was younger 
Gurindji people’s contestation of that power. Kukathas finds that in a liberal society, “there 
                                                 
46  Chandran Kukathas, ‘Introduction’, The Liberal Archipelago: A Theory of Diversity and Freedom 
(Oxford Scholarship Online, November 2003), p. 7 of 17. 
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will be a multiplicity of authorities, each independent of the others, and sustained by the 
acquiescence of its subjects’.47 This point is fundamental. Without the imposition of the 
state’s overt authority governing the association of individuals, acquiescence, or willing 
consent, is key to social coherence.  In answering the question ‘what is the principled basis 
of a free society marked by cultural diversity and group loyalties?’ then, Kukathas advances 
the following case: 
1. A free society is an open society and, therefore, the principles which describe 
its nature must be principles which admit the variability of human arrangements 
rather than fix or establish or uphold a determinate set of institutions within a 
closed order. 
2. Such principles should take as given only the existence of individuals and 
their propensity to associate; they need not and should not assume the salience 
of any particular individuals or of any particular historical associations.  
3. Granted this, the fundamental principle describing a free society is the 
principle of freedom of association. A first corollary of this is the principle of 
freedom of dissociation. A second corollary is the principle of mutual toleration 
of associations. Indeed, a society is free to the extent that it is prepared to tolerate 
in its midst associations which differ or dissent from its standards or practices.48  
In my reading, for Kukathas the ideal of the modern liberal democratic state is a society 
in which all its individual members—including those from various ‘cultural’ and 
minority groups—may associate freely. It follows that it was something akin to this 
freedom which, through their self-determination-type policies, the Whitlam and Fraser 
Governments wished to promulgate in ways that were unprecedented among Aboriginal 
people.  
As Kukathas points out though, by definition, the freedom to associate only 
acquires practical meaning if it entails the freedom to dissociate. Without the right to 
leave or differentiate oneself from a group, its membership is of little value—a position 
apparently endorsed by the actions of younger Gurindji people in the 1970s–80s. I will 
argue that it was the manifold effects of this socio-political dynamic in tradition-oriented 
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48  Kukathas, op. cit., p. 2 of 44.  
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Aboriginal contexts which self-determination’s policy design failed to anticipate—and 
whose later practitioners felt obligated to partially ignore.  
A caveat: although Kukathas argues that groups based on cultural difference 
and/or ethnicity are merely one among many association-types in a freely-associating 
(and dissociating) society, this could be seen to imply that cultural dissociation, in 
extremis, would entail some sort of ‘renunciation’ of membership/identity. This is not 
the sense in which I use the term dissociation. Although I am aware anecdotally of cases 
in which members of other Aboriginal groups dis-identified themselves as Aboriginal, 
I know of no Gurindji individuals who did so. When I speak of Aboriginal dissociation 
then, I am speaking of dissociation and differentiation between individuals and 
generations, not the dissociation of individuals from their society as a whole. I am 
speaking about individual autonomy from social loyalties and constraints and cultural 
change, rather than cultural loss. Specifically, I use the term to describe two related 
phenomena: (usually younger) Gurindji people contesting and at times rejecting aspects 
of their social inheritance over which they had previously exercised little agency; and 
the differentiating and individualising effects of such rejection and contestation on 
relationships between Gurindji individuals and generations.  
3.8 Conclusion 
In its initial articulation by the Whitlam Government, Aboriginal self-determination policy 
was ambitious, far-reaching, and self-consciously radical. Its intention to communalise the 
administration of Aboriginal Affairs, and to ‘devolve’ itself of aspects of that 
administration were eventually achieved, via its enablement of representational Aboriginal 
politics (the Aboriginal ‘voice’ in public affairs), its promotion of a pan-Aboriginal 
identity, and the passage of its Aboriginal Councils and Associations Act (1976) by the 
Fraser Government. Notwithstanding this partial alignment of intentions and outcomes, 
after its initial formulation, self-determination policy accumulated an operational meaning 
unintended by its architects. These are the two ‘types’ of self-determination policy that this 
thesis will consider. Firstly, there is that subscribed to by many upon its inception, in the 
Whitlam Government, the DAA, and the broader public. This definition of self-
determination would, in the case of Daguragu and Kalkaringi, be measured against the ideal 
of Gurindji individuals staffing (and managing) those communities’ organisations. I term 
this self-determination’s ‘ideal’ form, and note that this definition is still in use today within 
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the Aboriginal domain and among its rights-focused interlocutors. For the purposes of this 
thesis, I argue that although ideal self-determination’s detail and means of envisaged 
achievement may have differed from the Gurindji elders’, these competing versions of self-
determination were broadly commensurate. As I have shown in Chapter Two, the elders 
intended to create a community with services staffed by Gurindji individuals, too. For these 
reasons I have classified establishment-phase Daguragu, the main community on which 
this study is focused, a Type Three community: one whose residents (apparently) wanted 
more responsibility and were assumed by their government interlocutors to be capable of 
exercising it. The journey I describe in Part Two shows that this assessment was 
subsequently revealed to be incorrect.  
After the policy’s introduction in 1972–73, this ‘ideal’ of self-determination 
policy was subsequently modified and redefined. By the end of the 1970s, ‘self-
determination’ was commonly used to refer to the administration of Aboriginal Affairs 
by non-Indigenous and/or urban-educated Indigenous people. The Aboriginal Affairs 
portfolio had also been politically deprioritised. These changes occurred as a result of 
the political and financial constraints of Australian governments and the common 
inability and/or unwillingness of remote Aboriginal community leaders to manage and 
administer the corporate bodies created in their communities by the Whitlam and Fraser 
Governments for the purposes of self-management.  
The existence of those instrumentalities was indicative of self-determination 
policy’s definitive and enduring trait: its use of a communalising government rationality 
(as per Rowse, Cowlishaw and others). This communalising logic was transformative, 
though not in the manner intended in remote Australia. There, rarely did remote 
Aboriginal people administer the councils and associations that were established in their 
name. Rather, the argument I will make in Part Two of this thesis is that the contingent, 
adaptive and often dysfunctional means by which those Aboriginal councils and 
corporations operated was determined by the effects of another, more general axiom of 
liberal democratic governance and capital on Aboriginal people: that of 
individualisation.  
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Ch. 4 Gurindji Individual, Economic and 
Social Change, 1960–86  
 
 
 
The economic dimension of Gurindji life was fundamental to that group’s response to 
self-determination policy, and it was as a result of changes in this domain that they were 
able to realise their long-contained desires for social differentiation. The economic 
effects of the implementation of the Whitlam Government’s social policies among the 
Gurindji represented the culmination of their economic integration with the economy of 
the Australian nation state. Their monetary income and their resultant increasing 
enfranchisement as consumers within the greater economy facilitated sweeping social 
change. In this chapter, I show that many Gurindji people, especially the young, 
embraced aspects of this social change with enthusiasm, while the older cohort of 
Gurindji were commonly resistant. The disaggregative nature of these changes was 
largely deleterious to self-determination’s policy intentions and the related aspirations 
of Gurindji elders. Amongst the social tensions, opportunities and difficulties caused for 
Gurindji people by their changing economic circumstances, their participation in the 
social programs and community organisations associated with government policy was 
largely incidental, as I will show. 
Before outlining my argument about the general effects of increased financial 
incomes on Gurindji life, and describing the related phenomena of Gurindji dissociation 
and ‘disappearance’ as they impacted on governmental endeavours at Wave Hill, I will 
first elaborate on the qualities of ‘traditional’ Gurindji society and its economy which 
predisposed both to disruption by money. To do so, the balance of that society’s 
aggregative and disaggregative tendencies must be assessed. In Chapter Two, I 
established that Gurindji society was gerontocratic and restrictive. Like other Aboriginal 
groups, its members simultaneously enjoyed a large though culturally moderated degree 
of autonomy, which contributed to the group’s social resilience.1 In comparison to 
western societies, the Aboriginal individual’s identity was largely subsumed within the 
                                                 
1  LR Hiatt, Arguments About Aborigines: Australia and the Evolution of Social Anthropology 
(Cambridge University Press, Melbourne, 1996), pp. 90–93. 
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close bonds of the family group, the land-holding (or for the Gurindji, ‘ngurramala’) 
group, and other social/ceremonial denominations. Before European contact, it is 
generally agreed that wealth and social prestige in such societies were coextensive, 
concentrated in the hands of older people and apportioned within family groups 
according to traditional law and kinship.2 Thus tensions between what anthropologist 
David Martin, writing of Wik society in North Queensland, characterises as ‘autonomy 
and relatedness’ were therefore incumbent within the Gurindji’s heavily socially and 
materially circumscribed pre-contact world, and unresolved.  
As I have described in Chapter Two, these tensions functioned in a number of 
ways between Gurindji elders and their younger people. Anthropologists in the 1930s–
50s observed that young men and women were reluctant to fully participate in the 
ceremonial life valued by their elders.3 Another source of significant intergenerational 
tension was the monopolisation of young women’s sexuality by older men, according 
to Gurindji society’s system of kinship. Polygyny was practiced, and as mentioned, the 
Gurindji’s kinship system—mostly as interpreted and enforced by male elders—
determined which men women might marry. Anecdotal evidence and ethnographic 
research elsewhere suggests that increasingly in the post-contact era, many young 
women harboured resentment towards Gurindji elders for forcing them into unwanted 
unions, and many young men likewise resented the same elders for ‘taking’ their 
potential partners.4 
The broad outline of these tensions within Gurindji society was repeated within 
hundreds of other Indigenous groups across Australia. Recognising this, anthropologist 
Les Hiatt advanced an argument with which this thesis concurs: that the inequitable 
distribution of power within Aboriginal society made that society ‘vulnerable to external 
challenge and susceptible to internal collapse’.5 Catherine Berndt believed such tensions 
were so widespread that she described ‘young people who were enticed by the prospect 
                                                 
2  John Stanton, 'The Mount Margaret Community, Western Australia', in E.A. Young and E.K. Fisk 
(eds) Small Rural Communities (Canberra, Australian National University Press, 1982) 61–88 
(p.69). 
3  Anthropologist Mervyn Meggitt was also given to understand that the number of old men skilled 
and authorised to make sacred objects was in decline. Mervyn Meggitt, ‘Notes on the Malngjin [sic] 
and Gurindji Aborigines of Limbunya, N.W. Northern Territory’, Mankind; Sep 1, 1955, 5, 2 (45–
50), pp. 48, 50; Catherine H. Berndt, Women’s Changing Ceremonies in Northern Australia (Paris, 
Hermann, 1950), p. 63. 
4  David McKnight, Going the Whiteman’s Way: Kinship and Marriage among Australian Aborigines 
(Ashgate, Aldershot, England, 2004), pp. xix–xxvi. 
5  Hiatt, op. cit., p. 98. 
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of brighter lights and greener pastures’ as the ‘Trojan Horse’ compounding the 
difficulties of older Aborigines in resisting what they saw as the inimical effects of their 
society’s engagement with the settler mainstream.6 These observations are indicative of 
traditional Australian Aboriginal societies’ containment of their members’ autonomy.  
There were several means by which traditional Aboriginal societies maintained 
their own social structures. Firstly, a highly punitive regime underlay gerontocratic 
power. As David Brooks has written of the Ngaanyatjarra people of South Australia: 
Because of the absence of centralised political and judicial institutions, the 
maintenance of social order (or its corollary, disorder) was ultimately in the hands 
of individuals; it potentially gave physically capable individuals, mostly men, an 
inordinate amount of power over their fellows.7 
Secondly, as noted in Chapter Two, Gurindji society was extremely communal and 
interlinked by kinship. Collective life and good relations were accordingly valued above 
all other social virtues, to the extent that individuality was in constant tension against 
them. What Trigger describes as Aboriginal ‘relatedness’ provided a powerful 
counterbalance against dissociation in pre-contact times, and decreasingly in the 
pastoral industry environment which followed. Thirdly, isolation was significant, and if 
an Aboriginal person were hypothetically to leave their own group, other societies were 
organised along similarly demanding lines. Finally, and most importantly in terms of 
the argument in this chapter, the economic situation of Gurindji people during pre-
contact times and during their decades in the pastoral industry was one of subsistence. 
Anthropologist David Martin describes that for Wik people on Cape York:  
[…] access by each person to the basic necessities of life had been dependent upon 
the complex human/landscape association expressed in the land tenure system, 
mediated through relationships of exchange and distribution, over which had been 
                                                 
6  Catherine Berndt, ‘Out of the Frying Pan…?  Or, Back to Square One?', Aborigines and Change: 
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superimposed such factors as restrictions on consumption of specific items 
occasioned by particularities of age, ritual status, seniority, and so forth.8  
Healthy adults may have had the skills to support themselves indefinitely, though no 
individual was expert in obtaining and processing all the foods required for a balanced 
diet. Critically, surplus food was immediately consumed and ‘wealth’ was posited in 
status and relationships rather than material goods. These qualities of Indigenous life—
social dependence, punitivism and material subsistence—formed the cohesive substrate 
of Gurindji society, mitigating against its dissolution. This substrate was certainly 
affected by its members’ transition into the cattle industry, though a range of factors in 
that industry’s economy and management served to constrain the social tensions among 
its Aboriginal workers and their families.  
To understand the profound ways in which Gurindji society’s integration into the 
mainstream economy in the 1970s affected Gurindji individuals and largely shaped their 
responses to self-determination policy, a brief account of that society’s post-contact 
economic history is necessary. For eight decades following the establishment of the 
pastoral industry on their land in the 1880s, generations of Gurindji had lived within the 
quasi-feudal economy of a remote privately-run pastoral station. Fundamental to this 
was the exchange of their labour for food, clothing and protection from the worst of 
settler violence.9 As their economic situation was almost entirely determined by the self-
interest of the Vestey family’s Australian Investment Agency (AIA), material poverty 
among the group was an entrenched condition. Significant individual income was also 
unknown.10 In this isolated environment, while providing semi-indentured labour, they 
were able to maintain their systems of value and distribution. Commenting on 
Aboriginal groups’ limited participation in the cash economy in Australia’s centre and 
north during the first half of the twentieth century, anthropologist Nicolas Peterson 
argues:  
                                                 
8  David Martin, ‘Autonomy and Relatedness: an Ethnography of the Wik people of Aurukun, 
Western Cape York Peninsula’ (Unpublished PhD thesis, Australian National University, 1993), p. 
117. 
9  I describe the economic parameters of this situation in my book A Handful of Sand. See Charlie 
Ward, A Handful of Sand: The Gurindji Struggle, after the Walk-off (Clayton, Victoria, Monash 
University Publishing, 2016), pp. 12, 18, 23. 
10  Minoru Hokari, Aboriginal Economy and Cattle Labour: the Economic History of the Gurindji 
People (Masters of Economics Thesis, Tokyo, Hitotsubashi University, 1996), pp. 53–54. 
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A consequence of [their] limited interaction was that, even though the way in 
which subsistence was acquired had often changed radically, the Aboriginal social 
relations of production and their value system remained substantially 
unchanged.11 
When those employed by a pastoral station were required to work, it was rare for that 
employment to exceed thirty weeks per year.12 Most work conducted by Wards was 
exchanged by their employers for rations, or after an initiative by Chief Protector of 
Aboriginals in the NT Cecil Cook in 1930, small wage payments were held in trust for 
them. For the Gurindji, the outcome of these arrangements was the same: subsisting 
largely on pastoral leases, Lingiari’s generation and their antecedents gained little to no 
experience using cash until the 1950s.  
Later in that decade, governments’ recognition of their own responsibility for 
Aboriginal people increased, resulting in the award of invalid, aged and nursing 
pensions to Aboriginal adults.13 These were commonly paid in trust to their nominal 
recipients’ non-Indigenous trustees, Vestey’s AIA, though pastoral and mission-based 
intermediaries rarely paid these directly to their supposed beneficiaries. Gurindji people 
were also paid ‘special’ wages and exposed to money from this time.14 Direct payment 
of a small proportion of the government allowances available to the Aboriginal people 
under the care of missions, settlements and pastoral stations was mandated by the 
amendment of Social Services Act in 1959.15 A small amount of money was thus 
available to some Gurindji individuals, though by the early 1960s, the amount paid to 
Aboriginal workers was still approximately only 20% of the Cattle Station Industry 
(Northern Territory) Award 1951.16 In their famous Walk-off action of 1966, the 
                                                 
11  Nicolas Peterson, ‘Capitalism, Culture and Land Rights: Aborigines and the State in the Northern 
Territory’, Social Analysis: The International Journal of Social and Cultural Practice, No. 18 
(December 1985) 85–101 (p. 90). 
12  ibid., p. 88. 
13  Annette Hamilton, 'Aboriginal Women: the Means of Production' in Jan Mercer (ed) The Other 
half: Women in Australian Society (Ringwood, Australia, Penguin Books, 1975) 167–179 (p. 174). 
14  Ted Egan, 'Lingiari, Vincent (1919–1988)', Australian Dictionary of Biography (National Centre 
of Biography, Australian National University, Canberra) http://adb.anu.edu.au/biography/lingiari-
vincent-14178/text25190, accessed 9 January 2017. 
15  Tim Rowse, White Flour, White Power: from Rations to Citizenship in Central Australia 
(Melbourne, Cambridge University Press, 1998), pp. 133. 
16  Rowse, ibid., pp. 134, 136; Ronald and Catherine Berndt, End of an Era: Aboriginal Labour in the 
Northern Territory (Canberra, Australian Institute of Aboriginal Studies, 1987), p. 71; Minoru 
Hokari, Aboriginal Economy and Cattle Labour: the Economic History of the Gurindji People 
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Gurindji people’s impoverished economic situation provided them with their primary 
justification for severing their dependence on the Vestey company.  
In the decade following this event, at the Wave Hill Welfare settlement and the 
Gurindji’s camp at Wattie Creek, their material circumstances improved somewhat via 
donated food and limited employment at the Wave Hill Welfare Settlement. For the 
typical resident of Wattie Creek though, money remained rare in the 1967–72 period 
and a surfeit of food was uncommon.17 Although documents show that senior officials 
of the NT Administration were concerned to perpetuate what they saw as 
intergenerational ‘division’ and ‘disunity’ existing in the Wattie Creek group at this 
time, the Gurindji’s relative poverty and isolation ensured that Gurindji elders were still 
able to maintain a unitary social vision until the mid-1970s.18 As a result, young Gurindji 
wage earners donated a significant proportion of their income to develop the Wattie 
Creek camp.19  
It is against this truncated economic history of the Gurindji that the financial 
effects of the Whitlam Government’s social policies described in the previous chapter 
must be considered. Its changes to social welfare and the administration of remote 
communities meant that the number of Aboriginal individuals of low socio-economic 
status receiving their own source of income, and the amount of disposable income in 
their communities, dramatically increased. The effects of this were fundamental to 
Gurindji self-determination, as I will now demonstrate.  
4.1 Democratising Dispensations: the Effects of Cash  
At Wave Hill after the Whitlam Government’s election, the powerful fiscal effects of 
the new government’s efforts to engineer social equality between unemployed 
Aboriginal Australians and their mainstream non-Indigenous counterparts quickly 
became apparent. Award wages were paid to Aboriginal workers at the settlement for 
                                                 
(Masters of Economics Thesis, Tokyo, Hitotsubashi University, 1996), pp. 48–50; Northern 
Territory Administrator’s Report, cited in Pearl Ogden, From Humpy to Homestead: The Biography 
of Sabu Sing (Winnellie, Northern Territory, 1992), p. 97. 
17  Ward, 2016, p. 43. ‘Lyn Riddett to Lex Grey’, 18 June 1971, Riddett Personal Collection, pp. 17–
18. 
18  Canberra, NAA, Telex from Northern Territory Administration to Department of the Interior, 25 
September 1968, Petition by Gurindji People to Governor-General re Wave Hill Pastoral Land, 
Northern Territory, (A1734) NT 1968/2509. 
19  Darwin, NTAS, Interview with Gus George by Charlie Ward, October 2010, NTRS 3609, BWF 24. 
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the first time. More jobs were available, mostly in the new ‘Aboriginal’ organisations 
then being created, and unemployment benefits were also easier to obtain. A fortnightly 
payment cycle was established. Cash to pay wages and welfare payments was flown to 
the Kalkarung airstrip and delivered to Kalkaringi every second Thursday, and wage 
and benefit payments were made that day.20 These large though infrequent payments, 
combined with the propensity of Gurindji people to spend their money quickly and to 
request cash gifts and loans from their relatives, inculcated a fortnightly ‘boom and bust’ 
financial cycle like those observed in many remote communities. The relative plenty of 
one week was inversely mirrored by the poverty and lack of the following one. 
Nonetheless, with Kalkaringi and Daguragu’s Aboriginal residents comparatively flush 
with cash, an age of consumer choice dawned. Motor vehicles became affordable. Cars 
enhanced the ability of Gurindji and other remote Aboriginal people to avail themselves 
of the citizenship-type rights bestowed by liberal policies in the 1960s (see Chapter 
Three), and participate more fully in the consumer economy. Their spending on clothes, 
toys, accessories, entertainment and alcohol increased.21 By the mid-1970s, the women 
and young adults of Gurindji society had money, in addition to the primary males.  
The relative availability of cash had powerful equalising and destabilising effects 
on remote societies such as the Gurindji’s, which were unaccustomed to regular surplus. 
Notwithstanding the obligations of their kinship-based, demand sharing economy, this 
equalisation of income empowered young adults in relation to their powerful elders.22 
Anthropologist David Martin describes the dynamics by which a similar process occurred 
in Wik society during the same period: 
[…] having an independent income allowed individuals—if they so choose—to 
obtain basic necessities such as food outside the network of reciprocal rights and 
obligation of the Wik domain.23 
                                                 
20  The airstrip adjacent to Kalkaringi was named ‘Kalkarung’ in the mid-1970s. Patrick McConvell, 
‘Changing Places: European and Aboriginal Styles’, in The Land Is a Map: Placenames of 
Indigenous Origin in Australia, ed. by F. Hodges, J. Simpson and L. Hercus (Canberra, Pacific 
Linguistics and Pandanus Press, 2002), pp. 50–61 (p. 52). 
21  Darwin, NAA, ‘Circular Memorandum No. 164 […]’, Wave Hill—Reports on Community 
Development, E460, 1978/242. 
22  Basil Sansom, The Camp at Wallaby Cross: Aboriginal Fringe Dwellers in Darwin (Canberra, 
Australian Institute of Aboriginal Studies, 1980), p. 254; Tim Rowse, ‘From Houses to Households? 
The Aboriginal Development Commission and Economic Adaptation by Alice Springs Town 
Campers’, Social Analysis, 24 (1988), 50–65 (p. 56); Stanton, op. cit., p.75. 
23  Martin, 1993, p. 117. 
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For the Gurindji elders’ vision of creating a homestead managed by their children to 
succeed, resolving extant tensions between old men and young people (especially males) 
was critical, yet the ready availability of cash enabled young men in particular to assert 
their independence. According to Martin’s description of the people of Aurukun: 
Cash […] was one critical factor in the sundering of the reproduction of relations 
of domination and subordination between older men and younger ones; neither 
access to it nor its use needed to be mediated by senior generations.24  
This situation paralleled that of Gurindji society. In arguing that younger ‘men’s access 
to cash incomes allowed them to create a contemporary style of life defined in opposition 
to that of women and the requirements and demands of the domestic sphere’, Martin’s 
observations also apply to Gurindji households.25 This increasing dissociation between 
young men and their male elders, not to mention regarding those individuals designated 
as their ‘carers’, comprised other means by which cash’s increased availability facilitated 
and catalysed the differentiation of Gurindji society in unprecedented ways.  
To a lesser degree, dissociation and dissent marked young Gurindji women’s 
experience of the period as well.  A contingent of teenage girls left Daguragu for a 
boarding school education in 1972, and at this time the elders also loosened a significant 
aspect of Gurindji traditional law. Tired of the stresses created by youthful lovers eloping 
with members of the wrong ‘skin’, Lingiari initiated a reform allowing the young 
‘promised’ wives of male elders to pursue boys their own age as sexual partners.26 Similar 
tensions regarding marriage choices have been recorded in many Australian Aboriginal 
societies.27 This apparently radical shift reflected Lingiari’s reformist, pragmatic 
leadership, and was largely motivated by a desire to reduce the number of conflicts then 
caused by contested liaisons.28 Regardless of such accommodation and the appearance 
                                                 
24  ibid.  
25  Martin, 1993, p. 119. 
26  In light of subsequent conflicts over this same issue, it appears that the elders’ new accommodation 
was only occasionally enacted.  
27  It was over this issue that the outright rebellion of young Gurindji women occurred a decade later. 
See Ward, 2016, pp. 272–276; McKnight, 2014, pp. xix–xxvi.  
28  According to Lyn Riddett and David Quin, Lingiari said he had ‘softened’ Gurindji law earlier, 
doing away with capital punishment. Lingiari’s father accepted this reform, with the proviso that if 
it failed, his son should be put to death. Lyn Riddett, ‘The Strike That Became a Land Rights 
Movement: A Southern Do-Gooder Reflects on Wattie Creek, 1966-74’, Labour History, 72 (May 
1997) 50–65 (p. 58); Quin, Personal Communication, 16 August 2007. 
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among the women of relative peace, it could also be that because women did not, by and 
large, drink alcohol, they lacked the bravado or poor judgement fuelling the ‘rebellion’ 
of their male counterparts.29 Why women’s dissociation in the 1970s was less dramatic 
than that of Gurindji men is a matter for conjecture. Fewer employed positions were 
available for female staff and therefore less money was available to them. Also, what 
money they received was frequently claimed by their husbands. Seemingly Gurindji 
women also felt less constrained by Gurindji social expectations than young Gurindji 
men, and similarly they may have been temporarily content with the freedoms they had 
recently won. Now with their own incomes, the mothers and aunts of young Gurindji 
could choose to provide their dependents with money instead of food, thus acquitting their 
duty as caregivers, even while lessening the work which that role traditionally entailed. 
Although the form dissociation took for both sexes differed, the Whitlam 
Government’s social policies enabled Gurindji individuals to access their own money and 
decrease their dependence on the Gurindji domestic unit, thus significantly expanding 
their personal autonomy for the first time. Just as their temporary possession of money 
loosened bonds within family and domestic groups each fortnight, its subsequent absence 
had a similar effect. Although most adults could access welfare payments or a waged job, 
the occasions on which individuals lacked cash entirely were also frequent. Indeed, in 
similar communities, the period in which people possessed their pay or a portion thereof 
could be less than a day in the fortnightly cycle.30 As such, the occasions on which 
individuals were unsuccessful in their search for cash among relatives were frequent. In 
some instances, the increasing assertiveness or aggression with which young people 
demanded material support caused frustration and sorrow, leading to arguments and 
conflict. David Trigger writes of the Ngububurinji, Waanyi, Ganggalida and other 
Aboriginal people at Doomadgee, near the NT/Queensland border in this period: 
While economic support among close kin was a routine aspect of social life, the 
level of requests at times led to complaint and tension.31   
                                                 
29  A more dramatic female dissociation would occur later, in the early 1980s. See Ward, 2016, pp. 
272–76.  
30  Martin, op. cit., p. 111–113. 
31  David Trigger, ‘Blackfellas and Whitefellas: the Concepts of Domain and Social Closure in the 
Analysis of Race Relations’, Mankind, Vol 16., No 2, August 1986 (99–117), p. 119. 
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For the Gurindji, the individualising process of differentiation underway at Kalkaringi 
and Daguragu in the 1970s–80s caused by the novel and frequent availability of money 
was transformative and unprecedented. Yet the increased availability of this ‘product’ of 
mainstream society among the Gurindji functioned merely as an enabling tool of a larger, 
less tangible, and arguably more pervasive process simultaneously affecting them. 
4.2 Westernisation 
The infrequent anthropological and historical archival record shows that the constraints 
of their own society were immediate and perceptible to Gurindji youth from as early as 
the 1940s. It also shows that since their early contact with pastoralists, Gurindji people 
were amenable to, and in many cases highly desirous of, experimentation with and/or 
consumption of European food, drugs, and modes of behaviour and self-adornment. This 
process was one that continued at a gradual and relatively even pace among the Gurindji, 
until the early 1970s.32 The consistency of the Gurindji people’s interest in European 
technologies was well catered-for by the gradual, limited introduction of new and 
evolving technologies in Australia’s remote north during the first half of the twentieth 
century. By the time they left Wave Hill Station in 1966, Gurindji people were familiar 
with—and chose to repeatedly use—basic European foodstuffs, steel knives and axes and 
various hand-tools, leather saddlery, battery-powered torches, gramophones and records, 
pit toilets, shaving equipment and battery-powered radios.33   
While their receptivity to new technologies can be gleaned from photographic 
records and the archaeological evidence of the old Wave Hill Station site, the historic 
interest of Gurindji people in European knowledge and concepts is more difficult to 
deduce. One significant reason for this, which also forestalled their comprehension of 
Western society, is that Aboriginal staff were deliberately excluded from meaningful 
discussions and often, even casual conversation, with European co-workers and 
employers in the pastoral industry.34 They were similarly prevented from acquiring 
                                                 
32  Peterson, 1985, p. 88. 
33  NTAS, ‘Interview Recorded with Billy Bunter by Charlie Ward’, 24 October 2010, NTRS 
3609/BWF 2; Frank Hardy, The Unlucky Australians, Sydney, Nelson, 1968 (2006 edn, Melbourne, 
One Day Hill); Personal inspection of the Aboriginal camp site at Jinparrak (old Wave Hill Station).  
34  Charlie Ward, ‘Tracking Wave Hill: Following the Gurindji Walk-off to Wattie Creek, 1966–1972’, 
Unpublished Masters’ Thesis (Flinders University, Adelaide, 2012), pp. 231–32. 
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literacy and numeracy.35 An exception was made by Wave Hill’s management to this in 
the early 1960s, however, regarding Christian missionary doctrine. The station’s 
Aboriginal workers had been exposed to travelling missionaries at the annual Negri races 
on the Vestey Company’s Ord River Station since the 1950s. By the time Wave Hill 
Station manager Tom Fisher welcomed Baptist minister Jim Kime on to Wave Hill 
Station in 1964, Vincent Lingiari was a ‘believer’, with an interest in Bible stories.36 
When I interviewed Reverend Kime, he impressed on me that in contrast to the Warlpiri 
elders at the Hooker Creek Welfare Settlement where he was based, the Gurindji leaders 
on Wave Hill Station were highly enthusiastic about elements of Christian theology.37 
Gurindji people’s engagement with Christian doctrine in significant numbers increased 
after Grahame Paulson (the country’s first Aboriginal Baptist minister) took up residence 
at the Wave Hill Welfare Settlement in 1970. Afterwards, a mass baptism of twenty-five 
Gurindji individuals—including leaders Vincent Lingiari and Mick Rangiari—took place 
in Wattie Creek.38 As I will show in this thesis, Baptist theology formed an important 
tool used by Gurindji elders to prevent the dissociation enacted by their young people 
during the late 1970s and early 80s.  
The favourable response of many Gurindji people to Christianity provides an 
important indication of the group’s receptivity to certain Western concepts or cultural 
modes, which as stated, was deliberately and circumstantially minimised in their time in 
the ‘traditional’ pastoral industry. The Gurindji had also demonstrated their historic 
interest in European culture during the 1950s and 60s through their adaptation of cattle 
industry fashion and work techniques, and their enjoyment of infrequently-screened 
                                                 
35  See Lyn Riddett, Kine, Kin and Country: The Victoria River District of the Northern Territory, 
1911–1966 (Darwin, Northern Territory, Australian National University, 1990), p. 84; Ronald and 
Catherine Berndt, End of an Era: Aboriginal Labour in the Northern Territory (Canberra, 
Australian Institute of Aboriginal Studies, 1987), p. 8; Ann McGrath, Born In the Cattle (North 
Sydney, Allen & Unwin, 1987), p. 104. 
36  See Darwin, NTAS, Billy Bunter, Interview Recorded by Charlie Ward, October 2010, NTRS 3609, 
BWF 21; Rev. Ivan Jordan, ‘Brief History of Baptist Ministry to the Indigenous People of Central 
Australia’, 8 Dec 1999 <http://www.bwa-baptist-heritage.org/bap-ab.htm> [accessed 14 March 
2014]. 
37  According to Kime’s account of his first encounter with Lingiari in 1964, it appears likely that the 
Gurindji leader viewed the ‘virtuous’ life of Christianity as providing a path of material betterment 
and increased control. According to Kime, the Gurindji leader had pointed to a poster on the wall 
of his government hut. Distributed by Protestant missionaries, it showed many Aborigines ensnared 
by poverty and booze—and a few well-dressed black men walking up a road to heaven, or at least 
salvation. ‘We want to go that way’, Lingiari had said. Rev Jim Kime, Interview Recorded by 
Charlie Ward, 3 June 2014. 
38  Jordan, op. cit. 
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‘Western’-style movies and live Country and Western music performances. During the 
1970s and 80s, their exposure to a broader array of images and symbols of Western 
societies, many illustrating the ostensible virtues of self-advancement, personal freedom 
and autonomy, increased markedly, due to a number of factors. Enabling this exposure 
were evolving communications technologies, the installation of generator-powered 
domestic electricity, the invention of domestic labour-saving devices, the Gurindji’s 
increasing travel to NT towns and interstate cities for educational and other purposes, 
their increasing interaction with a large and diverse number of non-Indigenous 
Australians, and finally the later availability of home entertainment technologies such as 
commercial radio, video and eventually television during the period.39 The latter were 
purchased by Gurindji people using their own money.40  
As a result of these changes, Gurindji people’s exposure to Western values and 
behaviours in their own domain reached ‘critical mass’ in the 1970s and 80s, creating the 
novel situation where exogenous subcultural forms—and often the relationships between 
them—became commonly recognised, if not well understood, cultural referents among 
the majority of Gurindji people. As a result, at the same time as their members’ 
empowerment by cash incomes, the traditional leadership of Aboriginal groups such as 
the Gurindji were in an important sense no longer able to determine or stipulate which 
cultural values, meanings and artefacts the members of their society identified with. 
Gurindji elders themselves were keen consumers of Western movies, and the popularity 
of mainstream film screenings at Daguragu, conducted by the Muramulla Company, 
decreased Gurindji people’s attendance at, and their performance of, traditional Gurindji 
dancing.41 Anthropologist David Martin contends that Wik people in this period were 
likewise increasingly becoming ‘as much consumers of symbolic forms as producers of 
them’. Another mechanism of differentiation ensued:   
[…] with contemporary personal identity and status (particularly for males) 
defined in part through the appropriation of these externally generated symbols, 
                                                 
39   David Trigger has written about the [presumably concurrent] arrival of VCR technology in Gulf 
communities during 1983. See David Trigger, ‘Blackfellas and Whitefellas: the Concepts of 
Domain and Social Closure in the Analysis of Race Relations’, Mankind, Vol 16., No 2, August 
1986 (99–117), p. 100. 
40  Colin and Maggie Muir [Kalkaringi electrician and spouse, resident 1976–86], Interview 
Recorded by Charlie Ward, 24 October 2012. In possession of the author. 
41  Darwin, NTAS, Alex Romanoff, Interview Recorded by Charlie Ward, July 2014, NTRS 3609, 
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autonomy and individuality could be asserted over their ideologically defined 
concomitant, relatedness.42 
The increasing concentration of the European-derived symbols and meanings in 
Gurindji people’s perceptual life brought by technological advances can be construed 
as constituting the consolidation, if not the advent proper, of globalism in the Gurindji 
domain. An epistemological and perceptual dialectic of increasing contrasts was 
created, in which important aspects of the traditional social order were rendered open to 
interrogation by many, usually younger, Gurindji people. As a result, young Gurindji 
apparently deemed their usual forms of social organisation comparatively archaic, 
parochial and prescriptive, compared with other, imagined modes of life. As 
anthropologist Robert Foster has noted, by providing exoticised  images of commodified 
alterity, globalism shifts the focus of individuals so that their ‘daily existence is 
understood and enacted with reference to people living in other localities’.43 Young 
Gurindji people, in other words, were increasingly aware of disparate others who were 
comparatively unconstrained regarding their behaviour and life choices, and with whom 
they shared identifying qualities like youth and style and attitude.  
Measuring the impact of globalism and ‘Westernisation’ on Gurindji culture and 
on their leaders’ aspirations of creating a self-managing community by such means is a 
conjectural activity at best. My purpose here is merely to establish that the first broad 
scale exposure and interpenetration of Gurindji society with images, values and 
behaviours of Western societies occurred at the same time that their elders and 
government officials were attempting to effect an independent, self-managing Gurindji 
society. As noted, these impacts were concurrently increased by the individualising and 
differentiating effects of cash incomes. It is notable that in light of the financial and 
social ‘equality’ that Aboriginal self-determination policy heralded for the Gurindji, 
self-determination policy itself also functioned as a vehicle for Westernisation, not least 
via the great number of non-Indigenous residents its implementation required at 
Kalkaringi. As with other elements of the ‘West’ however, Gurindji people chose how 
they wished to respond to their new circumstances.44 The theme of Gurindji choice is 
                                                 
42  Martin, op. cit., p. 169. 
43  Robert Foster, ‘Melanesianist Anthropology in the Era of Globalization’, The Contemporary 
Pacific, Vol. 11, No. 1, 1999, 140–159 (p. 140). 
44  The partial exception to this was of course the novel and consistent subjection of Gurindji people 
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observable in the concurrent processes I have described, of increasing social 
differentiation within the Gurindji group, and their adaptation to the economic, legal and 
cultural forms of the settler state. Both processes were hastened and complicated 
massively though, by the sudden availability of a mainstream product I have so far little-
mentioned: alcohol.  
4.3 The Effects of Alcohol at Wave Hill 
Poor supply, low to no income and restrictive race-based prohibitions had effectively 
made alcohol unavailable to Gurindji people until the Social Welfare Ordinance was 
rescinded in 1964. Since that time, Aboriginal Australians in the NT had been legally 
allowed to drink, though in the Gurindji’s case, had rarely done so. As mentioned, 
Gurindji gerontocratic authority, which opposed the consumption of grog, was still 
largely respected until the early 1970s, and because Gurindji people rarely travelled 
independently beyond their traditional country until that time, alcohol was basically 
inaccessible. Significantly, until the implementation of the Whitlam Government’s social 
policies, most individuals held insufficient funds to purchase alcohol. Perhaps more than 
any other single factor, its consumption from that time exacerbated intergenerational 
tensions and was used by many young men in particular to fuel processes of 
differentiation and social change.  
By the late 1970s, many of Wave Hill’s young men were commonly driving 170 
kilometres to the closest bottle shop at Top Springs and buying excessively large group 
orders of alcohol. Such trips would most commonly occur after the fortnightly delivery 
of government wage and welfare cheques.45 Consequently, according to Norm McNair (a 
Summer Institute of Linguistics field worker who arrived at Libanungu in 1977): 
It was pretty deeply entrenched you know; you could see the pattern. The welfare 
cheques would come in, or gambling rings would set up. [People would] go up to 
Katherine, get a car and ferry grog in. You would be aware of the car coming in and 
within about twenty minutes the town would be in uproar. It would last that long, 
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they’d soon consume it. […] Eventually the cops would come in […], take a few 
[people] away and lock them up [and] it would all calm down.46 
As a result of alcohol–inspired violence and the Whitlam and Fraser Governments’ 
efforts to ensure Aboriginal people were afforded the same treatment before the law as 
mainstream Australians, the involvement of (mostly younger to middle-aged, male) 
Aboriginal people with the settler society’s prisons, courts and legal aid services also 
increased massively in the 1970s.47 For these reasons, the availability of young men for 
domestic and ceremonial purposes declined significantly. According to my assessment 
of the accounts of kartiya who enjoyed relationships with the Gurindji during this time, 
alcohol was at the centre of a difficult ‘battle’ in Gurindji society—issues such as who 
could access it, how and when they should do so; who should manage its harmful effects; 
what the appropriate ‘manner’ of drinking might be—all clamoured for resolution. In 
suffering from major alcohol-related problems, Libanungu and Daguragu were not 
unique. The deleterious effects of alcohol on many Aboriginal communities were the 
focus of a national enquiry by the House of Representatives Standing Committee on 
Aboriginal Affairs (HoRSCAA).48 
Broadly speaking, Gurindji women and older people were more likely to abstain or 
drink infrequently and/or in moderation than young men. Reasons for the elders’ 
common moderation probably relate to their inculcation as workers in the pastoral 
industry; their observation of the effects of alcohol abuse on kartiya and (recently) their 
own family members; and a long-held, widely shared perception in the North—among 
whites and Aboriginal people alike—that ‘grog’ was particularly damaging to 
Aborigines’ health and social wellbeing. 49 As such, the divisions between local elders 
caused by grog were incidental, compared to the ways in which it exacerbated 
                                                 
46  Norm and Helen McNair [former SIL Linguists at Libanungu], Interview Recorded by Charlie 
Ward, March 2010, in possession of the author. 
47  Darwin, NTAS, Wave Hill Police Journal, NTRS 2127, Vol. 16–17; Darwin, NTAS, Lyn Riddett, 
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intergenerational tension among the Gurindji. Liberal and indulgent attitudes towards 
alcohol and its use and abuse fast became one of the important measures by which the 
emerging ‘new generation’ of Gurindji, particularly males, sought to contest the values 
and authority of their elders.50 Equivalent processes were observed in many other remote 
Aboriginal communities at the time.51 Less obvious were the ways in which alcohol 
placed stress on domestic/family units. Decisions by primary adults (usually male) to 
spend a proportion of their time and income, and perhaps their spouse’s income, on 
alcohol all impacted inimically on Gurindji families. The substance was central to what 
anthropologist David Martin described as Wik men’s ‘contemporary style of life defined 
in opposition to that of women and the requirements and demands of the domestic 
sphere’.52 
Alcohol, cash and Westernisation are the factors I have identified above which 
challenged and unsettled the formation of a self-determining Gurindji community, such 
as those which elders and DAA officials sought at Wave Hill. Greater in its effect on the 
Gurindji self-determination project though, was another factor, arrived upon by the 
Gurindji. Of all Aboriginal people’s responses to self-determination policy, that which I 
term their ‘disappearance’ or self-exclusion was the most deleterious to official policy 
and ‘communal’ Gurindji goals. Their excessive use of alcohol was only one means by 
which Gurindji individuals effected it. 
4.4 Gurindji Disappearance: the limits of liberal governance  
The development of two self-managed Aboriginal communities at Wave Hill as 
promoted by governments and the development of the autonomous Gurindji homestead 
envisioned by Gurindji elders required cultural and behavioural change among Gurindji 
people. By formulating a policy that found specific merit in Aboriginal decision-making, 
authorities concurrently limited the means by which governments might promote or 
                                                 
50  As described in Chapter Two, Minoru Hokari records the self-identification of a ‘new generation’ 
of young Gurindji in the post-pastoral industry society of Kalkaringi and Daguragu. See Minoru 
Hokari, Gurindji Journey: A Japanese Historian in the Outback (Sydney, University of New South 
Wales Press, 2011), p. 240. 
51  For other descriptions of the disintegrative effects of alcohol consumption on ‘traditional’ 
knowledge transfer and cultural continuation, see Stanton, 1982, p.74; Sansom, 1980, pp. 92–98; 
Noel Pearson, Up From the Mission: Selected Writings, (Collingwood, Australia, Black Inc., 2011), 
pp. 24–25; Bernard Clarke, Larrpan Ga Buduyurr: The Spear and the Cloud (Tranmere, South 
Australia, 2010), pp. 155–57, McKnight, 2004. 
52  Martin, op. cit., p. 119. 
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encourage certain behaviours among that policy’s Aboriginal subjects. The employment 
of overtly coercive measures by state agencies to enforce Aboriginal compliance with 
Aboriginal self-determination policy would not only have contravened liberalism’s 
tenets, but have been flagrantly self-contradictory. The Gurindji people’s ambivalent and 
variable responses to governments’ self-determination-type policies in the 1970s–80s 
highlight the limited ability of liberal democratic states to determine the behaviour of 
their citizens. As Duncan Ivison writes, this trait is characteristic of this system of 
governance: 
Whatever the differences over the various conceptions of freedom, equality, 
democracy or modes of public justification, they all express a general commitment 
to ‘rational argument and reasonable attitudes’ aimed at procuring the general 
agreement of individuals through reason and persuasion rather than force.53 
Nonetheless, in exchange for the benefits of community life such as financial incomes, 
medical services, access to food, shelter, communication technologies (and should they 
want it, apparent enfranchisement within their communities’ administration), limited 
pressure was placed on Gurindji people by the DAA to provide their labour for 
‘community projects’ or organisations. A range of motivational measures, most 
obviously the termination of employment or reduced or non-payment of wages, was 
available to DAA and Department of Social Security authorities wishing to engender 
particular behaviours among Gurindji people. In myriad ways, local people resisted 
these influences in collective acts of ‘disappearance’, as I will show. Socially ‘internal’, 
individualised and generational forms of dissociation are my main focus in this thesis, 
however when the efforts of both the Department of Aboriginal Affairs’ and Gurindji 
leaders to create a self-managing ‘community’ or homestead placed undue demands on 
the time and social pursuits of Gurindji people, they also elected to dissociate and 
distance themselves collectively. 
As I have argued, the novelty of economic consumerism in conjunction with recent 
liberalist interventions of the state regarding citizenship, alcohol and social equality 
effected profound cultural and behavioural change among the Gurindji. Gurindji 
individuals utilised cohering elements of their own economy, sociality and culture (such 
as resource redistribution and self-maintenance on country) to both co-opt and/or resist 
                                                 
53  Duncan Ivison, Postcolonial Liberalism, (Cambridge University Press, Melbourne, 2002), p. 19. 
Ch. 4 Change and the Gurindji  
118 
 
self-determination policy’s prescriptions and the atomising effects of consumerism. 
Gurindji culture thus found new forms of expression in the 1970s amongst the novel, 
often European-designed or influenced conditions of community life. Paradoxically, 
inspiration for this cultural and political resurgence and reformulation drew from both 
‘traditional’ and exogenous roots. As much as Gurindji people resisted the 
communalising aspects of self-determination policy by seeking to create novel, 
distinctive life-paths for themselves, their resistance drew inspiration from liberalism and 
globalism in the form of representations of comparative individual wealth and other, 
liberal societies. The means by which many young Gurindji people and others responded 
to appealing representations of liberal citizenship were innovative and adaptive. The 
resultant ambiguity of young Gurindji people’s actions gave them powerful means of 
ignoring and resisting, if they wished to, both the DAA’s organisations and programs, 
and their elders’ ‘community development’ activities. To the DAA, the behaviour of 
Gurindji youth at times appeared incontrovertibly ‘Aboriginal’ and unresponsive to 
governmental rationality. To their elders however, Gurindji young people seemed to have 
abdicated any personal responsibility for upholding Gurindji mores, having apparently 
been irredeemably affected by ‘Kartiya way’. By such means, young Gurindji and others 
effectively engineered their own disappearance from the policy stage of government and 
the stage of political action devised by their elders.  
A thorough-going analysis of Gurindji individuals’ non-participation in 
community projects in the period is not possible, though non-participation was a common 
response of Gurindji individuals to both the community projects of their elders and the 
incorporated bodies and community projects that formed the government’s tools to 
achieve Gurindji self-determination. This mode of dissociation, which I term one of 
‘disappearance’, was fluid and dynamic. Most often it was also collective and 
oppositional, prioritising and asserting novel individualist Gurindji or ‘new generation’ 
modes of behaviour, sociality and culture against European/governmental or ‘traditional’ 
gerontocratic cultural norms and demands. Disappearance was thus utilised by young 
people and others to maintain a realm relatively free of European and/or gerontocratic 
influence. By the early 1980s, Gurindji elders also effected disappearance from their 
government interlocutors at times.54 Similar resistance to, and evasion of the imposition 
                                                 
54  Their volition for creating their camp at Wattie Creek was initially one of ‘disappearance’ writ large. 
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of European cultural norms and/or ‘traditional rule’ by members of northern Aboriginal 
groups has been observed elsewhere, as I shall soon describe.  
My formulation of the concept of ‘disappearance’ among the Gurindji draws from 
the sociological literature on ‘social closure’, a ubiquitous social phenomenon first 
described by the influential German sociologist Max Weber. In its Weberian iteration, 
the term was used to refer to the various means by which social groupings exclude others 
from access to power or resources. As such, social closure initially described processes 
by which boundaries are drawn, identities constructed, and communities built, in order 
to monopolize resources.55 The theory of social closure has since undergone a ‘political 
turn’, whereby scholars such as the sociologist Frank Parkin have argued that various 
forms of social closure are also practised ‘from below’ as a mode of political contention 
by which subjugated groups may generate strategies in order to ‘reorganize the structure 
of distribution’.56 In the context of Gurindji self-determination then, I use ‘social closure’ 
to refer to the practice of Gurindji individuals self-excluding themselves from 
communalising activities imposed by the staff, programs and policies of the state, many 
of which were designed by officials to inculcate Self-Governmental responsibility. In 
this, I take after anthropologist David Trigger who, like Parkin, argues that social closure 
may be usurpatory or defensive as well as exclusionary, and not only concerned with the 
protection of material resources but also the maintenance of social and cultural identity.57 
Describing the maintenance of an exclusionary Aboriginal domain by the residents of 
Doomadgee, Trigger writes: 
  [Social closure] is designed to exclude, limit or subject to conditions, the access 
and participation of Whites […] as part of a defence against constant administrative 
intrusiveness and attitudinal ethnocentrism on the part of Whites.58 
                                                 
55  Juergen Mackert, ‘Social Closure’, in Sociology: Oxford Bibliographies Online, 
http://www.oxfordbibliographies.com/view/document/obo-9780199756384/obo-9780199756384-
0084.xml. Accessed 10 January 2017. 
56  Frank Parkin, Marxism and Class Theory: A Bourgeois Critique. (Columbia University Press, New 
York, 1979), p. 44–45. 
57  Trigger, 1986, p. 100. 
58  See Frank Parkin, ‘Strategies of Social Closure in Class Formation’, in The Social Analysis of Class 
Structure. Edited by Frank Parkin (London, Tavistock,1974) 1–18; Trigger, 1986, p. 115. 
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Robert Tonkinson describes a similar social demarcation created by the Aboriginal 
residents of Jigalong, in Western Australia.59 Likewise, when it came to engaging with 
the Self-Governmental processes sought by DAA staff, in many instances, Gurindji 
individuals used their newfound freedom from punitive control to ‘disappear’ both 
physically and as policy subjects. By describing such practices among the Gurindji as 
‘disappearance’, I seek to emphasise the ways which this behaviour impacted specifically 
on the self-determination-type projects of governmental officers and Gurindji elders 
alike. Specifically, my use of the term alludes to the fact that not only were there Gurindji 
individuals who wished to maintain their own cultural (and sub-cultural) cliques and 
activities at the cost of the communal, socially responsible activities which self-
determination demanded, but that this behaviour was designed at least in part to make its 
protagonists unavailable to such demands. Through their absence from particular 
situations or places (such as ongoing regular employment, training workshops, or at times 
their communities of residence), or through their subsumption in collective activities 
overtly unamenable to policy purposes, Gurindji individuals communicated their lack of 
interest in and/or resistance to activities reflective of the self-determinative aims of their 
elders and/or government policy.  
Identifying instances in which there was a degree of intentionality to Gurindji 
disappearance is problematic, however. Nowhere else does the limitations of this thesis’s 
large reliance on a ‘European’ archival record of Gurindji intentions and activities create 
such a challenge. Gurindji ‘disappearance’, as such, is not discernible in that record at 
all. Gurindji absences and non-participation were noted, but identifying the reasons for 
those absences and non-participation was apparently rarely judged to be a topic worthy 
of consideration. Gurindji people themselves were extremely reluctant to directly 
criticise or displease Europeans in general, and under the terms of Gurindji 
‘disappearance’, would have extra motivation not to provide reason for their absences 
and non-participation in kartiya business. For these reasons, the intentionality of Gurindji 
disappearance in the period may only be inferred, rather than evidenced explicitly.  
In considering Gurindji ‘disappearance’ as it affected their self-determination, it 
should be remembered that the pursuit of self-determination had little precedent in 
                                                 
59  Robert Tonkinson, ‘Outside the Power of the Dreaming: Paternalism and Permissiveness in an 
Aboriginal Settlement’, in Michael Howard (ed.), Aboriginal Power in Australian Society (St 
Lucia, Queensland, University of Queensland Press, 1982), pp. 115–130 (p. 115). 
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Gurindji life. For Gurindji people, representative politics, organisational governance, 
financial self-management (requiring literacy and numeracy) and systems of employment 
that prioritised administrative proficiency over ceremonial knowledge, were all more or 
less novel requirements heralded by the self-determination era.60 Gurindji people’s 
participation in community-based employment or DAA-created projects or 
organisations, and their use of services such as shopping or banking were also excursions 
into (European) cultural alterity. The same may be said of their occupation of housing 
during the period. Unsurprisingly, Gurindji people sought to maintain social and physical 
areas largely unaffected by European influence. In Doomadgee, Trigger makes the point 
that Aboriginal residents only entered the town’s ‘White domain’ for (European) 
administrative, schooling and employment-related purposes—a situation that had its 
equivalents when it came to Gurindji participation in self-determination-type activities 
at Kalkaringi and Daguragu. In this overwhelmingly unfamiliar environment, it may 
safely be assumed that many Gurindji individuals would have sought to control or 
minimise their engagement with the European-derived situations and cultural practices 
mentioned above. Banking, shopping and (for many) the administration of Social 
Security payments, were essential for their physical and economic survival. Community 
Development-type activities such as those promoted by Gurindji elders and self-
determination policy were not—and hence were frequently avoided by local residents. 
Techniques of disappearance were used for various purposes by Aboriginal people 
at different times. Trigger notes that during his lengthy period of fieldwork in 
Doomadgee during the early 1980s: 
Aboriginal speakers by no means always wished to give Whites understanding of 
particular subjects.  [This] was achieved through silence, by briefly professing 
ignorance about the matter or by agreeing with whatever the White person says. 
Nor was information concerning kinship relations given freely; […] White 
                                                 
60  For a comprehensive analysis of the issue of representational and other forms of non-Indigenous 
political instrumentality in Indigenous life, see Tim Rowse, Remote Possibilities: the Aboriginal 
Domain and the Administrative Imagination, (Darwin, North Australian Research Unit, 1992); and 
Rowse, ‘“Democratic Systems are an Alien Thing to Aboriginal Culture”’, in Speaking for the 
People: Representation in Australian Politics, Ed by Marian Sawer and Giannin Zappala 
(Melbourne University Press, Carlton Victoria, 2001) 103–133 (p. 108–109).  
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misconceptions on this subject have at times been deliberately allowed to 
continue.61  
In the physical area of Doomadgee in which Aboriginal residents maintained their own 
values and customs, ‘the presence of an approaching Whitefella […] was commonly 
considered as an uncomfortable intrusion by many’.62  
As well as maintaining some exclusionary modes of behaviour in their domestic life, 
especially at Daguragu, Gurindji people also used certain group activities to assert their 
social and cultural prerogatives, to subsume their individual availability for other purposes, 
and to resist the prescriptivism of self-management in the new communities established by 
their elders and the DAA. Card-playing was one such pastime, highly popular amongst the 
region’s Aboriginal people. Anthropologist Gillian Cowlishaw describes Rembarrnga 
people’s gambling with cards at Bulman, east of Katherine: 
The behavioural dimension of sociality continued to express Rembarrnga 
recalcitrance […] For instance the practice of openly sitting and playing cards all day 
contradicted the moral language of ‘a good day’s work’, of ‘getting things done’ and 
‘making an effort’, and was seen [by authorities] as shameless public laziness.63 
In his study of Wik society in the mid-1980s, anthropologist David Martin characterises 
gambling with cards as a communalising activity which was ‘a practice which stood in 
structural opposition to those of the dominant society, based as they were on individual rights 
and property’.64 By playing cards, Gurindji people too were able to ‘communalise’ 
(instantiate their kinship and social bonds) through a forum of their own choice, on their own 
terms, in their own time—in sharp distinction to the highly regulated ‘social projects’ of the 
DAA. Such public, collective activity paradoxically comprised another form of 
‘disappearance’, by which individuals and Gurindji individuality were jointly subsumed and 
rendered unavailable to governmental agendas.   
The same may be said of fighting and group drinking, other activities commonly 
mediated or occurring within the Gurindji domain. By observing and moderating fights, 
playing long-running card games and drinking alcohol in groups, Aboriginal people in 
                                                 
61  Trigger, 1986, p. 113. 
62  Trigger, ibid., p. 112. 
63  Gillian Cowlishaw, ‘Erasing Culture and Race: Practising ‘Self-determination’, Oceania, Vol. 68, 
No.3 (145–169), p. 162. 
64  Martin, 1993, p. 139. 
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remote settlements such as Kalkaringi and Daguragu ‘communed’ beyond the limits of 
governance. They conducted and prioritised these activities in small to large groups with 
adaptive resourcefulness and purposive dedication. In doing so, they utilised their ‘right of 
dissociation’, as per Kukathas’s criterion of a ‘free society’. For purposes of communal self-
determination, they ‘disappeared’ in plain view.  
In considering the non-participation of Gurindji people in governmental activity more 
broadly during the period, it should be remembered that in principle, the western 
governmental construct of self-management—not to mention representational politics 
itself—functions precisely so that the overwhelming majority of a population’s individuals 
need not concern themselves with group leadership. Indeed, it is logical that many Gurindji 
people (and even more so, Kalkaringi’s non-Gurindji Aboriginal residents) would have 
sought to avoid engaging with Libanungu or Daguragu Council and other governmental 
projects and programs precisely because those entities’ existence relieved individuals of 
responsibility for ‘self-determination’, as either their leaders or government agencies defined 
it. Such a response is understandable. As Philip Batty points out: 
One wonders how members of an all-white township would have reacted to the same 
demand to ‘determine their own affairs’. No doubt they would face the same 
intractable difficulties that Aboriginal people have encountered in trying to 
‘determine’ every aspect of their communal lives.65 
Of male Gardudjara and Mandjildjara speakers faced with the same challenges at Jigalong 
in the Western Desert, Robert Tonkinson writes: 
To these men, most ‘whitefella business’ is peripheral. Having a council to deal with 
it is a good thing, because it leaves them free to devote themselves to the concerns of 
life that really matter: the retention of their Law and the carrying out of religious 
activities. As long as they get enough to eat and have some form of shelter, the 
majority of the local people are primarily concerned with their own internal affairs.66  
                                                 
65  See Appendix A, which ostensibly reveals the commitments of community leaders to the 
governance of local organisations. Philip Batty, ‘Private Politics, Public Strategies: White Advisers 
and their Aboriginal Subjects’, Oceania, No. 75 (2005) 209–221 (p. 215). 
66  Tonkinson, op. cit., p. 97. 
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Although Tonkinson posits that for Gardudjara and Mandjildjara men at this time, ‘the 
concerns of life that really matter’ were religious, the nature of the Gurindji people’s 
priorities in this context is unimportant. As I will show in Chapters 9–10, the operation of 
local-governance-type bodies in Kalkaringi and Daguragu freed up the majority of residents 
not to participate in them, to pursue anything they deemed preferable or more important.  
From this perspective, ‘disappearance’ was a common means by which many Gurindji 
individuals utilised what was for them a newfound corollary of functional specialisation. 
The non-participation of many Gurindji people in local political life comprised a 
response to self-determination policy little-anticipated by its architects. While state 
authorities used an array of methods to engender Aboriginal conformity to the norms and 
behaviour of the ‘self-managing’ populations they envisioned, Gurindji individuals availed 
themselves of a freedom which self-determination policy ostensibly tolerated if not 
endorsed—that of non-participation in governmental activity. Contrary to the political 
rhetoric that accompanied it though, self-determination policy placed significant demands 
on Aboriginal people, whether they chose to accept or reject its challenges. To avoid the 
onerous consequences of these little-acknowledged demands, Kalkaringi and Daguragu’s 
Aboriginal residents ‘disappeared’ in publicly conducted though ‘covert’ forms of 
resistance.  
4.5 Gurindji Women  
In Chapter Four, I described the differentiated status of women in ‘traditional’ Gurindji 
society, and in this thesis’ Introduction I explained the quotidian means whereby women’s 
voices were commonly excluded from official accounts of Gurindji interests and opinion, 
until at least the early 1980s. Nonetheless, it is useful to this analysis to consider, where 
possible, the ways in which the social processes I have described were differentiated by 
gender among the Gurindji. In the 1970s–80s, after the dissociative push of younger Gurindji 
males, both gender relations and the position of women in Gurindji society were subject to 
revision, largely at the hands of Gurindji women themselves.  
As the first DAA-appointed Community Adviser to be accepted by the Daguragu’s 
elders as an adviser of that community, Richard Preece struggled in 1975–77 to solicit a self-
determining Gurindji subject. He did so primarily through attempting to engender greater 
Aboriginal identification with, and leadership of, the governmental vehicle created for that 
purpose: Libanungu Council. (The story of these efforts by the bureaucracy forms the subject 
of Chapters Nine and Ten). High among Preece’s concerns was the broad neglect of 
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women’s interests by both his predecessors and Gurindji leaders, and Gurindji women’s 
subsequent marginalisation in the community’s ‘self-determination’. Seeking to remedy this, 
Preece turned to the precepts of democratic representation, and played a hand in ensuring 
five seats on the Libanungu Council board were reserved for women. The greater problem 
Preece faced though, was that which had facilitated and compounded the marginalisation he 
sought to rectify: soliciting an opinion from the women themselves. In confronting this issue, 
he seemed to recognise that ‘somebody’ else, presumably female, might achieve a better 
result:   
[…] Whenever Aboriginal women become involved in a committee, at first they attend 
the meetings but say very little and then appear to become bored and do not attend 
meetings after a short time. […] Now that five women have been elected to the Council 
[…], it would be worthwhile the Department employing somebody to work with the 
women on the council and in the community generally, to try and understand the type 
of problems that arise there. A great ‘shyness’ barrier exists […].67  
Nonetheless, with increased personal incomes, equality before the law (especially in ‘family 
matters’) and the equalising effects of westernisation increasingly perceptible to Wave Hill’s 
residents, Gurindji women would soon dramatically announce their discomfiture with their 
society’s status quo. Elsewhere, I have termed these dramatic actions taken by young 
Gurindji women (in many cases supported by their mothers), a ‘rebellion’.68 The rebellion 
of Gurindji women occurred in the early 1980s, and was initially fought along 
vertical/intergenerational lines. Notwithstanding the elders’ earlier relaxation of kinship-
determined marriage rules, the first issue young Gurindji women publicly contested was 
exactly that: kinship-determined marriage rules. Very soon however, with the support of Jan 
Richardson, a non-Indigenous and feminist supporter employed as Daguragu Council’s 
finance officer and then Town Clerk, a large number of Daguragu women moved to address 
broader issues of gender inequality, specifically the control of ‘community’ resources by 
men. The resulting reconfiguration of Gurindji gender relationships in the early 1980s, 
accompanied by the frequent election of women as Council board members and their 
employment in mid-level roles in local organisations, can be seen as the expression of similar 
                                                 
67  Darwin, NAA, ‘Establishment of […] Community Adviser to Work with Women’, 31 December 
1975, Wave Hill Community Development, E460, 1978/242. 
68  Ward, 2016, pp. 272–276. 
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tensions as those driving the dissociation of young Gurindji men in the previous generation. 
And similar to that disaggregation of male Gurindji interests, the rebellion of Gurindji 
women was expedited and supported by the introduction of the ‘mainstream’ products and 
social technologies I have discussed in this chapter: liberalist ‘universal’ laws and discourse, 
common cash incomes, westernising cultural materials and alcohol.  
4.6 Conclusion 
The Whitlam Government’s announcement of its radical plans to create Aboriginal 
representative bodies that would encourage their members to participate in their own self-
determination was both an indication and a symptom of the significant social and cultural 
changes occurring in Australia at the time. Yet the changes that swept the social and political 
landscapes of the nation’s mainstream settler society in the 1960s and 70s were slight in 
comparison to those the Gurindji and other remote Aboriginal people underwent in the 
period. For remote Aboriginal societies like the Gurindji’s, access to the consumer economy, 
Western concepts and knowledges, and the benefits of mainstream social progressivism had 
been largely delayed or denied by their situation as pastoral industry employees. An effect 
of remote Aboriginal people’s departure from that industry in the 1960s and 70s was that in 
addition to being exposed to the reality of a modern, rural, liberalised society for the first 
time, they were concurrently able to utilise their recently-acquired basic citizenship rights. 
Also, the Gurindji people’s traditional forms of economic and social organisation, which had 
largely been preserved during their decades within the pastoral industry, had given many 
Gurindji individuals cause to desire significant reform. In combination, these factors created 
a moment in the history of Gurindji social development in which hitherto-obscured, extrinsic 
social change provided a suite of enabling techniques and the legal environment in which 
younger Gurindji were able to realise their long-constrained desire for greater freedom from 
adult authority, and Gurindji women were similarly able to obtain greater freedom from male 
authority. This coincided with the introduction of a ‘communalising rationale’ among 
Aboriginal peoples by federal governments, and the introduction of a similarly justified, 
collective social vision by Gurindji elders.  
Rather than accepting the ‘communal’ responsibilities of Gurindji self-determination 
proffered by its policy architects or Gurindji elders, many Gurindji people used cash, alcohol 
and other newly available means to fulfil agendas they found important: to revise their 
intergenerational and gender relationships and distinguish their own intentions from 
communal ones. A significant technique for those undertaking this process was a novel form 
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of social closure, or ‘disappearance’. For members of a small, isolated society characterised 
by increasingly high levels of tension, these social reforms were fundamentally important to 
their protagonists.  
To demonstrate these dynamics in practice, and to deliver my final analysis of Gurindji 
self-determination, it is now necessary to investigate the ‘delivery’ stage of policy 
implementation, in which the volition of some Gurindji people and their DAA or other 
interlocutors was translated (or not) into practical, physical activity at Kalkaringi and 
Daguragu. In Part Two of this thesis, I therefore describe the main activities and projects in 
which the priorities of government and Gurindji leaders regarding the Gurindji’s self-
determination converged. In each case I will describe the rationale of authorities (and as 
much as possible, the extent of matching Gurindji support) for the prioritisation of each 
project area for actualisation. By analysing the ‘delivery’ stage of policy implementation, 
other significant impediments to ‘ideal’ Gurindji self-determination also become apparent: 
the mutual misunderstandings of the Gurindji and their governmental interlocutors, and 
similarly the mismatch of Gurindji aspirations with bureaucratic means and methods.
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Introduction to Part Two 
 
 
 
 
In Part One of this thesis I have described the ideological and political impetus that gave 
rise to the Aboriginal self-determination policies of Australian governments, and the 
ostensibly compatible social vision articulated by male Gurindji leaders of the period. I 
have also described contingent elements of the social and economic situation of the 
Gurindji group, which I argue affected Gurindji people’s responses to ‘Gurindji self-
determination’: the collectively-oriented zone of endeavour formed at Kalkaringi and 
Daguragu by government officials and Gurindji elders intent on developing a self-
managing, nominally independent Gurindji society. As I have shown, relevant aspects of 
the Gurindji’s social and economic situation were the liberalising effects of globalisation 
and increased cash incomes, which fuelled individualising processes of decision-making 
and disaggregative social tensions. The response of many Gurindji individuals to the 
prospective social responsibilities that Gurindji self-determination entailed were therefore 
those of indifference and/or dissociation, as expressed by the outright contestation of 
prescriptive social expectations and an autochthonous form of social closure I have termed 
‘disappearance’.  
The function of Part Two of this thesis is to illustrate the effects of these dynamics 
on each of the significant pillars of Gurindji self-determination identified by Vincent 
Lingiari and his coterie of fellow elders: land, cattle, schooling and an independent 
homestead. It is also to demonstrate that other factors also affected the Gurindji elders’ 
achievement (or not) of their own success. With the elders’ proposal of establishing their 
own school, for instance, government inactivity meant that the occasion simply never arose 
in which they could attempt to put their ideas into practice. Similarly, we will see that 
categorical differences between the possession of ‘rights’ and the operation of 
organisations (as required by the other pillars of Gurindji self-determination I address) 
rendered the Gurindji elders’ pursuit and possession of land rights largely unresponsive to 
the individualising social and economic dynamics I have described. Because the elders and 
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the Whitlam and Fraser Governments saw the return of the Gurindji group’s land as 
fundamental to their autonomy, it is to their ‘land rights’ that we will first turn. 
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Ch. 5 Gurindji Land and Land Rights 
 
 
 
 
 
The recognition of Gurindji people as leaders of the Aboriginal Land Rights movement 
following their Walk-off from Wave Hill Station in 1966 has been ensured by a well-
known photograph taken by the Indigenous photographer Mervyn Bishop (See below). 
The image shows Vincent Lingiari receiving a handful of soil from then Prime Minister 
Gough Whitlam at Daguragu on 16 August 1975. Since its publication, Bishop’s image 
has come to be associated with the amorphous concept of the ‘birth of Aboriginal Land 
Rights’, and the return of the Gurindji’s land to them in perpetuity.1 Both perceptions are 
erroneous, yet it remains the case that the Gurindji leaders’ success in obtaining their land 
rights was singular and pronounced among their self-determination-type aims. 
In this chapter, I describe the actions of various governments to variously support 
and delimit the Gurindji elders’ land rights campaign, and show why the elders’ receipt of 
property rights under the Pastoral Ordinance Act and the Aboriginal Land Rights 
(Northern Territory) Act 1976 comprise the singular success of Gurindji self-
determination. To do so, I will examine the various purposes ascribed to the Northern 
Territory’s Aboriginal Land Rights legislation by its architects, contextualising such 
legislation and its statutory apparatus within the framework of Australian government 
activity directed towards Aboriginal self-determination. This chapter’s explanation of the 
terms of the Gurindji’s receipt and occupation of their land base also contextualises the 
account of the Muramulla Cattle company that I provide in Chapters Six and Seven. 
 
 
 
                                                 
1  For example, SBS news described the occasion as ‘Gough Whitlam formally hand[ing] back land to 
the Gurindji people […], marking the first time land was handed back to Aboriginal Australians’. 
http://www.sbs.com.au/nitv/nitv-news/article/2014/10/21/Indigenous-australians-pay-tribute-gough-
whitlam. Accessed 29 September 2016.  
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Figure 1. Vincent 
Lingiari and Prime 
Minister Gough 
Whitlam at 
Daguragu, 16 August 
1975. © Mervyn 
Bishop/ Department 
of Prime Minister 
and Cabinet 
The Gurindji people did not receive inalienable Aboriginal freehold title (i.e. 
‘Aboriginal Land Rights’) over their land until 1986, the time at which this study ends. In 
the preceding 1975–86 period, the Gurindji ran their cattle business with the tenure of a 
mere Pastoral Lease, yet events showed that they could not securely occupy their lease in 
a political climate hostile to Aboriginal Land Rights. The Gurindji elders’ apparent 
indifference about the limitations of the pastoral leasehold tenure they held in the 1975–
86 period—and the fact that the change from leasehold to freehold made no difference to 
their use of the land—raises important analytical issues. To resolve these, I will compare 
the terms of a pastoral lease with those of inalienable freehold title, as they pertained (or 
not) to the Gurindji people’s ambitions. I argue that during the decade prior to their receipt 
of inalienable freehold title, the rights entailed by pastoral leasehold was sufficient to serve 
the Gurindji’s land use goals, and that therefore for analytical and practical purposes, their 
grant of ‘Aboriginal freehold’ title to them in 1986 means less than might be assumed.  
To distinguish between land rights and the Gurindji people’s other domains of self-
determination, and to explore why the Gurindji’s operationalisation of ‘land rights’ 
through leasehold was an anomalous success among their self-determining goals, this 
chapter will explore the nature of rights, and consider several pertinent operational 
differences between Gurindji land rights and the Gurindji elders’ other self-determination-
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like projects. This discussion provides context for my exploration of Aboriginal Land 
Rights as a governmental practice of postcolonial settler states, and in particular how the 
statutory regime of Land Rights and its operational strengths and limitations influenced 
the practice of Gurindji land rights. As elsewhere in this thesis (see Chapter Three), I have 
found the ideas of Michel Foucault on governmentality useful in enunciating the 
limitations of legislated land rights (and in the Gurindji’s case, the granting of a pastoral 
lease) as vehicles for Indigenous self-determination. After examining Aboriginal Land 
Rights legislation as an artefact of self-determination policy ideals, I argue that although 
its proponents focused on the enabling attributes of inalienable freehold title, the 
requirements placed on Aboriginal Trusts and/or on Aboriginal pastoral lessees by 
enabling legislation and funding inevitably had a counter-effect: co-opting Indigenous 
constituents into self-governing processes. 
Drawing from the above, I will show that for the elders in the period 1975–86, their 
lack of inalienable freehold title did not impede their progress towards, or practice of, the 
‘self-determination’ they sought. This provides the basis for my comparison of the ways 
in which operationalising land rights differed for the Gurindji from their attempted 
realisation of Gurindji-managed businesses, companies and organisations. My explanation 
as to why ‘Gurindji land rights’ was a singular and durable success among the Gurindji 
elders’ self-determining aspirations concludes the chapter.  
5.1 Aboriginal Land Rights and Self-determination policy 
When articulating its policy for Aboriginal Affairs, one of the Whitlam Government’s 
primary goals was the official recognition of Aboriginal Land Rights, and it therefore 
established a Royal Commission to determine how customary Aboriginal Land Rights 
might be fairly and accurately recognised within Australian law in the Northern Territory.2 
The government framed the restitution of land to Aboriginal people, and the purported 
socioeconomic benefits of this, as necessary components of its broader ‘self-
determination’ policy. So that Aboriginal people might ‘assume an honoured place in the 
Australian community and to achieve their freely chosen purposes by their own efforts’, 
the Whitlam Government asked Justice Edward Woodward to specifically ‘investigate the 
                                                 
2  [Departmental Secretary] Barrie Dexter, ‘The Commonwealth Department of Aboriginal Affairs—
Its Functions and Underlying Principles, 9 May 1973’, in Seminar on Aboriginal Affairs (Monash 
Centre for Research into Aboriginal Affairs 1973. 
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means whereby effective action can be taken in respect of land’.3 In his final report (1974), 
Justice Woodward wrote he had ‘assumed’ the aims of the inquiry to include, inter alia: 
‘the provision of land holdings as a first essential for people who are economically 
depressed and who have at present no real opportunity of achieving a normal standard of 
living’.4 The Whitlam Government’s assumption was that an Aboriginal land base was a 
necessary pre-requisite for meeting Aboriginal self-determination policy’s broader social 
and cultural goals. 
As I will describe, several years passed before the Aboriginal Land Rights (Northern 
Territory) Act 1976 (hereafter ‘ALRA’, or ‘the Act’) was legislated by the Fraser 
Government. That government’s rhetoric on land rights after enacting the legislation 
echoed that of the Whitlam Government and its advisers. Like its ALP predecessors, the 
Fraser Government presented Aboriginal Land Rights as congruent with self-
determination (now self-management) policy’s remedial ends, if not as a designated part 
of the policy.  In his second reading speech when the Bill was passed, Fraser’s first 
Minister for Aboriginal Affairs Ian Viner echoed the Whitlam Government’s definition of 
Aboriginal self-determination when describing the merits of the Bill: 
It is the objective […] of the government to secure conditions in which all 
Australians can realise their own goals in life—to find fulfilment in their own 
way—consistent with the interests of the whole Australian community. 5  
Exactly how an Aboriginal land base—which according to Woodward’s recommendations 
would consist largely of economically marginal areas because only unalienated Crown 
land could be claimed under the Act—would support Aboriginal self-determination was 
not explained.  
In an address to the National Press Club, Minister Viner spoke of Aboriginal people 
‘deciding for themselves what they want to do with their own land’.6 ‘Land Rights for 
Aboriginals’, Viner said, will make them ‘freer than ever before’. Statements such as 
Viner’s indicate that ALRA’s protagonists saw that Aboriginal peoples’ receipt of land 
                                                 
3  Barrie Dexter, Pandora's Box: The Council for Aboriginal Affairs 1967-1976, ed. by Gary Foley and 
Edwina Howell (Southport, Queensland, Keeaira Press, 2015), p. 271. 
4  Australia, Aboriginal Land Rights Commission, Second Report, April 1974 (Australian Government 
Publishing Service, Canberra, 1974), p. 2. 
5  Hon Ian Viner, ‘Second Reading Speech, Aboriginal Land Rights (Northern Territory) Bill 1976’, 4 
June 1976, Australian House of Representatives.  
6  Minister for Aboriginal Affairs Ian Viner, ‘Address to National Press Club’, 7 July 1977. 
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rights equivalent to ownership would expedite their increased participation in the legal and 
economic life of the settler society.7 Viner also saw the Act as a remedial measure designed 
to acknowledge and validate the cultural importance of land to Aboriginal people. 
According to him: 
So that a unique culture may be preserved and the Aboriginal people may keep the 
land which is part of their being, land rights have been recognised.8 
The Department of Aboriginal Affairs put it in the following terms: 
We recognise that fundamental to the Aborigines’ sense of Aboriginality—of 
affinity with one another—is their affinity with the land. 9  
Under ALRA, the ‘freedom’ of Aboriginal people’s decision-making over their own 
land would be overtly similar to that conferred to all landowners under Australian law, yet 
when the Bill was before the parliament prior to its passage in the Senate on 4 November 
1976, Minister Viner acknowledged that under its terms: 
[…] Power to decide what happens to the land thus rests with the traditional owners 
whose representatives, the members of the Land Councils, will have available all 
necessary specialist advice and assistance.10  
The legalisation of a mediated process regarding the enactment of Aboriginal people’s 
land rights referred to by Viner effectively created a powerful, complex decision-making 
Traditional Owner-‘agent’ in the Aboriginal Affairs domain. The instantiation of this agent 
was the network of statutorily enabled land councils. Like the land council to which the 
Gurindji would eventually become beholden, other Aboriginal people recognised as 
Traditional Owners under ALRA would be simultaneously enfranchised as the potential 
beneficiaries of activity undertaken on their land, and obliged to realise their ownership 
according to structures and procedures set out in the Act. 
Having quoted some of the relevant legislators on what they hoped the Aboriginal 
Land Rights (Northern Territory) Act 1976 would achieve and foreshadowed the means of 
                                                 
7  See Julie Finlayson, ‘Northern Territory Land Rights: Purpose and Effectiveness’, Discussion Paper 
No. 180 (Australian National University, Centre for Aboriginal Economic Policy Research, 1999). 
8  The Hon Ian Viner, Minister for Aboriginal Affairs, 29 March 1976.  
9  DAA Annual Report 1976–77, p. 6. 
10        Dexter, 2015, op. cit., p. 390.  
Ch. 5 Gurindji Land Rights  
  136  
 
its operation, I will now show that although the Gurindji elders’ narrative about customary 
Aboriginal Land Rights was utilised in ALRA’s formation, it was ironically not under this 
legislation that they were initially granted tenure.  
5.2  How did the Gurindji obtain their Pastoral Lease?  
As I have written elsewhere, perhaps more than any other single Aboriginal group, the 
Gurindji people’s Walk–off from Wave Hill Station exemplified for mainstream audiences 
the cultural basis of traditional Aboriginal rights to land, and the moral foundation from 
which such rights might be recognised.11 In the late 1960s and early 70s however, whether 
the Australian state might respond positively to this issue was uncertain. While legal 
recognition of an intrinsic, pre-existing form of Aboriginal Land Rights was unacceptable 
to the Gorton and McMahon Governments, the Gurindji’s situation as displaced former 
workers of the cattle industry was one the Liberal-Country National Party coalition was 
more amenable to resolving. Courtesy of the Council for Aboriginal Affairs, a stream of 
bureaucratic advice to resolve the Gurindji’s status as unemployed, tenure-less veterans of 
the pastoral industry was issued in the late 1960s and early 70s.  
Following a recommendation by the CAA, in 1970 Prime Minister Gorton sought 
independent opinion on the ill-defined status of Aborigines on cattle stations—and of the 
Wattie Creek squatters in particular.12 As I have described in Chapter Two, to that end, 
Cecil Gibb of the Australian National University (ANU) was commissioned to chair a 
committee that would provide advice to the government. In late 1971, the ‘Gibb 
Committee’ released its report. Gibb’s committee comprised public servants H.C. Coombs 
of the Council of Aboriginal Affairs and Ted Milliken (Assistant Director of the NT’s 
Welfare Branch), cattle industry representative Bill de Vos, and anthropologist John 
Taylor. In an unusual move for the time, an Indigenous man, Clancy Roberts from Roper 
River mission, was also asked to participate. Broadly, the committee found that small 
Indigenous groups on or near cattle stations should be encouraged to develop their own 
communities through incorporation, education, grants, Special Purpose Leases and 
                                                 
11  Charlie Ward, 'Tracking Wave Hill — Following the Gurindji to Wattie Creek, 1966–72' 
(Unpublished MA thesis, Flinders University, 2012), Chapters 2–5; Charlie Ward, ‘Following the 
Leaders: the Role of Non-Indigenous Activism in the Development of Wattie Creek, 1969–73, 
Journal of the Royal Australian Historical Society, Vol. 100, Pt. 1, 2014, pp. 69–92. 
12  Ward, 2014, pp. 72–74; Jeremy Long, ‘Frank Hardy and the 1966 Wave Hill Walk-Off’, Northern 
Perspective (192, 1996) 1–9 (p. 7). 
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excisions.13 After William McMahon replaced Gorton as Prime Minister on 10 March 
1971, the Committee’s initial findings were quickly adopted. Afterwards, McMahon 
announced that his government would support the provision of ‘Special Purpose Leases’, 
where reasonable cause could be shown, for non-reserve based Aboriginal groups.14 These 
leases were designed to facilitate the granting of funds to Aborigines on reserves for 
‘productive purposes as a business’, and—when authorities assessed a group as possessing 
an achievable business idea—the purchase of land.15  
On this basis, the Gurindji applied to the Lands Branch of the Department of the 
Interior for a Special Purpose Lease, which was approved. Their eight square mile lease 
(NT SPL 353) was to be for ‘the purpose of establishing and maintaining a communal 
settlement and all purposes ancillary thereto’.16 Though the Department approved the 
application, when the McMahon Government lost office to the Australian Labor Party on 
2 December 1972, a ‘freeze’ was placed on lease applications by the incoming government 
of Gough Whitlam and their application was delayed.17 
Notwithstanding the ensuing rearrangement of the Aboriginal Affairs portfolio 
undertaken by the Whitlam Government (described in Chapter One), thanks to their years 
of lobbying ALP politicians, tenure for the Gurindji was high on the new Department of 
Aboriginal Affairs’ list of priorities. It was therefore soon announced that their application 
of the previous year for a Special Purpose Lease over eight square miles around Wattie 
Creek (the area also known as Daguragu) had been successful.18  
Although the Gurindji’s Special Purpose Lease legalised their occupation at 
Daguragu after six years—rendering them ‘squatters’ no longer—it did not satisfy the 
elders’ desire for an area of land sufficient to operate their cattle enterprise. Due in part to 
                                                 
13  Gibbs et al, (1973), pp. 72–76. 
14  McMahon also announced that the government would apportion a sum of money for the purpose of 
purchasing land outside reserves for Aboriginal groups. See Ian Palmer, Buying Back the Land: 
Organisational Struggle and the Aboriginal Land Fund Commission (Canberra, Aboriginal Studies 
Press, 1988), p. 20–21; Prime Minister William McMahon, ‘Australian Aborigines: Commonwealth 
Policy and Achievements’ (Canberra, Australian Government Publisher) 26 January 1972; Darwin, 
NTAS, Interview with Barrie Dexter recorded by Charlie Ward, NTRS 3609/BWF 25. 
15 Palmer, ibid., pp. 15–22; Minister for the Interior Peter Nixon, Press Release: ‘Land Leases for 
Northern Territory Aboriginals’, 21 July 1970. Oke Personal Collection. 
16  Darwin, NTAS, ‘Surrender of Land from Wave Hill PL 529’, 30 May 1972, NTRS 246, Pastoral 
Lease 529, Part 3. 
17  Dexter, 2015, op. cit., p. 270. 
18  The terms of Gurindji Special Purpose Lease 353 are contained at Appendix C. ‘Statement by the 
Minister for Aboriginal Affairs, Mr Gordon Bryant, and the Minister for the Northern Territory, Mr 
Kep Enderby’ (Canberra, 18 March 1973). 
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the pressure that activists applied to the government to hasten a resolution for the Gurindji, 
the possibility of buying land from surrounding pastoral leases for the Muramulla 
Company to run as a cattle station was investigated by the Department of Aboriginal 
Affairs and the Lands Branch of the Department of the Northern Territory. Such an 
excision and purchase could be achieved within extant land tenure arrangements; indeed, 
using the cumbersome Lands Acquisition Act (1955–73), the government was already 
moving to do just that for several other Aboriginal groups. In 1970–71, the McMahon 
Government had similarly awarded pastoral leases to the Yugal Mangi Cattle Company at 
Ngukurr, to a Pitjantjatjara group at Everard Park (Mimili) in South Australia, and a group 
at Panter Downs in Western Australia.19 Far from fostering recognition of Aboriginal Land 
Rights however, the Lands Acquisition Act vested ownership of land purchased for 
Aboriginal groups in the purchasing party, namely the government.20  
For the Whitlam Government, new legislation was therefore required to realise the 
CAA’s recommendation that the Commonwealth should establish an effective means for 
purchasing land on behalf of Aboriginal people.21 Regarding Aboriginal groups like the 
Gurindji, with a traditional interest in country alienated by a pastoral lease, Justice 
Woodward recommended that they would be required to lodge a land claim with the 
Aboriginal Land Fund Commission. Such arrangements would eventually be formalised 
in Section 5(e) of the Whitlam Government’s Aboriginal Land (Northern Territory) Bill, 
which recommended that:  
 On an application being made to the [Land] Commissioner by or on behalf of the 
Traditional Aboriginal Owners of land, being Crown Land, to inquire into, and to 
report to the Minister on, the desirability of securing that land for the use of those 
traditional owners.22  
                                                 
19  See Elspeth Young, 'Aboriginal Cattle Stations: Strategies for Self-Management', in Proceedings of 
the 17th Inst. Australian Geographic Conference (Bathurst, NSW, 1981); Steven Thiele, Yugul: An 
Arnhem Land Cattle Station (Darwin, The Australian National University, North Australian Research 
Unit, 1982); H.C. Coombs, Kulinma: Listening to Aboriginal Australians (Canberra, Australian 
National University Press, 1978), p. 177. 
20  Cited in Ian Palmer, Buying Back the Land: Organisational Struggle and the Aboriginal Land Fund 
Commission (Canberra, Aboriginal Studies Press, 1988), p. 30. 
21  Barrie Dexter, in 'Seminar of the Fortieth Anniversary of the 1967 Referendum: Transcript, 22 June 
2007', (Parkes, Canberra: Office of Evaluation and Audit (Indigenous Programs), Department of 
Finance and Administration, 2007), p. 8. 
22  Australian Government, Aboriginal Land (Northern Territory) Bill 1975 (Australian Government 
Printer, Canberra, 1976), p. 4.  
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Earlier, while the Aboriginal Land Fund Commission Act (1974) was being drafted, 
the DAA sought Aboriginal Affairs Minister Cavanagh’s approval for a grant of approx. 
$160,000 ($1.2 million) to negotiate the purchase for the Gurindji of the 1,240 square mile 
western portion of Wave Hill Station in March 1974.23 (See Map 5). The request was made 
on the basis of the 1973 interim report of Australian Agricultural Consultancy 
Management (AACM) company, which advised the DAA on several other purchases of 
alienated crown land operating as pastoral leases. According to DAA Deputy Secretary 
Jeremy Long, the AACM report suggested that the area desired by the Gurindji was 
‘suitable for the establishment of a cattle station, and that it has reasonable prospects of 
achieving long term commercial viability’.24 
While the bureaucracy and the Interim Land Commission worked on resolving 
Aboriginal land purchases in 1974, it was unclear to Departmental Secretary Barrie Dexter 
whether the Gurindji’s land would be granted to them via ALRA legislation or pastoral 
lesseeship. He told the Gurindji that until certainty about their tenure was resolved, his 
Department could do little to support the Muramulla Company.25 After pressure on the 
government from Aboriginal supporters increased, Dexter was able to expedite the passage 
of the Aboriginal Land Fund Commission Bill to the parliamentary draftsman.26 The 
Whitlam Government was not bound to wait for legal recognition of the Gurindji’s land 
rights; political considerations demanded that it purchase land for them from Wave Hill 
Station immediately.27 As a result, on 5 October 1974, the Aboriginal Affairs Minister 
James Cavanagh announced that the government would liaise with the Vestey Company 
about excising 1,240 square miles from Wave Hill Station.28 On this basis the Gurindji’s 
excision from Wave Hill Station was the first to be purchased by the ALFC with Judge 
                                                 
23  Darwin, NAA, ‘Economic Development Muramulla […]’, Muramulla Gurindji Co Pastoral Project, 
(E460) 1974/1588. 
24  Despite extensive searching in archival, library and private collections, I have been unable to locate 
a copy of this report.  Darwin, NAA, ‘Economic Development Muramulla […]’, Muramulla Gurindji 
Co Pastoral Project, (E460) 1974/1588. 
25  Darwin, NAA, ‘Dexter to Nitschke’ Muramulla Gurindji Co Pastoral Project, (E460) 1974/1588. 
26  Dexter, 2015, op. cit., p. 388. 
27  The excision of Northern Territory Daguragu Pastoral Lease 805 was issued under the NT Crown 
Lands Ordinance (1971). The general terms of the lease are contained in Appendix B. The purchase 
of the property was one of the first conducted under the Aboriginal Land Fund Commission Act 
(1974). 
28  Sen. James Cavanagh to Vincent Lingiari, 5 October 1974, Oke Personal Collection. 
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Dick Ward acting as Interim Land Commissioner, and a date for the ceremonial handover 
of title over Pastoral Lease 805 to the Gurindji was set.  
We have seen in the preceding paragraphs indications of uncertainty within the 
bureaucracy as to whether land should be alienated for the Wattie Creek people on the 
basis of their cattle aspirations (via an excision and a pastoral lease) or their traditional 
rights (via Aboriginal Freehold Title, as recognised by a successful claim under the 
anticipated Aboriginal Land Rights (Northern Territory) Act 1976. The DAA’s uncertainty 
at this time was not challenged by the Gurindji elders, who conflated the ‘moral right’ 
basis of their claim to land with the (pastoral) uses they wished to put it. Upon this inchoate 
foundation, misconceptions by both the Gurindji elders and their DAA interlocutors about 
the government’s basis for alienating the Gurindji’s sought-after land were perpetuated 
during the Muramulla Company’s establishment (1973–75). The following chapters will 
show that this created problems for the Company throughout its life. Before describing the 
Whitlam Government’s handover to the Gurindji of a pastoral lease and its implications 
then, I wish to focus on the observable conflation by the Gurindji and their interlocutors 
of the elders’ land-related purposes.  
While their DAA interlocutors believed that the Gurindji had chosen the Western 
portion of Wave Hill Station because the group was seeking acknowledgment of their 
traditional rights, as no Aboriginal Land Rights Act existed in 1973–74, they were 
ironically compelled to excise it on the basis of its pastoral merits (see also Chapter Six). 
DAA staff were therefore pleased to discover that from a financial perspective, the area of 
land the Gurindji elders sought would be sufficient to operate the cattle enterprise they 
envisaged. Although this vaunted profitability was essentially the justification used by the 
government to release the land, its implications—that the Gurindji would have to work the 
entire property and develop it to an imposed timetable—were not communicated to them. 
The failure of their intermediaries to consult Gurindji leaders about which part of the total 
claimed area they wished to run cattle on perpetuated the failure of the parties involved to 
differentiate between the land area the Gurindji sought, the uses to which they intended to 
put it, and the appropriate avenue for its acquisition.  
Perpetuating the ambiguities underlying the Gurindji’s land request was the fact that 
Daguragu Pastoral Lease 805, which was subsequently awarded to Gurindji people under 
their ALRA Land Claim, had little to do with the traditional rights of the elders themselves. 
The area the elders sought generally did not include their own traditional country, and 
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three of its four boundaries were identical or parallel to those of Wave Hill Station; they 
had nothing to do with any Gurindji demarcation under the customary law later described 
to the Aboriginal Land Commissioner. (See Maps 2 and 5). Rather, the area sought by the 
elders reflected their leadership of a tradition-oriented, land-affiliated group (actually a 
number of subgroups, as described in Chapter Two) with long and intimate pastoral 
experience. According to Aboriginal Land Commissioner John Toohey when he 
subsequently acknowledged the validity of the Gurindji’s ALRA claim over the elders’ 
pastoral lease: 
Although there is a very real sense in which Gurindji have a deep, general 
attachment to the land under claim, the area also can be seen in terms of smaller 
‘estates’ for which local descent groups have particular responsibility. Not all the 
Gurindji, including some of the most important leaders in the community, have 
traditional country within Daguragu [lease].29  
While the traditional estates of individual Gurindji (and Bilinarra, Nyininy, Mudburra, 
Malngin, and Ngarinyman) families within the Walk-off group stretched over a far greater 
area than Wave Hill Station, the group was united by its affinity for, and knowledge of, 
that part of the station to which they had largely been confined during their period of semi-
indentured servitude to Vestey’s. Further, it is likely that Gurindji people had adapted to 
that partial confinement by bestowing ceremonial responsibilities for the area, or at least 
knowledge about its Dreamings, on a greater number of individuals than had been the case 
pre-settlement. Such accommodation of life experience in determining a person’s 
responsibilities for country has equivalents elsewhere in Aboriginal Australia.30 Such was 
the Gurindji people’s connection to the country which they thought the Whitlam 
Government was awarding to them in recognition of their traditional ownership. 
As the day of the pastoral lease transfer at Daguragu loomed, the government 
invested much importance in the occasion, dubbing it a ‘historic and symbolic milestone’ 
before it occurred.31 At Daguragu on the morning of 16 August 1975, evidence of the 
                                                 
29  Justice John Toohey, Gurindji Land Claim to Daguragu Station: Report by the Aboriginal Land 
Commissioner [….] (Canberra, Australian Government Publishing Service, 1982), p. 10.  
30  Benjamin R. Smith, ‘Pastoralism, Land and Aboriginal Existence in Central Cape York Peninsula’, 
Anthropology in Action: Journal for Applied Anthropology in Policy and Practice (Berghahn 
Journals, New York, Vol. 9, No. 1, 2002) 21–30 (p. 25–26).  
31  Hon. Les Johnson, Minister for Aboriginal Affairs, ‘Transfer of Part of Wave Hill Pastoral Lease 
[…]’, Media Release, 31 July 1975, Oke Personal Collection. 
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Whitlam Government’s failure to legislate the findings of the Woodward Royal 
Commission into Aboriginal Land Rights may be discerned. The new Aboriginal Affairs 
Minister Les Johnson explained that with the government’s forthcoming land rights 
legislation, the Gurindji could convert their lease to freehold Aboriginal title ‘later in the 
year’.32 After Prime Minister Whitlam handed Lingiari the title deeds ‘as proof, in 
Australian law, that these lands belong to the Gurindji people […] forever’, Whitlam 
stooped down, grabbed a handful of red earth, and poured it into Lingiari’s open palm.33 
As noted, once they were disseminated, images of the ‘Handover’ would become some of 
the most recognised of Australian Aboriginal history.34  
The day after the Gurindji’s lease ceremony, the Prime Minister proclaimed that ‘for 
the first time, Aboriginal people have been given rights to their own land’.35 This was 
disingenuous, for although the PM made it clear that he saw the government’s transferral 
of a pastoral lease to the Gurindji as merely a first step towards the return of their land in 
perpetuity, the ‘rights’ conferred to the Gurindji were merely those of pastoral lessees—
which had been already granted to other Aboriginal groups.  
Within months of the ceremony at Wattie Creek, the ALP was removed from power. 
At the time, the Northern Territory’s Aboriginal Land Rights Bill—representing years of 
hard work by many Aborigines, the Woodward Commission, the CAA and the DAA—
was before the House of Representatives, requiring its last reading in the Senate.36 The 
Whitlam Government’s intention of facilitating the rapid award of Aboriginal freehold title 
to the Gurindji people was thus thwarted on 11 November 1975 by the constitutional crisis 
known as ‘The Dismissal’—though as time passed, the wider public came to believe that 
Whitlam had provided the Gurindji with the property rights they sought. In actuality, the 
Gurindji were stuck with Whitlam’s ‘interim’ tenure until 1986. Before we examine the 
implications of this for the Gurindji elders’ Land Rights ambitions, it is necessary to 
describe the process of ALRA’s development. 
                                                 
32  ‘Some Earth From Wattie Creek’, Nation Review, August 22–28 1975, p. 1153; Hon. Les Johnson, 
‘Transfer of Pastoral Lease at Daguragu to Gurindji People: Speech by Minister […] 16 August 1975, 
Oke Personal Collection. 
33  Edward G Whitlam, Abiding Interests (St. Lucia, University of Queensland Press, 1997), p. 189. 
34  See http://www.theglobalmail.org/feature/framing-history-a-handful-of-sand/286/. Accessed 9 
October 2013. 
35  ‘Blacks’ Land by Whitlam: QLD is Accused’, Courier Mail, 18 August 1975, p. 2. 
36  Dexter, 2007, p. 91; Dexter, 2015, p.390. 
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5.3  Development of the Aboriginal Land Rights (Northern Territory) Act 1976  
Based closely on the Second Report of Justice Woodward, the ALRA Bill developed by 
the Whitlam Government was far-reaching in terms of the rights it afforded Aboriginal 
people. The Bill proposed that: 
• full ownership rights in reserves and certain other lands should be vested in 
appropriate groups of Aboriginal trustees, holding title of the land in Aboriginal 
law; 
• ownership would be communal and there would be a non-transferable title in fee 
simple; 
• the Northern and Central Land Councils […] would assist in the administration of 
Aboriginal lands, in particular by administering leases and handling negotiations 
with existing (Aboriginal) leaseholders; 
• and although rights to minerals in Aboriginal lands should remain with the 
government, royalties would be paid to the Aborigines and the consent of the 
Aborigines (via the Land Councils) would be necessary before exploration or 
mining is allowed.37 
For the Gurindji, the terms of prospective Aboriginal Land Rights legislation regarding 
Aboriginal claims over pastoral leases were especially pertinent. In addition to the 
establishment of the Aboriginal Land Fund Commission (described above and in Chapter 
One), Justice Woodward’s Second Report made several recommendations on the issue of 
pastoral leases. It recommended that some pastoral leases, or substantial parts of such 
leases, should be purchased as tribal lands and/or as economic ventures by the Aboriginal 
Land Commission; that one of the functions of the Commission should be to inquire into 
the likely extent of Aboriginal claims to pastoral lease lands; that the Commission should 
establish a register of such claims; and that it should also advise on the feasibility of 
determining such claims.38  
                                                 
37  A paraphrased version of Senator James Cavanagh’s ministerial statement accompanying the tabling 
of Justice Woodward’s Second Report, 17 July 1974. Quoted in Barrie Dexter, Pandora’s Box: The 
Council for Aboriginal Affairs, 1967–76, ed. by G. Foley and E. Howell (Southport QLD, Keeiara 
Press, 2015), p. 385. 
38  Justice Woodward, Second Report, April 1974 (Canberra, Government Press, 1975), p. 48–49. 
Ch. 5 Gurindji Land Rights  
  144  
 
With the above recommendations formalised in the Whitlam Government’s Bill, it 
was proposed during parliamentary debate that like Aboriginal reserves, pastoral leases 
held by Aboriginal claimants were to be ‘Category 1’ land and hence automatically 
transferred to Aboriginal Freehold Title with the passage of the Act. As Commissioner, 
Woodward had referred to this as a ‘reversionary’ process, or ‘right’. As noted above, this 
potential in the then un-legislated Bill led to the Aboriginal Affairs Minister’s 
announcement on the day of the pastoral lease transfer to the Gurindji that their receipt of 
freehold title would be assured, when the Act was passed:  
Later this year, I expect you will be able to change this pastoral lease into a freehold 
title if you want to.39  
Woodward’s decision not to acknowledge reversionary rights over pastoral land was 
eventually retained in the Fraser Government’s ALRA Bill, proving Johnston’s expectation 
incorrect. Woodward’s decision regarding land held under pastoral lease was based on 
several concerns he held. In his Second Report, he had stated that a reversionary right over 
those lands ‘might tend to be divisive amongst Aborigines, by pitting ‘traditional’ people 
with continuity of occupation against those of mixed descent and possibly urban 
backgrounds.40 Woodward also believed that if a reversionary right were legislated, 
Aboriginal people would claim the great majority of pastoral lease land in the NT, and that 
the government should be better informed about the ramifications of this. He was also of 
the opinion that another likely result of the assertion of a reversionary Aboriginal right 
over pastoral leases ‘would be that present owners of cattle stations would be unwilling to 
put much capital expenditure into their properties, particularly in the last ten or fifteen 
years of their leases’.41  
The Fraser Government seemingly agreed with Woodward’s findings on this matter, 
and in early June 1976, made its position on the Gurindji’s pastoral lease clear: no longer 
would the group get freehold title to their lease ‘automatically’. Now it was obvious that 
the Aboriginal traditional owners residing at Daguragu and Libanungu would be forced to 
present their claims to the Land Rights Commission.42 Whitlam (by then Leader of the 
                                                 
39  Hon. Les Johnson, Media Release: ‘Transfer of Part of Wave Hill Pastoral Lease to Gurindji […], 31 
July 1975, Oke Personal Collection.  
40  Woodward, op. cit., p. 36. 
41  Woodward, op. cit., p. 35. 
42  When Gough Whitlam returned to Wattie Creek (as Leader of the Opposition) on the anniversary of 
the Handover in August 1976, he used the opportunity to place pressure on the government about 
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Opposition) criticised the government for betraying the Gurindji. In response, Aboriginal 
Affairs Minister Ian Viner reiterated that the Gurindji had ‘a very good chance of getting 
freehold title to [their] entire pastoral lease, and their claim [would] be one of the first to 
be dealt with’.43  
By mid-1976, it was apparent that the Fraser Government’s Bill also rendered 
specific changes to that proposed by the Whitlam Government. Controversially, the Fraser 
Government’s Bill did not enable land to be claimed by Aboriginal people for commercial 
purposes, or on the basis of need.44 Although the provision in Whitlam’s Bill allowing for 
traditional claims over unalienated land, including pastoral leases, had been retained, 
concerns were raised by the Land Councils about other changes.45 Among the 42 
amendments made by the Fraser Government to Whitlam’s’ Bill, was a reversal of its 
earlier determination that Aboriginal Legal Services rather than Land Councils would 
handle land claims. The Fraser Government also determined that certain pastoral 
properties (including Daguragu Pastoral Lease 805) could be treated as unalienated so that 
Aboriginal Title could be granted over them.46 Fraser’s Bill also determined that after Self-
Government, the Northern Territory Government would develop ‘complementary’ 
legislation relating to the traditional rights of Aboriginal people to access and hunt wildlife 
on their traditional country, if that land was recognised as Aboriginal Freehold.47  
When the Whitlam Government had drafted its ALRA Bill on the basis of Justice 
Woodward’s report and released it for comment, the CLP’s conservative leader Dr Goff 
Letts criticised its recognition of Aboriginal people’s rights to claim pastoral properties. 
The debate continued after the Fraser Government was elected, and the attack which Letts 
                                                 
this, and its capitulation to the NTLA. ‘Fraser Government Let Aborigines Down—Gough’, NTN, 31 
August 1976, p. 1; Michelle Grattan, ‘Delay on Gurindji Freeholds’, 2 June 1976, The Age, p. 1; 
Australia, Senate, Sen. Keefe, Official Hansard, No. 50, 1976—First Session of the 30th Parliament 
(Second Period), 7 December 1976 (Canberra, Commonwealth Government Printer), p. 2729. 
43  Min. Viner, cited in Land Rights News, No, 4, October 1976 (Alice Springs, Australia, Central Land 
Council), p. 5; Darwin, NAA, Minutes of a Meeting [DAA], 21 December 1976, Muramulla Gurindji 
Cattle Company Part 1, E460, 1981/256.   
44  This in turn necessitated amendments to the Crown Lands Ordinance to ascertain the right of 
Aboriginal people to access and hunt on pastoral properties with which they had connection. 
45  Among other matters, ALRA (NT) left the enactment of a permit system and the protection of sacred 
sites to be legislated upon at a future date by the then-unformed NT Government. See, for instance, 
Geoff Eames, ‘Land Rights or a Sell Out? An Analysis of the Aboriginal Land Rights (Northern 
Territory) Bill, 1976’ (Alice Springs, IAD Press, 1976). 
46  Barrie Dexter, Pandora’s Box: The Council for Aboriginal Affairs, 1967–76, ed. by G. Foley and E. 
Howell (Southport QLD, Keeiara Press, 2015), p. 469. 
47  ibid.   
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led on behalf of the Northern Territory Legislative Assembly and its Country Liberal 
majority revealed fundamental differences between the NTLA and the Federal Cabinet.48 
While the Fraser Government’s ALRA Bill gave powers to the NTLA to develop 
complementary legislation on some matters, members of the Northern Territory CLP 
remained unsatisfied. MLA Rupert Kentish opined that: 
Of all the disasters conceived by Canberra politicians for Territory Aboriginals, none 
is likely to have as disastrous an impact as this Land Rights Bill when the land 
owners realise the practical application of what is at present to them only a jumble 
of words. […] It is ironical that the Labor Party in Canberra, the ‘designer-in-chief’ 
of disasters, has left the Liberal Country Party to put the match to this one.49 
The conflict was not only about the issue of authority over the Territory’s pastoral land 
base; it served as a focus for long-simmering tensions in Darwin and Alice Springs about 
federal control of the Territory’s affairs.50  
Dr Goff Letts, the Leader of the Country Liberal Party and the Gurindji’s local 
member, brought the issue of the Daguragu group’s land tenure and anticipated Land 
Claim into the debate. Offering his own ‘resolution’ to the Gurindji’s situation in 1976, 
Letts thought that rather than granting them land rights over their 1,240 square mile lease, 
the Muramulla cattle company ‘could continue with similar tenure to that of neighbouring 
properties’, as pastoral lessees.51 Instead of receiving the sweep of the land they had sought 
in perpetuity, Letts proposed that the Gurindji should only have ownership of Daguragu 
and their nearby sacred sites at Mimangu (Seale Gorge): special tenure over both areas had 
been approved earlier by the McMahon Government.52 The area of these two excisions 
combined was about twenty square miles. (See Map 5.) In October 1976, four of the 
Gurindji’s elders wrote to Minister Viner to complain about Letts’ proposal: 
                                                 
48  Dexter, ibid., pp. 465–66. 
49  Northern Territory, Legislative Assembly, Hon Rupert Kentish, Parliamentary Record–First 
Assembly. Part One–the Debates, 18 November 1976 (Darwin, NTLA Printer, 1977), pp. 826–827. 
50  Alastair Heatley, Almost Australians: The Politics of Northern Territory Self-Government (Darwin: 
North Australia Research Unit, Australian National University, 1990), p. 29; John Reeves, ‘Territory-
Canberra Relations: The Past, Present and Future', Northern Perspective, 8 (1985) 27–33, p. 27. 
51  Letts, cited in Land Rights News, No. 4, October 1976 (Alice Springs, Australia, Central Land 
Council), p. 5. 
52  Seale Gorge had been declared a sacred site reserve in November 1970, and the adjacent Daguragu 
area was that over which the Gurindji had been granted a Special Purpose Lease in 1972–3. 
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Mr Whitlam came in to hand over the land forever, but people in Darwin are not 
satisfied; they want to take the land back. This is Gurindji country all over; that is 
why the people here are pretty sorry that the white man wants to take it back.53  
The letter indicates that the elders had not appreciated the finite duration, or the alienability 
of the tenure awarded to them by Whitlam; they believed that Whitlam had granted them 
ownership of their traditional land. This is an important point I shall return to.  
On the anniversary of Australia’s European settlement, 26 January 1977, the Fraser 
Government’s revised version of the Aboriginal Land Rights (Northern Territory) Act 
1976 came into effect. In the period that followed, Gurindji leaders became agitated by the 
Country Liberal Party’s lobbying against Aboriginal Land Rights, and the NT Legislative 
Assembly’s increasing empowerment under the approaching Self-Government (Northern 
Territory) Act 1978. As a result, the elders became anxious to have their claim to the 
Daguragu lease heard quickly under ALRA. The CLC lodged a claim application on the 
Gurindji’s behalf on 26 February 1979 to the entire leasehold excised from Wave Hill 
Station and given to the Muramulla Cattle company by Prime Minister Whitlam in 1975: 
Daguragu Pastoral Lease 805, which included the area surrounding Daguragu (NT SPL 
353), and the area around Seale Gorge.54 As I will detail in the following chapter, the full 
extent of the Gurindji’s vulnerability as pastoral lessees was revealed on 1 October that 
year, when the NTG threatened the Muramulla Company with forfeiture of its lease. The 
reason for this was the company’s failure to implement measures ensuring its covenants 
were met. The fact this power was hitherto unused in the Northern Territory indicated to 
many that the new NTG had not forsaken the proposal of their former leader Goff Letts to 
prevent the Gurindji obtaining freehold tenure over the majority of their land. 
The Gurindji’s land claim was heard by Justice John Toohey in July 1981. The 
hearing’s overriding purpose was to ascertain the Gurindji, Mudburra, Malngin and 
Nyininy witnesses’ connections to the area under claim (See. Map 5), and to create a 
register of those deemed from this process to be legitimate ‘traditional owners’. Justice 
Toohey’s recommendations to the Minister were made known to the Gurindji on 17 April 
                                                 
53  Nyurrmiarri, Lingiari, Nangiari, Rinyngayarri to Min. Viner, 17 October 1976, Oke Personal 
Collection.   
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1983, following a change of federal government. On 5 March that year, the Fraser 
Government had lost power to the Australian Labor Party, led by Bob Hawke. One of the 
first tasks for the new government’s Aboriginal Affairs Minister Clyde Holding was 
therefore to consider Justice Toohey’s recommendations. Holding then announced that the 
Gurindji’s land claim had been successful: he would grant Aboriginal freehold title over 
the Daguragu pastoral lease. Although Justice Toohey had recognised the vast majority of 
the Gurindji’s claim area as theirs, under the terms of ALRA he had been unable to 
recommend freehold title over a tiny piece of ‘Yarri’ land on the lease’s southwest corner. 
The reason for this was that although he found that Gurindji ‘group 11’ were the traditional 
owners of the area, ALRA required claimants to give evidence of their spiritual attachment 
to the claimed land, and this was usually evidenced by knowledge of the songs for specific 
sites on the claimed land. The ‘yarri’ area was free of all such sites. On the advice of the 
CLC, this small area was thus subject to a second ‘test case’ claim.55 The oversight in the 
extant legislation that Group 11’s situation highlighted was subsequently amended by a 
unanimous decision of the High Court on 23 March 1984.56  
Eventually, after two land claims and ten years of ‘interim’ leasehold tenure, 
Whitlam’s promise regarding the ‘imminent’ transfer of the Gurindji’s lease to Aboriginal 
Freehold Title was fulfilled. Aboriginal Affairs Minister Clyde Holding flew to Daguragu 
on 11 May 1986 to hand the Gurindji their Aboriginal freehold title deeds.57 While a clutch 
of CLC lawyers, public servants and locals watched on, Minister Holding delivered the 
Gurindji their land rights with little fanfare. Nineteen years after they had sent their petition 
to the Governor General requesting their land, it was by these means that the Gurindji 
elders won their land rights in perpetuity. 
                                                 
55  Office of the Aboriginal Land Commissioner, Gurindji Land Claim to Daguragu Station: Further 
Report by the Aboriginal Land Commissioner Mr. Justice Maurice to the Minister for Aboriginal 
Affairs, No. 20 (Canberra, Australian Government Publishing Service, 1985). 
56  High Court of Australia, Re Kearney; Ex parte Jurlama (M25 of 1983) – (1984) 52 ALR 24. 
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5.4  Land rights and Gurindji self-determination  
As the above account makes clear, it was not until 1986 that the Gurindji won their 
Aboriginal freehold rights under Australian law—which is also the year in which the 
research period of this study ends. To clarify the rationale of this periodisation, I will 
illuminate a substrate of the above account, relating to the Gurindji elders’ use of their 
land.  
Let us appraise the Gurindji elders’ situation after their supposed land rights victory 
on 16 August 1975. The speeches by Prime Minister Whitlam and others, not to mention 
the PM’s visit itself and the ceremonial aspect of his performance, all conveyed that 
Vincent Lingiari, on behalf of the Gurindji group, was receiving the land rights the group 
had fought for in the previous decade—or at least that the Gurindji’s land rights were as 
good as theirs. As I have described, what the Prime Minister actually granted them was a 
pastoral lease over the same area purchased for the Gurindji by the ALFC, and the Whitlam 
Government’s intention to deliver the Gurindji their freehold title was soon thwarted by 
that government’s Dismissal. However, the effect of Whitlam’s ceremony and related 
governmental communications on the Gurindji elders, I believe, was to create an 
impression among them that they were in receipt of full proprietary rights over their land.  
Although the rights of a pastoral lessee were less extensive than those conferred by 
inalienable Aboriginal freehold title, during 1975–79 they bestowed upon the Gurindji the 
primary rights they had worked for: those of exclusion and their own unhindered access. 
Under the terms of their lease, they enjoyed full access to the area they had identified as 
comprising their traditional estates, and they were free to conduct economic and 
ceremonial activities accompanying traditional Aboriginal ownership, where and 
whenever they wished. Furthermore, the tenure awarded to them by the Whitlam 
Government allowed the proponents of the Daguragu project to wholly engage with 
fulfilling their primary land use goal: operating their cattle business. Although the federal 
and later the Northern Territory governments retained the right to enforce lease conditions 
and even to impose forfeiture of the lease, as long as neither government did so, the 
leaseholders were not disturbed in their belief that they owned the land unconditionally. 
Given that the covenants (which are contained at Appendix B) which the government 
required of their Gurindji lessees after 1975 were onerous, a significant misconception on 
the part of those lessees about the nature of their tenure may appear unlikely, though it 
should be remembered that the covenants they were subject to were contingent upon their 
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receipt of funding for the Muramulla Company, not their occupation or use of the land per 
se.58 Also, as my account has shown, the pastoral lease the Gurindji were awarded in 1975 
gave them substantial proprietary rights which enabled them to do what, in the period 
1976–86, they imagined they wished to do with their land. In the absence of any statements 
or actions from them to suggest otherwise, it is safe to assume of this politically voluble 
group that it appeared to them that their traditional land rights had been recognised under 
Australian law. A corollary of this for my study, which I discuss in Chapter Six, is that 
differences between Aboriginal freehold title and pastoral lesseeship were irrelevant to the 
difficulties faced by the Muramulla Company in 1975–86.59  
The elders’ misperception apparently continued until the Everingham Government’s 
hostility and posturing over the Gurindji’s leasehold reached a peak in 1979. Statements 
by the government had motivated the Central Land Council to file a claim under ALRA on 
the Gurindji’s behalf in February of that year. In October 1979, the NTG threatened the 
Muramulla Company with lease forfeiture. This threat revealed the antipathy of the new 
Northern Territory Government of Paul Everingham towards both Aboriginal Land Rights 
and publicly-funded Aboriginal-owned pastoral properties. Desirous as ever of their 
traditional rights’ ‘full’ recognition, the elders realised in 1979 that, for security of tenure, 
they needed to make a claim under the ALRA to obtain their land rights in the form of 
inalienable Aboriginal freehold title. By the time the Everingham Government threatened 
the Muramulla Company with lease forfeiture, the fundamental differences between 
pastoral leasehold and Aboriginal freehold tenure—the right of unrestricted occupation 
and the right of transfer—were clear to the elders.  
In terms of the Gurindji elders’ immediate land use goals in the 1979–86 period 
however, this thesis argues that insofar as we have reliable evidence of those goals, the 
elders saw little practical difference between the pastoral title they held and inalienable 
freehold title. Once their land use goals changed in the late 1980s and the effort required 
of them to meet the demands of the Muramulla operation became untenable, differences 
between the two forms of tenure acquired great salience. Then, unlike pastoral leasehold, 
the ALRA-conferred right of subleasing allowed them to relinquish the responsibilities they 
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had accepted with the receipt of a pastoral lease in 1975. For these reasons, although the 
Gurindji elders lacked ‘full’ property rights in the 1975–1986 period, Gurindji land rights 
may be considered an operational success during that decade. Differences between the two 
tenures by which the Gurindji have occupied their land after 1975 are therefore of little 
relevance in describing Gurindji self-determination. That said however, the Gurindji’s 
receipt of Aboriginal freehold title under ALRA granted them a right which enabled them 
to obviate themselves of those difficulties: the right to grant a lease over ALRA land to any 
person for any purpose and for any duration (including a lease on similar terms to a pastoral 
lease). 
For these reasons, ‘land rights’ can also be compared with the Gurindji’s progress 
towards their other aims, as they were operationalised in the period. This I intend to do in 
the remainder of this chapter. To understand the differences between utilising Aboriginal 
Land Rights and (for instance) utilising one’s right to operate a company or organisation, 
it is necessary to briefly consider the nature of rights, and specifically Aboriginal Land 
Rights. 
5.5   Why did Gurindji ‘land rights’ succeed? 
According to the Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy’s definition, ‘Rights are 
entitlements (not) to perform certain actions, or (not) to be in certain states; or entitlements 
that others (not) perform certain actions or (not) be in certain states’.60 In other words, 
rights are entitlements that may be possessed without being utilised. The same is true in 
the traditional Indigenous Australian context. For the purposes of this analysis, an 
ethnographic account of all those rights is unnecessary, though from the work of 
anthropologist Nancy Williams and others, it is evident that some traditional Yolngu and 
other Australian Aboriginal rights to land share this quality of ‘entitlements (not)’. As per 
Stanford Encyclopaedia’s definition, Williams writes that in traditional Yolngu culture, a 
person or group’s land rights may be ‘inchoate’ or ‘potential’.61 In this context, 
anthropologist Peter Sutton’s comment about traditional Aboriginal Land Rights is 
illuminating: ‘The character of a right over a country or its resources cannot be determined 
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in any depth by observing behaviour’.62 As I will illustrate, this basic quality of rights—
their potentiality—is germane to why ‘Gurindji land rights’ was operationally successful, 
in contrast to their other self-determination-type aspirations. 
Long before the introduction of ALRA on 26 January 1977, aside from the requisite 
land base, Gurindji people possessed the means to advance their other self-determining 
interests. In a legal sense at least, a school, a cattle company and an independent 
community had potentially been within their grasp. As mentioned in Chapter Four, once 
the Welfare Ordinance was repealed in 1964, Aboriginal people of the Northern Territory 
were free, in theory, to manage their own communities and businesses under the terms 
available to other citizens. According to the law, there were no longer limits imposed upon 
those classified as Aboriginal regarding the purposes for which they could incorporate. As 
described in Chapter Three, what we might call Aboriginal people’s ‘right to incorporate’ 
was soon given official imprimatur under the auspices of self-determination policy. In 
contrast to the preceding policy era of assimilation, in the late 1960s and early 70s, 
government advisers wished to constitute a collective Indigenous subject for the purposes 
of encouraging Aboriginal collective endeavour.63  
As I have outlined in Chapter Two, the achievement of Gurindji elders’ aims 
required the ongoing professional endeavour of Gurindji people in organisations of largely 
European origin. Aspiring also to a sense of ‘equality’ with mainstream society (as 
exemplified by their keen pursuit of a ‘signboard’ and a unique cattle brand for their 
station), Gurindji elders were also amenable to the process of incorporation for a variety 
of purposes. Yet, as I have documented in this thesis, in the Gurindji’s other domains of 
endeavour, incorporation alone was inadequate in eliciting a self-determining Gurindji 
subject, in either the elders’ reckoning or that of their government interlocutors. Unlike 
their proposed cattle enterprise, school and independent community, once the Gurindji’s 
land rights were recognised with a pastoral lease or by inalienable Aboriginal freehold 
title, they immediately gained the land security they required to legally operate a cattle 
enterprise and access their land. By virtue in part of those rights’ potential nature, there 
was little more for them to do. This was a key factor of Gurindji land rights’ success, as I 
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shall soon show. In a practical sense regarding their land, their self-determination had been 
achieved.  
  The Gurindji people’s eventual receipt of land under ALRA differed from their 
organisationally-focused pillars of self-determination in other ways. As I have described, 
from the time they received a pastoral lease in 1975 until their receipt of Aboriginal 
Freehold Title in 1986, the Gurindji occupied their land as if the title with which they held 
it was the strongest title in Australian law–freehold. During this time, their progress 
towards that title was almost entirely in the hands of the Central Land Council and various 
governments, requiring little from the Gurindji except for their full participation in the 
Daguragu Land Claim hearing of July 1981. Limited negotiations regarding the Gurindji’s 
occupation of their land required little or no ongoing negotiation with their government 
intermediaries, and those responsibilities were undertaken by the purpose-created, 
statutory body of the Central Land Council on the Gurindji’s behalf. In contrast, as I have 
shown, the ‘Aboriginal’ organisations created to manage the Gurindji’s pastoral and 
community governance interests were the source of onerous, ongoing demands on local 
people. (See Appendix A). In these domains of failed, or at least heavily compromised 
endeavour, there were no third party, independent ‘brokerage’-type entities to perform 
equivalent duties to the Central Land Council.  
Underlying the operationalisation of ‘Gurindji land rights’, then, was a heavily 
mediated relationship between the Gurindji people and the state. The Gurindji’s embrace 
of any form of title involved their subjection to norms of conduct inherent in the covenants 
and other requirements which accompanied tenure. A discussion of the paradoxes of 
legally-recognised land rights as a marker of Indigenous self-determination is therefore 
apposite. Under the Pastoral Ordinance, which the Gurindji were party to as pastoral 
lessees during 1975–1986, and under ALRA (NT) (to which they were subject as claimants 
during 1979–86), we must ask: did the Gurindji’s property rights release them significantly 
from dependence on the Australian state, or did they implicate them further in the 
processes of government?  
A Foucauldian mode of enquiry is again useful in considering the effect of property 
rights legislation on Indigenous people.64 Heidi Norman is one scholar informed by such 
an analytic frame. In her book ‘What Do We Want?': A Political History of Aboriginal 
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Land Rights in New South Wales, she describes the effect the NSW ALRA Act had on 
Aboriginal people in that state: ‘The ALRA and land councils […] constituted Aboriginal 
people in such a way as to make them governable and self-governing’.65 Aboriginal land 
councils, Norman writes, were intended by government to be ‘culturally informed 
structures that would form a power base for Aboriginal communities […] to interface with 
wider white power structures. At the same time, they were not separate from the operations 
of the state […].66  
Similarly, anthropologists John Bradley and Kathryn Seton have criticised ALRA NT 
as a governmental intrusion into the lives of Aboriginal people—albeit a remedial one in 
its stated intent. In examining the land claim process for Aboriginal claimants under ALRA, 
they found that:  
We have a situation of what could be called benign conquest and contestation, a 
situation that will continue as long as the final arbitrator of the legislation is based 
within white parliamentary structures.67  
Bradley and Seton emphasise the Act’s alien nature to Aboriginal people, noting that even 
when traditional owners are registered with a land council under the Act, they ‘are having 
to deal with legal issues that are not of their making and over which, prior to the land claim, 
they had had no dealings’.68 
Applying James C. Scott’s Foucauldian theory of governmental ‘legibility’ to this 
subject helps us in understanding what is incipient in Bradley and Seton’s account. 
According to Scott’s reckoning, by alienating the Gurindji’s land under ALRA (NT) as 
Aboriginal freehold and creating a register of Gurindji traditional owners legally 
responsible for it, the Australian state rendered Gurindji people more ‘legible’ to 
governmental techniques. The same may be said of the Gurindji elders’ incorporation of 
the Muramulla Company, their subsequent status as company directors, and their legal 
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status as the lessees of land purchased for them by the ALFC under the Aboriginal Land 
Fund Act (1975). Scott summarises: 
Processes as disparate as the creation of permanent last names, the standardisation 
of weights and measures, the establishment of cadastral surveys and population 
registers, the invention of freehold tenure, the standardisation of language and legal 
discourse [all] seemed comprehensible as attempts at legibility and simplification. 
In each case, officials took exceptionally complex, illegible, and local social 
practices, such as land tenure customs […], and created a standard grid whereby it 
could be centrally recorded and monitored.69 
With various emphases, these criticisms make the same point: that both forms of tenure 
held by the Gurindji in the 1975–86 period subjected them closely to the demands of the 
state. This may seem surprising: despite their novel gloss as legislation that ‘recognises 
Aboriginal rights’, ALRA, the Aboriginal Land Fund Act and the Pastoral Ordinance also 
involved Aboriginal people more closely with what, in a Foucauldian vein, is described as 
governmentality—the means by which power co-opts individuals (and populations) to 
effectively self-govern, by ‘arranging things so that people, following only their self-
interest, will do as they ought’.70 This might seem contrary to the purported intention of 
the Gurindji’s government interlocutors to utilise the above laws for the purposes of 
promoting a ‘self-determining’ Aboriginal subject, yet it remains the case that the 
application of such new laws recruited Aboriginal people into practices of self-
aggregation, self-organisation, categorisation and resource distribution, all entailing 
Indigenous people’s greater involvement in self-governing practices. Like the 
requirements of incorporation entailed by the other pillars of Gurindji self-determination, 
which we shall explore in the remainder of Part Two, the response of governments to 
traditional Aboriginal Land Rights in the Northern Territory made Aboriginal people more 
available—or more legible, in the idiom of James C. Scott—to the requirements of capital 
and the state. 
                                                 
69  James C. Scott, Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have 
Failed (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1998), p. 2. 
70  David Scott, ‘Colonial Governmentality’, Social Text, 43 (1995) 191–220 (p.202). 
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5.6  Conclusion  
Although the Gurindji did not get title under ALRA until 1986, the pastoral leasehold tenure 
that the Gurindji held in the period 1975–86 allowed them to undertake all of the land-
related activities that they wished to and that inalienable Aboriginal freehold title would 
have entitled them to. I have shown that the two types of tenure were equivalent in practical 
terms to the Gurindji and that their land-related endeavours were unaffected by the 
transition from Pastoral Leasehold to Aboriginal Freehold Title. For these reasons, I have 
determined Gurindji land rights as extant during the period of this study for analytical 
purposes.  
At this point I wish to briefly restate the reasons I have put forward for the success 
of Gurindji land rights in contrast to their other self-determining endeavours. Before doing 
so, I will briefly foreshadow the shared qualities of the Gurindji’s other fields of 
endeavour. The various iterations of Daguragu Council, the Muramulla Company board 
and the Kalkaringi School all required protracted engagement with alien, individualist, 
market and/or governance-based ways of acting and thinking to perform their core 
functions.71 As I will show in the remainder of this thesis, the pressures that managing 
such community organisations in Kalkaringi and Daguragu imposed on Gurindji staff and 
board members and their government intermediaries (arising, in most cases, from the 
mutually contested, and/or irreconciled, misunderstood, and/or inchoate knowledges of 
both parties) were usually sufficient to undermine or diminish Gurindji people’s 
participation. In every case, as conduits for Gurindji self-management, these essentially 
non-Indigenous organisations failed—though endured in a functional sense by employing 
educated mixed descent or non-Indigenous staff to manage them.72 
                                                 
71  Karu Bulangkarni Co. Ltd was incorporated in March 1972 for the purpose of applying for a Special 
Purpose Lease in the Settlement, presumably so that the shop could legally receive government funds. 
See Department of Aboriginal Affairs, Kalkaringi—Book of the Community (NT Division of the 
Department of Aboriginal Affairs, 1977, p. 8. 
72  In describing these organisations as having failed, I part ways with other scholars such as Robert 
Levitus, for instance, who sees their function as providing an organisational ‘carapace’ via which the 
interests of their Indigenous protagonists may be advanced. The nature of those protagonists’ 
involvement within ‘their’ organisations he sees as a secondary concern. My terms of assessment are 
more aligned with the aspirations of self-determination policy’s early protagonists. See Robert 
Levitus, ‘Aboriginal Organisations and Development: the Structural Context’, Power, Culture, 
Economy: Indigenous Australians and Mining, edited by Jon Altman and David Martin, CAEPR 
Monograph No 30 (Canberra, Australian National University, 2009), 73–97 (pp. 77–81).  
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Ch. 6. Muramulla I: Gurindji Cattle 
Dreaming 
 
 
Reporting of the Wave Hill Walk-off in 1966–67 made clear that the return of a portion 
of the Gurindji’s land was an essential goal to the groups’ leaders, as was the activity 
they wished to conduct on it: operating a cattle enterprise. Working intimately with cattle 
for generations in all practical aspects of pastoral production had revealed to the older 
Gurindji men the industry’s potential benefits, and engendered among them a clear self-
confidence: hence their unwavering desire to manage the cattle enterprise they envisaged 
themselves. More than the other pillars of Gurindji self-determination I analyse in these 
chapters, the former stockmen worked consistently hard to establish and operate their 
cattle enterprise. The putative outcomes of this aim—livelihoods, a source of meat and 
incomes, working on country—were the means by which they envisaged their ‘self-
determination’ could be realised. As we have seen, security of tenure or land rights were 
a necessary pre-requisite to operate their cattle enterprise, and this in turn they saw as 
necessary to support the remaining two pillars comprising their vision—two-way 
education for their children and the self-managed facilities of an independent homestead.  
This chapter provides contextual material regarding the origins of both the 
Aboriginal pastoral sector and the Gurindji’s cattle operation. As a prelude, I will show 
the ways in which supportive non-Indigenous Australians responded to the cattle-related 
aspirations of the Gurindji and other Aboriginal groups, increasingly through the 
channels of government. A review of the literature on the resultant Aboriginal pastoral 
sector is then necessary, describing the practical, bureaucratic and financial contexts in 
which the Muramulla Company operated. This is followed by an historical account, 
narrating the incorporated form that the Gurindji elders’ cattle aspirations took, and the 
developments that shaped their cattle company’s life, including the means by which the 
Gurindji (and their cattle company) obtained their land. All of this information forms the 
background to the analysis provided in the subsequent chapter.   
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6.1  Government support for Aboriginal cattle enterprises 
During the period of this review, Australian and Northern Territory Governments 
provided support in a variety of forms to Aboriginal groups wishing to own and manage 
cattle for purposes of financial gain and social benefit. In all instances, those agencies 
justified the provision of this funding and advice on the basis of the ability of pastoral 
enterprises to support the community development and self-determination-like aims of 
their Aboriginal proponents. Thus, to explicate the effects on the Gurindji elders’ cattle-
related, self-determination-like aims of the support offered by governmental entities 
during the period, that support requires some explanation and contextualisation.  
As I have outlined in Chapter Three, the potential of Aboriginal-operated cattle 
enterprises was a topic that elicited the sympathetic interest of the Council of Aboriginal 
Affairs, and members of the Gorton and McMahon Governments. In 1971, the McMahon 
Government accepted the CAA’s recommendation that it should seek advice on the future 
prospects of Aboriginal people on existing cattle stations. The resultant Committee, 
chaired by Psychologist Cecil Gibb of the Australian National University, accepted 
guidelines including the following: 
• To survey the situation of Aborigines on pastoral properties in the Northern 
Territory so as to identify problems and special needs; 
• To examine ways by which economic and social conditions may be improved; 
• To see whether new or additional steps need to be taken to give effect to 
existing policies for Aboriginal communities on pastoral properties.1 
In its recommendations, the Committee proposed that land should be excised from 
pastoral holdings for residential and small-scale subsistence-type activities. On the future 
involvement of Aboriginal groups in their own cattle enterprises, the Committee 
recommended that the government:  
• strengthen a wider ranging employment service to Aborigines to encourage 
and assist their training and placement in work in other areas as well as on 
pastoral properties. 
                                                 
1  Cecil Gibb et al, The Report of the Committee to Review the Situation of Aborigines on Pastoral 
Properties in the Northern Territory, (Canberra, Commonwealth Government Printer’s Office, 
1973), p. 2.  
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•  [encourage and help Aborigines financially] to establish enterprises in 
activities serving the cattle industry e.g. contract trucking, mustering, fencing 
and yard building, bore sinking, share farming etc (with experienced 
managers). 
• Should encourage, wherever a coherent group of Aborigines indicates 
effective interest in establishing a group-owned enterprise [possessing] 
reasonable prospects of success, using grants from the Aborigines Benefits 
Trust Fund, the Aborigines Advancement Trust Account together with loans 
from the Capital Fund and technical and managerial expertise […].2  
The Committee also recommended that the government devise legislation to ‘enable an 
Aboriginal Community Society to be loosely incorporated’. On the topic of Aboriginal 
groups incorporating for business purposes however, it was silent.3 
Throughout this period, the issue of tenure continued to provide an obstacle to non-
reserve-based Aboriginal groups who wished to manage their own cattle, such as the 
Gurindji. At the urging of the CAA, the federal government had purchased land for a few 
Aboriginal groups, but it was criticised by pastoralists and privately by the 
Commonwealth Department of Lands for the amateur and irregular way it had done so. 
Rather, as described in Chapter One, the McMahon Government preferred to commend 
excisions be made to Aboriginal groups from pastoral leases under the Special Purpose 
Leases Ordinance 1953–68. Under this legislation, Special Purpose Leases (SPLs) were 
awarded on the basis of the lessees’ ‘intention and ability to make reasonable economic 
and social use of […] land’.4 While the Gurindji’s application for a small SPL in 1972 
was successful, as we have seen in the previous chapter, the incoming Whitlam 
Government sought an effective means by which Aboriginal pastoralists might obtain 
large, commercially viable areas of land to conduct their operations. The Aboriginal Land 
Fund Commission it established in 1975 enabled the Department of Aboriginal Affairs 
                                                 
2  Gibbs et al, ibid., pp. 72–77. 
3  The Gibb Committee had also been asked to make recommendations on the situation of the Wattie 
Creek group, though it had little to say about the future of their nascent cattle operation either. ibid., 
p. 75.  
4  Cited in Kathy Lothian, “Moving Blackwards: Black Power and the Aboriginal Embassy”, 
Ingereth MacFarlane and Mark Hannah (eds), Transgressions: Critical Australian Indigenous 
Histories (ANU ePress, Australian National University, Canberra, 2007), 19–34 (p. 22). 
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to recommend and co-ordinate a series of ALFC-conducted purchases, of which the 
Gurindji’s Daguragu excision was first. 
With the governmental machinery now in place to acquire land for pastoral 
ventures, the DAA found it necessary to devise appropriate criteria against which it 
would assess the funding of Aboriginal cattle operations (see Section Two, Chapter 
Seven). As these grew in number, the Department also established an organisational 
model for those operations which mandated the integrated provision of expertise by 
employed advisers. Once implemented, the result of these innovations was the creation 
of a small, publicly funded, ‘Aboriginal’ sector within the pastoral industry. The 
disparate cattle-oriented Aboriginal groups scattered throughout the remote north and 
centre of Australia often lacked support from their neighbours and depended on 
centralised government agencies for advice and funding. The nature of the advice given 
and the terms of the funding were of mixed benefit, as I will illustrate regarding the 
Gurindji’s Muramulla Company. This theme is common in extant analysis. As Stuart 
Phillpot, a key authority in the field, noted in 1999, three decades after the creation of the 
Aboriginal industry: 
The problem of dissonance between government objectives and Aboriginal 
aspirations for their pastoral enterprises remains.5  
The thread of governmental endeavour I have outlined above represents the efforts of 
governments in the period to actively support the establishment of a new, Aboriginal 
sector of the pastoral industry. It should be noted though, that these efforts were 
frequently resisted and constrained by the demands of pastoral industry lobby groups and 
cliques within government sympathetic to the pastoral industry’s demands. These 
conservative interests resisted the provision of special dispensation to the proponents of 
Aboriginal pastoral operations on the basis of race, and/or their poor assessment of those 
proponents’ managerial capability. Of more consequence to the Gurindji’s cattle 
aspirations though, were the industry standards to which, via government covenants and 
funding conditions, their enterprise was subject.6 I refer here also to the rationalist and/or 
scientific ideological basis of the operating frameworks, legislative and policy charters 
                                                 
5  Stuart Phillpot, ‘Black Pastoralism: Contemporary Aboriginal Land Use—the Experience of 
Aboriginal-Owned Pastoral Enterprises in the Northern Territory, 1972–1996’ (Unpublished PhD 
Thesis, Australian National University, 2000), p. 2. 
6  Ultimately of course, all federal departments were subject to the Public Accounts Committee. 
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of government departments responsible for the administration of lands and livestock in 
the period. (For a list of those departments, see Table 4, p. 190). Within those 
departments, responsibility for enforcing the terms of the Muramulla Company’s tenure, 
the management of its lease and the health of its stock depended on the enforcement of 
‘universal’ scientific rationalist standards, which by definition did not incorporate the 
type of ‘special provisions’ Aboriginal self-determination policy entailed.  
The cattle-related aspirations of Gurindji elders and the Muramulla Cattle Company 
were subject by various government agencies to laws and programs informed by these 
ideologies throughout the period. In addition to inimical social-professional dynamics, 
the effect of these on the Gurindji’s operation of a cattle enterprise as a vehicle for their 
‘self-determination’ was significant. 
6.2 The Aboriginal Pastoral Enterprise in the literature 
By the late 1970s, the Muramulla Company had accrued novel and various functions at 
Daguragu, as a ‘driver’ of community development and social cohesion; as the 
community’s main employer; and even as a provider of ‘municipal’ services. This 
situation warrants an assessment of the unique status of such government–funded 
Aboriginal pastoral enterprises. There were twelve such enterprises in the Northern 
Territory by this time, effectively comprising a small, new policy-created sector of the 
pastoral industry.7 Examples included the Yugul Cattle Co, operated by Nunggubuyu 
land rights supporters at Roper River; Amanbidji, purchased by the DAA in 1973; and a 
Ngumpit operation neighbouring the Daguragu lease at Yarralin. 
To contextualise my analysis of the Muramulla enterprise in this and the following 
chapter, I will now briefly review the literature on Aboriginal Cattle enterprises, in 
particular those established under policies of self-determination in the 1970s. A number 
of academics and practitioner/researchers of various disciplines have contributed to this 
small and specific body of work. The commentary I will summarise here is that of 
anthropologist Gillian Cowlishaw, geographer Elspeth Young, agricultural economist 
Stuart Phillpot, and sociologist Steven Thiele. My intention is to identify common themes 
in the writing of these individuals and to show which of these themes are congruent with 
                                                 
7  David Hanlon, ‘The Aboriginal Pastoral Industry: A Conflict of Development Objectives’, in 
Ecology Management of the World's Savannas, ed. by J.C Tothill & J.J Mott (Canberra: Australian 
Academy of Science, 1985), pp. 185-189 (pp. 186–187). 
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those that emerge in this and the subsequent chapter regarding the Gurindji people’s 
Muramulla Company. This is an easy task: although the events and decisions shaping the 
operations of each Aboriginal cattle enterprise varied, I argue that the forces shaping their 
establishment, operations and eventual demise were the same.   
Gillian Cowlishaw has written extensively about the operationalisation of self-
determination policies, within the domain of an Aboriginal cattle enterprise and more 
broadly. In her 1983 article ‘Blackfella Boss: A study of a Northern Territory Cattle 
Station’, like other writers, Cowlishaw ascribes importance to the divergent aims of the 
directorships of Aboriginal cattle enterprises and their bureaucratic intermediaries.8 
Describing the establishment and fraught operation of the Jandi cattle company at 
Jimboingal near Katherine, Cowlishaw paints a picture of an Aboriginal directorship 
alienated from the structure, governance and raison d'être of the company which they 
ostensibly managed. Similarly, Cowlishaw describes the company’s non-Indigenous 
staff and bureaucratic intermediaries as ignorant of the aims, priorities and social 
structure of the Aboriginal group which nominally led the enterprise. Cowlishaw’s 
argument parallels my findings regarding the Muramulla company: that poor 
communication and implicit and contradictory aims and approaches between the 
Indigenous and non-Indigenous protagonists undermined the enterprise, as did highly 
changeable funding and disbursement arrangements.  
Cowlishaw makes a further point  to these findings however, arguing that such 
descriptions ‘underplay the obvious fact that these conflicts take place in a context of 
unequal power which is created by, and effectively protects, the wider economic and 
political structures’.9 They are not, in other words, only ‘between cultures, but between 
groups of people with different access to resources’.10 Cowlishaw’s point is an obvious 
and important one, with implications for our understanding of this important subset of 
Aboriginal self-determination program activity. In the constant tension between Gurindji 
and Anglo-European/governmental priorities that characterised the Muramulla 
Company’s operations, it was the Anglo-European governmental values underpinning 
the company that were fundamental to its progress and survival as a government-funded 
                                                 
8  Situated in the Katherine region of the NT like Daguragu, Jimboingal’s cattle operation paralleled 
the Muramulla Company in its origins, governance, management, funding and the issues 
surrounding them. 
9  Gillian Cowlishaw, ‘Blackfella Boss: A Study of a Northern Territory Cattle Station’, Social 
Analysis (No. 13, May 1983) 54–69 (p. 68).  
10  op. cit., p. 61. 
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enterprise. That these were rarely understood by its Aboriginal protagonists did not give 
the company’s non-Indigenous intermediaries sufficient motivation to question or 
disregard those values or the regulations, statues, social conventions and laws in which 
they were encoded. Rather, the operation of these enterprises revealed to the Aborigines 
that their own comprehension and/or support of those values and knowledge was of 
limited importance. As Cowlishaw and others describe, this recognition frequently 
hastened the withdrawal of Aboriginal cattle enterprise proponents from what they saw 
essentially as ‘whitefella’ operations. The history of the Muramulla Company bears this 
out, as we will soon see. 
A second Aboriginal cattle enterprise in the Katherine region was the Yugul Cattle 
Company (YCC) at Ngukurr. Sociologist Steven Thiele’s doctoral research attempted to 
understand Yugul’s fraught operation in the context of Australian race relations. A 
monograph was produced from Thiele’s thesis by the North Australian Research Unit in 
1982, though Thiele published little else on the topic. His contribution to this literature 
was thus singular and significant. Like Cowlishaw, he noted the imbalance of power 
between the local, Aboriginal proponents of an Aboriginal cattle enterprise (in this case 
Yugul), and its Anglo-European intermediaries. Thiele argued that by retaining 
involvement in Yugul Cattle Company, the DAA’s ongoing, mandated participation 
undermined the Aborigines’ belief that the YCC was under their control. Furthermore, 
the Aborigines’ recognition that important decisions could be made without reference to 
the company resulted in a degree of Aboriginal withdrawal’.11  
A consistent theme in this literature is the divergence of values and meanings 
ascribed to the cattle operations of Aboriginal communities by their Aboriginal 
proponents and government intermediaries. Like Cowlishaw and myself, Thiele 
acknowledged a gulf between Anglo-European and Aboriginal perspectives of the 
operation on which both groups focused. He argues that social development ‘of a radical 
kind’ was required at Ngukurr for the YCC to succeed, yet such activity was ‘alien’ to 
the consultants employed to support the company, who saw social matters as outside their 
(financial) responsibilities to the company.12 In Thiele’s reckoning, the lack of 
Aboriginal ‘community-wide authority or power structures’ was a key local/social 
determinant of the company’s failure.  
                                                 
11  Steven Thiele, Yugul: An Arnhem Land Cattle Station (Darwin, The Australian National University, 
North Australian Research Unit, 1982), p. 66.  
12  ibid.   
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In terms of her output, foremost among the commentators I will address here was 
geographer Elspeth Young. Young’s frequent themes were the divergent social, 
environmental and economic dimensions of Aboriginal cattle operations. In a 
representative passage from her book chapter ‘Land Use and Resources: A Black and 
White Dichotomy’, Young describes:  
Economic criteria [….] are not necessarily the most appropriate way to assess the 
success or failure of Aboriginal cattle stations. For the Aboriginal owners, the 
maintenance of a satisfactory lifestyle for all is usually of greater importance.13  
Young traces the disconnection between the views of Aboriginal proponents of 
cattle enterprises and the terms of those enterprises’ operation back to first principles. 
She reminds us that, as was the case with Daguragu’s leaders, Aboriginal motivation to 
buy cattle stations was ‘not primarily to earn cash, but to get the land back in a way 
universally accepted throughout Australia’.14 As I described in the previous Chapter, a 
similar conflation of land rights and business-oriented land use by Aboriginal elders and 
their bureaucratic intermediaries occurred at Daguragu, and activities undertaken by both 
parties when that distinction or motivation was unclear carries the potential to create 
analytical complications.  
In providing her argument about the unviability of Aboriginal cattle enterprises to 
the west of Gurindji country in the East Kimberley, Elspeth Young makes the case that 
the agencies funding such projects almost exclusively stressed their financial viability, at 
the expense of the ‘community and social needs’ of their Aboriginal proponents. It is an 
observation commonly advanced in the literature. Young describes the priorities of 
Aboriginal cattle directors as the ‘maintenance of customary practices and subsistence 
[…], health, education and housing’, and argues that the Aboriginal pastoralists saw these 
matters as more important than their stations’ financial profitability.15 Young argues that 
                                                 
13  Elspeth Young, ‘Land Use and Resources: A Black and White Dichotomy’, in Land, Water and 
People: Geographical Essays in Australian Resource Management, ed. by R.L. Heathcote and J.A. 
Mabbutt (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1988) 102–122 (p. 117). 
14  op. cit, p. 118. 
15  Elspeth Young, Australian Institute of Aboriginal Studies, Centre for Resource and Environmental 
Studies, Australian National University, Academy of the Social Sciences in Australia, University 
of Western Australia, Aboriginal cattle stations in the East Kimberley: communities or enterprises? 
East Kimberley Impact Assessment Project (Centre for Resource and Environmental Studies, 
Canberra, 1988), p. ii; Elspeth Young, ‘Aboriginal Economic Enterprises: Problems and Prospects’, 
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for these reasons, the Aboriginal proponents of cattle operations saw them as 
‘communities’, while their government intermediaries saw them as ‘enterprises’:  
[…] The main emphasis placed on these stations by Aborigines [is that] they are 
above all social communities, with intricate systems of interrelationship. 
Commercial activities come second’. 16   
Like the Aboriginal proponents of these operations, Young’s frequent focus on the 
social dimensions of Aboriginal cattle enterprises leads her at times to term those 
enterprises ‘communities’ rather than ‘businesses’ or ‘operations’.17 By doing so, she 
emphasises the primacy of their Aboriginal proponents’ social values, but in the same 
way as bureaucrats’ description of Aboriginal cattle operations as ‘businesses’ 
obfuscated their important social dimension, here Young downplays the essential 
contribution of government to these operations.  
Agricultural consultant Stuart Phillpot is another analyst and a participant/observer 
of the Aboriginal pastoral sector of the 1970s and 80s. Phillpot provided advice to 
government and the sector’s stakeholders in various reports, and his publications and 
doctorate share this focus. Phillpot’s work also addresses the indistinct relationship 
between Aboriginal cattle enterprises and the communities that host them. Phillpot notes 
that enterprise and community frequently can’t be separated, in practical or conceptual 
terms. He distinguishes between geographic/physical communities and human/‘social’ 
ones, arguing that the latter, which all the individuals with a stake in a cattle enterprise 
and/or the land on which it operates comprise, is frequently larger and more dispersed 
than the former.18  
                                                 
in Peter Loveday and Deborah Wade-Marshall (eds) Contemporary Issues in Development 
(Darwin, Australian National University, North Australia Research Unit, 1988), 182–200.  
16  Elspeth Young, Australian Institute of Aboriginal Studies, Centre for Resource and Environmental 
Studies, Australian National University, Academy of the Social Sciences in Australia, University 
of Western Australia, Aboriginal cattle stations in the East Kimberley: communities or enterprises? 
East Kimberley Impact Assessment Project (Centre for Resource and Environmental Studies, 
Canberra, 1988), p. 66, 116. 
17  Elspeth Young, 'Aboriginal Cattle Stations: Strategies for Self-Management', in Proceedings of the 
17th Int. Australian Geographic Conference (Bathurst, NSW, 1981), p. 312. 
18  One implication of this, Phillpot argues, is that the size of an Aboriginal enterprise’s actual 
decision-making group (as opposed to its Aboriginal staff and board) is far larger than the few 
individuals usually involved in decision-making on a non-Indigenous station. Stuart Phillpot, ‘Black 
Pastoralism: Contemporary Aboriginal Land Use—the Experience of Aboriginal-Owned Pastoral 
Enterprises in the Northern Territory, 1972–1996’ (Unpublished PhD Thesis, Australian National 
University, 2000), pp. 300–306. 
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Issues of terminology mask empirical complexities characterising Aboriginal cattle 
enterprises and directorships and the communities that nominally supported them. As 
much can be gleaned in this passage about Yugul from a multi-enterprise review 
conducted by the Northern Land Council: 
There was rivalry between the [Yugul] station and the Ngukurr Council and 
antagonism between the traditional owners of the Yugul lease and the executives 
of the company.19  
The majority of the Traditional Owners and executives lived, among many others, at 
Ngukurr. Like other Aboriginal host communities of Aboriginal cattle enterprises, people 
with diverse relationships to the enterprise comprised Ngukurr’s population: traditional 
owners of the country under the enterprise’s pastoral lease; enterprise directors who were 
often but not necessarily traditional owners of the lease area; traditional owners of the 
lease area who were not enfranchised by the cattle enterprise on their land; and many 
people without particular  affiliation to either the enterprise or its area of operation. All 
of this was true for Daguragu community, where few among the directorship of the 
Muramulla enterprise were traditional owners of its lease area. The implication of this 
little-considered diversity for the staff of the DAA and other intermediary bodies was 
considerable. Assuming that the ‘ownership’ of an enterprise was vested with its 
associated ‘community’, consultants and bureaucrats alike were often perplexed or 
dismayed at the varied (or non-existent) commitment of its residents to the enterprise.  
In his Doctoral thesis about Aboriginal-owned pastoral enterprises in the Northern 
Territory, Phillpot shows that federal funding requirements regarding Aboriginal cattle 
enterprises were amended by the DAA during the period. According to Phillpot, ‘social’ 
and community-oriented funding criteria applied in the early 1970s were incrementally 
deprioritised and discarded by the DAA (and from 1980, the Aboriginal Development 
Commission). Eventually, Phillpot observes, the only measurable concern of these 
agencies regarding the Aboriginal cattle enterprises they funded was their financial 
profitability.20 This claim is consistent with the financial and ideological transition that 
occurred between self-determination and self-management policies that I have described 
                                                 
19  Nicky Phillips, Northern Land Council, ‘A Review of Three Aboriginal Cattle Stations; Gulperan, 
Yugul and Murwangi: Why were they established: How were they Administered: Why did they 
Fail?’ (Northern Land Council, Darwin, 1985), p. 15. 
20  Phillpot, 2000, op. cit.  
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in Chapters One and Three. There I have shown that in light of this transition and 
emergent operational constraints in the latter part of the 1970s, similar amendments were 
made to project performance criteria and the broad terms of Aboriginal self-
determination policy goals in remote areas by the Department of Aboriginal Affairs. 
In ‘Secret Whitefella Cattle Business’, Phillpot describes his involvement in the 
development, implementation and evaluation of a training program for Aboriginal cattle 
managers in Central Australia.21 He argues that the knowledge and cultural reference 
points inherent to the management of a cattle enterprise were so alien to the Aboriginal 
directors of remote cattle enterprises as to effectively constitute ‘secret’ whitefella 
business. This supports my argument regarding the impact of its board’s ignorance about 
corporate and financial governance on the Muramulla Company. As I show in the 
following chapter, the effects of this were profound.  
From the writings of all these authors, a consistent picture of the Aboriginal cattle 
enterprise emerges, according broadly with the Gurindji’s Muramulla company. 
Typically, these enterprises were led by a coterie of former stockmen, guiding their 
families’ or clans’ involvement. Those elders were responsible to a much larger group of 
kin and other groups which comprised the landholding body. (in the case of the Gurindji, 
this group was eventually identified as the Aboriginal land trust listed in Justice Toohey’s 
Land Claim report). In neither case did they usually possess the knowledge required to 
operate the business which the management group had been funded to run.   
6.3 Irregularity: The Aboriginal Pastoral Sector 
As we have seen, the situation of Aboriginal cattle enterprises was ambiguous. On the 
one hand many had been incorporated before the introduction of the Aboriginal Councils 
and Associations Act (1976) (hereafter ACAA) and operated under the same government-
imposed lease requirements as any of the long established ‘traditional’ properties by 
which they were usually surrounded.22 In other words, they mostly shared the same 
responsibilities as other lessees of alienated Crown land. The market conditions, supply 
                                                 
21  Stuart Phillpot, ‘Understanding Whitefella Secret Cattle Business’, in Working on Country: 
Contemporary Indigenous Management of Australia's Lands and Coastal Regions ed. by Jocelyn 
Davies, Richard Baker and Elspeth Young (Melbourne, Oxford University Press, 2001), pp. 199–
213. 
22  Prior to the DAA’s full funding of the Muramulla Company in 1975–76, the Company was an 
unaudited ‘exempt proprietary company’. See Darwin, NAA, ‘Auditors’ Report’, 26 April 1977, 
Cattle Mustering Venture […], 1 June 1977, (F1) 1975/4091. 
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and distribution channels and climatic variables on which they depended to earn an 
income were also the same as those affecting other stations. Yet in other regards, 
Aboriginal enterprises were in a position of radical alterity within the industry. Their 
structure, history, relationships with government and the pastoral industry, 
funding and desired outcomes differentiated them from the industry’s traditional 
mainstream. To understand the government-supported operation of the Muramulla 
Company then, it is necessary to compare it with its ‘mainstream’ competitors by 
considering each of these factors in turn.  
The structure of the Muramulla Company was as follows: a board of nine Gurindji 
directors provided the nominal ‘management’ of the company. In practical terms, they 
provided on-the-job supervision and training and managed the recruitment of the 
company’s labour force. These board members—in conjunction with a government-
mandated (always) non-Indigenous full-time ‘adviser’—negotiated decisions about the 
seasonal activities of the company. Longer term development, infrastructure and pastoral 
advice was given by a consultant, the first of whom was John Edey. This structure, 
common to most DAA-funded pastoral enterprises, was loosely based on the ‘traditional’ 
cattle station model, though with important variations.  
Comparing the organisational structure of ‘traditional’ properties with the new 
government-funded Aboriginal pastoral enterprises incorporated prior to the ACAA, it is 
evident that while their Articles of Association may have been similar, there were 
important differences in their rationale and practical operation. Firstly, although 
government had decided to supplement it with cattle ‘advisers’ and consultants, it had 
empowered a class of Aboriginal pastoral management that lacked any management 
experience. Secondly, unlike the directorship of an absentee-owner company, the 
directors of Aboriginal pastoral enterprises were commonly involved intimately in the 
day-to-day functioning of their company. Thirdly, while the management of Aboriginal 
staff by non-Indigenous head stockmen had worked effectively in the ‘traditional’ 
industry, it appeared to observers that for the Muramulla Company and other Aboriginal 
enterprises, cultural factors were impeding the ability of many Aboriginal managers to 
create a workforce with the continuity of motivation that the ‘traditional’ station stock 
camps had demanded.23  
                                                 
23  According to Ray Hempel [former Welfare Branch and DAA staffer] many Aboriginal men 
reported to him that ‘Aboriginal people can’t be boss’ when this demand was placed on them by 
self-determination policies. Personal Communication, 3 January 2010. 
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The capital base and financial environment of the new Aboriginal enterprises 
and traditional stations also differed significantly. As they usually had negligible capital 
and their capacity to raise it by borrowing was very limited, the purchase and 
establishment costs of the new Aboriginal enterprises were almost always provided by 
government.24 To access further funding, officials were required to determine that the 
Aboriginal enterprises were likely to meet the ‘social and financial’ outcomes required 
by the DAA. Furthermore, after 1977, Aboriginal pastoral properties operating on 
Aboriginal freehold land awarded under ALRA (NT) were unable to use their land as 
collateral and were almost ‘entirely excluded from the commercial finance market’.25 In 
contrast, initial costs of the traditional industry lessees were self-provided or privately 
borrowed and the mainstream of the industry in the 1970s–80s was significantly 
indebted.26 
The financial management skills and the environment those skills were employed 
within also varied widely between the mainstream and Aboriginal sectors. The directors 
of the new Aboriginal enterprises usually had very limited experience of financial 
governance and had rarely purchased assets of significant value. Hence the relative value 
of company income and the funding received from government by Aboriginal enterprises 
to purchase their leaseholds, ‘build up’ station infrastructure and provide for operational 
costs was poorly understood by their directors. Related difficulties that low numeracy 
skills created were arguably exacerbated by the DAA’s decision to ‘outsource’ the 
accounting of Aboriginal enterprises to third party accountants who communicated 
infrequently, and even then, not with their Aboriginal clients but with those clients’ non-
Indigenous advisors. Fortunately, despite such handicaps, Aboriginal operations—like 
their mainstream equivalents—could withstand financial loss for a limited period. In the 
case of Aboriginal operations, these losses were temporarily absorbed by government 
                                                 
24  After its creation in May 1975, the Aboriginal Land Fund Commission purchased properties such 
as the Daguragu lease for Aboriginal groups for pastoral and social purposes. The Commission 
acted only as a purchasing body—all subsequent costs related to the land’s use were met by the 
DAA. See Ian Palmer, Buying Back the Land: Organisational Struggle and the Aboriginal Land 
Fund Commission (Canberra, Aboriginal Studies Press, 1988), p. 44. 
25  Phillpot, 2000, op. cit., p. 342. The Daguragu lease was alienated as Aboriginal Freehold in 1986. 
26  See generally Edward Ling, ‘Blame and Martyrs: The Commonwealth Government’s 
Administration of the Northern Territory’s Pastoral Industry, 1911–1978’ (Unpublished PhD 
Thesis, Charles Darwin University, 2010). Although it is clear that the mainstream pastoral industry 
in Australia was heavily subsidised by government, its level of support is low in comparison to 
countries such as Japan, Norway and many other European nations. See Hanlon and Phillpot, op. 
cit., p. 5; Phillpot, 2000, op. cit., p. 341. 
Ch. 6 Muramulla Cattle Co. I 
  170  
 
funding and indeed there was little expectation that the enterprises would ‘break even’ 
for years after their commencement. In this regard, the industry’s small mainstream 
owner/managers were perhaps in the most tenuous position, though it was estimated in 
1985 that enterprises in the emerging Aboriginal pastoral sector possessed only 36% of 
the capital of mainstream NT operations.27  
The relationships of the newly enfranchised Aboriginal landholders and 
mainstream pastoralists with government (and with each other) were illustrative of the 
greatest differences between the industry’s traditional and new Aboriginal players. The 
pastoral industry had been established in the Territory (then part of South Australia) since 
the 1870s. The relationship between colonial authorities in Adelaide and many of the 
earliest large pastoral lessees was often close, if not intimate, as the individuals in both 
were drawn from many of the same families.28 As such, the historical ability of the NT’s 
larger pastoral concerns to contribute to government decision-making processes 
regarding the industry was considerable. While close links to political power remained 
during the twentieth century (Territory pastoralists were often elected to Federal 
Parliament and also the NTLC and the NTLA), NT cattlemen had also established a 
number of representative advocacy bodies to promote their interests publicly.29 As a 
result, Territory pastoralists secured significant financial support and minimal 
developmental and environmental covenants regarding their leases from the 
Commonwealth.30 With the advent of the Aboriginal pastoral sector in the 1970s, it 
appeared that the federal government would show Aboriginal enterprises the same 
generous attitude. Many observers questioned whether the same could be said of the new 
NT government after 1978, however. In this and many other regards, the relationship of 
the new Aboriginal pastoralists (as lessees and recipients of capital funding) to their 
government intermediaries was entirely novel and poorly defined—as the Gurindji’s 
experience described elsewhere in this thesis illustrates.  
                                                 
27  Stuart Phillpot, ‘Aspect of Labour Usage in Aboriginal Operated Activities in Central Australia’, in 
Economy and People in the North, ed. by P. Loveday and D. Wade-Marshall (Darwin: Australian 
National University, North Australia Research Unit, 1985), pp. 122–128 (p. 122).  
28  See Tony Roberts, Frontier Justice: A History of the Gulf Country to 1900 (St Lucia, Qld, 
University of Queensland Press, 2005). 
29  The two main representative associations during the 1920s–80s were the Northern Territory 
Pastoral Lessees Association (NTPLA) representing the Victoria River and Barkly Tableland 
districts and the Centralian Pastoralists Association (CPA), representing landholders in the Alice 
Springs area.   
30  See generally Ling, op. cit.; Jack Kelly, Struggle for the North (Sydney, Australasian Book Society, 
1966), p. 35. 
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The relationship of the new Aboriginal pastoralists and their mainstream 
‘colleagues’ also needs to be understood in light of the past involvement of Aborigines 
in the pastoral industry.31 As in the case of the Gurindji, Aboriginal people in the 
Territory had commonly provided labour to pastoralists occupying their land since the 
inception of the industry.32 Nonetheless, by the late 1970s, the role of Aborigines in the 
industry had been strictly curtailed. Historically, Aboriginal people were seen by many 
pastoralists as lacking in intelligence and many cattlemen participated actively in the 
subjugation of their Aboriginal workers.33 Broadly speaking, communication between 
Aboriginal and non-Indigenous males on the stations was confined to physical, outcome-
focused speech and chiacking. With such practices and inequitable relations inculcated 
for decades, mainstream pastoralists were frequently dismissive of and ill-equipped to 
deal with Aboriginal pastoral lessees and company directors now comprising a new 
professional class.34  
The differences between the desired outcomes of mainstream and Aboriginal 
enterprises were also significant. The operational rationales of absentee–owner 
corporations—or the only ones to be articulated—can be summarised as financial profit 
for their shareholders and a salary income for staff.35 In contrast, the outcomes desired 
by Aboriginal proponents from their pastoral enterprises were many and often poorly 
                                                 
31  Fuller accounts exist elsewhere. See Mary Anne Jebb, Blood, Sweat and Welfare: A History of 
White Bosses and Aboriginal Pastoral Workers (Perth, University of Western Australia Publishing, 
2002); and Dawn May, Aboriginal Labour and the Cattle Industry: Queensland from White 
Settlement to the Present (Melbourne, Cambridge University Press, 1994). For accounts of the 
Gurindji’s experience on Wave Hill Station, see Charlie Ward, ‘Tracking Wave Hill: Following the 
Gurindji Walk-off to Wattie Creek, 1966-1972’, Unpublished MA Thesis, Flinders University, 
2012; Minoru Hokari, Aboriginal Economy and Cattle Labour: the Economic History of the 
Gurindji People (Masters of Economics Thesis, Tokyo, Hitotsubashi University, 1996). 
32  Ann McGrath, Born In the Cattle (North Sydney, Allen & Unwin, 1987), p. 26–27. 
33  See Lyn Riddett, Kine, Kin and Country: The Victoria River District of the Northern Territory, 
1911–1966 (Darwin, Northern Territory, Australian National University, 1990), p. 84; Ronald and 
Catherine Berndt, End of an Era: Aboriginal Labour in the Northern Territory (Canberra, 
Australian Institute of Aboriginal Studies, 1987), p. 8. 
34  Arguably for related reasons, in the early 1980s there was only one Aboriginal owner/manager of a 
‘mainstream’ station in the Territory. This was William Shadforth of Seven Emus Station, whose 
lease was granted in 1953. See New Dawn, Vol. 20, No. 7, 1971, p. 11. One author states that there 
were no Aboriginal owner/managers. See S. Pathmanathan, Development of the Northern Territory 
Rural Industries […] (NT Vocational Training Commission, Darwin, 1983), cited in Phillpot, 1985, 
op. cit., p. 122. 
35  See for instance, Elspeth Young, ‘Land Use and Resources: A Black and White Dichotomy’, in 
Land, Water and People: Geographical Essays in Australian Resource Management, ed. by R.L. 
Heathcote and J.A. Mabbutt (Sydney, Allen & Unwin, 1988), pp. 102–122. 
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understood by government. In the case of the Gurindji, the elders’ desires included the 
following:  
• that the work of the Muramulla Company would provide its staff with access to 
and enjoyment of much of their traditional country;  
• employment for any and all of those Ngumpit community members who should 
want it;  
• ongoing opportunity for the transmission of skills and knowledge to younger 
generations (thus strengthening intergenerational bonds);  
• and income for the development of the Gurindji’s community at Wattie Creek.36  
It might also be assumed that unlike many absentee–owning companies, the directorship 
of Muramulla and other Aboriginal cattle enterprises were committed to preventing 
significant environmental damage on their lease holdings whilst in pursuit of these 
aims.37  
In some cases, the aims of Aboriginal cattle enterprises were supported by the terms 
of DAA funding, however the goals of the Aboriginal pastoralists’ bureaucratic 
intermediaries regarding Aboriginal pastoral enterprises were changeable and also poorly 
articulated. The Department’s expressed criteria regarding Aboriginal project funding 
were mainly developed from self-determination and self-management policies in two 
ways: against ‘social outcomes’ and ‘financial viability’ criteria, both of which were 
applied to all the DAA’s community projects.38 In the case of cattle enterprise projects, 
these were assessed against a range of quantifiable and immeasurable outcomes, 
including ‘meat production, employment, training, self-esteem, community activity and 
                                                 
36  For a fuller explication of the common Aboriginal pastoral aspirations, see Elspeth Young, 
‘Aboriginal Cattle Stations: Strategies for Self-Management’, in Proceedings of the 17th Inst. 
Australian Geographic Conference (Bathurst, NSW, 1981), p. 311. Although the specifics of such 
enterprise goals were only vaguely articulated, it was hoped by Aboriginal proponents and 
bureaucrats alike that the enterprises would support a great many Aboriginal community members 
as staff. Such ambitions were held even as the modernisation of the mainstream industry proved 
that it was only economical to employ a very limited number of staff. See also Young, 1988, op. 
cit., pp. 102–22. 
37  For various descriptions of environmental damage caused by the pastoral industry in the Victoria 
River region during the twentieth century, see Darwin, NAA, Report from M. Ivory to H.C. Giese 
in ‘Sacred Sites: Wave Hill Area’, 29 May 1967, District Welfare Officer Reports, Wave Hill Area, 
E242, K66/1/1; Deborah Bird Rose, Reports from a Wild Country: Ethics for Decolonisation 
(Sydney, University of New South Wales Press, 2004), pp. 3, 4; Kelly, op. cit., p. 20; Ling, op. cit., 
pp. 47–48. 
38  Young, 1981, op. cit., p. 310. 
Ch. 6 Muramulla Cattle Co. I 
  173  
 
profit’.39 As I will soon describe however, in Muramulla’s case, the DAA’s financial 
support was not provided just on the basis of its assessment of the project’s merit, but 
also by invoking a possible hostile public reaction should the Department cease funding 
the company. This argument was perhaps applied most powerfully to the Gurindji 
enterprise, due to public awareness of the group’s situation. 
In light of the above distinctions I have drawn between Aboriginal and mainstream 
pastoral companies, I now wish to explore the anomalous operational constraints with 
which Aboriginal pastoral enterprises such as the Muramulla Company had to contend. 
Prior to the introduction of the ACAA (1976), Aboriginal groups with pastoral aspirations 
were incorporated under extant legislation such as the Companies Act (1963). In some 
instances, these arrangements enabled Aboriginal pastoralists to obtain access to their 
land under Special Purpose Lease tenure, as well as funding to develop their operations. 
The purposes of the Companies Act and other extant legislation differed significantly 
from those of Aboriginal cattlemen (as I have outlined above), however. As a result, the 
incorporation of Aboriginal groups under this legislation and their subsequent funding 
by governments created organisational structures and governmental requirements that 
were little-suited to the aims of their Aboriginal members. Thus, while there was a 
political impetus to promote the realisation of Aboriginal pastoral aspirations, the 
legislative, financial and political ‘tools’ that guided the development of these new 
enterprises prior to the introduction of the ACAA in 1977 were in no way designed to 
facilitate those aspirations. On the contrary, the companies comprising the Aboriginal 
sector in that time were the hastily-developed results of the bureaucracy’s attempt to 
reconcile the wishes and policies of new governments with extant corporation law: an 
unlikely foundation from which to achieve Gurindji interests and goals. 
While the Gurindji elders and their intermediaries operated the Muramulla 
Company within the legal, financial and organisation frameworks I have described, the 
extraordinary nature of such pastoral enterprises was illustrated in a number of ways: 
according to John Edey, in 1977 the Company’s Aboriginal staff had ‘applied themselves 
well’ without ever ‘achieving a high level of efficiency’—a situation that would (and 
could) if true, have only been briefly tolerated in the mainstream industry.40 Similarly, 
                                                 
39  Phillpot, 2000, op. cit., p. 272. 
40  Darwin, NAA, ‘Muramulla Gurindji Co P/L Report […]’, 30 June 1977, Muramulla Gurindji Cattle 
Company, Part 2, E460, 1981/256. 
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on many occasions, the Muramulla Directors were forced to employ staff half-time to 
conserve funds. By Edey’s reckoning, restricted working hours delayed the start of 
branding in 1977, yet it is unclear whether he saw the ‘efficiency’ of staff—or the 
Muramulla business itself—as compromised by its staff’s frequent curtailment by four 
hour working days. The financial implications of this restriction were obscured by the 
enterprise’s receipt of DAA funds, not self-generated profit.  
By way of comparison, although the historical profitability of the mainstream 
industry in the early to mid-20th century was low, its survival depended on large numbers 
of very poorly paid men working in remote areas for weeks on end, usually for fifteen or 
more hours per day. Yet even if the Gurindji were to model the activities of the 
Muramulla Company on their own historical experience of such practices on Wave Hill 
Station and elsewhere, the industry had evolved significantly by the late 1970s. Since the 
Commonwealth Arbitration Commission’s decision to extend the Pastoral Award to 
Indigenous workers in 1966 and the introduction of helicopter mustering and other 
labour-saving technological developments, the industry’s profitability had come to 
depend on their use—and the resultant minimisation of employee numbers. The DAA 
and other proponents of Aboriginal pastoral enterprises were thus caught in a double 
bind. To achieve a semblance of ‘financial viability’, Aboriginal enterprises would need 
to adopt practices similar to the wider industry. They were unwilling to do so because 
the same practices directly contradicted the aspirations which Aboriginal enterprises had 
been created to realise.     
Such contradictions between form and purpose in the new Aboriginal pastoral 
sector were apparent in other ways. Its governmental funding system created a significant 
burden for the Muramulla Company unknown to mainstream pastoral businesses. On 
those properties, the majority of developmental work (and indeed most pastoral activity) 
was initiated as soon as practicable after the enforced inactivity of the wet season. In 
contrast, Aboriginal enterprises subsisting on government grants were unable to purchase 
materials or make other financial decisions until after the results of Departmental funding 
allocations were known—usually in the first half of the financial year when the wet 
season began and work was impossible. This effectively limited the opportunity for 
development work to a few months—perhaps half the time available on other 
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properties.41 If this period coincided with unseasonal rain—as occurred in 1978—the 
company’s ‘window’ of work time was further curtailed. 
My contextualisation in this chapter illustrates the anomalous character and internal 
inconsistencies of the new Aboriginal pastoral sector, of which the Muramulla Gurindji 
Cattle Company formed a small part. An account of that Company’s origins, provided 
below, is thus rendered more comprehensible. To discern the Muramulla Company’s 
beginnings, it is necessary to include a brief history pre-dating the period of this study. 
6.4 Interpreting the Cattle-related Aspirations of Gurindji elders 
In incipient form, the Gurindji elders’ goal of running their own cattle may be found 
among the earliest of their recorded utterances, reported by Frank Hardy upon his arrival 
at the Wave Hill Welfare Settlement in September 1966. Vincent Lingiari then apparently 
told the radical author and journalist that he had been thinking for a long time previously, 
‘we can run Wave Hill without Vestey mob’.42 The petition sent by Frank Hardy on 
behalf of Gurindji elders to the Australian Governor General several months later in early 
1967 indicated what ‘running Wave Hill’ meant in practice to the old Gurindji stockmen. 
According to their literate interlocutors Hardy and Welfare Officer Bill Jeffrey, the men 
planned to:  
[…] build our new home there [at Daguragu], then buy some working horses with 
which we will trap and capture wild unbranded horses and cattle. These we will 
use to build up a cattle station within the borders of this ancient Gurindji land.43    
Later in the petition, Hardy continued this theme on the elders’ behalf:  
[…] If our tribal lands are returned to us, we want them, not as another “Aboriginal 
Reserve”, but as a leasehold to be run cooperatively as a mining lease and cattle 
station by the Gurindji tribe.44 
                                                 
41  Darwin, NTAS, Barry Hansen [Former DAA Project Officer], Interview Recorded by Charlie Ward, 
September 2012, NTRS 3609, BWF 39; Darwin, NAA, ‘Muramulla Gurindji Co P/L Report […]’, 
14 August 1978, Muramulla Gurindji Cattle Company Part 2, E460, 1981/256. 
42  Frank Hardy, ‘Strike in the North’, Nation, 29 October 1966, p. 13. 
43  Canberra, NAA, ‘Petition by Gurindji People to Governor-General re Wave Hill Pastoral Land, 
Northern Territory’, A1734, NT 1968/2509. 
44  ibid.  
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Truncated and mediated as these references to the elders’ cattle aspirations were, they 
conveyed to outsiders that Lingiari and his coterie wished to create and operate some sort 
of cattle enterprise of their own.45 Self-evidently, access to land would first be required 
to realise this vision, and this significant practical challenge deflected the attention of the 
Gurindji’s interlocutors from the group’s cattle plans. In late 1969 though, a group of 
student supporters of the Gurindji arrived at Wattie Creek with the intention of eliciting 
an expanded account of the elder’s goals. For these activists, who were either members 
of or affiliated with Abschol, an Indigenous rights-focused student support body, it was 
the first of several consultative visits and working bees at Wattie Creek in the 1970–74 
period. Members of the Abschol group would go on to play a key role in interpreting the 
Gurindji elders’ needs and desires, assisting them to develop their cattle enterprise, and 
co-ordinating a nationwide campaign to support the Gurindji.46  
The accuracy of the activists’ interpretation of the elders’ goals was fundamental 
to both this support and my efforts here to determine the elders’ cattle-related aspirations 
in the period. These were expressed by the elders in Aboriginal English. Although 
Abschol’s first report does not contain direct quotations from Gurindji elders, it is 
nonetheless worth quoting at length for the insights it provides into a) the incipient 
aspirations of the cattle enterprise’s proponents; b) the issues with which the Gurindji 
group had to contend to realise their cattle-related ambitions; and c) the nature of the 
advice most likely given to the Gurindji group by the students, which strongly influenced 
the inception of the Gurindji’s cattle business. In the report of their first visit, the Abschol 
activists described:  
As far as we could ascertain in our five days at Wattie Creek, the general feeling is 
that [the Gurindji] want to maintain their independence. […] Their plans do not 
appear to have changed since they first went to Wattie Creek over three years ago. 
Ultimately, they would like to run and own their own cattle station. They realise 
                                                 
45  Other expressions of the Gurindji elders’ cattle aspirations may be found here: Vincent Lingiari 
cited in Frank Hardy, The Unlucky Australians, Sydney, Nelson, 1968 (2006 edn, Melbourne, One 
Day Hill), p.180; Committee of Muramulla Gurindji Company to Managing Director of Vestey’s, 
12 December 1970, Oke Personal Collection; Abschol, What Now at Wattie Creek: Report of the 
Abschol Field Team which Visited Wattie Creek in May-June 1970, (Melbourne, National Union of 
Australian University Students, 1970), p. 16. 
46  See Charlie Ward, ‘Following the Leaders: the Role of Non-Indigenous Activism in the 
Development of Wattie Creek, 1969–73, Journal of the Royal Australian Historical Society, Vol. 
100, Pt. 1, 2014, pp. 69–92. 
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this cannot be achieved at once, and realistically [they] want to begin in a small 
way in the contract business—perhaps in rounding up, breaking and selling 
brumbies. 
The people at Wattie Creek seem to fear that there will be retaliation from 
Vestey’s if they extend their [illegal] activities. They realise that they cannot run 
cattle or horses unless they own or lease some land. [..] Agricultural Department 
personnel in Darwin told us that that the minimum economic size of an intensively 
run cattle station in the Wave Hill area, would be 3–400 square miles. […] The 
group at Wattie Creek claim they could fill most of the positions required, with the 
exception of the book-keeper and mechanic. […] If land is to be granted or leased 
to the Wattie Creek group, it is important that an incorporated body be formed. 
Abschol is investigating how this can be done. 
The group’s proposal to develop contract teams to capture and break-in horse 
seem to be feasible projects. […] Again there is the lack of a sympathetic person 
in the area to advise them.47  
I accept the foregoing as a credible account of what Gurindji elders were saying 
about their cattle-related ambitions at that time. Before I return to the nature of those 
ambitions, the postulates of this summary by Abschol and its underlying assumptions are 
worthy of comment, for they guided the Consolidative Phase of the Gurindji’s cattle 
operation (1970–75). 
Firstly, Abschol’s report credits the Gurindji elders with wanting to ‘run and own 
their own cattle station’. What Abschol meant by a ‘cattle station’, or what the Gurindji 
meant (if they used the term) are undefined. In its industry usage, a cattle station connotes 
more than its Macquarie Dictionary definition of ‘a rural property for raising sheep or 
cattle’.48  In practical terms in Australia, a cattle station is a typically a large area of 
Crown Land alienated under pastoral leasehold on which stock are grown before their 
sale for the financial profit of the lessee. The lessee may be an owner-operator (usually a 
family-owned small business entity) or a large pastoral company employing its own 
resident management and staff. The earliest of these, the ‘owner–operator’ stations, were 
                                                 
47  Rob and Kay Oke, Paul Fox, David Twitt, Wattie Creek: Present and Future—Report of the 
Abschol Field Team (Melbourne, National Union of Australian Students, December 1969), p. 6. 
48  Macquarie Dictionary Online, https://www.macquariedictionary.com.au/. Accessed 27 January 
2017. 
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leased and worked by an individual or several individuals in partnership, usually of 
modest means.49 By the 1960s however, the majority of stations were of the ‘absentee 
owner’ variety.50 These properties were leased by large companies, some of which—like 
the Vestey Company, the lessees of Wave Hill—held a large number of stations, 
amounting to combined holdings larger than many European nations. Such ‘absentee 
owners’ employed a resident manager and a bookkeeper who resided on each station. 
These staff were advised by a company-employed travelling manager/inspector.  
In exchange for granting the lessee tenure and certain subsidies supporting their 
operating costs, the Australian Government required them to undertake improvements 
and maintenance of their property’s infrastructure, to maintain the environmental health 
of their property, and to keep their herd(s) disease-free. The normal taxation laws 
applying to private entities are also enforced.  
As noted, in the Abschol report quoted above, the full meaning which Gurindji 
elders and/or their Abschol interlocutors ascribed to ‘a cattle station’ is unexplored. To 
understand the Gurindji’s cattle aspirations and the path that their self-determination 
subsequently took, in the following Chapter I will establish what those Gurindji men 
understood a cattle enterprise to entail, and show the significant differences between this 
and the meaning(s) which Abschol and the Gurindji’s other interlocutors ascribed to it.  
Until a Gurindji cattle station was actually realised legally in 1975, all that was certain 
about the Gurindji’s cattle aspirations was that they existed. Therefore, at this stage of 
my analysis I will also leave this question aggregate and undefined. For the time being, 
I will adopt other terms which the Gurindji’s bureaucratic interlocutors commonly 
utilised, such as a Gurindji cattle ‘enterprise’ or ‘operation’. 
Leaving for now the full financial, regulatory and epistemological connotations of 
the Gurindji elders’ purported desire for a cattle station, it is difficult not to agree with 
the authors of Abschol’s first report, that the Gurindji required significant support. 
Whatever the scope and terms of a Gurindji cattle enterprise were to be, it would require 
the purchase of cattle and horses, for which the people at Wattie Creek lacked sufficient 
money. Also, as the report’s authors noted, the Gurindji realised that they could not run 
                                                 
49  David Hanlon and Stuart Phillpot, Rural Development Skills: Can we meet the Challenge?, Vol. 2, 
Working Papers (Report Prepared for Department of Employment, Education and Training by RCS 
Hassall, 1993), p. 5; Darrell Lewis, A Wild History: Life and Death on the Victoria River Frontier 
(Clayton, Vic: Monash University Publishing, 2012), p. 244. 
50  Kelly, op. cit., p. 20. 
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cattle or horses ‘unless they own[ed] or lease[d] some land’.51 Without possessing 
property rights of their own, the Gurindji were unable to receive government support for 
any cattle enterprise they might establish. On this matter, the elders accepted Abschol’s 
advice, which had two consequences. Firstly, how much land the Wattie Creek group 
needed had to be identified. Abschol’s report indicates that Department of Agriculture 
authorities found that at least 4-500 square miles of land would be required for the 
Gurindji to generate any profit. As we shall see, the consequences of this were significant 
for the Gurindji, both in terms of the amount of land they would eventually acquire, and 
the obligations that ensued from its acquisition. Secondly, as mentioned in the Abschol 
report, ‘If land is to be granted or leased to the Wattie Creek group, it is important that 
an incorporated body be formed’. The reasons Abschol deemed incorporation important 
are not specified, but likely reflected their thinking about tenure: only with incorporation 
would the Gurindji be able to obtain official support for getting a lease. Again, the terms 
under which official support was offered by virtue of the Gurindji’s incorporation would 
also have significant consequences for their cattle aspirations, as we shall soon see.  
In 1970, with the ongoing attention of activists both living at Wattie Creek and 
working in Sydney and Melbourne, efforts to accurately identify the nature of the 
Gurindji’s cattle aspirations and support their realisation intensified. At a series of 
meetings in August 1970 at Wattie Creek, the Gurindji discussed and clarified their plans 
for the future. Anthropologist Hannah Middleton compiled a list of the squatters’ goals. 
She noted that the men wished for horses and stock for their proposed cattle enterprise, 
and to establish contract mustering and fencing teams. They also listed the supporting 
infrastructure they required: a bore to supply water; sturdy vehicles, heavy machinery 
and a school, store and mechanical workshop and clinic at Wattie Creek. Significantly, 
their hope was that their own people would acquire the skills to run all of these facilities 
and that they would be eventually managed by Gurindji people.52 As Pincher Nyurrmiarri 
put it:  
                                                 
51  Gurindji leaders were likely very receptive to this advice for its congruence with their campaign for 
‘full’ land rights.  
52  Hannah Middleton, But Now We Want the Land Back- A History of the Australian Aboriginal 
People (Sydney, New South Wales, New Age Publishers, 1977), p. 119. 
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[…] We would like to have cattle to work this place and horses. We try to be getting 
going this place here. We need horse and we need money too.53 
Australian Governments in this period were not averse to these types of proposals and 
put significant energy into identifying how they might be supported. 
6.5 Life of a Cattle Company (1970–86) 
The elders’ cattle operation, and their relationship with it, changed markedly over time, 
as I will show. During the period in which the Gurindji leaders lacked a land base and 
significant funding (1966–69), the operation was mostly an imagined affair, the subject 
of their lobbying. This period I therefore refer to in the account that follows as 
Muramulla’s ‘Aspirational’ Phase. The elders incorporated the Muramulla Gurindji 
Cattle Company in 1971, and lobbied for government backing. First illegally and then 
with the contingent support of the Whitlam Government, the old men did what they could 
to initiate their enterprise’s full operation. They continued in this endeavour until 1975, 
when their company acquired the Daguragu pastoral lesseeship (P/L 805) and secured 
operational federal funding on an annual basis. I refer to this as Muramulla’s 
‘Consolidative’ Phase. With significant operational funding and a 1,250 square mile 
lease on which to operate, what I call the Company’s ‘Productive’ Phase (1976–1979) 
began. This was a period of significant though qualified progress towards the elders’ 
aims, though in 1979–80, a series of events heralded the beginning of a more difficult 
period for the Company which would culminate in its liquidation. That stage of the 
Company’s life I term Muramulla’s ‘Deteriorative’ Phase, (1980–86). Therefore: 
1. Aspirational Phase 1966–69 
2. Consolidative Phase 1970–75 
3. Productive Phase 1976–79 
4. Deteriorative Phase 1980–86 
                                                 
53  Pincher Nyurrmiyarri, Pincher Numiari [sic]- Gurindji Plans and Attitudes: An Interview by 
Warwick Neilley (Abschol and Save the Gurindji Campaign, 1970), p. 3; 
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Table 3. The Muramulla Company’s Four Phases, 1966–86. 
With this periodisation of the Gurindji leaders’ cattle operation in place, we can more 
readily contextualise events in the following account. 
The Gurindji’s pre-incorporation process occurred in 1970. Those involved included 
Abschol, the National Union of Australian University Students (NUAUS), the federal 
Office of Aboriginal Affairs, and anthropologist Hannah Middleton. Pro bono legal 
advice was provided by a Melbourne-based law firm. How the interests of the family-
based clan groups at Wattie Creek could best be represented by a commercial corporate 
structure was the subject of lengthy discussions and consultations. It was decided that the 
Muramulla Gurindji Company would hold shares in trust for a ‘Gurindji Association’. 
Middleton conveyed to the Gurindji’s solicitors that: 
The Gurindji insist that the Association be so incorporated that they may at any 
time in the future take in […] new members from unspecified groups. Apart from 
this, membership is restricted to six groups, all of whom live in this area and most 
of whom identify themselves partly or wholly as Gurindji. There is no residence or 
other qualification to be applied to these groups, which are: Gurindji, Bilinara, 
Ngaringman, Nyining, Mudbra and Malngning [sic, emphasis in original].54   
The Muramulla Company was incorporated under the Companies Act, 1961 (Victoria) 
on 9 March 1971, subject to the Companies Ordinance, 1963. As a result of long 
conversations between the Gurindji leaders and their interlocutors, the objects of the 
Muramulla Company’s incorporation were many, and included:  
a) To foster and promote community group participation and development of the 
Gurindji Aboriginal tribe of the Wattie Creek area through business interests in 
the mining, pastoral and allied industry suitable to the area […]. 
c) To establish a store at Wattie Creek owned and operated by such persons who 
may be engaged by the company […]. 
e) To purchase, take on a lease […], or otherwise acquire any real and personal 
property, building, workshops, […] and animals and to construct, […] and 
maintain any buildings […] for the purposes of the company […]. 
                                                 
54  Middleton to Roet, 30 December 1970, Oke Personal Collection.  
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f) To contract to pastoral properties in the area association members or 
shareholders of the company and other aborigines of the area to be paid by the 
company for such employment as fencing, mustering, horse breaking, boring, 
branding and other allied pastoral work […]. 
g) To apply to government [bodies] for and to accept grants and subsidies of money 
and land donations […] with a view to promoting the objects of the Company.55  
Initially, Muramulla secured only sporadic project funding from the government, and 
operated as an ‘exempt’ proprietary company. As such it was un-audited.56 Vincent 
Lingiari, ‘Long Johnny Kijngayari, Pincher Nyurrmiarri, ‘Hoppy’ Mick Rangiari, 
‘Captain Major’ (Lupngagiari), Jerry Rinyngayarri, George Manyo and Donald Nangiari 
comprised the Company’s first board of directors.57 Later, Lingiari became the Chairman 
and Donald Nangiari the Manager.  
The initial focus of the company was to increase the Gurindji’s herd, using 
donations raised primarily by activists, though tasks such as cattle buying required better 
numeracy than the Gurindji could muster.58 As I described in Chapter Five, in 1972 the 
Gurindji then successfully applied for a Special Purpose Lease over eight square miles 
around Wattie Creek, representing the McMahon Government’s partial validation of the 
group’s ambitions. Before the lease could be issued however, there was a change of 
government. Afterwards, officials of the Whitlam Government re-approved the granting 
of the lease, acknowledging that it was now merely a stopgap solution while the 
government examined how it could grant the Gurindji land rights over the (much larger) 
area they sought. The newly-created Department of Aboriginal Affairs supported the 
company by funding the wages of live-in supporter David Quin.59 Rapidly, the 
Department became the Muramulla Company’s primary benefactor, rather than the 
network of activists they had hitherto relied on. The Aboriginal Benefits Trust Fund too, 
                                                 
55  ‘Memorandum of Association of Muramulla Gurindji Pty. Ltd.’, 12 October 1970, Oke Personal 
Collection.  
56  Darwin, NAA, ‘Auditor’s Report’, Cattle Mustering Venture […], 26 April 1977, (F1) 1975/4091. 
57  See ‘Memorandum of Association, Muramulla Gurindji P/L’, 12 October 1970, Oke Personal 
Collection. 
58  David Quin to Vic Barnett, 13 December 1972, Atkinson Personal Collection.  
59  David Quin to Rob Wesley Smith, 18 July 1973, Wesley Smith Personal Collection. 
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provided a $15,000 ($150,000) grant to the company, with which it bought a cattle 
truck.60  
With the prospect of a small herd now within reach, the ‘drivers’ of the Muramulla 
project—old men such as Donald Nangiari, Long Johnny Kijngayari, Jerry Rinyngayarri 
and Long Jack Jurumbak—turned directly to organising the construction of their own 
stockyards. These were a high point of Gurindji achievement, embodying the value and 
transfer of generations of accumulated knowledge. Younger men provided much of the 
labour, with advice contributed by their elders. Timber cattle yard-building was difficult 
and demanding work, requiring: 
[…] knowledge of the right trees to select and cut, design […] and 
layout, construction techniques, and hard work with the skilled use of 
adze, axe, crosscut saw and chainsaw. None of the kartiya associated 
with [the squatters] since the Walk-off had those skills or knowledge.61  
In Mick Rangiari's words: ‘That big stockyard now, they bin start building. That time 
was—you know, proud people, eh?’62 Rather than being conceptualised merely as a place 
of residence, by now Wattie Creek—or Daguragu, as it had been renamed—was seen by 
its founders and many of their interlocutors primarily as the ‘homestead’ or ‘base camp’ 
supporting the operations and staff of the Gurindji’s Muramulla Cattle Company.63 
Notwithstanding some government support in 1973–74, the Gurindji’s cattle 
operation was officially in caretaker mode during that period, hamstrung by its lack of 
legal tenure over a large area. Resolving this for the Gurindji was the DAA’s main focus 
in 1973–74, as I will now describe. When the Whitlam Government took office in 
December 1972, it was keen to act on two of the Gurindji elders’ espoused desires. One 
was to obtain land for the Wattie Creek group on the basis of their traditional rights, and 
the other was to support the group to create their own cattle enterprise. While the Gurindji 
required some form of tenure to run cattle, these concerns were not identical: other forms 
of tenure than that potentially bestowed by ‘Aboriginal Land Rights’ existed which 
                                                 
60  Jean Leu to Rob Oke, Oke Personal Collection, 2 June 1973, p. 3; Darwin, NTAS, Mick Rangiari 
Interview Transcript, October 1986, NTRS 226, TS 485, (T4), p. 15. 
61  David Quin, Personal Communication, 14 July 2012. 
62  Darwin, NTAS, Mick Rangiari Interview Transcript, October 1986, NTRS 226, TS 485, (T4), p. 
15. 
63  AIATSIS, ‘Daguragu and Libanungu (Wave Hill Town)’, in Wattie Creek and Wave Hill 1966–75, 
Papers of Jeremy Long, Manuscript Collection, MS 2534, Box 3, Folder 24; Darwin, NTAS, 
Interview with Bev Andrews, Recorded by Charlie Ward, November 2012, NTRS 3609, BWF 40. 
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would grant the Gurindji the property rights they required to run cattle, such as a pastoral 
lease. Alienating a pastoral lease for the Gurindji allowed the government to obtain land 
for the group under extant legislation, though I argue it also led to the conflation by 
officials and the Gurindji themselves of the Gurindji’s land rights and cattle-related plans. 
As much is apparent from the Gurindji elders’ first consultation with pastoral experts, 
which omitted discussions about the old stockmen’s vision for their proposed cattle 
station. The consultation (which I shall describe in the following chapter) was instead 
directed towards assessment of the area’s financial potential on the basis of its pastoral 
capacity.  
Through their intended possession of a large area of land and their operation of a 
cattle enterprise, Gurindji leaders sought to send a message of equivalency to, and 
equality with, surrounding stations. This does not mean that they comprehended the 
financial and managerial axioms underpinning a mainstream pastoral business. Rather, 
their aspiration to achieve equivalence in that domain was based on their knowledge of 
those businesses’ physical features, their knowledge of the practical work required to 
operate them, and their limited perception of the cattle industry’s financial structure. 
When their governmental interlocutors estimated the area chosen by the elders as large 
enough to support a financially viable cattle operation, the implications were hence not 
apparent to the old Gurindji men. Yet in 1972–73, this viability was the Department of 
Aboriginal Affairs’ primary concern regarding the Gurindji.  
Meanwhile, Wattie Creek residents were taking steps to achieve their modest 
vision of a cattle enterprise. Those who were now receiving unemployment benefits 
channelled their payments towards the purchase of saddles, horses and cattle. As quoted 
in Chapter Two, according to Mick Rangiari: 
Soon as we got that money we used to […] put it in. ‘Okay, we got to buy this 
with this money—we got to buy a horse. We'll have to save up, we’ll have to keep 
every cheque. Maybe fortnight we get it—just put ’em in.64 
Funding from the DAA was minimal and unpredictable, which created uncertainty as to 
the number of individuals that Muramulla could employ. Such vagaries made the 
company a poor employment choice for Gurindji and other Aboriginal men wishing to 
                                                 
64  NTAS, NTRS 226, op. cit., p. 16. 
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work, resulting in many taking work on commercially-operated stations in the area.65 
Early in 1974, the Muramulla Company hired fifteen stockmen, at the request of its 
Board. The wages of this labour force quickly drained the company’s accounts, catching 
both the workers and the DAA unprepared. In an attempt to prevent a reoccurrence, 
activist supporters suggested to Departmental Secretary Barrie Dexter that the company’s 
money should be administered at Kalkaringi, ‘so that the Gurindji would learn to handle 
money and they could see by the bank books just what was happening’.66 Dexter 
consented, though this experiment was short-lived. 
Due to such misadventures, the DAA and its agronomy consultants (the Australian 
Agricultural Consultancy Management company, or AACM) concluded that the 
Muramulla project ‘would be very unlikely to succeed without the guidance of a 
competent [non-Gurindji] cattle advisor’.67 After speaking with DAA staff, Muramulla 
managing director Donald Nangiari formed the opinion that the company would have to 
accept an outside ‘manager’ if it wished to receive more government support.68 Perceived 
pressure from the DAA to employ a kartiya manager was sufficient to prompt the 
Gurindji men into a public statement of their will to control their cattle enterprise largely 
unaided.69 It also caused infighting among the Gurindji board.70 
The federal government’s excision of a large (1,250 square mile) area from Wave Hill 
Station and its award to Muramulla as a pastoral lease in August 1975 marked a milestone 
for the company. The area of the lease was the same as that which its lessees had 
specified. Pastoral industry experts were also satisfied that the resultant property could 
be used to create an (eventually) profitable business. On the basis of the company’s 
tenure and potential profitability, the lease transfer was accompanied by an initial 
                                                 
65  According to Jenny Lowe, the former book-keeper of Wave Hill Station, there were 120 employees 
of Wave Hill Station at the time, 90 of whom were Indigenous. Jenny Lowe and Barbara Walters, 
Interview Recorded by Charlie Ward, October 2012.   
66  Jean Culley and Brian Havenhand, ‘Report on a Meeting […]’, 5 June 1974, Pelczynski Personal 
Collection.  
67  Darwin, NAA, ‘Economic Development Muramulla […]’, Muramulla Gurindji Co Pastoral 
Project, 9 May 1974 (E460) 1974/1588. 
68  Darwin, NTAS, Northern Territory Pastoral Lessees Association, Administration and 
Correspondence Files, Philip Nitschke in ‘Race Relations Newsletter No. 8’, 8 April 1974; and 
Pincher Nyurrmiyarri et al, ‘Race Relations Newsletter No. 9’, 2 May 1974, NTRS 3548, C1/2D. 
69   Donald Nangiari et al, ‘Letter to the Editor’, Identity, October 1974, p. 30. 
70  Cited in Philip Nitschke to Jean Leu, 8 April 1974, Oke Personal Collection. 
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developmental grant of $128,000 ($885,000) from the DAA.71 To manage Muramulla’s 
financial affairs, the Department also made arrangements between the intermediaries 
now involved: the company’s DAA-appointed Darwin-based accountants; AACM; and 
the Department itself. For the Gurindji, the immediate result of the complex financial 
arrangements being negotiated between their various intermediaries was more delays: 
although their accountants had received funds for the purpose, no wages were paid to 
Muramulla employees for at least several weeks after they were expected, causing a 
‘collapse of morale’ among the station workers.72  
After the receipt of its lease from Prime Minister Whitlam, as per DAA stipulations 
regarding the administration of its ‘pastoral projects’, the company was required to hire 
a pastoral consultant. A former AACM consultant took up the position.73 The DAA also 
required the company to employ a ‘Cattle Advisor’, a position which was taken by a 
pastoralist called Stan Andrews. Donald Nangiari was re-appointed as the managing 
director of the company, with Jerry Rinyngayarri, Nangiari’s ‘full brother’, as the 
company’s head stockman.74 The number of Gurindji and other Aboriginal stockmen 
employed under these four ‘bosses’ varied.  
The company began its operations in late 1975 and its ‘Productive’ phase soon 
began. Vehicles were purchased and five kilometres of much-needed fencing was 
erected. During monthly meetings, budgets, development plans, stock buying, 
employment and the operation of the company store were discussed. John Edey judged 
such meetings ‘very good’.75 After receiving a gift of four hundred cattle from the Vestey 
Company, Muramulla purchased 1,169 beasts in the following eighteen months. Its herd 
grew to approximately 2,000 head. 76 According to Pincher Nyurrmiarri:  
                                                 
71  Sydney, SLNSW, Tanya McConvell to Jean, 29 July 1975, in Gurindji at Wattie Creek (Daguragu), 
Northern Territory, Hannah Middleton Papers, c. 1966–1976, MLMSS 5866/15. 
72  Darwin, NAA, McConvell to Hon Race Mathews, 11 September 1975, Muramulla Gurindji 
Company—Pastoral, 1975–79, E460, 1975/137. 
73  Darwin, NAA, Edey to Con Foo [DAA], 16 February 1976, Muramulla Gurindji Cattle Company 
Part 1, E460, 1981/256.   
74  The staff at the newly built store—Donald Nangiari’s daughter Judith Donald and Stan Andrews’ 
wife Bev—were also Muramulla employees. 
75  NAA, E460, 1981/256.   
76  ibid.    
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We’re starting off now. We want to work the station right away, so we can make 
a few bob ourselves, when we put the cattle in the meatworks and the money in 
the bank like white Europeans.77 
Regardless of its internal dynamics, in a legal sense the Gurindji accumulated a cattle 
property, ‘same as other people have got it’. In the mid-1970s however, membership of 
the pastoral ‘club’ bought few benefits. Financially speaking, the Gurindji had won little 
more than the right to lose money. Even the Territory’s most successful pastoral 
producers were struggling. The global beef market was oversupplied and beef prices in 
Australia were at a sixteen year low.78 It was reported that ‘white [pastoralists] are 
considering walking off stations of 5,000 square miles, unable at current beef prices to 
maintain ten or twenty people’.79 
If Gurindji ambition was driving the Muramulla Company’s activity in the mid-
1970s, the prescriptive financial arrangements, staffing requirements and covenants 
attached to its funding were shaping the development of its lease. These were substantive, 
as shown in Appendix B.80 Yet while the government required massive expenditure of 
the Company, it also urged restraint. This compromised stance resulted from the slight 
change of direction in Aboriginal Affairs heralded by the election of the Fraser 
Government on 13 December 1975, described in Chapter One. The new government 
reduced funds to the Aboriginal Affairs portfolio as a whole, and as a result the DAA 
notified the Muramulla Company in March 1976 that its annual funding was to be 
reduced by 12%, or $41,000 ($260,000).81  
The 1977 assessment of the Department’s Project Officer, Barry Hansen, was grim. 
He found that based on the amount of funding the DAA was able to provide the Company 
in the foreseeable future (approx. $90,000 ($505,000) per year), not only would 
Muramulla be unable to generate surplus income (unless there was a ‘significant 
improvement in the [pastoral] industry’), but the Gurindji would be unable to develop 
                                                 
77  Darwin, NAA, Numiari [sic] to Viner, 8 August 1976, Wave Hill Centre: Policy and Development, 
E460, 1981/306. 
78  ‘Expert Predicts Quick Recovery’, The Land, 28 October 1976, p. 8. 
79  Dennis Minogue, ‘The Dreaming: Wattie Creek’s Black Cattlemen Look to the Future’, The Age, 
14 February 1976, p. 14. 
80  Darwin, NAA, ‘Report on Application for Funds’, Muramulla Gurindji Company—Pastoral, 1975–
79, E460, 1975/137. 
81  Darwin, NAA, Lovegrove [DAA] to Muramulla, 3 March 1976, E460, 1981/256.   
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their property’s infrastructure as required by the government.82 Hansen recognised that 
as a result, the Muramulla Company would probably not be able to meet the 
government’s lease covenants in the coming year.83 Nonetheless, little heed was paid to 
Hansen’s observations and the possibility of terminating the Company’s funding was not 
considered.  
The Fraser Government’s funding cuts presaged early signs of an increasingly 
adversarial political and ideological operating environment for the Muramulla Company.  
Confirmation of this came in July 1978, when Self-Government legislation was passed 
in the Northern Territory. Then, critics of Aboriginal-operated pastoral properties in the 
NT found their most outspoken representative: the Territory’s first Chief Minister, Paul 
Everingham. Everingham claimed on radio that such cattle stations were ‘running sores’ 
and ‘harbours of disease’ blotting the landscape.84 Under the terms of Self-Government, 
responsibility for the administration of land was concurrently passed from the (federal) 
Department of the Northern Territory’s Lands Branch to the Northern Territory 
Department of Lands and Housing, and responsibility for agriculture passed from the 
(federal) Department of the Northern Territory to the new NTG’s Department of 
Industrial Development.85 With these changes, responsibility for the Muramulla 
Company’s lesseeship (but not its governance and financial management) passed to the 
Northern Territory Government. The various agencies responsible for the Muramulla 
Company in the period are shown below. 
 Federal Government 
Agencies (–1986) 
NT Government 
Agencies (1978–) 
Responsibility 
for Livestock 
Department of 
Primary Industry: 
1956– 
Department of 
Industrial 
Development: 1978–
1979 
                                                 
82  See Darwin, NAA, ‘Muramulla Co. Project Report 1976–77’, 1 June 1977, Cattle Mustering 
Venture […], (F1) 1975/4091. 
83  ibid.  
84  Dean Jaensch and Peter Loveday, ed., Under One Flag: The 1980 Northern Territory Election 
(North Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1981), p. 55; ‘Everingham and Aboriginal Pastoral Leases’, 
Central Australian Land Rights News, No. 11, December 1979 (Alice Springs, Australia, Central 
Land Council). 
85  This was renamed the Department of Primary Production on 1 July 1979. 
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Department of Primary 
Production: July 1979– 
Responsibility 
for Land 
Lands Branch of the 
Northern Territory 
Administration, 
Department of 
Territories: 1952–1972 
Department of Lands 
and Housing: 1978–
1980 
Lands Branch, 
Department of the 
Northern Territory: 
1972–1978 
Department of Lands: 
July 1980– 
Table 4. Government agencies responsible for administration of the Gurindji’s 
leasehold and cattle, 1970–86. 
The Muramulla Company’s relationship with its political ‘masters’ in the Whitlam 
Government had begun poorly, yet initial communications with the new NTG after Self-
Government were apparently disastrous. On 1 October 1979 a delegate of the NT 
Minister for Lands Marshall Perron sent a warning to the Muramulla Company that it 
had failed to meet some of its lease covenants and would therefore be forced to relinquish 
its lease, unless it could show ‘due cause’. In part, the letter read: 
[…] the NT of Australia intend after twenty-eight days of the giving of this notice 
to you to forfeit the above lease due to your failure to comply with condition of the 
above lease.86  
When news of this official correspondence—one of thirty-nine identical letters, the 
government claimed—became known, an outpouring of public support for the Gurindji 
erupted and a dispute between the major NT political parties, federal Labor politicians, 
the Central Land Council (CLC) and Muramulla staff occurred.87 
                                                 
86  ‘Leases “Warning” Claim Denied’, NTN, 30 October 1979.  
87  Among them were the Gurindji’s Mudburra countrymen at Montejinnie station. See ‘Blacks to 
Govt: Not Welcome’, NTN, 3 November 1979. 
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Many, including the Central Land Council’s Wenten Rubuntja, saw the letter of the 
government as a forfeiture notice.88 Others, such as the NT ALP’s Deputy Leader Neville 
Perkins, looked at the letter as a message communicating the NTG’s intention to 
undermine the security of Aboriginal pastoral leaseholders. According to MLA Jack 
Doolan, after receiving the letter, the Gurindji felt ‘betrayed’: former Prime Minister 
Gough Whitlam, his Aboriginal Affairs Minister Les Johnson, and (the then current) 
Aboriginal Affairs minister Ian Viner had all ‘indicated verbally and in writing that they 
[the Gurindji] could never lose their land’.89 When he was later asked about the incident, 
Mick Rangiari was quoted as saying ‘Them government mob no good, they never want 
Gurindji people to be happy at Daguragu’.90 
The Muramulla Company was now faced with the possible termination of its lease, 
and the Gurindji elders were forced to respond. Their consultant John Edey took the view 
that in most cases the Muramulla Co. had actually already met its covenants, or that they 
should be waived on technical grounds. In the meantime, Gurindji and other Ngumpit 
leaders took an unprecedented step, sending a message to the Everingham Government 
that its representatives were no longer welcome in Daguragu, Yarralin and elsewhere.91  
Although the Commonwealth government had monitored the compliance of 
pastoral lessees with their lease conditions for seventy years, to officially threaten 
forfeiture of a lease was unheard of.92 Rather, the common practice among pastoralists 
in the industry according to scholar Ted Ling, had been to routinely ‘undermin[e] or 
negat[e] their lease covenants, even though they were fully aware of them […]’, and such 
transgressions went unpunished.93 Clemency shown to the Muramulla Company thus far 
by the DAA regarding compliance with its lease covenants tends to confirm that the 
Everingham Government’s letter was intended as a political statement of the newly-
empowered CLP against Land Rights.94 Such an interpretation is consistent with 
                                                 
88  Howie [CLC] to Burchett [Dept. Lands], 29 October 1979, Pelczynski Personal Collection. 
89  ‘Blacks to Govt: Not Welcome’, NTN, 3 November 1979. 
90  Cited in Tina Jowett, ‘Walking to Wattie Creek: the History of the Gurindji People and Their 
Struggle for Land Rights’ (BA Honours Thesis, Sydney, University of New South Wales, 1990), p. 
97. 
91  ‘Blacks to Govt: Not Welcome’, NTN, 3 November 1979. 
92  Ling, op. cit., p. 382; Jack Ellis, ‘Land Lease Row’, NTN, 26 November 1979, p. 2; Darwin, NTAS, 
Barry Hansen [former DAA Assistant Regional Director (Central Australia)], Interview Recorded 
by Charlie Ward, September 2012, NTRS 3609, BWF 39. 
93  Ling, op. cit., p. 231. 
94  Darwin, NAA, ‘Report on Inspection of Pastoral Properties […]’, 12–16 September 1979, 
Muramulla Gurindji Cattle Company, E629, 1979/7/7856. 
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Everingham’s belief that pastoral leasehold land should not be available for alienation as 
Aboriginal freehold under ALRA, or as he put it to journalists, that ‘Aboriginal 
pastoralists should have exactly the same tenure as others in the industry’.95 Although 
such sentiments were a direct contradiction of the political impulse underlying the federal 
government’s support of Aboriginal Land Rights in the Territory, the Fraser Government 
lacked the will to force a confrontation on the issue.96 In response to the outrage he had 
provoked, Minister Perron claimed that his letter to the Gurindji was merely a ‘warning’ 
and extended the Muramulla Company’s deadline until the following June.97 I deem 
Muramulla’s conflict over ‘forfeiture’–and the rise of the NT CLP government that 
arguably caused it—as heralding the beginning of the Company’s ‘Deteriorative Phase’ 
(1979–86). 
During the latter half of the 1970s, the annual turnoff of Daguragu cattle bearing 
the ‘GDT’ brand rose by 400%.98 The beef market had begun to improve from the 
oversupply-driven slump hampering the Muramulla’s earlier years, but the turn of the 
decade marked a difficult time for Muramulla. Deaths and resignations by long-term 
senior staff exacerbated the instability caused by its variable funding, and in 1980, 
Muramulla was confronted by a problem of much greater magnitude.99 This arrived in 
the form of a national cattle disease eradication campaign known as ‘BTEC’ (the 
Brucellosis and Tuberculosis Eradication Campaign). The Campaign was introduced on 
Australia’s southernmost tip, and implemented in the Katherine region in 1979—80. It 
required that all pastoralists in the nation would capture and test every beast on their land 
(a feat never achieved before), destroy any infected animals, and build any fencing 
required to properly manage their herd in the future.100 Although the federal government 
assisted landholders with the costs of de- and re-stocking, the Commonwealth itself 
                                                 
95  ‘Everingham and Aboriginal Pastoral Leases’, Central Australian Land Rights News, No. 11, 
December 1979 (Alice Springs, Australia, Central Land Council). 
96  NTAS, Hansen, NTRS 3609, BWF 39. 
97  ‘Lease Notices served on 40’, NTN, 2 November 1979; Ellis, op. cit.; ‘Gurindji Land Rights 
Forfeiture’, Central Australian Land Rights News, No. 11, December 1979 (Alice Springs, 
Australia, Central Land Council). 
98  That is, from about two hundred to eight hundred cattle. Darwin, NAA, ‘Report and Financials […], 
September 1978, Muramulla Gurindji Cattle Company, E629, 1978/7/7581; Darwin, NTAS, 
‘Interview with Jack Doolan’, c. 1981, NTRS 226, TS 193, p. 29.  
99  Terry Ingram, ‘Hooker Earns $3.9m Aided by Beef Boom’, Australian Financial Review, 27 
February 1979; Paul Myers, ‘Record Beef Killing Output’, The Land, 6 April 1978, p. 21. 
100  ‘Eradication Success Story: Australia is free of Brucella Abortus’, Department of Agriculture, 
Fisheries and Forestry publication. Accessed 20 May 2014, 
http://www.daff.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0009/2182869/brucella-abortusoct12.pdf. 
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reported that ‘as the campaign proceeds into the difficult parts of northern Australia, the 
costs of eradication rise rapidly, raising doubts about the ability of cattle producers to 
meet these costs and remain viable’.101 Experts described BTEC as ‘undoubtedly the 
most significant factor to impact on the industry since World War II’.102 
While disease eradication was BTEC’s raison d’être, this was merely a carapace 
for the campaign’s secondary, more consequential function, to force the modernisation 
of the pastoral industry. The historical mode of pastoralism in the NT (which Robert 
Lehane describes below) was no longer deemed adequate by government to meet the 
demands of the modern international cattle market: 
On the most marginal properties there was virtually no cattle control before BTEC; 
the owners made their living from irregular harvests from what were essentially 
feral populations. Other stations mustered generally once a year, with no 
expectation that all cattle would be accounted for. Very few stations had the yards, 
races and crushes needed for branding; stockmen lassoed the calves and pulled 
them to the ground. Even on company-owned stations in the most productive 
extensive cattle country, there was virtually no separation of different classes of 
cattle.103  
Pastoralists responded to the Campaign with dismay and disbelief. A third generation 
northern landholder summed up the reaction of many of his colleagues: ‘we are the 
victims of bureaucracy gone mad’.104 
In the Northern Territory, responsibility for administering the Campaign fell to the 
new NT Department of Primary Production (DPP). Neither the DPP nor BTEC’s federal 
directors had much anticipated the challenges that BTEC would create in the north of the 
country.105 The administrators of Aboriginal pastoral projects in the period, the DAA and 
the new Aboriginal Development Commission, were also caught unprepared. Lacking 
significant pastoral expertise of their own, they were forced to rely on the DPP, with 
                                                 
101  Gary Stoneham and Joe Johnston, The Australian Brucellosis and Tuberculosis Eradication 
Campaign: An Economic Evaluation of Options for Finalising the Campaign in Northern Australia, 
Bureau of Agricultural Economics: Occasional Paper 97 (Canberra: Australian Government 
Publishing Service, 1987). 
102  Hanlon and Phillpot, op. cit., p. 28. 
103  Robert Lehane, Beating the Odds in a Big Country—the Eradication of Bovine Brucellosis and 
Tuberculosis in Australia (Collingwood, Victoria: CSIRO Publishing, 1996), p. 230. 
104  ibid., p. 70. 
105  ibid., pp. 59–60, 65. 
Ch. 6 Muramulla Cattle Co. I 
  193  
 
whom their communication was minimal at best. The Campaign’s demands therefore 
also caught the Muramulla Company and other Aboriginal enterprises by surprise.106  
The requirements that BTEC placed on Aboriginal pastoralists such as the Gurindji 
were disproportionate: generally, the position of Aboriginal cattle operations in a 
marginal industry was more tenuous than that of their competitors. They were usually 
new and relatively un-developed, and were thus required to do more work to meet the 
Campaign’s requirements. Their proponents also had little or no experience with the 
financial aspects of long-term herd management on which they could rely to ‘ride out’ 
the effects of BTEC. Nonetheless, unlike other ‘mandatory’ conditions placed on 
pastoralists by the state, non-compliance with BTEC was not an option. Concerns about 
the Campaign’s possible effects were so great that one experienced consultant warned 
that it might ‘destroy’ the Aboriginal pastoral sector.107 
Prior to the excision of the Daguragu lease from Wave Hill Station in 1975, that 
land had comprised the roughest and least developed portion of Vestey’s famous holding. 
Muramulla had had little time and often insufficient specialised labour to develop the 
infrastructure required to turn their lease into a potentially self-supporting property 
during its lesseeship, but BTEC’s requirements effectively increased the number of lease 
covenants to which Muramulla was subject dramatically.  
In 1980, to avoid the compulsory destocking of the Company’s lease, then 
Muramulla manager Jerry Rinyngayarri was forced to begin the long, demanding process 
of trying to meet the tuberculosis testing program required by the government. In the 
eradication program the NT Department of Primary Production (DPP) designed for the 
Gurindji’s property, disease testing by locally-based government stock inspectors 
(‘stockies’) could only be done with the Muramulla men’s cooperation as they mustered. 
Rinyngayarri and Victor Vincent were proactive about their company’s compliance with 
the BTEC program, but it was nonetheless a huge challenge. The southern end of the 
Gurindji’s lease was particularly rough and inaccessible, making it almost impossible to 
muster thoroughly. All pastoralists in marginal country found properly mustering their 
lease each year difficult, but BTEC increased the challenge significantly: cattle had to be 
tested not once, but twice each season.108 The communication between the Gurindji 
                                                 
106  Phillpot, 2000, p. 91. 
107  Hanlon, 1985, pp. 185-189 (p. 187). 
108  Brian Radunz [former Chief Veterinary Officer of the NT], Interviewed by Charlie Ward, August 
2014. 
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stockmen and the Kalkaringi-based Primary Production officers that this collaboration 
required proved difficult, and frustrations arose. The government vets and inspectors 
were used to completing a test over four days, but due to Rinyngayarri’s refusal to use 
helicopters, the yarding (and testing) process often took much longer, straining the stock 
inspectors’ patience.109 At other times significant numbers of cattle that had been tested 
escaped before the ‘results’ could be read.110  
Despite the Muramulla Company’s efforts since 1975 to ‘improve’ its 
infrastructure and the attempts of John Edey and adviser Buck Buchester to force its 
adoption of helicopter mustering, the company continued to operate what was now being 
derogatorily dubbed in the language of government a ‘feral harvesting approach’: 
previously the northern industry’s modus operandi. Although the government offered a 
range of tax concessions and ‘concessional loans’ through BTEC to pastoralists investing 
in capital infrastructure, the harsh reality confronting the Muramulla Company in 1983–
84 was that it was impossible for their under-developed property to meet the campaign’s 
requirements without significant changes to both its infrastructure and management 
approach.111 This view is supported by kartiya familiar with the Gurindji leasehold at the 
time. The new managerial standard demanded by the DPP and the federal Department of 
Primary Industries was exacting, however.112 According to the then manager of 
neighbouring Wave Hill Station Graeme Fagan, on Vestey’s Wave Hill:  
[Cattle] were mustered twice a year, regardless of BTEC. […] We did four rounds 
a year of branding and weaning. We had paddocks where we could isolate cattle—
‘tail-tag’ paddocks they were called. You could have three or four [such paddocks, 
and] cattle couldn’t move out of them […] until you tested them.113  
Such standards remained far beyond the reach of the Muramulla Company. Instead, its 
Gurindji board members were increasingly marginalised and alienated by the industry’s 
                                                 
109  Darwin, NTAS, Interview with Jack Doolan, c.1981, NTRS 226, TS 193, p. 44. 
110  Financial and Advisory Consulting and Training Services [FACTS], Daguragu Development Plan, 
May 1983, p. 38.  
111  Lehane, op. cit., pp. 60–66. 
112  Darwin, NTAS, Brian Radunz [former Chief Veterinary Officer of the NT] interviewed by Charlie 
Ward, August 2014, NTRS 3609, BWF 60; Darwin, NTAS, Mark Lumsden [former DPP stock 
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113  NTAS, Fagan, NTRS 3609, BWF 42. 
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growing, technologized managerialism—a characteristic facet of the ‘new pastoralism’ 
of which they had no previous experience.   
In 1983, Daguragu Pastoral Lease 805 was listed for compulsory destocking under 
the Stock Diseases Act (1923). According to Fagan: 
Lack of infrastructure is what buggered them. They didn’t have anywhere to isolate 
cattle. They didn’t have many paddocks and they were really running a feral 
harvesting operation, even though they were branding cattle and turning them out 
once a year. 
To Buck Buchester, then the Gurindji’s adviser, the state’s logic was inexorable: 
‘[Muramulla] went under a TB [tuberculosis] testing program, they never kept it up, and 
that’s how they de-stocked Wattie Creek’.114 Far from the Gurindji’s company being 
alone in this, every Aboriginal-run property in the Katherine region suffered the same 
fate.115 The Muramulla board contested the Department of Primary Production’s 
handling of BTEC on their property, but the Department was unswayed. When the 
destocking of the Daguragu lease began, the Muramulla Co. had a herd of approximately 
8,600 animals that it had built up from a starting point of 600 cattle in 1975.116 The 
Gurindji had been well on the way to reaching their lease’s optimal carrying capacity of 
10–12,000 cattle, as estimated by experts and advisers. After the destocking had taken 
effect however, it was reported by the press that the Gurindji’s animals had been reduced 
by half.117 
Unlike the Gurindji men’s experience of governmental indifference when they 
were illegally taking their first steps with cattle on Vestey’s Wave Hill Station in the late 
1960s and early 70s, their engagement with BTEC must have provided them with 
irrefutable evidence of the state’s absolute dominance of their affairs. Not only the 
actions of the DPP and BTEC conveyed this message. As BTEC’s ‘hidden’ goal of 
industrial modernisation segued nicely with the ADC’s drive to improve the profitability 
of the Aboriginal pastoral sector, the Gurindji were told by the ADC that unless they 
                                                 
114  Darwin, NTAS, Interview with Buck Buchester recorded October 1986, NTRS 3164/295. 
115  NTAS, Radunz, NTRS 3609, BWF 60. 
116  Financial and Advisory Consulting and Training Services [FACTS], Daguragu Development 
Plan, May 1983, pp. 27, 46. 
117  Richard Pullin, ‘Frank Hardy revisits Gurindji to Help with New Problems’, Unknown Source, 
Date Unknown [c. 1985]. 
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invested their BTEC compensation money in more infrastructure, they would lose their 
funding.118 
By 1986, even Mick Rangiari and other Muramulla board members conceded 
privately that their enterprise—and their property, now held under Aboriginal Freehold 
Title—was getting away from them. Governance training—its board members’ first—
was planned for the following year, but by then the Gurindji’s cattle work had become 
an occasional, recreational-type pursuit.119 Under-used, poorly maintained equipment 
began falling into disrepair. Contrary to the projections of the AACM and a host of 
government intermediaries, within fifteen years of its incorporation, the Gurindji’s cattle 
business had revealed itself to be untenable. Billy Bunter, who took on the company’s 
management role in the mid-1980s, described the company’s demise:  
We were doing really good work [to build up the station], but [all] all of a sudden 
everything collapsed down. There was trouble with the accountant, John Trezona […]. 
We never got the monthly reports from the cattle company side. Everything was blind. 
Nobody let us know what happened with the bookwork. […] Then our figures dropped 
down, and we had to pay back so much money. For what? We’d never done anything 
wrong. 
So we lost that thing [Muramulla], and they did bugger all. I used to try to get 
the government to support us, but the consultant [was] not supporting us [either]. I 
never used to have any problem with Aboriginal people not supporting us, so I walked 
away, I got a job with the Land Council.120 
I left the cars, tractors, big truck, horses and cattle with the Gurindji people at 
Daguragu […]. They had to take the big truck away, the Toyotas away, everything that 
the station had, they took it away […]. The old fellas were wondering what was going 
on. I had to explain everything, what was the truth about what was happening.121  
Afterwards, with no publicity, the surviving members of the Muramulla board and the lease’s 
ALRA-recognised Traditional Owners decided to sublet the same southern portion of their 
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country to the Vestey Company.122 Then in the 1990s, they leased their entire property to 
ex-stock inspector Mark Lumsden, who was able to develop a successful business from it, 
including a small meatworks at Kalkaringi supplying beef to the Gurindji.
                                                 
122  NTAS, Fagan, NTRS 3609, BWF 42. 
Ch. 7 Muramulla Cattle Co II 
                                        199 
 
Ch. 7 Muramulla II: an incompatible 
entity 
 
 
 
 
In the foregoing chapter, I have articulated the Aboriginal pastoral sector’s origins and 
formative influences, and revealed its development as a result of Aboriginal self-
determination policy measures of Commonwealth governments in the 1970s. The sector’s 
unique history and composition differentiated it operationally from the mainstream pastoral 
industry, in several ways, as I have shown. I have also demonstrated aspects of the sector’s 
unique governance and financial situation in my account of the Gurindji elders’ cattle 
aspirations, expressed by the activity of the company incorporated in their name: the 
Muramulla Gurindji Cattle Company. In this chapter, it is my task to further explicate the 
ideological discrepancies between governmental and Gurindji approaches regarding the 
company, and their practical outcomes. In addition to the difficulties arising from the 
unarticulated and/or contradictory premises, assumptions and beliefs guiding the company’s 
hybridised managerial clique, I will show how issues of ‘internal’ Gurindji differentiation 
affected the Company’s long-term viability. The impact of the failure of the older generation 
to mobilise the younger regarding the Muramulla enterprise varied from that on their other 
self-determination-like projects, but was nonetheless substantive. Also, we will see in this 
chapter how both the elders’ conflict with their governmental interlocutors and their inability 
to engender a highly-skilled and motivated core of pastoral workers among younger Gurindji 
were compounded by the radical technological and managerial changes which transformed 
the North Australian pastoral industry during the Company’s brief life.  
As with other aspects of self-determination policy, the Walk-off leaders’ pastoral 
aspirations (as mediated by the CAA) had contributed to the development of the Whitlam 
Government’s policy response to the situation of Aboriginal people.1 By such means, that 
                                                 
1  As I describe in Chapter Six, the Gibb enquiry (also commissioned on the advice of the CAA, with 
terms of reference including the situation of the Gurindji at Wattie Creek) into the situation of 
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government harnessed the political momentum required to facilitate the provision of 
governmental support for Aboriginal cattle businesses in the form of land purchases, 
funding, and the supply of additional expertise. The operating terms of the Gurindji’s 
Muramulla Company were largely determined as a result of its integration within the 
governmental system of support thus created. The elders’ actions post-1973 would indicate 
that they perceived themselves to be highly dependent on the DAA to realise their cattle 
plans, yet neither the Gurindji nor their governmental interlocutors identified or understood 
the constitutive assumptions, beliefs and ascribed purposes which their respective ‘business 
partner’ bought to the Muramulla Company’s operation. An early indication of this was the 
shock, bitterness and conflict among Muramulla’s Gurindji proponents that ensued when 
DAA secretary Barrie Dexter informed them of the (compulsory) terms under which the 
Whitlam Government proposed to provide Muramulla with land and financial support in 
1974—a matter I shall return to.2 Consequently, Gurindji elders seemingly resisted and/or 
resented the employment and influence of the non-Indigenous advisers compulsorily 
employed by the Company under its terms of funding for the remainder of its corporate life 
(1975–1986). A degree of tension and conflict regarding the Company’s fundamental 
purposes among its senior staff therefore characterised the company’s operation.  
In light of the Muramulla Company’s frequently fraught management and its ultimate 
failure, it is necessary to explore the points of difference and elision between the 
government-created ‘path’ it essentially followed and what is known about the plans, 
motivations, beliefs and understandings informing the company’s Gurindji proponents. To 
do so, I will draw on statements by those individuals, and examine a series of events in the 
history of the Gurindji cattle operation to illustrate the frequent unawareness of and/or 
indifference to Gurindji motivations, beliefs and understandings on the part of authorities. 
At other times, as I will also show, Gurindji elders refused to accept the conclusions and 
instructions of their government interlocutors. 
                                                 
Committee to Review the Situation of Aborigines on Pastoral Properties in the Northern Territory, 
(Canberra, Commonwealth Government Printer’s Office, 1973). 
2  Darwin, NAA, ‘Lovegrove to Long’ Muramulla Gurindji Co Pastoral Project, 29 April 1974 (E460) 
1974/1588; Philip Nitschke to Rob and Kay Oke, 5 May 1974, Oke Personal Collection; Nitschke to 
Josie Briggs, 10 June 1974, Pelczynski Personal Collection. 
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7.1 Unarticulated and Contrasting Visions 
I have argued in the previous chapter that given the then laws of the Australian state, the 
advice given to the senior Gurindji men by Abschol and others in 1969/70 was essentially 
correct: for Gurindji elders to earn any income from cattle, or even to legally obtain them, it 
was necessary that they obtained tenure over an area of land.  
Because the Gurindji had made clear they wished to claim a large area of land, and the 
Whitlam Government could not, before the passage of Aboriginal Land Rights legislation, 
award them that land without the reasonable expectation of it being used for financially 
viable purposes, the DAA sought expert assessment of the area’s economic potential. To this 
end, DAA officials returned to Wattie Creek with consultants from the Australian 
Agricultural Consultancy Management (AACM) company in mid–June 1973. From an 
aircraft, Pincher Nyurrmiyarri, Jerry Rinyngayarri, Vincent Lingiari and brothers Mick 
Rangiari and Long Johnny Kijngayari showed DAA staff the boundaries of the country they 
wished to claim.3 From the AACM’s perspective, the purpose of the visit was to identify 
what was required to turn the land the Gurindji sought into a cattle station like others in the 
region. This involved assessing the potential of the proposed Gurindji lease for (cattle) 
carrying, and also—for the purposes of compensating Vestey’s—its market value.4  
The AACM were contracted to advise the DAA regarding the purchase of numerous 
pastoral properties, and their communication was with senior Canberra-based officials who 
were concerned to expedite a welter of government promises and Aboriginal aims. During 
their two-day visit to Wave Hill Station, station manager Ralph Hayes hosted the AACM’s 
consultants, who only engaged in cursory discussions with Lingiari, Nangiari, Nyurrmiarri 
and Rinyngayarri et al.5 Extensive searching has not revealed a copy of the AACM report, 
though synopses reveal no indication that it included references to the form that the Gurindji 
elders wished their cattle operation to take. Observations about the emergent contrast 
between governmental and Gurindji aims were made at the time, however. DAA Project 
Officer Jack Doolan, who had long experience with Top End Aborigines and had helped 
                                                 
3  Darwin, NTAS, ‘Jack Doolan Oral History Interview Transcript’, NTRS 226, TS 193, p. 43; Melbourne 
Gurindji Group, Open Letter, 19 June 1974, Oke Personal Collection. 
4  Darwin, NAA, ‘Visit of AACM Representatives [...] to Wave Hill Station, Libanungu and Daguragu’, 
Wave Hill Station—Matters Affecting Aborigines, 13–16 June 1973, NDW 72, 1049.   
5  Middleton to Oke, 19 July 1974, Oke Personal Collection; Oke to Nitschke, 12 August 1974, Oke 
Personal Collection. 
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build the pit toilets at Wattie Creek, was concerned that when his Department considered the 
viability of Muramulla and other proposed (Aboriginal) cattle enterprises, ‘European 
priorities [were] being looked at, rather than Aboriginal [ones]’.6 He continued: 
Vincent and his people are more interested in getting back some of their former land, 
where they can sit down and enjoy their ceremonies, eat their own beef, turn off enough 
cattle to provide for the necessities of life as they see it, and work at their own pace.7  
That the ‘cattle’ vision of the Daguragu elders was more modest than that assumed by the 
officials and consultants gathered on Wave Hill Station in 1973 was an opinion shared by 
David Quin, the outsider most intimate with the Muramulla group at the time. Quin noted 
that while the Gurindji men were very keen to buy horses and a small cattle herd, they ‘don’t 
consider there is a need to buy a large number of cattle to stock the area (makes it a bit hard 
to explain to outsiders)’.8  
This emergent disjuncture between the Gurindji elders’ vision for their cattle enterprise 
and that of their government interlocutors was little acknowledged. In the self-justifying rush 
to remedy social injustice which attended self-determination policy implementation, the 
observations of junior officers and advisers such as Doolan and Quin were ignored. To 
acknowledge the Gurindji elders’ potential inability to operate a profitable cattle business, 
or their lack of interest in doing so, would have deprived the government of a definite, 
identifiable plan to provide the Gurindji with their land, potentially entailing significant 
political cost and practical impediment to the government’s resolution of ‘the Gurindji 
issue’. Files show that to avoid this, the DAA and its ministers were keen to accommodate 
the pressure applied on them by activists to expedite the excision of a pastoral leasehold to 
the Gurindji. 
Accepting the findings of the AACM’s report, the DAA continued to hastily organise 
the excision and transfer of the Gurindji’s land on the basis of its putative profitability during 
1974.9 The opinion of the Gurindji’s familiars about the modesty of the elders’ cattle vision 
did not change, however. Before the Muramulla Company received its leasehold, Vincent 
                                                 
6  NAA, NDW 72, 1049. 
7  Darwin, NAA, ‘Visit of AACM Representatives [...] to Wave Hill Station, Libanungu and Daguragu’, 
Wave Hill Station—Matters Affecting Aborigines, 13–16 June 1973, NDW 72, 1049. 
8  David Quin to Rob Oke, 2 April 1973, Oke Personal Collection. 
9  The story of the excision of Daguragu lease from Wave Hill Station is told more fully in Chapter Five 
on Land Rights.  
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Lingiari still harboured doubts about the large size of the cattle project proposed by the DAA. 
These were not expressed to the DAA or the public:  
Unfortunately, [the Gurindji elders] have always said they wanted the cattle station. I 
think if they had known what a tremendous worry it all has been, and the big price 
they have paid, I don’t think they would have gone on the same path. I have spoken 
about this with Vincent [Lingiari], and he told me he thinks it is ‘too big’, i.e. too hard. 
I told him that now they are on a road, and it’s hard to get off. He saw this, and said 
that he hoped the younger men coming on would help shoulder the burdens […]’.10  
By 1975, it would appear that the fundamental expectations of operating a mainstream cattle 
business were apparent to Lingiari and the other elders. Lingiari deemed these, on the area 
the elders had sought, much ‘harder’ than the vision he and his coterie had previously 
entertained. To publicly acknowledge this would have directly undermined the ‘viability’ 
justification upon which the Gurindji’s proposed lease then being excised from Wave Hill 
Station, and upon which the Muramulla Company would receive its funding.  
If the elders had been canvassed about their understanding of financial ‘viability’, it is 
likely that this would have revealed another disjuncture between their vision of Muramulla’s 
development and purpose and that of their interlocutors. In the absence of statements to the 
contrary, we can assume that the Gurindji leaders intended that their cattle operation would 
provide any Ngumpit family who sought it with food and an income. Yet in the industry 
model upon which their Company’s funding was based, fewer than a dozen or so individuals 
were commonly employed on each station, and profits were marginal. Furthermore, the 
number of employees was decreasing. Compounded by the mutual confusion and 
                                                 
10  My interpretation differs from Culley’s in that I believe it is probable that by choosing the phrase ‘too 
big’ to describe the Muramulla enterprise, Lingiari was indicating that the difficulties he perceived with 
the project were related at least in part to its size. He and his group had chosen the excision area to 
support themselves with cattle and potentially small scale mining, but now that the type of operation 
they would be required to operate was more apparent to them, Lingiari apparently doubted whether 
Muramulla could realistically conduct its business over the entire lease. It is worth noting too that Culley 
and any other supporters aware of the Gurindji leaders’ doubts would have been reluctant to relay these 
publicly as the activists themselves had contributed significantly to the ‘path’ of incorporation taken by 
the Muramulla Company and its receipt of funds and the P/L 805 area etc. It is thus likely that Culley 
et al would have felt some personal responsibility regarding the way in which the cattle enterprise was 
being realised (i.e. the ‘road’ and ‘path’ Culley refers to), although they were unrestrained about 
critiquing them privately. Culley to Wesley Smith, undated [February 1975], Wesley Smith Personal 
Collection. 
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assumptions I have described regarding the justification of the Gurindji’s land request and 
the proposed purposes to which they would put their land, this disjuncture between the 
financial ‘size’ of the cattle business envisaged by Gurindji elders and their governmental 
interlocutors would create a source of debilitating conflict for the company, as we shall see. 
The disparity of the Wattie Creek group’s imagined means of self-determination regarding 
cattle, and the state’s efforts to enable that vision of the Gurindji’s would prevail.  
7.2 The Governmental Rationale for Support 
Once the Gurindji elders’ cattle aspirations became discernible to non-Indigenous 
Australians, the form provided by the Aborigines’ interlocutors to assist those aspirations’ 
realisation was that of an incorporated proprietary company. When sympathetic politicians 
and bureaucrats adapted the legislative machinery of the settler state to do so, that company 
was vested with the responsibility of a lessee for the funded, provisional management of a 
large body of alienated Crown Land. The Daguragu Pastoral Lease granted by the Whitlam 
Government (as codified by the Northern Territory Crown Lands Ordinance (1971) 
determined the tenure and terms, and thus the nature and timing of the Gurindji Company’s 
improvements. Conditions placed on the Company’s receipt of significant amounts of 
funding determined that the lessee would also direct its energies towards the production of 
profit in the open market. These arrangements were contingent on the basis of government 
projections that the Muramulla Company would be able to return a net profit, given the 
correct financial and ‘technical’ (practical) support and monitoring. The Whitlam and Fraser 
Governments therefore committed themselves to provide the Muramulla Company with 
financial support only until that profit was obtained. Thus the Establishment Phase (1976–
79) of the Muramulla Company began. 
While the Whitlam Government rushed to support the Gurindji with funding on the 
basis of its self-determination and Aboriginal Land Rights policies, to apportion those funds 
in 1975, the Department of Aboriginal Affairs applied six criteria to its large developmental 
grants: precedents for government assistance; benefits to the community; consultation; 
implications of the request not being met; eligibility; and economic feasibility. In Figure 2, 
these are presented [in bold], and the responses to each of DAA Project Officer Barry Hansen 
are quoted in full. The effects of the governmental assumptions revealed in this document 
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about the motives and the shared knowledge of Muramulla and other Aboriginal cattle 
project proponents are observable in the subsequent analysis.  
1. Precedents for Government Assistance: The Government has previously 
supported pastoral projects for Aboriginal community enterprises e.g. the Murin, 
Unia and Yugal cattle projects. In addition, the Government has accepted the 
Gurindji claim to the land and has promised to support the project; 
2. Benefits to the community: The project will provide both regular and 
substantial employment and also provide significant long-term financial 
benefits, [such as] improved services for the community, resulting from the 
generation of funds from the pastoral project; 
3. Consultation: Departmental officers have been in close liaison with the 
Daguragu Community, and the proposal is in accordance with the desires and 
ambitions of the community; 
4. Implications of the request not being met [emphasis mine]: If the government 
did not provide funds to develop this area, the community would be most 
disappointed and perhaps even feel betrayed. There would undoubtedly be 
national publicity; 
5. Eligibility: The Muramulla Company has nine Gurindji people as directors, each 
holding a one dollar share in trust for the Muramulla Gurindji Association, which 
represents the full Aboriginal community at Daguragu. Thus the Muramulla 
Company is eligible to receive assistance from the government; 
6. Economic feasibility: The area involved was formerly part of the Wave Hill 
Station and this country is suitable for a pastoral property. Wave Hill Station has 
operated successfully for a number of years and the only factor that would vary 
the viability of the Muramulla Gurindji project from that of Wave Hill Station is 
its size. […] The fact that [the Department of Northern Australia has] divided 
Wave Hill Station lease may be construed as indicating that they consider the 
Muramulla Gurindji lease as being sufficient for a viable pastoral project.11 
                                                 
11  Darwin, NAA, Muramulla Gurindji Company—Pastoral, 1975–79, E460, 1975/137. 
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Figure 2.  DAA ‘Report on Application for Funds’, 1975. (Aboriginal cattle project 
funding assessment, Muramulla Cattle Company). 
Although their purpose was to serve as an object of funding assessment for an essentially 
industry-traditional cattle station to be operated by the Gurindji on their leasehold, the 
Project Officer’s responses to the six criteria collectively comprise an apologia to their own 
foregone conclusion: that the Whitlam Government would substantially support the 
Gurindji’s Muramulla operation. My comment on each follows:  
1. Precedents for Government Assistance: The use of government assistance 
‘precedents’ to justify the provision of further government assistance is largely 
self-supporting.  
2. Benefits to the community: The ‘benefits to the community’ perceived by the 
DAA are listed without any evidence. They are apparently justified by the 
assumption that a private company (Muramulla) should or could legally fulfil a 
(municipal?) service provision role within a ‘community’. 
3. Consultation: As I have described, in hindsight it is possible to see that the 
consultation conducted to date by Departmental officers did not reflect ‘close 
liaison with the Daguragu Community’, and neither had it successfully identified 
the actual nature of ‘the desires and ambitions’ of the ‘community’.  
4. Implications of the request not being met: ‘If the government did not provide 
funds to develop this area, the community would be most disappointed and 
perhaps even feel betrayed. There would undoubtedly be national publicity’. 
This highlights that while Wattie Creek had been the object of the ALP’s 
remedial intentions for eight years, the bureaucracy was under significant 
pressure to resolve the Gurindji’s situation as quickly as possible.  
5. Eligibility: As this thesis demonstrates, in the light of Gurindji dissociative 
pressures, any claim that an organ derivative of the elders’ Muramulla Company 
(or any other incorporated body) is representative of ‘the full Aboriginal 
community’ at Daguragu is highly suspect. 
6. Economic feasibility: The claim that the Gurindji leasehold was ‘suitable for a 
pastoral property [because] Wave Hill Station has operated successfully [on it] 
for a number of years’ fails to take into account the variability of country within 
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a financially viable pastoral lease. The area excised by the Vestey company for 
the Gurindji comprised the poorest country, in pastoral terms, of Wave Hill 
Station.  
The origins of many of the Muramulla Company’s subsequent misfortunes can be gleaned 
in incipient form among the DAA’s elisions and oversights within this official justification 
of the Company’s initial funding. Together, the justifications of the DAA cited above tend 
to confirm that the government believed that the use to which the Gurindji would put their 
lease had already been decided, and that this understanding had been developed with the 
Gurindji’s full knowledge and participation. This sentiment may have matched the rhetoric 
of self-determination, but claiming that the proposed legal and financial terms of the 
Muramulla ‘proposal is in accordance with the desires and ambitions of the community’ was 
disingenuous. While it was true that one of the Gurindji elders had said he envisioned ‘a big 
station […] same as other people have got it’, there is no evidence that the full financial 
management, property development and corporate governance implications of such 
statements had been explained to the elders, nor the extent to which the industry itself had 
changed in the decade since they had terminated their routine employment in it.12 
Admittedly, conversations had taken place between the Muramulla proponents and DAA 
and AACM staff in which a conventional pastoral station/business model had been proposed 
to the old stockmen, yet this did not include the time-consuming, expert-facilitated process 
required to develop a shared understanding of what this might mean for the Gurindji. 
Indications of the elders’ assent to, and incipient comprehension of, some aspects of the 
AACM/DAA pastoral company vision had been observed (the justification, presumably, of 
Hansen’s claim that ‘the proposal is in accordance with the desires and ambitions of the 
community’), but the government had its own extant motivations to promote a ‘non-
Aboriginal’ model of animal husbandry to the Gurindji. Two years earlier, DAA staff had 
opined:  
                                                 
12  Committee of Muramulla Gurindji Company to Managing Director of Vestey’s, 12 December 1970, 
Oke Personal Collection. 
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The manner in which the Gurindji [operate] the project will […] depend on the terms 
of the Government making finance available for securing the lease and establishing 
the project.13  
To those in the bureaucracy’s inner workings, in other words, consultation about the 
Company’s ‘manner’ of operation was ultimately unnecessary. According to its internal 
reasoning, the government could create an ‘Aboriginal’ project simply by providing it with 
that labelling. Further, according to the DAA:  
The basis of costing and income estimation are determined as for a non-Aboriginal 
project. It is probable that the income of an Aboriginal-operated project will be less 
and the costs greater if professional management is not provided [emphasis mine].14  
Hence a ‘non-Aboriginal project’ model was imposed upon the Gurindji with the attached 
condition of two literate, management-experienced, pastoral industry advisers to guide them, 
and/or, simply to make the resultant enterprise work. For the DAA and the various 
governments which would deal with the Muramulla Company, financial accountability was 
paramount. The means by which it was achieved and the extent to which they involved the 
Company’s Gurindji management were functionally unimportant. 
7.3 In/commensurability: the knowledge of elders and their interlocutors 
In the above, I have shown that among Muramulla’s Gurindji proponents and its government 
interlocutors, there were fundamental misunderstandings and an absence of clarity about the 
elders’ reasons for choosing the land area that was excised on their behalf, the purposes to 
which they intended to put it, the number of individuals the enterprise could sustain, and the 
specific nature of the business which the Whitlam Government began funding the Gurindji 
to operate. From the government’s perspective, the success of their cattle management 
depended on the elders’ ability to create a profitable enterprise. This brings us to a critical 
issue: what did the Gurindji elders understand about the governance and financial 
requirements of the business that was created to assist them to realise their aspirations 
                                                 
13  Darwin, NAA, ‘Muramulla Gurindji Co Pty Ltd’, Cattle Mustering Venture […], 12 September 1973, 
(F1) 1975/4091. 
14  NAA, (F1) 1975/4091. 
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regarding cattle? In the following, I will explore the question of the Gurindji elders’ relevant 
economic/ financial and practical knowledge. 
After building their own cattle yard in 1972, the Gurindji were ready to purchase their 
herd and horse plant. Abschol Adviser David Quin busied himself with assisting the senior 
men to buy cattle and horses from local pastoralists. Gurindji supporters were concerned that 
without expert advice, the Muramulla board might be ‘taken down’ by profiteers. ‘[…] 
Evaluating and negotiating the purchase of stock at current market prices is a totally new 
experience for them’, Jean Leu observed. She asked Donald Nangiari—then a prospective 
Manager of the company—how much the Gurindji had paid for their first acquisitions. ‘Five 
dollars for some, ten dollars for others’, he replied. Later, however, Leu ascertained that the 
six horses bought from locally-based contractor and Gurindji friend Jack Noble had come at 
the market price—$100 ($990) each—making a total cost to the Gurindji of $640 ($6,300).15 
Pending specialised and intensive training for its Board, the Company’s reliance on third 
party numeracy and economic knowledge to conduct its affairs—and the elders’ 
determination to manage those affairs themselves, as much as possible—placed it in an 
invidious position. 
The economic knowledge required of the Company’s management was far more 
extensive than purchasing and sales. After the AACM’s brief inspection of the land sought 
by the Gurindji in 1973, their DAA and AACM interlocutors attempted to ascertain that 
Lingiari and his coterie were cognisant of the industry’s market-focused business precepts. 
DAA staffer Jack Doolan reported: 
It was explained to Vincent that after the initial setting up of the station with assistance 
from government, it was expected that wages would be paid by the [Muramulla] 
company to its employees and that this money would have to come from the profit of 
cattle turned-off [sold].16  
Lingiari affirmed his company’s management abilities, replying that he felt sure that 
Muramulla would be able to pay staff wages from the profit made on selling cattle.17 Whether 
he believed this, or saw his assurance as necessary to obtain land, is unknown. Later 
                                                 
15  Jean Leu to Rob Oke, Oke Personal Collection, 2 June 1973. 
16  Darwin, NAA, ‘Visit of AACM Representatives [...] to Wave Hill Station, Libanungu and Daguragu’, 
13–16 June 1973, Wave Hill Station—Matters Affecting Aborigines, NDW 72, 1049. 
17  ibid.  
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experience showed consistently that the elders chose to employ more staff than the company 
could afford.  
As board members of a proprietary company, the Gurindji elders’ were required to 
contribute significantly to Muramulla’s organisational governance, or at least maintain the 
appearance of doing so. There was nothing in their past that could have equipped them to 
provide the financial oversight required of a normal company directorship, and therefore 
self-determination policy regularly required mistruths and elisions from them, solicited by 
those working in their name. These circumstances led to the creation of implausible 
‘Directors’ Reports’, which included statements such as the following, signed by Donald 
Nangiari and Jerry Rinyngayarri:  
The Directors submit the accounts of the Company and report as follows: [We have 
taken] reasonable steps, before the profit and loss statement and balance sheet were 
made out, to ascertain what action had been taken in relation to the writing off of bad 
debts and the making of provisions for doubtful debts [etc].18  
For such statements to accrue any veracity, Muramulla’s Gurindji directors would need 
significant training in literacy and business. But while the project’s proponents presumably 
increased their understanding of such matters thanks to their regular board meetings with the 
Company’s Consultant (in which business and financial management were sometimes 
discussed), no training was proposed.19 In actuality, no individual or section within the 
company and its support apparatus possessed the local, financial, entrepreneurial, pastoral, 
ecological and Gurindji/ social knowledges required to ensure its successful operation. 
Instead of systematically explicating these bodies of knowledge and attempting their 
integration within the organisation, members of its advisory, funding, staffing and 
operational arms attempted to retain dominance over the areas of the company’s operation 
                                                 
18  Darwin, NAA, ‘Muramulla Gurindji Co Pty Ltd—Directors Report’, Cattle Mustering Venture […], 1 
June 1977, (F1) 1975/4091. 
19  Darwin, NAA, ‘Muramulla Gurindji Co P/L Report […]’, 5 September 1977, Muramulla Gurindji 
Cattle Company, Part 2, E460, 1981/256. Specialised training for Aboriginal pastoral directors did not 
occur in the NT until the early 1990s. See Stuart Phillpot, ‘Understanding Whitefella Secret Cattle 
Business’, in Working on Country: Contemporary Indigenous Management of Australia's Lands and 
Coastal Regions ed. by Jocelyn Davies, Richard Baker and Elspeth Young (Melbourne, Oxford 
University Press, 2001), pp. 199–213, (p.202). 
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which they perceived themselves to have authority, and to assert their opinion and methods 
onto others.  
Most commonly, these conflicts played out along ‘Gurindji’ and ‘kartiya/ modern’ 
lines. Following the departure of the Company’s non-Indigenous adviser in 1979, these 
tensions erupted. During the following season, instead of conducting all its musters on 
horseback as it had done in the past, helicopters and light aircraft were used.20 Helicopter 
mustering was much more arduous for the Muramulla stock, which were unused to the new 
machines, and, twenty cattle died.21 Later, the Gurindji cattlemen vowed that the Company 
would never muster by plane again. Their resolute refusal to embrace the practices of the 
modernising industry may be read as their failure to appreciate the economic prerogatives 
with which the financial ‘viability’ of their enterprise forced them to contend. Equally, the 
event indicates the failure of the DAA to appreciate or accommodate the elders’ true motives 
in ‘running cattle’. It may also be understood as a public ‘statement’ affirming the elders’ 
own abilities and their strong belief in cattle work’s value for their sons and nephews—
whatever the cost. 
As noted, the Company’s approach to employment was also characterised by perennial 
tension and conflict. Muramulla’s few financially numerate employees were concerned not 
to exceed the limited funds at the company’s disposal for wages. The board, on the other 
hand, saw the employment of all the Ngumpit men who sought work with them as its priority. 
After the Company’s receipt of its initial operational grant in 1975, eighteen individuals were 
employed, and John Edey warned that the large payroll this required would drain the 
company’s accounts.22 DAA officers agreed; pressure was exerted by the Department to 
temporarily reduce the working hours of employees.23 Such steps were resented by the 
Muramulla board. Pincher Nyurrmiarri soon complained to the Minister that the 
government’s miserliness was forcing the inaction of willing staff: 
                                                 
20  Darwin, NAA, ‘Report and Financials […], September 1978, Muramulla Gurindji Cattle Company, 
E629, 1978/7/7581; Darwin, NAA, ‘Report and Financials […], January 1979, Muramulla Gurindji 
Cattle Company, E629, 1978/7/7581. 
21  Darwin, NAA, ‘Report on Inspection of Pastoral Properties […]’, 12–16 September 1979, Muramulla 
Gurindji Cattle Company, E629, 1979/7/7856. 
22  Darwin, NAA, ‘Minutes of a Meeting [DAA]’, 21 December 1976 and ‘[…] Daguragu Station Progress 
Report […] 9/75–3/76’, Muramulla Gurindji Cattle Company Part 1, E460, 1981/256. 
23  DAA to Edey, 27 October 1976, NAA, E460, 1981/256. 
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[…] We got only four blokes working as ringers in the stock camp, because we got a 
letter from the government and they cut off the money. How are we going to work the 
station? We got plenty of cattle. We should have a lot of men working like Ralph 
Hayes has in Wave Hill Station. […] A lot of the Aborigines don’t work now because 
the money was cut off. […] We are just sitting around like a big mob of dogs […] We 
worked for the station manager all our life, we were good enough to help them, but the 
government can’t help us now.24  
The Muramulla board’s ongoing desire to provide work for all Ngumpit who wanted it 
caused difficulties for their Advisory staff. With John Edey’s approval, the Muramulla Co. 
employed thirty-seven Gurindji for various periods in 1978–79, at a cost of $60,000 
($304,000).25 To his DAA interlocutors, this signalled Edey’s tendency to ‘overspend’, 
which they believed needed to be ‘controlled’.26 The Company’s funding bodies were simply 
unreceptive to requests from it for more funds for staffing. Instead, government interlocutors 
from Minister Viner downwards took the view that the unemployed of Kalkaringi and 
Daguragu remained so by choice.27 The DAA and ADC’s public servants saw the 
employment of ‘excess’ staff as an internal matter for Muramulla at such time as it had raised 
sufficient profit. As we have seen however, indiscriminate hunting and the Company’s 
failure to meet the conditions imposed on it by BTEC meant that Muramulla’s progress 
towards reaching its lease’s carrying capacity was massively curtailed and the Company was 
liquidated before it reached a point of profitability. The conflict between Gurindji and 
official priorities regarding Muramulla’s staffing was never resolved. 
Unlike governance and finance, those areas in which the elders’ knowledge was 
lacking, the old men had a significant advantage over their kartiya staff and advisers when 
it came to Muramulla’s physical operations. Their knowledge of their leasehold was 
encyclopaedic, and by all accounts the group possessed top quality fencing, drafting, 
mustering, droving, broncoing, yard-building and horse-breaking skills. Their intimate 
                                                 
24  Darwin, NAA, Numiari [sic] to Viner, 8 August 1976, Wave Hill Centre: Policy and Development, 
E460, 1981/306. 
25  Darwin, NAA, ‘Report and Financial Statements […]’, 30 June 1979, Muramulla Gurindji Cattle 
Company, E629, 1978/7/7581. 
26  Darwin, NAA, ‘Edey to Kimmings [DAA]’, 7 March 1978, Muramulla Gurindji Cattle Company Part 
2, E460, 1981/256. 
27  Darwin, NAA, Viner to Numiari, [sic, Undated], Wave Hill Centre: Policy and Development, E460, 
1981/306. 
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knowledge of the country also gave them great insight into land management, as this letter 
written from David Quin to Rob Wesley Smith in 1973 describes:  
I talked to Vincent about the fencing and paddocking ideas you suggested for 
conserving grass and increasing fertility in the herd. He realises the need is there and 
so it is a case of putting it into practice. […] He told me how they would do this before 
I myself had anything much to say.28 
Later, during Muramulla’s Productive and Consolidative Phases when the Company was 
forced to employ non-Indigenous staff with expertise in land management, the elders’ feared 
that Gurindji knowledge, and they themselves, might become irrelevant to the Muramulla 
enterprise.  
7.4 Mandated External Support 
The decision of the Department of Aboriginal Affairs to mandate the employment of external 
advisers by DAA-funded pastoral companies demonstrated an uncertainty within self-
determination about how long the tutelary phase should last—that is, when advisers should 
withdraw. Although there was universal agreement that some sort of support was required 
from beyond the elders’ ranks, the nature of that support and who should provide it were 
hotly contested. Officials accommodated the preferences of the Muramulla Company board 
where they could, but forced the Company to retain an Adviser and Consultant permanently 
on the Muramulla payroll. 
During the Muramulla Company’s Consolidative Phase, Lingiari was of the opinion 
that if the company could employ a bookkeeper, the operation would function well enough 
under Gurindji management. For this role he nominated Abschol appointee David Quin.29 
According to DAA staffer Jack Doolan though, ‘they had their horse breaker picked out, 
they had their yard builders picked out, and they had their manager picked out. They didn’t 
want anybody’.30 There is every indication that this position of the Gurindji elders—that the 
                                                 
28  David Quin to Rob Wesley Smith, 4 April 1973, Wesley Smith Personal Collection; David Quin, 
Personal Communication, 4 October 2013. 
29  Darwin, NAA, ‘Visit of AACM Representatives [...] to Wave Hill Station, Libanungu and Daguragu’, 
13–16 June 1973, Wave Hill Station—Matters Affecting Aborigines, NDW 72, 1049. 
30  Darwin, NTAS, ‘Jack Doolan Oral History Interview Transcript’, NTRS 226, TS 193, p. 44. 
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role of kartiya staff should be limited to financial matters—remained unchanged during the 
Company’s life.  
The contradictory opinion of the Gurindji’s governmental interlocutors was similarly 
entrenched. In 1973, Len Ibbetson, the first DAA Community Adviser posted to Kalkaringi, 
opined that ‘it would not be possible for the Gurindji people to run an economically viable 
cattle project without competent management from an outside source’ [emphasis mine]—an 
opinion with which his Departmental colleagues agreed.31 During the following decade or 
more, each of the Company’s institutional supporters—the DAA, the ADC and the NT 
DPP—concurred. In the latter half of the 1970s during Muramulla’s Productive Phase, 
contention over the issue of outside support continued, although it was kept largely in check 
by shared optimism about the enterprise’s future among the personalities then involved.  
In 1979, the Company’s first tenured ‘advisor’, Stan Andrews resigned, and overt 
conflict between the Gurindji elders and government officials over the role and contribution 
of its mandated employees became entrenched. Consultant John Edey, whose workload 
increased dramatically after Andrews’ departure, was of the opinion that ‘[the Gurindji] are 
not able to adequately manage their cattle station at this time without competent resident 
assistance’ and further training, and that Andrews’ position required filling immediately.32 
He reported that the Gurindji were of the same view, as articulated in their meetings and 
discussions with him. When Trevor LaBrooy of the DAA discussed the issue with the 
directors however, LaBrooy concluded that ‘Donald and all others including Victor Vincent 
were adamant that they did not require a resident European adviser/manager’.33  
Jerry Rinyngayarri and Donald Nangiari fought for a Gurindji man to take up the 
Company’s cattle advisor role, and their relationships with their public service ‘friends’ 
became strained as a result. While the company’s bureaucratic intermediaries considered 
who should ‘advise’ the Gurindji, the Muramulla Board were again largely excluded from 
the public servants’ discussions. The NT Department of Primary Production proposed one 
of its own staff for the role, and to drive home the point that no Gurindji person would get 
the job, the ADC announced that it was unwilling to fund the company unless they employed 
                                                 
31  ‘Visit of AACM Representatives [...], NAA, NDW 72, 1049. 
32   Darwin, NAA, Edey to LaBrooy, 19 July 1979, Muramulla Gurindji Cattle Company, E629, 
1979/7/7856. 
33  LaBrooy to Edey, 17 July 1979, NAA, E629, 1979/7/7856. 
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a properly qualified (or non-Gurindji) adviser.34 Unable to identify a Gurindji candidate 
acceptable to the DPP and ADC authorities, the Muramulla board instead sought a kartiya 
adviser seasoned in the ways of the cattle industry and with whom they were familiar.35 The 
person chosen by the elders was long-term stockman Buck Buchester. When Buchester was 
later sacked by the Muramulla board for his insistence on mustering by helicopter, according 
to Stan Davey, the dismissal had barely taken effect when ‘three departments of the Darwin 
administration descended on Wattie Creek to force [the Gurindji] to give Buck his job 
back’.36 Even though the Board’s retrenchment signalled their specific dissatisfaction with 
Buchester, the episode highlights the significant difference between Gurindji and 
bureaucratic ideals regarding the Company’s management. This was a challenge which the 
elders were structurally unable to overcome, and they duly reinstated their former employee. 
Such eventualities were undoubtedly what Vincent Lingiari had in mind when he even-
handedly said in 1985 that the government was ‘using their bag of tricks to stop us running 
[Muramulla] we own way’.37 
7.5 In/commensurability: the elders’ aspirations and social dissociation 
Regardless of the significantly ‘European’ composition of the operation the elders were 
encumbered with by virtue of their company’s funding terms, as with the facilities of their 
proposed community, the elderly proponents of the Muramulla cattle operation intended that 
the management of their cattle enterprise would be transferred to the younger generation. 
This supposition became problematic, however. Like their broader project of 
intergenerational transfer, the Muramulla Company was affected by the widening generation 
gap and social dissociation among the Gurindji described in Chapter Four.  
Working in the cattle industry in decades past had provided Gurindji elders with a 
purposeful livelihood, and the only ‘mainstream’ forum in which they were able to 
successfully compare their (usually advanced) skills with Europeans. It may be assumed that 
the elders’ drive to create a successful cattle operation on their country was motivated by 
                                                 
34  Darwin, NAA, Westbury to Casey [DAA], Community Review […], 16 July 1980, Wave Hill 
Community Development, E460, 1978/242. 
35  Darwin, NTAS, Mick Rangiari Interview Transcript, October 1986, NTRS 226, TS 485, (T4), p. 27–29. 
36  NTAS, Darwin, Transcript of Interview with Stan Davey, October 1986, NTRS 226, TS 462. 
37  Frank Hardy, ‘In Fear of a Town Called Welfare’, The Bulletin, 24 September 1985, pp. 64–74 (p. 69–
70). 
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these two benefits. The old men would also have been extremely aware that traditional 
pursuits and systems of value were becoming increasingly peripheral and extraneous in their 
people’s rapidly changing life-world. As the elders did not propose alternative avenues by 
which subsequent generations, particularly of men, might achieve such purpose and self-
worth, it appears that working cattle was the only means of achieving these things which the 
elders perceived. 
 The corollary of these intentions was that their cattle enterprise should provide 
employment to a large number (how many was not defined) of Gurindji workers. Especially 
during its Consolidative and Productive phases (1970–80), there is evidence that a 
reasonable number of men saw this work as desirable. A frequent oversupply of labour 
during the late 1970s reveals that the physical day-to-day operations of the Company’s 
workforce functioned as an arena in which men vied for recognition of their social status, 
and in which European and Aboriginal knowledges frequently found functional coexistence. 
Physical skill, seniority in Aboriginal law, organisational/hierarchical rank and capability in 
the English language and kartiya culture comprised the indicators upon which individuals 
staked their claims to authority within the Company’s workforce. The importance and 
complexity of these processes was increased for their Aboriginal protagonists because the 
gerontocratic system of traditional law was itself in a process of renegotiation in the new 
‘self-determining’ communities. The project of self-management required that the 
administrators of such communities should identify and foster the articulation of an 
Aboriginal identity which they deemed both representative of, and receptive to, the 
government’s remedial ambitions. Often the individuals identified for these purposes were 
younger and/or more fluent in English than the leaders of Aboriginal tradition. At the same 
time, as we have seen, European school education, greater fluency in English and higher 
wages were giving young people new grounds for autonomy—and a new basis from which 
to contest the authority of their elders. Initiatives such as the Muramulla Company—which 
valorised Aboriginal pastoral skills and knowledge in a largely kartiya-defined forum—
created an environment in which young Aboriginal men sought to reposition themselves in 
regards of both their elders’ authority and a nominal ‘pro-Aboriginal’ European socio-
political program of development. The Europeans in the midst of this renegotiation bought 
with them their own hierarchy of value, which often varied from that of both their Aboriginal 
interlocutors and the precepts of the policy they were required to operationalise.         
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In light of these factors the emergent interpersonal dynamics of the Muramulla 
organisation are better understood. As the precepts of self-determination required, during his 
employment from 1976–79, Stan Andrews’ designated role in the Muramulla Company was 
to act as an ‘adviser’—not a ‘boss’—to its Gurindji directors. A ‘quiet’ personality, 
according to those who knew him, he refrained from giving orders to the Gurindji.38 While 
this approach aligned with government policy, it contradicted popular European perceptions 
about Aboriginal agency. Many kartiya at the time believed that advisory positions such as 
Andrews’ were in reality designed to provide Aboriginal people with the ‘management’ 
(direction) that they were unable to provide themselves. According to Andrews’ widow Bev, 
her husband (and Nangiari) negotiated this paradox adroitly with the Gurindji stockmen: 
They’d have a meeting every morning. Stan used to advise them about what jobs 
needed doing but he didn’t actually say ‘Do this, do that’. He used to say ‘Well this is 
what needs to be done’, and the old fellow [Donald Nangiari] who was actually given 
the role of Cattle Manager, he’d just say to the boys: ‘I want this done, I want you to 
go out and check that bore, that fence’, and that’s what they did, and they all got on 
pretty well.39 
Andrews’ respectful approach to Gurindji knowledge and social authority may be linked to 
the Company’s relative stability and unity during the late 1970s, but this alone failed to 
ameliorate the effects of Gurindji dissociation among its Aboriginal staff. Although the 
relationships developed by Nangiari, Andrews and the Gurindji stockmen allowed their 
company to ‘work’, Jean Culley perceived difficulties accompanying the insertion of kartiya 
into the Gurindji men’s company and Company—in which ‘cultural’ power struggled to 
assert itself: 
Just by being around, Stan creates a conflict in authority with Donald. There have been 
several bust-ups in which Donald threatened to leave […]. There’s ‘industrial trouble’, 
[…] almost a ‘class struggle’ between Donald and the [Gurindji] stockmen over wages 
and conditions. Now […] the younger stockmen go to Stan and complain about Donald 
                                                 
38  Gwen Dickman [nee Moore], Interviewed by Charlie Ward 19 November 2013. 
39  Darwin, NTAS, Interview with Bev Andrews, Recorded by Charlie Ward, November 2012, NTRS 
3609, BWF 40. 
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or Jerry and [this] put[s Stan] in a very difficult position of having to (or having to 
avoid) defining himself in a hierarchy as regards them.40   
In other words, Andrews’ position in the Muramulla Company provided those young men 
keen to undermine traditional authority with an important forum to attempt to do so. 
Since the idea of a Gurindji cattle operation had first been advanced in the late 1960s, an 
integral part of the vision expounded by its proponents was that young Gurindji men would 
participate in the operation, learn from their elders and provide a skilled and reliable labour 
pool, ensuring the company’s survival. This project was undermined in two ways. Firstly, 
the anomalous labour conditions of the Aboriginal pastoral sector provided a range of 
disincentives to young Gurindji men who worked or who may have wished to work in the 
industry. Secondly, the perception of pastoral work among Gurindji youth was negatively 
influenced by the broader trend of Westernisation then underway. I will return to the impact 
of Westernisation, in the form partly of sedentary domestic life, soon. First though, I will 
outline the impact of the Company’s unappealing, Aboriginal pastoral sector-specific work 
conditions.  
For those ‘new generation’ Gurindji men who did work in the cattle industry, 
Muramulla was often not their employer of choice. One obvious reason for this was by the 
early 1980s, many of those who wanted to work for Muramulla did so via participation in 
Daguragu Council’s federal government-subsidised Community Development Employment 
Projects (CDEP) scheme. Via the council’s participation in CDEP, a subsidised allowance 
was paid to company staff. The amount was short of the award paid on mainstream 
commercial stations. According to Billy Bunter, who took on the company’s ‘manager’ role 
from Jerry Rinyngayarri in the mid-1980s: 
Nobody got proper wages […] it used to be voluntary work. We were saving to build 
up the station, to get that station running. For four or five years [we] only had a little 
bit of money for fuel, maybe some repairs. We had to put money aside to get the cattle 
company going, to work on the troughs and putting up fence. We had a lot of our young 
people and older blokes working under CDEP. As long as they were receiving CDEP, 
                                                 
40  Sydney, Library of New South Wales (hereafter SLNSW), Culley (Melbourne Gurindji Group) to 
Middleton, 24 February 1976, in Gurindji at Wattie Creek (Daguragu), Northern Territory, Hannah 
Middleton Papers, c. 1966-1976, MLMSS 5866/15. 
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that was enough, to work for our country. To get proper wages, we had to sell the cattle 
out, to make that money from cattle.41 
Not all local men were happy with the situation. According to Kerry Gibbs, who spent time 
with the Muramulla proponents in the mid-1960s and visited them occasionally in the 1980s, 
‘most of the young men took off [from Daguragu] to work on different stations and to do 
different jobs’.42 Pincher Nyurrmiarri’s son Charlie Pincher was one itinerant Gurindji 
stockman, and like others his prestige grew among his peers when he returned home with 
his newly accumulated wealth. Gibbs believes that Charlie and others had good cause to 
leave Daguragu: 
To sit around the camp, chase cattle and see no actual [financial] reward—it’s a pretty 
good reason to say ‘Well bugger this, I’m out of here. I’ll go where they pay me’.43 
The then manager of Wave Hill Station Graeme Fagan supports Gibbs’ assessment. 
Although the number of Gurindji staff working on the Vestey property was in steady decline, 
according to Fagan, some of them told him in 1986 that [unlike the Muramulla Co], ‘if you 
work for Vestey’s, you get paid. Three feeds a day and a house to live in—paid!’44  
While the few young Gurindji men who were serious about cattle work increasingly 
sought employment elsewhere, interest declined further among the majority who remained. 
According to observers, by the 1980s, the poor commitment and inconsistency of those who 
did work for the company was a problem. Graeme Fagan believes that the variable 
motivation of its staff was a factor in Muramulla’s decline: 
‘Flexible’ staffing arrangements—morning shift, afternoon shift and ‘no shift’—they 
had some really good guys who turned up, and then all the others who came and went, 
who watched and didn’t do much. It was just a hard slog.45 
                                                 
41   Bunter’s description apparently reflects funding cuts applied by the ADC to Aboriginal pastoral 
enterprises. NTAS, Bunter, NTRS 3609, BWF 26. 
42   Darwin, NTAS, Interview with Kerry Gibbs, recorded by Charlie Ward, September 2010, NTRS 
3609, BWF 18. 
43   ibid.  
44   NTAS, Fagan, NTRS 3609, BWF 42. 
45   ibid.  
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Similarly, Norm McNair’s perception was that by the mid-1980s: 
There wasn’t that much enthusiasm, I guess this breakdown was occurring, enthusiasm 
was lost. There’d be times when they would get the cattle in and [brand] them and then 
there’d be great delays. Eventually a few would get together and do a bit, but the 
momentum really petered out.46 
In an attempt to garner the young men’s engagement, Daguragu’s male leaders requested an 
Adult Educator to organise training in stockwork for the young men. Once it was underway 
though, it became apparent that most of the young trainees were non-committal, or 
participating in the training under duress. Rather than working and camping on the nether 
reaches of the Daguragu lease for weeks on end as their fathers’ generation had done 
historically, most ‘new generation’ fellows wished to return to their homes in the community 
each night.47 This domestication was a result of the Gurindji people’s recent transition to 
‘community’ life, and one that was perhaps unexpected by the group’s leaders. In addition, 
the increasing exposure of Muramulla’s potential labour pool to a broader array of lifestyles 
and livelihoods was imbuing them with a different perception of cattle work to that of their 
elders. In the words of Gus George, who was one of the dwindling number of young men 
who worked for Muramulla in the early 1980s, ‘the young ones [were] not interested in the 
cattle company side, they were interested in the footy and all that. That’s why you can see 
this thing [Muramulla] slowly drop down’.48 Some young Gurindji men sought work as 
mechanics, and others wished to complete their education rather than work with cattle.49 
As the commitment of new generation men to pastoral work declined, it is likely that their 
self-identification as ‘track mob’ did also. As these changes occurred, the elders’ influence 
over younger men and their own cattle operation also faltered. After almost two decades 
residing at Wattie Creek/Daguragu, the elders’ communal, aspirational values were 
                                                 
46   Norm and Helen McNair [former SIL Linguists at Libanungu], Interview Recorded by Charlie 
Ward, March 2010, in possession of the author. 
47    Jan Richardson, Personal Communication, 2 April 2010. 
48    Darwin, NTAS, Interview with Gus George by Charlie Ward, October 2010, NTRS 3609, BWF 24. 
49  See Darwin, NAA, ‘Minutes—Daguragu /Libanungu Council […]’, 15 February 1978, Community 
Adviser—Wave Hill, E460, 1974/1028; Darwin, NTAS, Interview with Michael Paddy by Charlie 
Ward, October 2010, NTRS 3609, BWF 30. 
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decreasingly desirable to the ‘new generation’.50 The result of this convergence of events for 
the Muramulla Company was perhaps predictable: widespread indiscriminate predation of 
its cattle. If Mark Lumsden, a former government stock inspector based at Kalkaringi, is to 
be believed, the impact of casual hunting on the Gurindji herd size approached that of 
BTEC’s de-stocking. Gurindji community leaders Michael George and Jimmy Wavehill, 
then Muramulla employees, also believe that their countrymen ‘stealing killers’ hastened the 
demise of the company.51 Common thieving by young men from the ‘community’ enterprise 
so closely associated with their elders may be viewed as a powerful expression of the 
perpetrators’ social dissociation from the old men and their interests. The scale of the 
predation is impossible to determine, but Mark Lumsden calculated in the mid-1980s that 
approximately one in nine of the Gurindji’s herd were being lost to immediate consumption 
each year. Similarly, Muramulla’s last accountant John Trezona recalls significant and 
avoidable financial losses that weakened the company, like a new truck engine worth $5,000 
($13,000) that was ‘cooked’ on a grog run, and a $12,000 ($30,000) stud bull that was 
butchered and eaten.52 While the consumption of an extremely valuable bull could be 
dismissed as an unfortunate accident, the attack was a small instance of a phenomenon so 
common that both Gurindji and kartiya observers agree that it played a significant role in 
the company’s demise.53 
Despite their collectively declining skills and waning interest in cattle work, a 
decreasing number of young Gurindji men provided the Muramulla Company with the 
number of stockmen required by the Company during the period under review. To the extent 
that the industry’s decreasing need for labour matched the declining interest of young 
Gurindji in that industry, this was fortuitous. In addition to the elders’ desire that their 
Company provide jobs for Daguragu’s residents, though, was their intention that the 
management of the Company itself would be transferred to the next generation of Gurindji 
men, thereby wresting the company from European control and relinquishing their own 
                                                 
50  A lack of ‘community’ support for a ‘community’ cattle venture had already inimically impacted on at 
least one other Aboriginal cattle enterprise. See Steven Thiele, Yugul: An Arnhem Land Cattle Station 
(Darwin, The Australian National University, North Australian Research Unit, 1982), pp. 38–39. 
51   Michael George, Personal Communication, 27 October 2010, Jimmy Wavehill, Personal 
Communication, 16 October 2011. 
52   John Trezona, Personal Communication, 15 November 2010. 
53   As a result of hunting and the de-stocking that had been enforced by BTEC, in 1986 the property was 
carrying only 2,500 cattle—about 20% of its potential. Darwin, NTAS, Interview with Buck 
Buchester recorded October 1986, NTRS 3164/295. 
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involvement. The transferral of power envisaged by the elders was in some regards a 
practical necessity, the effects of which stretched far beyond Muramulla’s pastoral 
operations. By the late 1970s, the elders perceived their need for a transition of Gurindji 
power, as well as the creation of a Gurindji administrative class to meet the demands of self-
management, as urgent.54 One of the few younger men to respond to these challenges was 
Vincent Lingiari’s son, Victor Vincent. Victor shared some of his father’s key traits: a quiet 
persona; the fellowship of the Baptist Church; maturation in the cattle industry; and the 
missed opportunity of a school education.55 The young stockman was elected to the board 
of the Muramulla Company at the company’s AGM in late 1978.56 He would also soon take 
the place of his father as president of the newly amalgamated Daguragu Council.57 
The Muramulla Board, placed significant pressure on Victor Vincent to ‘step up’ and 
manage the Company’s affairs. But while Victor was concurrently being groomed by the 
Baptist missionary Gordon Moore as a future Gurindji leader, neither he nor any of the 
younger men sought to occupy a managerial role in the Company, despite the cajolery of 
their relatives.58 In 1986, Mick Rangiari’s gravest concern about the company was its lack 
of a strong Gurindji leader:  
What really made me worried—you know, Vincent. Whitlam gave the dirt to Vincent 
Lingiari […], and afterward one of his son, Victor [was made] a company director. 
But he’s not here, he is way out in the bush. […] He’s supposed to take everything in 
his hand, he is supposed to be taking over. […] The place is getting bigger, and 
someone got to really stand up and run it.59 
While Victor Vincent wasn’t ‘standing up and running’ the Muramulla Co. with the 
enthusiasm Rangiari desired, the younger stockman was assuming some of the broader 
leadership duties previously carried out largely by his father. For several years in the mid-
                                                 
54  See Appendix A, which ostensibly reveals the commitments of community leaders to the governance 
of local organisations.   
55  Personal Observation; Gerritsen, 1982, op. cit., p.22. 
56  Darwin, NAA, ‘Report […], January 1979, Muramulla Gurindji Cattle Company, E629, 1978/7/7581. 
57  Darwin, NAA, ‘Situation Report […]’, 6 March 1978, Wave Hill Community Development, E460, 
1978/242; Department of Aboriginal Affairs, Kalkaringi—Book of the Community (NT Division of the 
Department of Aboriginal Affairs, 1977, p. 8. 
58   Rev Gordon Moore, ‘Wave Hill—Annual Report, 1982’, Global Interaction. 
59   NTAS, Rangiari, NTRS 226, TS 485, (T4), p. 32–33. 
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1980s he was the Gurindji’s elected representative on the Central Land Council executive 
and also worked for the DAA as the local Aboriginal Community Adviser.60 To Rangiari 
and others though, such pursuits—and Victor Vincent’s seemingly greater fondness for his 
traditional country at Berta Werta and planning for an outstation there—reduced what might 
be called the strategic management of the Muramulla operation. 
7.6 Dissolution and Apportioning Blame 
In seeking reasons for the difficulties faced by their company, its Gurindji proponents 
questioned the competence and propriety of all their former kartiya advisers. According to 
Mick Rangiari this was warranted, though it should be noted that if Muramulla’s kartiya 
employees had acted improperly, they had done so—unlike staff from every other 
organisation at Wave Hill—without attracting the attention or censure of either the 
company’s government intermediaries or other European residents. Nonetheless, in 1986 
Mick Rangiari cast doubt on the abilities and/or the honesty of all the company’s previous 
advisers: 
Interviewer: What was [Stan Andrews] like, a good manager? 
Rangiari: Well, he wasn’t bin too good, you know. He must have been 
good in the ’nother hand, but he must have bin little bit 
robbing people. 
Interviewer:  You reckon? 
Rangiari: That’s what I bin reckon, you know.61 
From Rangiari’s perspective, Andrews’ successor Bill Purdie had also been ‘not too good, 
you know. He been bit of a rogue. […] He wasn’t been stayed too long, because if he could 
stay a bit longer […], people complain about it’.62 The subsequent adviser Gordon Bauman, 
who according to my interview with him, subjugated his own opinions entirely to Gurindji 
prerogatives, was also criticised.  
                                                 
60   Central Land Council Annual Reports, 1983–84, 1984–85 (Central Land Council, Alice Springs), p. 
26; Rolf Gerritsen, 'Blackfellas and Whitefellas: The Politics of Service Delivery to Remote 
Aboriginal Communities in the Katherine Region', in Service Delivery to Remote Communities ed. by 
Peter Loveday (Darwin: North Australia Research Unit, Australian National University, 1982) 16-31, 
(p. 22). 
61   NTAS, Rangiari, NTRS 226, TS 485, (T4), p. 26. 
62   ibid., p. 32–33. 
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Rangiari’s, Billy Bunter’s and others’ criticism of the professional capability of 
Muramulla’s European staff may be warranted, for those possessing the skills required for 
such roles were rare.63 The Gurindji’s criticism is noteworthy in other ways though. Its theme 
is of European dishonesty, lack of communication, secrecy and/or deceit—of information 
being withheld. This perception may have been justified, though its implication is that the 
‘European’ knowledge required to operate the company was not only lacked by the Gurindji 
men, but seemed unobtainable to them. Given that the enterprise ran for fifteen years with 
both Gurindji and European Australians working proximally, it is apparent that the 
respective knowledges and subjectivities of each group were objectively inchoate and 
unavailable to each party, and to the extent they were articulated to their respective ‘other’, 
they were substantially ignored.  
7.7 Conclusion 
By 1986, even Mick Rangiari and other Muramulla board members conceded privately that 
the Gurindji’s cattle enterprise—and their property—was getting away from them. 
Muramulla remained as solicitor Geoff Eames described it, the ‘strictly European legal 
animal’ it had always been.64 Governance training—its board members’ first—was planned 
for the following year, but by then the Gurindji’s cattle work had become an occasional, 
recreational-type pursuit.65 When Muramulla was liquidated in the late 1980s, it signalled 
the collapse of the most valued ‘fourth pillar’ of Gurindji self-determination, and pre-empted 
the final dissolution of the self-managing aspirations that had guided the Gurindji elders’ 
Walk-off and the establishment of Wattie Creek.   
 Discussion in this and the foregoing chapter has described a corporate entity built on 
unstable and incongruous foundations. As Eames intimates, the Muramulla operation—like 
others in the Aboriginal pastoral sector—was designed by government officers and their 
                                                 
63  The capacity of the Muramulla Company’s Advisers and Consultants was questioned by external 
observers also.  Darwin, NTAS, Mark Lumsden [former DPP stock inspector] interviewed by Charlie 
Ward, August 2014, NTRS 3609, BWF 63; Brian Manning, ‘A Blast from the Past: an Activist’s 
Account of the Wave Hill Walk-off’, (The Sixth Annual Vincent Lingiari Lecture, 2002), Vintage Reds: 
Australian Stories of Rank and File Organising <http://roughreds.com/index.html> [accessed 6 
December, 2010], p. 13. 
64  Darwin, NAA, Eames [CLC] to Muramulla, Libanungu/ Daguragu, Department of Aboriginal Affairs, 
19 January 1977, CA2605, E242, K9/2/3. 
65   ‘Adult Education: “Know your Community”’, November 1986, Richardson Personal Collection. 
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advisers to function, if need be, without the input or labour of its Aboriginal protagonists 
and supposed beneficiaries. Although the enterprise and its leasehold was created to cater to 
the cattle-related aspirations of Gurindji leaders, the Company’s regulatory and funding 
framework ultimately differed little from that guiding its mainstream competitors. 
Muramulla’s significant point of difference was the formidable scope of the mandatory 
‘improvement’ program it accrued by virtue of its government funding. Ironically, the 
Companies thus established in the name of Aboriginal self-determination were subject to 
considerably more official engagement, intervention and regulation than their mainstream 
competitors. While these were provided by governments in the interests of support and 
accountability, they were often experienced by those companies’ Aboriginal protagonists as 
directly inimical of their own ‘rational’ decision-making and authority—qualities among 
Aboriginal people which all parties were keen to increase. The flawed basis of the Aboriginal 
pastoral sector compounded the ‘Gurindji’ issues of intergenerational transfer and 
‘community’ support with which Muramulla also had to contend
Ch. 8 Gurindji Schooling 
                                        226 
 
Ch. 8. ‘A Fragmentation of support’: 
schooling the Gurindji at Wave Hill 
  
 
 
In the previous chapters, we have seen how the achievement and durability of the Gurindji 
elders’ land-related aims were complicated by the frequent unwillingness and inability of 
younger Gurindji men and women to assume managerial positions in the organisations of 
Wave Hill. The Gurindji elders recognised that their own ability to create a new clique of 
Gurindji administrators and managers was limited, and that to do so they and the state would 
need to provide a particular form of schooling to Gurindji children. In this chapter, I describe 
the elders’ intentions in this regard, and show why the failure of those intentions to be 
realised comprise Gurindji self-determination’s most significant disappointment. 
From 1968 until the 1980s, the leaders of the Wave Hill Walk-off called for a school 
at Wattie Creek, a facility they saw as necessary to assist their vision of an independent 
homestead. While the Gurindji’s struggle for their land is well-known, community-
controlled, bicultural and bilingual education also formed a key component of the Gurindji 
elders’ vision of achieving a largely autonomous society. As an aspiration of the Gurindji 
elders, ‘education’ differs from others presented in this this thesis. Whereas Gurindji land 
rights, a cattle enterprise, and an independent homestead were all attempted by the Gurindji 
and officially supported by their governmental interlocutors during the self-determination 
policy era, the same cannot be said of the elders’ educative vision. This potential vehicle for 
Gurindji self-determination was never realised, or even attempted. The reason for this was 
not Gurindji social change or the incommensurability of kartiya and Gurindji knowledges, 
but state and federal policy and politics, and the practicalities of remote service provision. 
In the context of education policy implementation and the goals of Gurindji leaders, this 
chapter explores why neither a school, nor Gurindji-controlled education, were ever 
realised at Daguragu. It describes also the role that governments’ provision of mainstream 
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education did play in the lives of Gurindji people during the period, contextualising my 
analysis of Gurindji in/dependence in the following chapters. 
8.1 A Gurindji Pedagogy   
Vincent Lingiari’s generation of leaders placed a high value on education, including the 
European education that they themselves had been denied. Reflecting on the time of his 
arrival at Wattie Creek in 1971, long-term Gurindji familiar Alan Thorpe explains that the 
camp’s leaders:  
[…] Were always insistent on their kids going to school. The [Wave Hill Welfare 
Settlement school would] send the Bedford truck around in the morning, and you’d 
see parents chasing [the kids] with a stick if they didn’t get on. [That was because] 
there’s one thing that the old people at Wattie Creek realised, and that was that 
Aboriginal people needed to get an education, otherwise white people would be 
running [their affairs] for them forever.1 
For the old people, their children’s attendance at the Welfare Settlement school—which had 
opened in 1962—was a temporary, practical concession. Their intent was to create a school 
of their own at Wattie Creek, which they could manage and teach classes at, as soon as 
possible. In 1971, the managing director of the Muramulla Company, Donald Nangiari, 
dictated a letter to Barrie Dexter (then of the Council of Aboriginal Affairs), encapsulating 
the elders’ desires. In this, Nangiari stated that he wished for his daughter Judith and another 
girl of similar age to ‘see what they can learn’ in Sydney, and return to Wattie Creek to ‘learn 
[teach] all children and middle-aged and everybody so we can sign our name […]’.2 
Elsewhere that day, Nangiari requested ‘a teacher here for the little children [and] middle-
aged people’.3 The Gurindji saw their own tuition as  complementary to European education; 
in combination, they would create an independent Gurindji homeland for future generations.  
                                                 
1  Darwin, NTAS, Alan Thorpe, Interview by Charlie Ward, January 2010, NTRS 3609, BWF 9. 
2  Nangiari to Dexter, 23 August 1971, Oke Personal Collection. At this time Abschol was attempting to 
promote the introduction of compulsory subjects on Ngumpit culture into the national school 
curriculum, also at the request of the Gurindji. See Ward, ‘Following the Leaders: The Role of Non-
Indigenous Activism in the Development and Legitimation of Daguragu Community (Wattie Creek), 
1969–1973’, Journal of the Royal Australian Historical Society, Vol. 100, Pt.1, pp. 69–92, p. 84–86; 
Lawson to Nangiari, 8 January 1972, Oke Personal Collection.  
3  Nangiari to Lawson [Abschol], 23 August 1971, Riddett Personal Collection. 
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Education and training were identified by the Daguragu leaders as of key importance 
to their vision in two ways. Firstly, to manage their desired independent homeland, they 
recognised that their young people would require ‘western’ style education and training in 
literacy, numeracy, accounting and mechanical engineering. The second aspect of 
‘education’ critical to the Gurindji leaders’ agenda at Wattie Creek was that they would also 
train their children in aspects of ‘traditional’ Gurindji cultural knowledge at the school they 
envisaged.4 The elders also believed it necessary that this schooling would occur at 
Daguragu—a site over which they had some influence and to which many of their Dreaming 
stories relate.  
While the Wave Hill ‘track mob’ developed the Wattie Creek camp in the early 1970s, 
housing and public health, rather than onsite education, were their leaders’ priorities.  The 
elders did no lobbying on the matter of schooling in that time. Because secondary schooling 
was unavailable at the then Wave Hill Welfare Settlement however, they sent the first 
Gurindji children to Kormilda (Aboriginal residential) College in Darwin in 1972.5 The 
unanticipated effects of this in the following years—which I shall describe—increased rather 
than diminished the elders’ desire to educate their young people in their home community.6 
In 1974, the Commonwealth government’s proposed expansion of the school at Kalkaringi 
led the elders to reprioritise education. Pincher Nyurrmiarri characteristically expounded on 
his countrymen’s behalf: 
I want a school here in Wattie Creek [...] because we can’t get some children to go to 
the settlement, because they duck back. […] If a school starts off here, we’ll have two 
old [men] to teach them same time with the white bloke […]. They got to teach all 
sort of law from Aborigine too. I want you people to help me; I’m fighting hard for 
                                                 
4  This second form of education was critical to the Gurindji elders for cultural ‘maintenance’ purposes—
the transmission of their skills, values and cultural knowledge for the development of their young people 
as Ngumpit. Traditionally, such knowledge was acquired by direct modelling and tuition, and 
instruction in ceremonies that occurred over the lifetime of Gurindji individuals. It appears that the 
Gurindji elders intended that these practices would continue largely unaltered, with the addition of 
school-based instruction. 
5  NTAS, Rosaleen Farquarhson and Susan Cebu, Interview Recorded by Charlie Ward. October 2010, 
NTRS 3609, BWF 23; Darwin, NTAS, Robert Wesley-Smith, Interview Recorded by Charlie Ward, 
September 2010, NTRS 3609, BWF 15. 
6  Such effects are described elsewhere in this thesis. See Chapter Four.  
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this school. Another word now. We want a clinic right here in Wattie Creek. Not in 
Settlement. We want treatment right here.7  
Although the Daguragu people wished that their grown-up children would eventually run a 
school in their community, Kalkaringi’s school facilities were significantly expanded in 
1975–76. In 1977, leader Pincher Nyurrmiarri again expounded on the elders’ motivation 
and desires regarding the schooling of their children: 
We should have seen the young fellas in work in the Social Club, in Daguragu. 
Together they’ve got to be teached. They must learn somehow through old people, 
they got to know something […]. What about give a chance for Aborigine to take over? 
[…] They don’t want to be under white Europeans. [To] give them poor buggers a 
chance we got [to get] our children in school. They got to be teach by old people. We 
got to teach them so they can work the place. We like to see that, because white 
European take over all the time […]. Our children got to take over.8  
The duration and detail of the Gurindji leaders’ entreaties convey that Lingiari and others 
did not want a school at Daguragu in the same way that they wanted a laundry, a mechanical 
workshop or even a clinic—aims they had listed in 1970 but had little to say about 
afterwards.9 Rather, Gurindji statements between 1971 and 1985 show that they identified 
the provision of western education at Daguragu to their youth—supplemented by tuition the 
elders would provide in traditional lore and law—as essential to the achievement of their 
vision of an ongoing, largely autonomous Gurindji society.  
Location was key to their educational vision for two reasons.  Firstly, Daguragu was 
an important site to the Gurindji, and was close to their complex of sacred sites at Seale 
Gorge. This made the Gurindji homestead an ideal location from which Gurindji children 
might learn traditional law and lore. Equally, the Gurindji proponents of a Daguragu school 
were averse to their children being schooled at Kalkaringi due to its large Warlpiri and 
                                                 
7  Nyurrmiarri to ‘Robbie’ [Oke], 19 November 1974, Pelczynski Personal Collection. 
8  Darwin, NAA, ‘Wattie Creek Meeting […]’, 1 November 1977, Wave Hill Community Development, 
E460, 1978/242.  
9  Hannah Middleton, But Now We Want the Land Back- A History of the Australian Aboriginal People 
(Sydney, New South Wales, New Age Publishers, 1977), p. 119. 
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kartiya populations. Gurindji elders feared that among a mix of European/Warlpiri/Gurindji 
students, their children would absorb too much Warlpiri law and/or ‘kartiya way’. 
Other Aboriginal ‘outstations’ wanted their own bicultural and bilingual schools in 
which children would learn about their own culture, as well as enough ‘European’ style 
education to accrue the skills necessary to administer their communities. Similar 
circumstances had given another break-away Aboriginal group cause to formulate an almost 
identical position to that of the Daguragu elders. In 1963, Dooley Bin Bin of the Pindan 
Nomads Co-operative in the Pilbara told a group of FCAATSI activists:  
 
We want the children to go to school, the young people to be trained, to understand 
the White man’s law, to explain, to protect us in dealings with the Government… but 
they must also be trained in our law, so that they can hold fast to it’.10 
The leaders of Bin Bin’s ‘Strelley Mob’, as they were known, were also intent on 
establishing their own independent school so that they could oversee this process themselves. 
This hybridised approach to Indigenous education was described by adult educators from 
the ANU as ‘an education which builds on [Aboriginal people’s] own traditional 
socialisation practices and concept of informal education, and which is supplemented by the 
white-man’s skills in the three R’s and oral English’.11 The Strelley Mob’s subsequent 
journey with schooling, which I will return to, forms an informative counterpoint to the 
Gurindji’s.  
Although the Walk-off leaders’ vision of a school was both modest and clearly (if 
minimally) articulated, its desired effects were highly ambitious. It was also born out of 
necessity. Their vision of a school was an untried response to the problem of maintaining 
traditional values in a rapidly changing social environment and their primary means of 
containing or even reversing the dissociative process then underway between themselves 
and their young people. Neither was the second part of their plan—that after basic schooling 
Gurindji children would be both able and willing to work indefinitely as store managers, 
accountants, administrators, nurses, mechanics, bakers and the like—based on their own 
empirical experience: when the Gurindji’s plan for a bicultural and bilingual school was first 
                                                 
10  Grace Bardsley, ‘Dooley Bin Bin’, Outlook (Sydney, August 1963).  
11  Chris Duke and Elizabeth Sommerlad, Design for Diversity: Further Education for Tribal Aborigines 
in the North (Canberra, Australian National University, 1976), p. 30. 
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publicly articulated, no Gurindji people at Wave Hill of any age had undertaken western 
schooling beyond a primary level. From its proponents’ perspectives then, the Gurindji’s 
school was an unknown that would require their dependence on external funding and staff. 
I will now turn to the question of whether or how the Gurindji vision of education might be 
reconciled with the policy of Aboriginal self-determination at Wave Hill.  
When Prime Minister Gough Whitlam announced in April 1973 that his government wished 
‘to devolve [responsibility] upon a wide range of Commonwealth, state and local authorities, 
as well as upon organisations of Aborigines themselves’, he was in part signalling his 
government’s intention to avoid the ‘one agency’ model of governance which the Northern 
Territory Administration’s Welfare Branch had previously maintained in the remote 
Aboriginal settlements of the NT.12 As part of this agenda, Whitlam decided not to give 
responsibility for the education of the Territory’s Aborigines to the DAA but to the 
Department of Education’s NT Division (DE(NT)), which assumed responsibility for 
schooling all children in the Territory.13 To facilitate this, DE(NT) was given an 
unprecedented amount of funding to improve and expand schools in remote communities. 
Whitlam’s decision to remove education from the primary agency responsible for Aboriginal 
affairs would in time turn out to be critical for the desired educational outcomes of the 
Gurindji elders. 
The government’s stated policy of supporting the realisation of Aboriginal goals 
seemed to favour onsite government-supported schooling of Gurindji children in mainstream 
education and traditional knowledge at Daguragu. Indeed, it can be said in hindsight that if, 
as ‘ideal’ self-determination policy envisaged, Gurindji individuals were to manage 
community governance and service delivery bodies at Wave Hill, then just such a school 
                                                 
12  Edward Gough Whitlam, ‘Statement by the Prime Minister, the Hon. E. G. Whitlam, Q.C., M.P., to the 
Ministerial Australian Aboriginal Affairs Council in Adelaide on 6 April 1973.’, (1973), p. 2. 
13  Prior to 19 December 1972, responsibility for Aboriginal education had been with the Welfare Branch 
of the Northern Territory Administration. In 1973 the Northern Territory Education Division (NTED) 
of the Commonwealth Department of Education was created. See National Archives of Australia:  
http://recordsearch.naa.gov.au/SearchNRetrieve/Interface/DetailsReports/AgencyDetail.aspx?reg_no=
CA%202593&singleRecord=T. Accessed 17 June 2014. The NTED retained responsibility for 
education until it was broken up and its functions were passed to the Commonwealth Department of 
Education, Northern Territory Office on 1 January 1979. In 1983, the department was renamed the 
Department of Education and Youth Affairs (DEYA). See:  
http://recordsearch.naa.gov.au/SearchNRetrieve/Interface/DetailsReports/AgencyDetail.aspx?reg_no=
CA%202975&singleRecord=T. Accessed 17 June 2014.  
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might be required. Such a development was of little interest to Department of Education 
(NT) staff, however. 
8.2 Official Indifference 
With the Whitlam Governments’ new federal funding available for schooling infrastructure 
at Wave Hill, a series of meetings were organised in December 1974 by DE(NT) officials 
regarding ‘a new school complex at Wave Hill township for use by both [Wattie Creek and 
Kalkaringi families]’.14 In retrospect these meetings were the most critical juncture in the 
fifteen-year campaign waged by Gurindji leaders to influence the schooling of their youth. 
Official talk about the future of local schooling caused the elders and their supporters to 
refocus their own discussions on the elders’ educative plans. Pincher Nyurrmiarri, Patrick 
McConvell and Jean Culley, a prominent member of the Melbourne Gurindji support 
campaign, commenced active lobbying about the Gurindji elders’ long-sought school, which 
in Culley’s words was to be: ‘a community school in which all ages are involved, from 
toddlers and their mothers to old people who still sign with a mark’.15 When in Darwin, Long 
Johnny Kijngayari and others met with DE(NT) staff. Jean Culley described her hopes:  
I’m here […] with Long Johnny to get a truck and to try and get a school for Wattie 
Creek. Pincher and the others are terribly keen as they see this as a way to preserve 
and strengthen the Law, and I think it’s terribly important myself […] Vincent has 
written [about it to DAA Secretary] Dexter and Pincher to [Chairman of the House of 
Representatives Select Committee on Specific Learning Difficulties] Race Matthews 
[emphasis mine].16  
Kijngayari and Culley’s proposal was opposed by Jim Gallagher, the Deputy Director of the 
Education Department in the NT. Gallagher had formerly been a senior figure in the 
Education Division of the Welfare Branch and had been pivotal in developing the Branch’s 
education policy for Aboriginal settlements. He used his historic memory to reject 
Kijngayari and Culley’s proposal of a school at Daguragu, claiming that three years earlier 
                                                 
14  Ford (DAA) to Dexter, 24 December 1974, Oke Personal Collection. 
15  Nyurrmiarri’s letter to the Melbourne Gurindji Group of the previous month had opened with ‘I want a 
school here in Wattie Creek’. Nyurrmiarri to ‘Robbie’ [Oke], 19 November 1974, Pelczynski Personal 
Collection; Culley to Leu, 22 October 1974, Atkinson Personal Collection.  
16  Leu to Middleton, date unknown but late 1974, Oke Personal Collection. 
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(prior to the election of the ALP) the Gurindji had maintained that they didn’t want a school 
or any government officials there.17 According to Culley, Gallagher attempted to fob her and 
Kijngayari off by offering them a demountable ‘preschool’ for Wattie Creek.18 Gallagher, 
she warned, ‘will torpedo the whole thing if he can’. In an attempt to thwart the Department 
of Education, the activists pinned their hopes on the Minister for Aboriginal Affairs, Jim 
Cavanagh. 
Despite the Gurindji’s lobbying, the Education Department merely approved a major 
expansion of the existing school at Kalkaringi to cater to the children of both Kalkaringi and 
Daguragu communities. The decision effectively perpetuated the earlier policies of the 
McMahon and Gorton governments regarding Wave Hill’s development: that is, to build up 
the settlement at Kalkaringi and ignore Gurindji plans for Daguragu. Nonetheless, consent 
was given by the Gurindji elders to the settlement’s continued provision of educational 
facilities for the children of Wattie Creek—up to 50% of the Kalkaringi school’s enrolment 
came from the bush camp. The Gurindji believed that this commitment would not preclude 
their aspirations for a school of their own, and refused to relinquish their goal.19 Even as 
Kalkaringi’s expanded primary school was being built, Prime Minister Whitlam promised 
Gurindji elders their own school during his ‘hand-over’ speech in 1975. The new school—
ironically dubbed the Kalkaringi Community Education Centre (KCEC)—opened in 
October 1976, and as a compensatory gesture, the DAA delivered the demountable 
‘preschool’ to Wattie Creek around the same time.20 This was used when a DE(NT) teacher 
could be found for the remainder of the decade.21 From the time of the Kalkaringi school’s 
major expansion onwards, for reasons I will explain, lobbying such as that of Frank Hardy 
in March 1975 for a school at Daguragu was far less likely to succeed.22  
The marginalisation of the Gurindji elders’ educative aspirations was promulgated at 
the local and NT levels, that is, by KCEC staff and senior officers of the Department in 
                                                 
17  Culley to Atkinson, 25 November 1974, Atkinson Personal Collection.  
18  ibid.  
19  Culley to Oke, 13 December 1974, Oke Personal Collection. 
20  Sydney, Library of New South Wales (hereafter SLNSW), Culley (Melbourne Gurindji Group) to 
Middleton, 24 February 1976, in Gurindji at Wattie Creek (Daguragu), Northern Territory, Hannah 
Middleton Papers, c. 1966-1976, MLMSS 5866/15. 
21  Department of Aboriginal Affairs, Daguragu—Book of the Community (NT Division of the Department 
of Aboriginal Affairs, 1977, p. 12. 
22  AIATSIS, ‘Visit to Daguragu’, Wattie Creek and Wave Hill, Jeremy Long Papers, MS 2534, Box 3, 
Folder 24. 
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Katherine and Darwin. This marginalisation should be understood accordingly—its causes 
were systemic. The ‘local’ reasons why the Gurindji’s requests were ignored by DE(NT) 
bureaucrats are mundane, though as they had the potential to affect the Gurindji’s ‘self-
managing’ ambitions significantly, they are worthy of consideration. In 1974 a ‘turf war’ 
between public servants at Kalkaringi and the activists supporting the desires of the Gurindji 
at Daguragu was at its peak. Among the Europeans employed at Kalkaringi, a common 
attitude was that Wattie Creek was an unproductive and ephemeral camp of ‘fringe dwellers’ 
dependent on the non-Indigenous, service-providing centre of Kalkaringi.23 Attendant to this 
view was the notion that it was only a matter of time until the Gurindji abandoned the village 
they had founded. For instance, in response to entreaties from Gurindji leaders about a school 
for Daguragu in the late 1970s, a representative of the Department of Education (NT) said 
that while he personally would ‘like a school [at Wattie Creek]’, this was not possible as he 
could not ‘convince the planners in Darwin that the people will stay there’. Public servants’ 
persisting doubts about the permanence of Wattie Creek contributed to the delay/refusal of 
the Gurindji request to site a school there on more than one occasion.  
According to one of its former teachers, some principals and many of the teachers 
employed at Kalkaringi CEC were similarly unsupportive of, and/or uninterested in, 
Aboriginal education or local ‘community’ aspirations.24 One such principal was employed 
during the Department’s consultations during 1974, before being removed as a result of the 
school’s teachers passing a ‘vote of no confidence’ against him.25 It is likely that this 
individual saw the establishment of a large school at Kalkaringi as a testimony to his 
professional capability. He may also have viewed his support of the ‘winning’ proposal as a 
means to assert his own influence within the Department of Education (NT) against the 
activists then mediating the requests of the Gurindji. In any event, in the case of Daguragu’s 
putative school in 1974, the personal priorities of transient staff and the fight for power and 
ideological dominance raging between whites ‘on the ground’ at Wave Hill subverted the 
                                                 
23  Lyn Riddett, a former educationist and Gurindji supporter, reports encountering a general aversion to 
the practice and principal of ‘outstations’ congruent with a preference for centralised services among 
‘administrators, bureaucrats [and] officials’. She believes that this preference was inculcated in the 
Northern Territory Administration during the 1960s and early 70s, and later retained by public servants. 
NTAS, Lyn Riddett, Interview Recorded by Charlie Ward, November 2009, NTRS 3609, BWF 3. 
24  Julia Pannell [former teacher at Libanungu 1975–78], Interview Recorded by Charlie Ward 16 July 
2014.    
25  It is understood that this vote of no confidence was moved as a result of the principal’s perceived lack 
of professional competence, rather than being due to his stance on local political matters. ibid.     
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Aboriginal self-determination policy objectives of government and the goals of Gurindji 
elders alike. 
According to official rhetoric, self-determination and self-management policies were 
heavily reliant on close consultation with Aboriginal groups and communities. In the 
scenario I have described Gurindji wishes regarding the education of their children were 
wilfully ignored. As DE(NT)’s local decision-making was impervious or even inimical to 
the ‘self-managing’ Aboriginal agent promoted by policy, it is necessary to review the larger 
context of the circumstances in which this occurred.  
8.3 Disjuncture: Policy and Ideological Context 
When Department of Education staff were developing their plans for an enormous expansion 
of school facilities in Aboriginal communities during 1973–74, they were, like their DAA 
colleagues, breaking deliberately from the past. According to a major review of DE(NT) 
conducted in 1978 by Mitsuru Shimpo, in 1973 there had been a ‘deliberate emphasis on 
discontinuity of major education policies, [meaning] that materials and curricula were 
disregarded’.26 Figures 3 and 4 diagrammatise the transition. It was popularly thought among 
the Whitlam Government’s senior public servants that individuals and educational 
methodologies associated with the old Education Branch of the NTA smacked of 
paternalism. In the new government’s rush to substantiate its new direction, the merits of the 
NT Administration’s previous regime, which achieved school attendance rates that have 
rarely been observed since, were little considered. Disregarded by the Department of 
Education (NT) under Whitlam was the so-called Watts/Gallagher report of 1964. This 
document had provided the old NTA with a specialised pedagogy and curriculum regarding 
Aboriginal schooling during the 1960s. Teachers in Welfare Settlements had been subject to 
Watts and Gallagher’s maxims that ‘Aboriginal culture must be recognised and respected by 
all teachers and instructors’, and ‘the education of Aborigines […] is a special field of 
education. […] All who work in this field need special training if educational planning and 
action are to be fully effective’.27 The adoption of Watts and Gallagher’s recommendations 
                                                 
26  Mitsuru Shimpo, The Social Process of Aboriginal Education in the Northern Territory, Depart of 
Education Northern Territory Division (Darwin, Northern Territory), p. 163. 
27  Watts and Gallagher, cited in Chris Duke and Elizabeth Sommerlad, Design for Diversity: Further 
Education for Tribal Aborigines in the North (Canberra, Australian National University, 1976), p. 29. 
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by the NTA during the 1960s distinguished it from Western Australia and Queensland, in 
which no provision was made for the differing sociocultural backgrounds of Aboriginal 
children. Although Gallagher himself was employed within the ‘Special Projects’ branch of 
the new NT Division of the Department of Education, and later as its Deputy Director, his 
and Watts’s report was discarded.28 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Responsibility for schooling at Wave Hill (shaded), 1956-1972 
During the Whitlam years, few Education Department staff were interested in 
resolving how the government’s policy of Aboriginal self-determination should be translated 
into school pedagogy or teacher training for Aboriginal schools and students. Exceptions to 
this lack of interest in pedagogy for Aboriginal children included the establishment of a 
bilingual education unit within the Department in 1974, increased employment of Aboriginal 
teachers, and provision for the construction and staffing of ‘outstation’ schools. In the 
absence of a specialised approach to Aboriginal education, a socially democratic ethos of 
                                                 
28  Chris Duke and Elizabeth Sommerlad, Design for Diversity: Further Education for Tribal Aborigines 
in the North (Canberra, Australian National University, 1976), p. 80. 
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‘universal education’ prevailed within the Department.29 The Department’s universalist 
ethics were more congruent with the traditional values of the ALP than its ‘self-
determination’ policy, which was vulnerable to charges of elitism due to its recognition of 
Aboriginal Australians as a distinct group deserving of specific remedial activity.30  
As the new policies of the Whitlam Government were operationalised in the mid-
1970s, these ideological incongruities were recognised but unresolved within the public 
service. In 1974, senior bureaucrats of both the DAA and the Education Department 
conceded that without special measures, the ‘universalist’ approach of remote schools could 
override the wishes of local Aborigines, effectively contravening ‘self-determination’ 
policy—at least when it came to the education of their children. Bureaucrats recognised the 
potentially negative impact of this on Aboriginal people. They believed that ‘a fragmentation 
of support’ had resulted from transferring education to a mainstream department separate 
from that responsible for Aboriginal Affairs.31 Many remote teachers felt that the 
Department’s philosophy of Aboriginal education was poorly defined, and that they were 
significantly hindered by the lack of a ‘development’ plan for the Aboriginal communities 
in which they worked.32 To remedy this fragmentation between DE(NT) schools in 
Aboriginal communities and the communities they ostensibly served, a joint taskforce with 
members from the DAA and DE(NT) issued a memo in 1974 suggesting that in each 
community, Aboriginal parents and leaders, education staff and DAA community advisers 
might establish ‘Local Education Committees’ to solicit local views and troubleshoot issues 
regarding education. Due to the proliferation of such bodies among the many service 
providers now active in remote communities and frequent ideological differences between 
DAA and Education Department staff however, few ‘Local Education Committees’ actually 
met.33  
                                                 
29  As a result, the ‘Watts Gallagher report’ that had guided Aboriginal Education in the previous decade 
of ‘assimilation’ policy was frequently used by teachers as a resource to guide them in their tuition of 
Aboriginal students in remote communities during the 1970s. Duke and Sommerlad, 1976, op. cit., pp. 
28–29. 
30  ‘600 Demand a Royal Commission into Aid’, NTN, 9 March 1973; ‘The Katherine Meeting: What Was 
it All About?’, NTN, 10 March 1973. 
31  Darwin, NAA, ‘Draft Policy Statements: Health and Education’, Review of Policy Statements—DAA, 
E460, 1982/120. 
32  Shimpo, op. cit., p. 100. 
33  Duke and Sommerlad, 1976, op. cit., p. 42. 
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Figure 4: Responsibility for schooling at Wave Hill (shaded), 1973-1978 
The ill-defined, fractious and often non-existent relationship between Education and 
Aboriginal Affairs staff in many remote communities had negatively affected Aboriginal 
education across the Northern Territory. In Shimpo’s 1978 report, he noted that the provision 
of services by discrete departments had generated significant ‘confusion’ for Aboriginal 
people and recommended that governance on Aboriginal communities be returned to a ‘one 
agency policy’, under which an Aboriginal Affairs-type agency would resume the 
responsibility (divested by Whitlam) for education in Aboriginal communities.34 It was a 
belated recognition of the merits of the centralised, hierarchical structure (though not the 
policies) of the old Welfare Branch. In Kalkaringi, the practical application of Shimpo’s 
recommendation would have meant fewer non-Indigenous ‘bosses’, fewer agencies and—in 
theory at least—greater ideological coherence among those then working with the 
Aboriginal population. Instead, the delivery of Shimpo’s report coincided with Northern 
Territory Self-Government, and rather than responsibility for education on Aboriginal 
communities being transferred to the DAA, a new NT Government Department of Education 
(NTED) took up the role—a move which effectively further inculcated official opposition 
to the prospect of an Aboriginal school at Daguragu. 
                                                 
34  Shimpo, op. cit., p. 158.  
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Bureaucratic tensions between universalist service provision and consultative approaches to 
heterogeneous Aboriginal interests were exacerbated and reified among authorities at 
Kalkaringi by the proximity and politics of its neighbouring Aboriginal bush village, 
Daguragu. Their irresolution was also exemplified at Kalkaringi due to the mismatch of that 
community’s own tenure and demography. Whereas Kalkaringi was previously designated 
as a Welfare Branch ration depot on crown land, in 1976 the community was gazetted as an 
‘open town’, by which its residents were subject to the same regulations and ordinances 
governing the mostly non-Indigenous residents of the Territory’s larger centres.35 Ironically, 
in terms of the Kalkaringi school’s pedagogy, the community’s ‘open’ tenure provided a 
convenient justification for its provision of a ‘standard’ curriculum, though the great 
majority of the school’s students were Aboriginal. This raised questions for some about 
whether goals and methods designed specifically for educating Aboriginal children should 
be used. Such uncertainty was compounded by the absence of specialised training in 
Aboriginal education for teachers who, like the staff of other agencies, were thrown together 
into random ‘teams’ that frequently failed to find any commonality of approach.36 This was 
the case in Aboriginal communities generally, and the open town of Kalkaringi with its 
aspirational and controversial neighbour Daguragu in particular.  
Tensions between the government’s universal and particularist approaches to 
education also affected KCEC’s curriculum. Although it was the policy of both the Whitlam 
and Fraser Governments to provide a ‘bilingual’ curriculum in schools in predominantly 
Aboriginal settlements, applications for a bilingual program from the school at Kalkaringi 
were repeatedly unsuccessful: the Department of Education (NT) deemed that there had been 
too much deterioration of the Gurindji language for such a program to be beneficial.37 At the 
time that the expanded Kalkaringi CEC was opened, the Department’s bilingual program 
was subject to a period of enforced ‘consolidation’, meaning that no new bilingual programs 
in schools could be funded.38 The program itself lacked Departmental support at senior 
                                                 
35  This tenure itself was a result of the Gorton Government’s efforts to shift public focus away from the 
Gurindji’s request for land in 1968. 
36  Shimpo, op. cit., p. 162. 
37  Norm and Helen McNair [former Summer Institute of Linguistics staff at Kalkaringi], Interview 
Recorded by Charlie Ward, March 2010, in possession of the author. 
38  It is noteworthy that the timing and intention of this consolidation of DE(NT)’s bilingual program 
matches the wider processes then underway within the public service, often initiated by the Fraser 
Government to scrutinise and curtail expenditure on Aboriginal self-determination policy and self-
determination policy-like aims. As such, from a community perspective, it too can be seen as comprising 
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levels, and there was a move within the Department (later denied) to reduce the status of its 
bilingual program to that of a small pilot project. In these circumstances, the degree to which 
efforts were made to include Gurindji language and culture in the KCEC curriculum hinged 
on the proclivities of whoever the school principal happened to be. Both senior Gurindji 
women and male leaders were of the opinion that half of their children’s schooling should 
be conducted in Gurindji, but rather than the 50% ‘two way’ pedagogy envisaged by Lingiari 
and co, in the late 1970s only six per cent of class time—two hours of teaching per week—
was conducted in the Gurindji language.39 The refusal by government authorities to 
implement a bilingual teaching program created the same type of self-serving rationale for 
DE(NT) and Education Department (NT) staff as the Kalkaringi school itself: while the 
extant school was used to justify the authorities’ refusal to build a second one at Daguragu, 
infrequent teaching in the Gurindji language did little to slow its ‘deterioration’, which in 
turn provided the Department with further justification for maintaining its English 
curriculum. 
In light of the political and ideological tensions I have described, after local debate 
about a Daguragu school was curtailed by the establishment of the KCEC in 1976, the 
educative ambitions of Gurindji elders would have been seen by Kalkaringi’s school 
principals as peripheral to the operational concerns of their institution.40 From that time, the 
focus of official arguments against a school at Daguragu switched from that community’s 
alleged deficiencies to the anticipated and deleterious effects that a school there would have 
on the new KCEC. With some justification, DE(NT) authorities argued that a well-attended 
Daguragu school would lead to a 50% drop in enrolments at Kalkaringi, and a similar 
reduction in the number of staffing positions there. The Department’s attitude towards the 
question of a Daguragu school was illustrated by one quip from an official that, because 
                                                 
part of the policy’s adaptation and co-option by government during the latter part of the 1970s. Brian 
Devlin, ‘A Glimmer of Possibility’, in Brian Devlin, Samantha Disbray and Nancy Devlin (eds), History 
of Bilingual Education in the Northern Territory: People, Programs and Policies (Springer, Singapore, 
2017) 11–26 (p. 22).  
39  Department of Aboriginal Affairs, Kalkaringi—Book of the Community (NT Division of the Department 
of Aboriginal Affairs, 1977, p. 10; H.C. ‘Nugget’ Coombs, Kulinma, (Canberra, Australian National 
University Press, 1978), p. 234; McNair Interview, op. cit.; Will Sanders, 'From Self-Determination to 
Self-Management', in Service Delivery to Remote Communities, ed. by Peter Loveday (Darwin, North 
Australia Research Unit, Australian National University, 1982), pp. 4–10, p. 7; Hardy, 1985, op. cit., p. 
72. 
40  Keith Jeans, the Kalkaringi school principal of 1976–78, has no recollection of any ‘talk at the time of 
another school at Daguragu’. Personal Communication, 29 May 2014. 
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KCEC had ‘cost a million dollars, they [local Aboriginal people] had better appreciate it’.41 
This supports Mitsuru Shimpo’s finding in his review: ‘if the government spends money on 
a school, it tends to push the people to use it to justify expenditure’.42 
The tenure of the land at Daguragu also provided the Department with a fall-back 
excuse to justify their un-responsive attitude. On 1 July 1978, when responsibility for 
schooling in the Territory was transferred from DE(NT) to the new NT government, its new 
Education Department continued an important initiative begun by their federal predecessors, 
providing tiny schools for dozens of small Aboriginal groups living on their homeland 
centres or outstations. Although Daguragu was closely linked with Land Rights and was 
seen as a sort of progenitor of the ‘outstation movement’ in the public imagination, the 
community itself remained categorised officially as a ‘homestead’ on a pastoral lease, which 
disqualified it as a prospective recipient of NT Department of Education funding for an 
Aboriginal outstation school.43 These new, usually one teacher institutions were situated 
only on Aboriginal freehold land recognised under the Aboriginal Land Rights Act (Northern 
Territory) 1976. For the Gurindji, the situation again effectively perpetuated that of the late 
1960s when their lack of tenure at Daguragu provided government with a legal reason to 
reject their requests for infrastructure and housing. If there had been the political and 
bureaucratic will to build a school at Daguragu—and there was not—this issue among others 
would have required resolution. While a successful Land Claim might have expedited their 
campaign for their own school, the Gurindji’s experience had already shown them that 
changing the minds of governments could take years, if not decades.  
8.4 Engaging Gurindji Students and Teachers: the Educative Edifices of the State 
The failure of authorities and the Gurindji leaders and their supporters to realise a Gurindji 
school at Daguragu was a major blow to the elders’ post-Walk-off vision of an independent 
society. Yet as the elders acknowledged, education remained central to the Gurindji’s future 
autonomy. To understand why the group did not succeed in achieving that autonomy in the 
period (the topic of the following chapter), therefore requires our consideration of education 
and schooling, not as the elders wished for it, but as the Daguragu group encountered it. How 
                                                 
41  Pannell interview, op. cit.    
42  Shimpo, op. cit., p. 159. 
43  Jan Richardson, Former Daguragu Council Clerk, Personal Communication, 19 September 2014. 
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did the schooling and training available to Gurindji people as students and teachers in the 
period affect the ability of ‘new generation’ Gurindji to realise the aspirations of their elders? 
Or did it disincline them to do so?  
During the 1970s, the elders reconciled themselves to the fact that the Kalkaringi CEC 
would continue to provide their children’s mainstream education. Presumably they had faith 
in the ability of KCEC staff to educate students in ‘kartiya way’, yet the will of many older 
people to contribute ‘officially’ to the education of young Gurindji remained, their 
motivation perhaps strengthened by a desire to slow the alienation then growing between 
themselves and younger generations.44 For those old people resistant to this dissociation, the 
Kalkaringi’s kartiya school might have appeared as a practical vehicle to be judiciously 
utilised for its access to large numbers of (possibly receptive) children. Yet the contribution 
of Gurindji elders to the ‘Gurindji’ education of students in the Kalkaringi school 
environment depended on the amenability of recently-arrived European employees. When a 
sympathetic principal and core teaching staff were employed at KCEC for several years, the 
old people’s participation in activities and tuition increased in the early 1980s. A precedent 
for this had occurred in 1969–71, when local elders worked at the NT Administration’s 
Welfare Settlement school in a voluntary capacity, and taught the children a Gurindji 
ceremonial form for performance in the annual Darwin Eisteddfod.45  
These abortive collaborations were hampered by the older Aboriginal residents’ 
alienation from both the process of mainstream schooling and the buildings in which it was 
conducted. The KCEC buildings comprised by far the biggest and most highly developed 
piece of infrastructure at Wave Hill, and it is likely that some of the untraveled older 
generation had never entered such facilities. According to the linguist-educators Norm and 
Helen McNair, who worked at the school in the period: 
There should have been […] open buildings with verandas where parents could come 
in with their children and sit and begin to see what written language was and be part 
of it. Instead, all of the attention was given to the kids, and all of the owners of the 
                                                 
44  According to observers, many Gurindji elders at the time chose not to pass on their unique Dreaming 
stories and knowledge to those they saw as ‘rubbish’, young adults. Norm and Helen McNair, Interview 
Recorded by Charlie Ward, March 2010, in possession of the author. 
45  Darwin, NTAS, Charlie Mines (former Wave Hill School Head Teacher), Interview Recorded by 
Charlie Ward, January 2012, NTRS 3609, BWF 35; Charlie Mines, 1970 Photographs, in possession of 
the author. 
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language and the culture were disenfranchised. […] It all happened the wrong way 
around.46  
KCEC school principal Keith Jeans recognised that the involvement of Daguragu’s 
leaders would not increase—while ever they continued ‘not [to] see it as their own’ and the 
school retained its ‘obvious European design and styling’.47 These observations support 
Mitsuru Shimpo’s finding that in Aboriginal communities across the NT, ‘school buildings 
are [seen as] the symbol of non-Aboriginal authority’.48 Despite the reservations of their 
elders, some younger Gurindji adults were minimally involved in their children’s schooling. 
Several middle-aged and young Gurindji women worked as Assistant Teachers at KCEC. In 
this role, they co-authored Gurindji language resources with Summer Institute linguists. The 
contribution of these Gurindji educators in the classroom was dependent on the willingness 
of kartiya teachers to accommodate the young women into their classes. 
Gurindji collaboration and contribution to the teaching process at KCEC was further 
hampered by the incompatibility of classroom learning with the strong environmental basis 
of Gurindji language and pedagogy. Both the subject matter and the teaching styles of 
traditional Aboriginal education were formulated in and around the natural world.49 It is 
likely that the aging Gurindji were not only cowed by the school environment itself, but 
found that their teaching methods were ineffective and/or impracticable there also.50  
In the late 1970s, other than KCEC schooling, education and training opportunities for 
Gurindji people were limited. For those students completing their primary schooling at 
KCEC, the only feasible means of continuing their studies was at Kormilda College 
(Darwin) or Yirara College (Alice Springs). Both these residential colleges had been 
persistently criticised for failing to adequately cater to the needs of their prime market, 
Aboriginal students—a fact seemingly confirmed by their great ‘difficulties of adjustment’ 
                                                 
46  McNair interview, op. cit.;  
47  Jeans, op. cit. 
48  Shimpo, op. cit., p. 160. 
49  Max Hart, ‘Traditional Aboriginal Education’, in Aborigines and Schooling: Essays in Honour of Max 
Hart, ed.by Bill Menary (Adelaide college of the Arts and Education, Nelley, South Australia, 1981) 
1–8 (pp. 4–5). 
50  Presumably, the elders’ determination that Gurindji schooling should be conducted at Daguragu was 
based on a plan that they would conduct their own teaching outside the school building they desired. 
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and high ‘drop-out’ rates.51 At Wave Hill, Gurindji leaders’ expected the students returning 
from these colleges to work at Wattie Creek, however a significant disjuncture between the 
skill levels of returning students, available employment, the expectations of the 
gerontocracy, and the students’ own mutable or inchoate aspirations existed. Much of this 
was recognised by government authorities, who thought that the Kormilda and Yirara 
colleges had:  
[…] Possible ill-effects on the stability of the social structure of Aboriginal 
communities (e.g. through inter-group mixing encouraged by the colleges) and doubts 
as to whether the colleges are providing education which can be meaningfully utilised 
in the home communities.52  
As this bureaucratic intelligence indicates, even for those students who had received some 
western education, progression to management-type positions in their home communities 
proved difficult. Michael Paddy—a Gurindji boarder at Yirara at the time—remembers that 
if anything, the effect of schooling on a number of his peers was to cause criminality in them: 
Some kids came back (from school), they used to steal, steal cars, break-in to shop. 
The kids never listened to old people. I think it was because the lifestyle was changing. 
A different world.’53 
Such youthful behaviour was a ‘far cry’ from that expected by Gurindji elders. 
Presumably adding to their disappointment and frustration, other ex-Kormilda or Yirara 
students refused for years to return to their home communities after leaving school—an 
apparent statement, in part at least, of their greater interest in the opportunities that the 
outside world offered, rather than the Gurindji homeland project of their elders.54  
While the school system was largely failing Gurindji secondary age children, and 
hence threatening the elders’ planned creation of a new managerial class, the poor 
                                                 
51  Elizabeth Sommerlad., Kormilda, the Way to Tomorrow?: A Study in Aboriginal Education (Canberra, 
Australian National University Press, 1976). 
52  Canberra, NAA, ‘Ministerial Briefing: Kormilda College’, PM’s Visit to NT 24–27 April 1978, A1209, 
1978/1050, Part 1. 
53  Darwin, NTAS, Interview with Michael Paddy by Charlie Ward, October 2010, NTRS 3609, BWF 30. 
54  Gwen Dickman (nee Moore, former Baptist Missionary at Libanungu), Interviewed by Charlie Ward, 
19 November 2012. 
Ch. 8 Gurindji Schooling 
                                        245 
 
professional skills of Gurindji adults of working age were also impacting on the ‘self-
determination’-like visions the elders shared with their government interlocutors. While 
members of this Gurindji cohort might have received some schooling at the Wave Hill 
Welfare Settlement prior to the 1966 Walk-off, they were now of an age that many desired 
long-term employment. Yet in many cases these individuals lacked the abilities and 
qualifications that even the low-level positions available at Wave Hill required of them. 
Their situation is typified in the following discussion regarding Gus George and his friend. 
George was born on Wave Hill Station in the early 1950s and spent most of his teens and 
twenties working in the region’s cattle industry. In 1978 he returned to Daguragu and worked 
for the Muramulla Company for a few years.55 For a while George received instruction from 
the local store manager with a view to taking over the role himself.56 After this failed to 
eventuate, according to Colin Muir (CM), the Council electrician at the time:  
CM: Gus George was another bloke I had in the powerhouse. He wasn’t 
a bad bloke, either. [He and another trainee] had a fair few brains, 
those two. Eventually I trained them up and they [operated] their 
own power outfit. But once the Department of Works and the NTEC 
(the Northern Territory Electricity Commission) took over [the local 
powerhouse], of course they wouldn’t allow them in. 
Int: So then they lost their jobs? 
CM: Yeah, you know, when you’re running a $100,000 powerhouse […]. 
Int: They didn’t have the right qualifications? 
CM: Not really, no […]. I trained them for about six months, they were 
actually running the powerhouse at the time. They even went and 
sat for their exams for housing and construction and got their tickets, 
but of course [such efforts] didn’t really mean much [to the 
Department of Works and the NTEC]. I could still employ them as 
TAs [trade assistants] though.57 
                                                 
55  Darwin, NTAS, Interview with Gus George by Charlie Ward, October 2010, NTRS 3609, BWF 24. 
56  Darwin, NAA, ‘[…] Community Report for Quarter Ended 30 June 1979’, Wave Hill—Review of 
Projects, Part 2, E460, 1981/89. 
57  Colin and Maggie Muir, Interview Recorded by Charlie Ward, 24 October 2012. In possession of the 
author. 
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Being aware of many such situations, authorities had come to believe that poor literacy 
and technical skills were the major impediment to the Gurindji’s ‘self-sufficiency’.58 The 
under-employment and unemployment of Aboriginal adults due to the inadequacy of their 
mainstream education was so common in remote communities that the federal Department 
of Employment and Industrial Relations (DEIR) employed ‘Adult Educators’ to provide 
vocational training to their residents.59 The employment of these individuals signified the 
government’s belated recognition that the importance of education to, and its relationship 
with, ‘self-determination’ and ‘self-management’ had been badly underestimated.  
8.5 Conclusion 
In this chapter I have described the centrality of education and training to Gurindji aims, and 
shown that the lack of education and training of the types desired by Gurindji leaders 
comprised a little-known but significant failure of quotidian realities to match their ‘self-
determination’–type goals. I have argued that the allocation of responsibility for schooling 
Aboriginal children to a department little-aligned to the goals of self-determination policy 
created the conditions which stymied the Gurindji’s educational plan. The over-riding policy 
factor contributing to this failure was that local responsibility for the provision of education 
did not fall to the government agency concerned with Aboriginal ‘self-determination’: the 
Department of Aboriginal Affairs.  
Whether the construction of a Gurindji school at Daguragu would have enjoyed the 
outcomes envisaged by Gurindji elders is a matter for conjecture. In response to their wish 
for a Daguragu school, Daguragu Council Clerk Stan Davey organised a group of Gurindji 
councillors to visit independent Aboriginal schools in the Kimberly in 1984.60 A year later 
however, there was still no indication from government that the Gurindji would get their 
school. Then, senior law man Jerry Rinyngayarri reportedly told Frank Hardy that his 
‘deepest concern was that the modern school had been built in the open town […] instead of 
at Wattie Creek’.61 Donald Nangiari wondered whether the KCEC school buildings could be 
moved to where they were wanted. By this time intergenerational breakdown and the 
                                                 
58  Darwin, NAA, ‘Community Review Report […]’, 12 October 1979, Wave Hill Community 
Development, E460, 1978/242. 
59  The first of these at Wave Hill was Len Fracek, who arrived in 1978. 
60  ‘DCGC Study Tour’, 16–30 June 1984, Richardson Personal Collection. 
61  Hardy, 1985, op. cit., p. 68. 
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demands of ‘self-determination’ itself had undermined the old men’s enthusiasm. The 
Gurindji leaders were now well placed among northern Aboriginal groups to recognise the 
extraordinary commitment and time required to realise their own and government’s 
intentions to collaboratively develop new ‘Aboriginal’ institutions from scratch. By the time 
they received Aboriginal Title in 1986 (and hence were legally eligible to apply for a 
government-funded school at Daguragu), both their vision and their ability to fight for it was 
diminished.  
Unlike the Gurindji, the predominantly Nyangumarta Strelley Mob in the Pilbara were 
successful in their efforts to establish and manage an independent Aboriginal school, which 
is at the time of writing the oldest in Australia. The social situation of the Nyangumarta 
people in the 1960s–70s has many parallels with that of the Gurindji group, and their leaders’ 
assessment of their people’s educational needs is striking for its similarity to that of Lingiari, 
Nyurrmiarri and Nangiari. A study juxtaposing the subsequent ‘self-determination’ and 
cultural resilience of these two groups would be of interest, though is beyond the scope of 
this thesis. What is clear regarding the Gurindji and their educative aspirations is that in the 
absence of their own school, the young cohort of Gurindji managers sought by Daguragu’s 
elders to effect that place’s self-determination remained elusive. My presentation of 
‘education’ as one of the four pillars of Gurindji self-determination potentially affecting the 
lives of all Gurindji people thus provides important context for the question I address in the 
following chapter: why were the combined efforts of Gurindji elders to create an autonomous 
Gurindji homestead, and similarly the efforts of their DAA interlocutors to create a self-
managing Gurindji community, of such limited success?
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Ch. 9 Gurindji Independence, Part I 
 
 
 
 
More clearly perhaps than any other event in Australian history, the Gurindji people’s Walk-
off from Wave Hill Station bought a distinct aspirational Aboriginal group with pretensions 
of independence to the attention of the Australian public. While Gurindji elders themselves 
said little in English about the specific nature of the independence they sought, their group’s 
illegal establishment of a settlement at Wattie Creek substantiated their assertions that they 
wished to live on their own terms and create their own self-supporting livelihoods. 
According to their statements, Daguragu elders came to the opinion over time that their 
vision of independence and autonomy vis-à-vis the wider world might be realised by 
achieving Gurindji land rights, a Gurindji-run cattle operation, a school and other facilities. 
The realisation of the elders’ ideal was dependent on the successful realisation of its 
constitutive parts, and for this reason the exact form which the Gurindji imagined their 
independence might take was little-explored by them.  
 Yet how were these pillars of Gurindji independence to be created, managed, and 
sustained? Lacking evidence to the contrary, we must assume that the elders believed that 
their extant decision-making and leadership processes could be adapted to the task of 
‘governing’ their homestead. In the Department of Aboriginal Affairs’ early years, its 
functionaries may have agreed, pending the Daguragu group’s incorporation. Yet self-
determination policy’s provision of government funding for reapportionment by Aboriginal 
people necessitated not only the incorporation of Aboriginal groups but their concomitant 
compliance with the regulatory reporting and acquittal processes required by government. 
Further to this, the intention of the Whitlam, Fraser and Everingham Governments to divest 
themselves of ‘local government’-type functions in the remote NT determined their interest 
in creating ‘community council’ bodies in Aboriginal communities. Ironically then, 
Aboriginal groups like the Gurindji who were interested in living with a degree of autonomy 
were faced with the prospect of operating community councils themselves to provide 
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services formerly offered by government, or hosting visiting ‘trustees’ in their communities 
to do so. The role that extant Aboriginal leadership and decision-making processes would 
play in this was unknown. 
For the Gurindji, their obligation to accommodate and/or participate in a community 
council became apparent after the DAA created an incipient local-government-type body at 
Kalkaringi in 1973. From this point, the track mob’s ‘independence’ at Daguragu necessarily 
included the governance of Kalkaringi and/or Daguragu via a succession of local 
government-supported bodies, for reasons I will describe. Matching the historical priorities 
of Gurindji leaders’, my intention in this and the following chapter is to focus specifically 
on the autonomy of the track mob and that of their chosen community, Daguragu. As 
Gurindji elders were forced to accept in the 1970s however, government and Gurindji 
in/dependence was physically instantiated at Wave Hill by Daguragu’s proximity to its 
service-providing neighbour, Kalkaringi. The complex relationship between those two 
communities is also therefore germane to my analysis. As this chapter and the next will 
clearly show, in many regards it was the inadvertent effects of government activity at 
Kalkaringi—as per my description of ‘co-opted’ self-determination in Chapter Three—that 
adversely impacted the Gurindji’s decision-making and independence at Daguragu the most.  
First however, I will substantiate my assertion that Gurindji leaders were motivated by 
a desire to achieve economic and political independence for their people from the settler 
society of European Australians. As with the constitutive pillars of Gurindji Independence I 
have described, I will then outline the ways in which their independence goals were 
supported by government policy. The remainder of the chapter is concerned with describing 
the attempts of governmental staff and Gurindji leaders to force their respective aspirations 
of Gurindji independence into alignment through the incorporation of two council bodies: 
that which I term Libanungu Council Mk I (1973–74) and Libanungu Council Mk II (1974–
77). The chapter ends with my discussion of how this alignment was apparently achieved 
subsequently, in the drafting of the subsequent Daguragu Community Council’s terms of 
operation.  
9.1 Gurindji aspirations of Independence and Autonomy 
Various statements and acts of the Daguragu leadership group show the importance that its 
members attributed to their group’s eventual freedom from unwanted outside influence. 
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Lingiari and his coterie had a strong pedigree in this regard. The deliberate cultivation of 
their own indifference and obduracy to the directives and requests of Europeans was a 
necessary political tactic with roots originating in ‘strike’ actions taken well before the 
elders’ 1966 Walk-off from Wave Hill. Senior Gurindji man Long Johnny Kijngayari 
described his group’s determination prior to the Walk-off: ‘We will not go back, not for 
anything [we decided]. Whatever happens, whoever tells us to go back, we won’t listen (we 
said)’.1 In 1967, Vincent Lingiari encapsulated the independent rationale of his group’s 
subsequent action neatly: ‘I bin thinkin’ in my mind we can run Wave Hill, without Vestey 
mob’. He later expounded:  
I be number one man. Whitefella not number one no more. That right way, I be 
thinking […]. Later on, children know all that read-write business, white fella go ’way. 
We learn ’em drive motor car, everything. Gurindji people everywhere this country 
[…] would work for me.2 
In this and the following chapter, the fallibility of the elders’ belief that their independence 
would be realised through the ability and willingness of the younger generations of Gurindji 
to assume control of Daguragu’s projects and facilities will be fully revealed. 
During the Aspirational and Consolidative phases of the Muramulla Company (1966–
69 and 1970–75), Gurindji leaders extemporised on numerous occasions about the value they 
placed on their group’s independence. For instance, during Vincent Lingiari’s Gurindji 
language speech on the occasion of the Whitlam Government’s pastoral lease transfer to his 
people, he alluded to his group’s desire for control, at least of their land: ‘You (Gurindji) 
must keep this land safe for yourselves, it does not belong to any different ‘Welfare’ man’.3 
In linguist Patrick McConvell’s notes of his translation of the speech, he observes: ‘Here the 
conviction is expressed that the hand-over is not merely the transfer of land to a government 
department but that the Gurindji themselves should control the land’.  
                                                 
1  Vincent Lingiari, ‘Vincent Lingiari’s Speech’, transl. by Patrick McConvell, in This is What Happened: 
Historical Narratives by Aborigines, ed. by Luise Hercus and Peter Sutton (Canberra, Australian 
Institute of Aboriginal Studies, 1986), pp. 310. 
2  Cited in Frank Hardy, The Unlucky Australians, Sydney, Nelson, 1968 (2006 edn, Melbourne, One Day 
Hill), p. 112. 
3  Lingiari, 1986, op. cit., p. 315. 
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As described elsewhere in this thesis, during the late 1960s and early 1970s, Gurindji 
people developed their Wattie Creek camp illegally, while lacking any substantive 
government support. At this time, notwithstanding the influence of the activist-supporters 
they endorsed, the group’s modus operandi was consequentially autonomous, and 
collectively motivated. At this time, the Gurindji people were prepared to make significant 
sacrifices in order to live a collective yet independent life. 4 
While their people’s independence was their overarching aim, the elders were also clear that 
they required the support of outsiders working on the pillars of their self-determination to 
achieve this. As we have seen in regards of the Muramulla Company, the terms of this 
support were contested by both the Gurindji and their non-Indigenous intermediaries. When 
discussing their vision in the early 1970s, Gurindji leaders routinely delimited the amount 
and duration of the outside support they would require. In 1969, Long Johnny Kijngayari 
described the relationship he sought between the Muramulla Company and the kartiya-
dominated domains of the pastoral industry and government: ‘work for ourselves [with] little 
bit of help from white people, but left alone’.5 Other members of the track mob expected that 
government should provide them with substantial funding and support, but that this would 
only be required while they were establishing their homestead at Wattie Creek.  
For instance, while asserting the elders’ desire to ‘get ’em going and start ’em block 
here’ at Wattie Creek in 1970, Pincher Nyurrmiarri was also keen to remonstrate with the 
government for not providing, as he saw it, adequate assistance: ‘Yeah, we trying to get the 
government to help we […]. Y’ know, he’s supposed to help ’em [us] out’. In light of the 
elders’ goal of a broader, long lasting independence, Nyurrmiarri saw governmental support 
as necessary only during the formative phase of their various projects: 
As long as he help me and give me a start I’ll be right! Five hundred [dollars] to get a 
start, and by and by, we pay him back. Welfare should have helped him before!  
Nyurrmiarri believed that the government’s reason for refusing to support the group at 
Wattie Creek was its aversion to Aboriginal independence:   
                                                 
4  Darwin, NTAS, Mick Rangiari Interview Transcript, October 1986, NTRS 226, TS 485, (T4), p. 16. 
5  Long Johnny Kijngayari, cited in Cecil Holmes, ‘Wattie Creek,’ Aboriginal Quarterly (Abschol, 
Australian National University, Canberra, March 1969). 
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Oh they don’t want to help ‘em out you. He want to, same as old fashion, he want to 
put people back same way […]. They don’t want to see you work your cattle and 
horses, you know, work your place. They trying to put you back old fashion way.6 
Similarly, Nyurrmiarri saw the support of activists as desirable if the activists were employed 
by the Gurindji only for a limited time: 
I ’gree with them, people comin’ in from south to work for us. […] We need them 
fellas comin’ in from South to help we get ’em going this place. We’re the boss and 
they the ones going to work for us.7  
The matter of the Gurindji people’s apparent aversion to, and simultaneous reliance on, 
government support is one I shall return to. 
9.2 Facilitative Government Deliberations 
As we have seen in Chapter Three, the primary means by which self-determination policy’s 
architects sought to involve Aboriginal people in decision-making about their own affairs 
was by providing them with the means to incorporate. Aboriginal ‘independence’ was not 
touted as a policy aim of self-determination, but was implicitly presented as one of the 
political or economic goals that newly incorporation-enfranchised Aboriginal groups might 
embrace. In 1972, C.D. Rowley, one of self-determination policy’s primary theorists, 
provided an insight into his motivations for recommending national legislation providing 
means for Aboriginal groups to incorporate: 
The main purpose of [the ‘national strategy’ of Aboriginal incorporation] should be to 
strengthen the political influence of the Aboriginal people, so that they may, within 
the law and within reason, choose how and where they live, and operate as pressure 
groups for change.  
Similarly, he continued: 
                                                 
6  See Pincher Nyurrmiarri, Pincher Numiari [sic]—Gurindji Plans and Attitudes: An Interview by 
Warwick Neilley (Abschol and Save the Gurindji Campaign, 1970), p. 4. 
7  ibid. 
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The kind of institution I have in mind should provide an area of security for 
autonomous adjustment. [They] must have an autonomy recognised by law, providing 
[…] comparative security from interference, to develop patterns of leadership 
[emphasis mine].8  
Accordingly, when presenting a submission to the Cabinet of the Whitlam Government 
proposing it approve the drafting of legislation to create a new entity ‘empowered to 
incorporate Aboriginal communities’, Aboriginal Affairs Minister Gordon Bryant justified 
his request on the following basis:  
The government not only discourages such paternalism [of arrangements previously 
promoted by the McMahon and Gorton Governments] but is actively engaged in 
encouraging Aboriginal people to conduct as much of their community’s affairs as 
they wish, as well as entering into contracts and operating business enterprises […], to 
administer their own affairs to the extent they desire.9 
I infer from these and similar statements by H.C. Coombs that the independence of 
Aboriginal groups was one of a number of possible outcomes that the Whitlam Government 
and those involved with self-determination policy’s formulation hoped to foster, by 
providing special means for Aboriginal people’s incorporation.  
The remedial tool of incorporation was double-edged, however. If ‘administering their 
own affairs’ vested Aboriginal groups with a sense of independence which they desired, it 
can be assumed that an important policy corollary of self-determination in the early1970s 
had been fulfilled. It was also possible that in accepting the responsibility of administering 
their own affairs, Aboriginal groups might perceive their sense of independence vis-à-vis 
government to be diminished, and/or that the popularity among Aboriginal groups of the 
responsibilities that incorporation involved had been over-estimated by the CAA and the 
Whitlam Government. As we have seen, both these eventualities were realised in the late 
1970s, and became intrinsic elements of self-determination policy’s adapted form.  
                                                 
8  C.D. Rowley, Outcasts in White Australia (Penguin Books, Ringwood, Victoria, 1972), pp. 422–424. 
9  AIATSIS, ‘Incorporation of Aboriginal Communities’, Incorporation, Papers of Jeremy Long, Box 6, 
Folder 58. 
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9.3 Government-led efforts to enable Gurindji agency at Wave Hill, 1973–
86 
Under self-determination and self-management policies, government officials went to great 
lengths to incorporate a representative local government-like body at Wave Hill, staffed and 
managed where possible by local Aboriginal residents. Within the period of this review, four 
such ‘Council’ bodies were incorporated and subsequently folded, as I will describe. If these 
councils functioned well (and we may generalise that mostly they didn’t), they offered the 
promise of a particular kind of independence: that of the rationalist self-administration of 
government funds in an accountable and largely stipulated manner. The model of Gurindji 
political independence thus promoted via incorporation by government under self-
determination policy was effectively a specific type of limited Self-Government. Arguably, 
this did not confer, or enable, Gurindji independence at all, in some regards. Rather, with the 
accumulation of the new responsibilities that limited Self-Government entailed, the 
operation of these organisations increased Aboriginal people’s integration with the processes 
of the state. 
As I have shown elsewhere, the leaders placed greater emphasis on engendering their 
independence in the 1967—72 period by developing their homestead and cattle operation at 
Wattie Creek.10 I have also argued elsewhere that decisions made by Northern Territory 
Administration staff in Darwin and concomitant actions taken by their colleagues at the 
Wave Hill Welfare Settlement during this period are illustrative of an intention of some 
within the Gorton and McMahon governments to increase Gurindji dependence on 
government-provided services at the Settlement.11 At the time, Wattie Creek’s residents 
reluctantly relied on the Settlement for schooling, a few jobs, major health issues, and much 
of their food—dependencies which the Gurindji leadership were keen to discontinue. 
Throughout this time, the track mob by and large provided their own housing/shelter, water, 
ablutions, and a reasonable amount of their own food. As I have described, they also 
controlled the establishment of their own cattle enterprise, which was of great importance to 
                                                 
10  Charlie Ward, A Handful of Sand: the Gurindji Struggle, After the Walk-off (Clayton, Victoria, Monash 
University Publishing, 2016), Ch. 2–5; Charlie Ward, ‘Following the Leaders: the Role of Non-
Indigenous Activism in the Development of Wattie Creek, 1969–73, Journal of the Royal Australian 
Historical Society, Vol. 100, Pt. 1, (Sydney, 2014). 
11  Ward, 2016, pp. 82–83. 
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Gurindji leaders. The only significant contribution made by outsiders to the Gurindji’s affairs 
in this period was advice given by Gurindji-vetted activist supporters. This arrangement was 
semi-formalised in 1970, when the first live-in supporters employed on the Gurindji’s behalf 
by Abschol arrived.  
While Gurindji leaders sought their group’s social, political, and (ongoing) economic 
independence from the state via the work and lobbying they conducted from Wattie Creek, 
there is no indication that they had any interest in amending their own system of leadership 
in light of European Australian local government ideas and processes or any models of 
political and administrative organisation which they had given rise to. The Gurindji’s 
indifference to these matters is evidenced by their non-engagement with the first 
organisation incorporated at the Wave Hill Welfare Settlement partially for Aboriginal 
community purposes. The Wave Hill Social Club was instigated in 1967 by Settlement 
school teacher Fred Friis.12 Designed to ‘foster community participation in social, cultural 
and recreational activities among the people of the Wave Hill Welfare Centre’, and improve 
the local availability of groceries by establishing a purpose-built shop there, the Social 
Club’s membership was open to all the Aboriginal residents and staff of the Wave Hill 
Welfare Settlement.13 As the Social Club was specifically a ‘Settlement’ concern and the 
benefits of its membership were not apparent to the group at Wattie Creek, it initially 
attracted little interest from them, even while they patronised the Social Club’s store. Later, 
when staff of the Department of Aboriginal Affairs appeared in 1973 with a governmental 
charter to create a local council body that the Whitlam Government hoped would enfranchise 
the Aboriginal residents of Kalkaringi and Daguragu to ‘manage their own affairs’, Gurindji 
elders were nonplussed.  
9.4 Libanungu Council Mk I: 1973–74 
The intention of self-determination policy was to extend a decisive though limited say to 
Wave Hill’s Aboriginal residents in their local affairs, should they want it. In the resultant 
                                                 
12  Darwin, NAA, ‘Constitution’, Wave Hill Social Club, E460, 1981/100. 
13  Later, the Club’s account was used to hold money on behalf of Gurindji people, though the purposes to 
which the McMahon Government should allow them to put it were debated by the Minister for 
Aboriginal Affairs William C. Wentworth, and H.C. Nugget Coombs of the CAA. Oke et al, What Now 
at Wattie Creek, 1970, p. 5; H.C. Coombs, Letter to Mick Rangiari [n.d]; John Zakharov to Alex 
Romanoff, 6 October 1971, Oke Personal Collection. 
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effort by authorities to ‘transfer real authority’ to local Aborigines, including those residing 
at Daguragu, Libanungu Council was incorporated at Kalkaringi in 1973 with funding and 
oversight provided by the DAA. The Department’s intention was that the Council would 
take responsibility for the delivery of local government services, and to achieve this, a 
kartiya manager was employed.14 The Council was based in Kalkaringi, which the elders 
then largely sought to ignore. Relations between Daguragu’s leadership and this new 
‘representative’ council body were established, though the elders’ later actions reveal that 
they doubted the new Council’s relevance to their own work at Daguragu. This is 
understandable—its focus of municipal-type service provision was of little relevance in 
Daguragu, which remained an un-serviced collection of huts and humpies.15  
These issues were also peripheral to the new Council, which was productively 
occupied at Kalkaringi. With the town’s conducive tenure, and its historic function as a 
coordination point for governmental activity, significant building and development there 
continued. And unlike Daguragu’s residents, Libanungu Council’s ample Kalkaringi-based 
Aboriginal workforce identified with their employer: 
Councillors have acquired a demountable building left by a firm of contractors and 
have converted it to an office building from which they propose to conduct their 
affairs. Council workers, some of them in their off-duty time, have spread soil [and] 
planted grass and trees around their municipal office, which they consider to be their 
own headquarters.16  
Few residents wished to participate in the Council’s management, administration and 
governance, though. Those who did so were frequently placed in an invidious position. The 
enormous increase of financial and administrative responsibilities which the new Council 
placed upon Gurindji leaders was highlighted when a large funding cheque was sent to the 
new Libanungu Council, where according to an official it languished for some time. 
                                                 
14  These functions included general hygiene, road, aerodrome and parks and gardens maintenance and 
the development of a market garden and poultry farm. Darwin, NAA, Termination of Training 
Allowances […], E460, 1974/1217; Darwin, NAA, ‘Aboriginal Community Adviser’, 8 July 1974, 
Community Adviser—Wave Hill, E460, 1974/1028. 
15  Tensions at this time about whether the Council should perform basic services such as rubbish collection 
at Daguragu serve as early indicators of the contradictions of the Gurindji’s in/dependent political stance 
which I elucidate in the following chapter.  
16  Darwin, NAA, Wave Hill Community Development, E460, 1974/242.  
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‘Regrettably […] none of the Aboriginals were aware of what this [cheque] represented’.17 
Nonetheless, both Billy Bunter, the youthful council president elected in large part for his 
literacy and numeracy skills, and Mick Rangiari, representing Wattie Creek’s residents, were 
asked to consider whether ‘their’ new Wundamarie Housing Association wished to manage 
the Kalkaringi settlement’s housing program. They readily consented. The contract was 
worth the equivalent of $6 million in today’s terms.18 Far from Kalkaringi’s Aboriginal 
residents guiding the community’s extraneous, sudden, poorly-coordinated development by 
the Housing Association and Council however, they were badly disenfranchised by it, 
according to activist supporter Jean Culley: 
Despite the much-vaunted Aboriginal self-determination policy, the expansion at the 
settlement [Kalkaringi] is so great that the Warlpiri [residents] are losing track, more 
and more NACC elections, council, government elections, housing association [sic]. 
They just haven’t got a grasp of it all.19 
Libanungu Council’s immediate strategic problem was its inability to hire residents who 
could explain these matters to others, or even conduct the administrative work which the 
Council’s operation entailed.  
Libanungu Council’s other primary challenge was overtly political: how could it attain 
relevance, let alone credibility, in the eyes of local people, particularly Daguragu’s leaders? 
One year into the Whitlam Government’s self-determination project, Departmental secretary 
Barrie Dexter was privately concerned that any progress in this endeavour in NT 
communities was ‘more apparent than real’, and that the DAA had inadvertently created ‘a 
problem of major proportions’: 
Some communities seem to regard the councils as European, and therefore […] elect 
to them […] persons who they believe to be acceptable to European Australians. […] 
                                                 
17  Darwin, NAA, ‘Visit to Wave Hill Centre’, 30 January–1 February 1974, Wave Hill Centre—Policy, 
E460, 81/306. 
18  Darwin, NAA, ‘Housing Programme 1973/74’, 7 August 1973, Home Management Services: 
Wundamarie Housing Association 1974, E460, 1974/1486. 
19  The reasons for the presence of Warlpiri families and individuals at Kalkaringi and the broader 
relationship of Warlpiri with the Gurindji are described in Chapter Two. Jean Culley to Rob and Barbara 
et al, 20 August 1974, Oke Personal Collection. 
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We thereby set in motion a process that tends to weaken the traditional lines of 
authority.20  
More likely than Dexter’s concern that incorporated councils might result in ‘weaken[ed] 
traditional lines of authority’ was the likelihood that the extant ‘traditional authority’ at 
Daguragu simply saw the new council as largely irrelevant to their concerns. Their group’s 
self-identification and survival had depended upon the ability of its elders to provide 
competent and coherent leadership. Yet political anthropologist Patrick Sullivan notes in All 
Free Man Now: Culture, Community and Politics in the Kimberly Region, North-Western 
Australia, to whatever extent Aboriginal people might be aware of the ‘historically produced 
alien cultural system’ of European administration, it had a ‘lesser claim on them than their 
own [systems of knowledge and cultural meaning]’.21 Furthermore, Sullivan observes that 
an ‘Aboriginal’ council of the type incorporated under self-determination policy: 
[…] neither abrogates nor dominates other forms of agreement among community 
members. This poses problems for the effectiveness of representation, consultation and 
decision-making in the group. None of these activities necessarily attach to 
traditionally sanctioned authority.22  
As we shall see, attaching a local government-type body to ‘traditionally sanctioned 
authority’ was a problem that would preoccupy numerous DAA staff and increasingly the 
Gurindji elders at Wave Hill throughout the 1970s.23  
9.5 Libanungu Council Mk II: 1974–77 
Unable to recruit suitably-skilled local Aboriginal staff to manage their well-resourced new 
council at Kalkaringi, the Department of Aboriginal Affairs employed former Abschol-
employed bricklayer Alan Thorpe as the council’s Municipal Officer. The problem facing 
the DAA, and soon Thorpe, was that of encouraging the extant body of local Aboriginal 
decision-makers to recognise the Council’s relevance to their own political power. It was 
                                                 
20  AIATSIS, ‘Community Control’, Barrie Dexter 12 December 1973, in Local Councils, Papers of Jeremy 
Long, Manuscript Collection, MS 2534, Box 6, Folder 57. 
21  Patrick Sullivan, All Free Man Now: Culture, Community and Politics in the Kimberly Region, North-
Western Australia (Aboriginal Studies Press, Canberra, 1996), p. 46. 
22  Sullivan, ibid., p. 37. 
23  ibid.  
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hoped that by such means the Aboriginal population at large, especially that of Daguragu, 
might recognise the Council’s authority. With these ends in mind, Thorpe went to work 
convincing the Gurindji elders that unlike previous ‘Welfare’ initiatives at the Settlement, 
the new Council was—or had the potential to be—an Aboriginal political instrument. By 
virtue of his marriage to a Kalkaringi-based Warlpiri woman, Thorpe’s views carried some 
weight with Kalkaringi and Daguragu’s leaders and the Council’s staff. Little is known about 
the form his discussions with them took in late 1974, but their results were quickly apparent. 
A decision was made—or conceded to—by the Daguragu elders that went to the heart of 
their goal of political independence. The outcome of this was announced by Minister for 
Aboriginal Affairs James Cavanagh, whose press release of 11 December 1974 declared that 
Vincent Lingiari: 
[…] had the pleasure of advising […] that the Gurindji people of Wattie Creek and the 
townspeople of Wave Hill Settlement have united in the name of Libanungu 
Community Council to work together in all projects associated with the development 
of Wave Hill town and Daguragu Cattle Station […].24  
In practice, what this meant was that half of Libanungu Council’s twenty-two seats would 
be reserved for members from Daguragu, and that the Council would make decisions on 
behalf of both communities.25 The obvious corollary of this was that Libanungu Council 
acquired a degree of authority over the nascent Daguragu homestead. While the language of 
Lingiari’s supposed message was not likely his own, the political process behind the decision 
to which it alludes was entirely Indigenous, if the DAA is to be believed:  
The decision to amalgamate the Wattie Creek and Wave Hill township communities 
[…] was taken after lengthy discussion between the groups concerned, and followed 
on [from] a series of ceremonies, which had been performed jointly and separately by 
the Gurindji and Warlpiri tribes. These ceremonies extended into Hooker Creek, 
Yuendumu and Papunya and involved people from Wattie Creek and Wave Hill, who 
                                                 
24  Australia, The Senate, Sen. James Cavanagh, Aboriginal Land Fund Bill 1974, 11 December 1974 
(Canberra, Commonwealth Government Printer, 1974); Sen. James Cavanagh, ‘Statement by the 
Minister – Wattie Creek’, 11 December 1974. 
25  Darwin, NAA, ‘Addendum to Original […] Report]’, Wave Hill - Review of Council Programs and 
Employment Projects, E460, 1981/89 PART 2. 
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travelled to those centres. […] These ceremonial gatherings are explicitly of 
Aboriginal origin and could not in any way be influenced by non-Aboriginal sources. 
[The ceremonies] would seem to have some local Aboriginal political theme and [may 
be] an attempt to resolve potential frictions which were deriving from traditional 
matters [sic.].26 
Although this interpretation of the elders’ ‘amalgamation’ decision varies from other non-
Indigenous accounts that do not indicate any link between the ceremonies held and 
discussions about ‘amalgamating’ Kalkaringi and Daguragu, it is possible that Daguragu’s 
elders saw their merger with Libanungu Council as a conciliatory gesture between 
themselves and Kalkaringi’s (mainly Warlpiri) residents. As shown in my discussion 
regarding the plurality of the local Aboriginal population in Chapter Two, the issue of 
Warlpiri people living on Gurindji land and in Wave Hill’s nominally Gurindji communities 
provided a source of growing tension for Gurindji leaders. 
Rather than seeing the Gurindji elders’ decision to merge their leadership with 
Libanungu Council as the result of Warlpiri-Gurindji peacemaking however, the most 
common view—as conveyed in available records and supported by the (almost immediate) 
subsequent disavowal of the ‘amalgamation’ by the Gurindji—contradicts that of the DAA. 
To their unofficial supporters such as Jean Culley, the Gurindji’s decision was prompted by 
pressure and bribery:  
The Gurindji have finally been forced to put their heads in a noose to get some goodies. 
They needed help badly […]. I feel the threat of a school at Wattie Creek has forced 
the settlement’s hand. […] Money, money, and more money was what Thorpe [the 
newly promoted municipal officer of Libanungu Council] offered […] and so they 
gave in.27  
It was commonly thought by non-Indigenous observers that the ‘amalgamation’ of the 
Daguragu group with Libanungu Council was the result of Alan Thorpe’s attempt to increase 
his power over Daguragu.28 What was overlooked by kartiya at the time was that Thorpe’s 
                                                 
26  Ford (DAA) to Dexter, 24 December 1974, Oke Personal Collection. 
27  Culley to Oke, 13 December 1974, Oke Personal Collection. 
28  Sydney, Library of New South Wales (hereafter SLNSW), McConvell to Jean, 28 May 1975, in Gurindji 
at Wattie Creek (Daguragu), Northern Territory, Hannah Middleton Papers, c. 1966-1976, MLMSS 
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marriage to a Warlpiri woman would have aligned him with the Warlpiri in the eyes of 
Gurindji leaders. The elders’ motivation for the merger was not so much the result of 
Thorpe’s bargaining skills as the elder’s desire to resolve local Aboriginal tensions.29  
After the Minister’s announcement about the administrative ‘unification’ of Kalkaringi 
and Daguragu residents, the Gurindji elders distanced themselves from the European and 
Warlpiri power base of Kalkaringi. Although the elders did not, it seems, wish to join with 
the official instrument of governance at the settlement in the way described by Cavanagh, 
their concession to ‘amalgamate’ was nonetheless an astute example of their real politik. In 
amalgamating, the Daguragu leaders sacrificed some of their independence from 
government—a regrettable outcome, in the eyes of their kartiya supporters—while 
concurrently increasing their entitlement to government services and their own power (or at 
least relevance) regarding local affairs. By conceding to a body representative of both 
communities, they had increased their authority over the settlement (including the Warlpiri 
living there) and compelled the well-equipped council at Kalkaringi to provide services to 
Wattie Creek. Importantly, they had not conceded any of their ambition for the Muramulla 
Co. In the words of Lingiari at this time: 
My [pastoral lease, excised from Wave Hill Station] is coming. [It] covers the lot. […] 
All these councillors, half of the money they’re going to chuck it back here [to 
Daguragu]. Township [Libanungu Council] have his own book [financial records] in 
Settlement, Wattie Creek going to have his own [too].30  
From this short statement, it would appear that Lingiari conceded to the amalgamation 
because of the funding it would apparently deliver to Wattie Creek, even while he sought to 
retain the homestead’s financial independence. In the eyes of the Gurindji’s supporters 
                                                 
5866/15. ‘Gurindji Struggle Threatened by Bureaucracy’, Tribune, 21 January 1975, p. 12; Darwin, 
NAA, ‘Bishaw to Director, Muramulla Gurindji Association —Wattie Creek Development, E460, 
1975/196; Darwin, NAA, ‘Addendum to Original […] Report]’, Wave Hill - Review of Council 
Programs and Employment Projects, E460, 1981/89 PART 2. 
29  Considering that Thorpe’s power among Aboriginal people at Wave Hill was dependent upon his 
marriage to a Warlpiri woman, the saga of the Council merger and its subsequent abandonment by 
Gurindji elders may be read as a result of local Aboriginal plurality—and an example of the largely 
unforeseen complications this would cause for self-determination policy’s implementation.  
30  Lingiari’s allusion to ‘books’ refers to financial self-management, as in ‘book-keeping’, or ‘keeping the 
book’ as it was sometimes described. Lingiari to Cavanagh, 27 December 1974, Oke Personal 
Collection. 
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however, the cost of this short-lived ‘amalgamation’ was that the Gurindji conceded 
something of their powerful reputation as the nation’s bastions of Indigenous self-reliance, 
built over the last seven years. How important this reputation was to Gurindji elders is 
unknown. 
On 30 April 1975, Frank Hardy visited the Gurindji.31 Hardy—accompanied by DAA 
regional manager Alex Bishaw and community adviser Richard Preece—wished to discuss 
with the elders their relationship with Kalkaringi, and to encourage them to reclaim their 
independence from Libanungu Council. Although the DAA officers were less prescriptive, 
the topic of conversation suited them. Due to the impending resolution of the Gurindji’s land 
tenure ‘in their favour’, Bishaw wished to get some ‘definite expression of [the Gurindji’s] 
intentions and ambitions […], for now is the time for them to decide the direction of their 
future’.32 Discussion ensued between those Bishaw saw as a ‘fairly representative group of 
Gurindji elders’ and the three visitors. Despite his belief that Hardy’s visit would 
restrengthen the Gurindji leaders’ vision of an independent Daguragu, Bishaw went to some 
lengths to make sure that the Department did not interfere with their discussions. During the 
talks that ensued, it became apparent to the visitors that from the elders’ perspective, the 
amalgamation of Daguragu and Kalkaringi under one council was effectively over. Instead, 
the Gurindji men advanced a series of proposals which Bishaw saw as a request ‘for a 
strengthening of their own social organisation as an entity separate from [Kalkaringi]’.33 
Bishaw described the Gurindji’s desire for ‘separate development’ as a ‘new concept’ 
without irony.34 Following their talks, the Gurindji leaders ‘held an election to create the 
new [Daguragu-based] Gurindji Council’.35 The day after, Preece (and Hardy) became 
‘almost violently opposed to what they claimed were Alan Thorpe’s efforts to amalgamate 
the Gurindji people with the Settlement people, [so as to] gain control of most of the daily 
operations in the whole area himself’.36 Thorpe, who was inadequately qualified to manage 
                                                 
31  NAA, E460, 1975/196. 
32  ibid.  
33  ibid.  
34  Kijngayari, op. cit.; Ward, ‘Tracking Wave Hill—Following the Gurindji to Wattie Creek, 1966–72’ 
(Unpublished MA Thesis, Adelaide, Flinders University, 2012); NAA, E460, 1975/196. 
35  NAA, E460, 1975/196. 
36  ibid.  
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the Council, resigned as its Municipal Officer soon afterwards, and took up the management 
of the Kalkaringi store. 
The ‘unification’ of the two Wave Hill communities’ institutional governance that 
Minister Cavanagh had trumpeted five months earlier was now in tatters. Libanungu Council 
continued functioning with nominal responsibility for both communities but lacked any 
mandate from Daguragu’s elders. When Cavanagh visited Daguragu on 29 May 1974, he 
did not comment on the elders’ about-face. He did, however, recognise the validity of the 
new (then un-incorporated) Daguragu Council, which accepted a government ‘welfare’ 
employee, Richard Preece, as its Community Adviser and general assistant—a first for the 
leaders of Daguragu. Probably more significant in their decision than Preece’s status as a 
public servant was his ‘pro-independence’ stance and his affiliation with Hardy.  
In the weeks after the elders and Cavanagh reached agreement on the creation of a new 
Daguragu Council and the government’s willingness to support it, linguist Patrick 
McConvell reported that the general mood of the Daguragu homestead/community 
improved, and much fencing, gardening and mustering was conducted ‘with no white 
direction’.37 Street lighting and a sewage system had just been installed, though the ambition 
of Daguragu’s residents to maintain practical—as opposed to administrative—independence 
from Kalkaringi remained.38 High among the elders’ goals in this regard was to revive the 
Muramulla Company-owned store at Daguragu, which had previously operated from a 
wooden shed under the guidance of Pincher Nyurrmiarri and Jean Culley. For this reason, 
Preece’s first job as the community’s (or from the elders’ perspective, their homestead’s) 
adviser was to oversee the building of a ‘proper’ government-funded shop there, which 
opened in early March 1976.39 As a subsidiary of the Muramulla Company, the enterprise 
used the Muramulla Company’s Social Club (which had been incorporated in 1971) as a 
carapace.40  
While the new Daguragu Council and the recently-funded Muramulla Company enjoyed a 
period of increased activity at Daguragu during Muramulla’s Productive Phase (1976–79), 
                                                 
37  McConvell to Culley, 8 May 1975, Oke Personal Collection. 
38  Darwin, NTAS, Richard Preece, Interview Recorded by Charlie Ward, September 2010, NTRS 3609, 
BWF 17. 
39  Darwin, NAA, ‘Community Development Wave Hill […]’, 16 March 1976, Community Adviser—Wave 
Hill, E460, 1974/1028. 
40  Middleton to Roet, 30 December 1970, Oke Personal Collection 
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the accelerated growth that had characterised Kalkaringi’s development during the early 
1970s slackened. In September 1976, DAA officers deemed the community to be in ‘a state 
of disarray’.41 Visiting officials diagnosed Libanungu Council as the cause of its malaise. 
Evidence of this was obvious to them: underperforming employees were a primary symptom, 
as was poor ‘control of council vehicles’, attributed to ‘so much ceremony going on’.42 The 
public servants noted that in comparison to Daguragu, Kalkaringi’s work gangs now lacked 
motivation. They attributed the Settlement’s decline to the laziness of Council staff and/or a 
lack of appropriate instruction. It was believed that such issues would be remedied by 
‘suitable European support’, as the following departmental assessment of council employees 
shows: ‘I am convinced that in by far the majority of cases [underperformance] is not from 
a lack of “will to work” but a lack of knowledge of what to do and when to do it’.43 
In the latter part of the 1970s, Libanungu Council slid into dysfunction, as I have 
described in my book A Handful of Sand.44 The Council and other Aboriginal organisations 
at Wave Hill were subject to the same pressures and elisions driving self-determination 
policy’s adaptation elsewhere. With a paucity of qualified or experienced local Aboriginal 
staff, under-qualified non-Indigenous staff were recruited, and these individuals were then 
able to influence subsequent staffing decisions in turn. Such employees had little incentive 
(and perhaps less ability) to improve the Council’s departmentally-defined functionality, and 
harboured divergent or no opinions about what that might mean. In combination with work 
gangs of Aboriginal staff who were also lax in acquitting the duties required of them, it was 
thought by DAA officers that the Council was an organisation that ‘lack[ed] motivation for 
change’.45 In fact the main ‘change’ that occurred during this period was the cyclical process 
whereby new staff arrived, their limitations were discovered by their Aboriginal board or 
DAA ‘employers’, and they eventually left, whether of their own free will or not.46 Such 
‘teething problems’ of government-defined Gurindji independence at Kalkaringi would soon 
occur at Daguragu also.  
                                                 
41  Darwin, NAA, ‘Report of Happenings and Changes […]’, 18 November 1975, Wave Hill Community 
Development, E460, 1978/242. 
42  Darwin, NAA, Wave Hill - Review of Council Programs and Employment Projects, E460, 1981/89 Part 
2. 
43  NAA, ‘Report of Happenings […]’, E460, 1978/242. 
44  Ward, 2016, pp. 226–228 
45  Darwin, NAA, ‘Visit Wave Hill Community 20/21 September 1976’, Wave Hill - Review of Council 
Programs and Employment Projects, E460, 1981/89 Part 2. 
46  ibid.  
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Although there were plans to incorporate the unofficial new ‘Council’ at Daguragu, its 
DAA intermediaries desired further reform of Wave Hill’s local governance. The 
Department’s overarching agenda was increasingly to create one local government body. 
The economic and practical inefficiencies of operating two remote area councils for small 
populations in close proximity were problematic, as the paucity of staff housing at 
Kalkaringi and the poor quality of its staff had revealed. Also, as the eventual withdrawal of 
DAA staff was planned under the terms of ‘self-management’, any new council(s) would 
hopefully take over local administration and community development from the Department. 
Such a withdrawal, it was presumably thought, would be easier if there was one (stable) local 
government authority accommodating both Gurindji communities.  
9.6 Developing a council at Daguragu: 1976–77 
With these issues in mind, the DAA’s Katherine-based Area Officer John Rutter travelled to 
Wave Hill in late July 1976. He proposed a new amalgamated council structure to Vincent 
Lingiari and Billy Bunter which differed from Thorpe’s earlier proposal in one key respect. 
Rather than the Wattie Creek leadership being subsumed into the existing Libanungu 
Council structure, in Rutter’s vision the seat of decision-making would shift to Daguragu 
and the people there would be ensured, but not limited to, equal representation. In short, 
Rutter’s proposal located administrative control and decision-making at Daguragu rather 
than Kalkaringi, as Thorpe’s had done. It was an attempt to reflect and support the extant 
dialectic of ‘traditional’ Aboriginal power in the two communities, while advancing the 
Department’s other, consolidative aim. The response his proposal engendered among the 
Gurindji makes a section of Rutter’s report worth quoting in full:  
The new Council arrangements would involve five councillors from both Wave Hill 
[Kalkaringi] and Wattie Creek. Each group of five would make routine decisions 
pertinent to their own community, but they would act as a council often for general 
planning and major decisions. Mr Vincent Lingiari told me that this is the way the people 
had [previously] decided that it was to be, but that efforts to form a single Council had 
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been [previously] thwarted by Mister Frank Hardy who came to Wattie Creek and ‘kept 
talking’ until they agreed to change.47 
[…] I only described this proposal briefly and on one occasion. This was to 
Aboriginal Community Adviser Billy Bunter and Vincent Lingiari. Both men 
immediately got very excited and started drawing an organisation in the dirt. Later I 
borrowed a blackboard from the school in order to describe the concept of the Council, 
but half an hour later I found several Aboriginals in control of the blackboard drawing 
their own version of the organisation. They were copying it from a notebook where they 
had set it out in considerable detail. We were not invited to join the subsequent joint 
council meeting until it had been going for an hour, and by then there was little left for 
me to do but make sure that they had not misunderstood what was departmentally 
acceptable. After I left [Kalkaringi] meetings were held at Wattie Creek on three 
successive days with attendances of up to three hundred people. Europeans were not 
permitted to attend. I understand that the proposal as outlined above has been accepted 
by both communities.48 
During his subsequent visit to Wave Hill, DAA officer Len Ibbotson was also reportedly 
told by residents ‘very strongly that they are one people and want one council’.49 From his 
perspective, this had only been prevented by the meddling of an un-named person (Frank 
Hardy), which had ‘naturally’ confused people. Although Rutter and Ibbotson’s superior Ian 
Pitman advised caution due to the previous failure of Thorpe’s proposed amalgamation, he 
nonetheless made it clear that he welcomed ‘amalgamations and rationalisations of this kind, 
provided that the residents of the communities involved are happy with the arrangements’.50 
Noting that the extant Libanungu Council had been hamstrung by its need to refer decisions 
to the Daguragu group, the DAA staff involved in this merger believed that a Daguragu-
                                                 
47  In line with his general vision of an autonomous socialist society at Wattie Creek (as put forward in his 
film: John Goldschmidt (Dir.), ‘The Unlucky Australians’, Associated Television (ATV), United 
Kingdom,1974; it is likely that Hardy had encouraged the Gurindji there to reject proposals emanating 
from the Settlement by which the governance of the two communities would merge. Hardy—and many 
others—believed that such moves would lead to the usurpation of the Gurindji at Daguragu by either 
(or both) Warlpiri and government staff at the Settlement.  
48  Darwin, NAA, ‘Community Associations Wave Hill and Hooker Creek’, Wave Hill - Review of Council 
Programs and Employment Projects, E460, 1981/89 Part 2. 
49  Darwin, NAA, ‘Wave Hill/Wattie Creek’, Wave Hill - Review of Council Programs and Employment 
Projects, 23 November 1976, E460, 1981/89 Part 2. 
50  ‘Assistant Director, Planning and Projects’, NAA, E460, 1981/89 Part 2. 
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based council would provide a more appropriate vehicle for local political power. Contrary 
to the earlier, common perception among activists that the government’s attempts to unite 
the leadership of the two communities were designed to bring Daguragu ‘under the control’ 
of officials at Kalkaringi, when it finally occurred, the intention of the Department (as 
described by its Regional Officer) was the ‘rationalisation and recognition of the existing 
[Aboriginal] decision-making process’.51 
As we will soon see, by this time the elders were of the opinion that a European-style 
council at Daguragu could be harnessed to increase their own authority, and attract funding 
to further develop their homestead. This marked a major shift in the elder’s political stance. 
Previously, the Daguragu leadership had rightly associated governmental power and 
resourcing with hegemonic interference and/or neglect from the Wave Hill Welfare 
Settlement/Kalkaringi. Now, after witnessing Kalkaringi’s development under self-
determination policy and the associated professional advancement and enrichment of 
associated kartiya, it appears they had concluded that they could similarly capitalise on the 
resourcing of Daguragu without compromising their independence—or be left behind.  
The elders’ previous maintenance of an almost exclusive Gurindji ‘domain’ at 
Daguragu—for long held in contradistinction by them with the kartiya and Warlpiri edifice 
of Kalkaringi—was similar to that observed by a number of anthropologists and scholars 
elsewhere in north and central Australia in the 1970s–80s.52 The elders’ purpose in doing so 
was to attend to internal matters and (as they saw it) to nurture conditions supportive of the 
power from which their authority derived, in some isolation from the non-Indigenous realm 
to which they believed they had been historically over-exposed. We can induce from the 
elders’ promulgation of an autonomous Gurindji domain at Daguragu that they had seen 
their project of independent self-management there as achievable within the Gurindji 
realm—with the additional contribution, as we have seen, of specific forms of non-
Indigenous support. That stance was one that they sought to experiment with in a 
consequential way in 1978. Five years of increased government resourcing and ‘Aboriginal 
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control’ at Kalkaringi (and more recently of the Muramulla Company) had given Daguragu’s 
leaders cause to reconsider their precept of their homestead’s self-management as an entirely 
Aboriginal concern. That is to say, they now considered Gurindji self-determination—or at 
least the part of that project responsive to the activity of an incorporated Council body—as 
one to which they could productively harness non-Indigenous governmental machinery. In 
the same way that they now managed the Muramulla Company at Daguragu with the 
contribution of visiting non-Indigenous expertise, the elders believed that they might 
incorporate the new Council’s political machinery within their own domain, from where they 
would seek to control its work, resources, and many non-Indigenous exigencies. To obtain 
autonomy and control of Daguragu Council, the elders repeatedly insisted that a condition 
of the new amalgamation was that this organisation should ‘keep the book’ itself. Any 
Departmental doubts about ‘devolving’ self-administration had been quashed by the 
inadequate work of Libanungu Council’s third-party accountants in Darwin.53  
It is highly likely that another significant factor in the elders’ re-evaluation was the 
Muramulla Company’s recent activity and progress at Daguragu, not only as a cattle 
enterprise but as something of a civic service provider and a vehicle for community 
development under the elders’ nominal control. While Libanungu Council was criticised for 
its inactivity, Muramulla—the elders’ preferred utility, perhaps—played a consequential 
role in Daguragu’s development. After the Company’s store opened in 1976, it became the 
heavily-patronised centre of activity and community focus at Daguragu. Unlike the 
massively subsidised pastoral operations of the Company itself, the Daguragu store was 
financially self-supporting and at times profitable. In 1978, Muramulla consultant John Edey 
anticipated that the store’s ‘turnover’ would probably exceed $100,000 ($506,000) that year. 
Edey believed that ‘the Gurindji viewed the shop at Daguragu with considerable pride and 
[…] there have been significant social benefits, in addition to the successful direct 
involvement of Judith Donald’.54 Muramulla’s workers planted lawns and trees around the 
                                                 
53  Dispersal of financial responsibility exposed community councils to greater risk. When the high 
likelihood of Libanungu Council running out of funds before its grants were received for the next 
financial year was identified by a DAA review team in 1978, its accountants were asked why they had 
not warned the DAA (or the Council itself). The accountant’s response was that unlike in the case of 
their Housing Association clients, they were under no obligation to provide advice about the spending 
of councils. See Darwin, NAA, ‘Funding of Projects’, Wave Hill - Review of Council Programs and 
Employment Projects, E460, 1981/89 Part 2. 
54  Darwin, NAA, ‘Edey to Kimmings [DAA]’, 7 March 1978, Muramulla Gurindji Cattle Company Part 
2, E460, 1981/256 
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store and the area was used to screen well-attended movies with an expensive Company-
bought projector.55 The successful delivery of these and other ‘community development’ and 
modest municipal-type services by the company in these years is seemingly indicative of an 
approximate match between Daguragu’s still modest size, the simplicity of its facilities and 
the Muramulla enterprise’s staffing and resource base.56 By deciding that in addition to their 
Muramulla responsibilities they would effectively take on governance responsibility for 
Daguragu Council—a body which would provide local government-type services for both 
the communities at Wave Hill—Daguragu’s leaders sacrificed any such match. 
9.7 Conclusion 
The machinations I have described in this chapter provide an account of the Whitlam and 
Fraser Governments’ efforts to align incorporative governmental tools with the extant 
arrangements of Aboriginal power at Wave Hill. Simultaneously, we have seen the attempts 
of Aboriginal leaders to harness and/or accommodate these government-created entities for 
their own, collective, enabling purposes. After several attempts made by both parties over a 
period of five years at Wave Hill, an ostensible match between the political arrangements of 
Aboriginal people with the governmental tools provided to support them was achieved in 
1977. In the following chapter I shall explore this arrangement’s outcomes as a vehicle of 
Gurindji independence and therefore Gurindji self-determination, for both its Aboriginal and 
non-Indigenous interlocutors.  
                                                 
55  Darwin, NAA, ‘Muramulla Gurindji Co P/L Report […]’, 5 September 1977, Muramulla Gurindji 
Cattle Company, Part 2, E460, 1981/256. 
56  Ironically, the Company had more success in its community-development-type role than it eventually 
achieved as a pastoral concern. Although the Company’s store was ‘managed’ by a succession of 
kartiya, its success as an agent of community development, its employment of Gurindji women, its 
stability in the 1970s and 80s, its heavy patronage by Daguragu’s residents, the revenue it generated for 
the Muramulla Co, and not least its seeming lack of appeal to thieves and vandalism—warrant its 
categorisation as a success of Gurindji self-management, as measured against the aims of both local 
leaders and the Fraser Government. If Daguragu’s scale and complexity had remained akin to that of a 
large and well-resourced station homestead (as I believe the Gurindji elders’ original vision entailed), 
the elders’ guidance of the Muramulla Company store in the late 1970s indicate that they might also 
have possessed the capacity to successfully oversee Daguragu’s management through the Company—
if there had been enough of them to manage the pastoral side of its operations as well.  
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Ch. 10 Gurindji Independence: Part II 
 
 
 
 
  
After four years of Aboriginal self-determination policy implementation at Wave Hill, by 
1977 the Gurindji elders had been given cause to reconsider their previously separatist stance 
regarding Kalkaringi in important ways. No statements regarding their reasons for this were 
recorded, though it may be surmised that major development at Kalkaringi and the 
incorporation of organisations with Aboriginal governance and employment opportunities 
encouraged the elders to reconceptualise the role of government they envisaged regarding 
Daguragu’s development and governance. This revision had two immediate outcomes: 
firstly, the elders made it clear that contrary to their earlier position, they now wished for 
Daguragu to be resourced and developed with similarly-scaled infrastructure to that at 
Kalkaringi.1 Secondly, Daguragu’s elders had enthusiastically adopted the notion of a 
Daguragu-based local council, which would include representatives from Kalkaringi on its 
board and would exercise authority over both Wave Hill’s communities. The appeal of this 
prospective arrangement to the elders may be assumed: such an arrangement would reflect 
and potentially channel the extant system of Aboriginal power at Wave Hill, which they 
dominated. Presumably, Daguragu’s leaders also now thought that a Daguragu-based 
council would also provide more jobs for their extended family members residing at 
Daguragu, and provide more opportunity for those individuals to contribute in meaningful 
ways to their community’s development.  
With these newly-acquired apparent beliefs and motives, Daguragu’s leaders had 
accepted some important premises and assumptions of self-determination policy, namely 
that incorporated organisations could be potentially utilised to realise Aboriginal aspirations, 
                                                 
1  From the evidence I have obtained, this change in the elders’ position was not, apparently, accompanied 
by any new thinking about how this development should occur. Darwin, NAA, ‘Bishaw to Director’, 
Muramulla Gurindji Association—Wattie Creek Development, E460, 1975/196. 
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and that Aboriginal organisation-directed material development and employment, among 
other things, could enfranchise Aboriginal groups in desirable ways.  
Gurindji elders and DAA staff thus incorporated a new council at Daguragu. With both 
sets of Gurindji self-determination’s protagonists apparently enjoying a shared 
understanding of the new council’s raison-d’etre, this body (and its subsequent incarnations) 
represented self-determination policy’s greatest potential at Wave Hill. My final assessment 
of Gurindji self-determination hinges on its progress as an enabler of Aboriginal 
independence.  
10.1 Daguragu Council, 1977–82 
In early 1977, Daguragu Council was incorporated under the Associations Incorporations 
Ordinance (1964–69).2 Although the ability of the Council to influence the activities of 
government departments in the ‘open town’ of Kalkaringi was extremely limited, more than 
any of the Gurindji’s other enabling projects and most prominent within the group’s 
generation-long quest for independence, the amalgamated, Daguragu-centred Council 
incorporated in 1977 represents the historic apex of Gurindji people’s self-determinative 
potential. To understand the Council’s impact—or the lack of it—on Gurindji self-
determination, we will analyse the factors influencing its operation in some detail. 
A combined Council meeting was held on 1 November 1977 at Daguragu to discuss 
the proposed merger. Sixteen Aboriginal councillors and five government officials were 
present. As per the DAA’s formulaic style of community consultation, each councillor was 
encouraged to give their opinion on the topic of amalgamation. Unusually, their words were 
transcribed by DAA staff. Each of the Councillors’ speeches were short, and were generally 
used to affirm their relationships to each other and to express optimism about the 
amalgamation. All the Aboriginal speakers voiced their faith in Vincent Lingiari’s leadership 
and some also emphasised his status as a leader of all Australian Aboriginal people. 
Muramulla Manager Donald Nangiari was the first to speak: 
We got two councils separate—Daguragu and Libanungu. I think much better to have 
one council instead of two […]. This way we will work and help each other [and] have 
one bookkeeper for both council. […] We want you young people trained [to] run our 
                                                 
2  Darwin, NAA, Libanungu/ Daguragu, Department of Aboriginal Affairs, CA2605, E242, K9/2/3. 
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place and [get] more money to build up our country. [Soon] everything have to go 
through Council or Committee, not the white people without committee.3  
Mick Rangiari spoke next: 
[…] Whether it’s shop, housing, anything, [it] belongs to Gurindji. Put it together this 
way […]. We must get strong, we must get up and do something, because our land, 
our country is ours. We like to see [it], this is the way it should be run by both 
community peoples.4 
Kalkaringi Councillor Mick Inverway also spoke, pledging unanimity between the two 
‘branches’ of the Council while asserting his independence: 
I’m president of Libanungu. What Donald said, I agree about [Libanungu] together 
and Wattie Creek. Four of them there—Pincher, Hoppy Mick and Long Johnny, they 
got the council together and leave the job with me at Libanungu. We agree about 
[what] Donald Nangiari [said]: we don’t want books separate because we are one 
group.5  
In the first election of the combined council, most of the Daguragu leaders were 
elected. Though the capacities of Vincent Lingiari and Donald Nangiari had been impeded 
by age, both men continued in their (non-elected) positions as President and Vice President 
of the new Council unchallenged. If the confidence and assertiveness of its board members 
(as was soon displayed by their management of local organisations) were a reliable measure, 
the new council seemingly reified and reinvigorated the authority of Gurindji leaders, in their 
own perception at least. From DAA Community Adviser John Millhouse’s perspective too, 
‘Wattie Creek are assuming full control of the township’.6 At public meetings, ‘strong talk’ 
from councillors became a commonplace, and Council members asserted their control of 
local organisations. Mick Rangiari and others questioned Stan Andrews’ conduct in his 
advisory role with the Muramulla Company, and the independent management style of Bev 
                                                 
3  Darwin, NAA, ‘Wattie Creek Meeting […]’, 1 November 1977, Wave Hill Community Development, 
E460, 1978/242. 
4  ibid.  
5  ibid.  
6  ‘Project Review Visit […]’, August 1977, NAA, E460, 1978/242. 
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Andrews at the Daguragu store was also noted.7 The Wave Hill Social Club committee 
(which was comprised mostly of members of the new Council) confronted shop manager 
Alan Thorpe in a two-day meeting over what they had increasingly come to see as his 
autonomous and unaccountable management of the Kalkaringi store. The Council also 
expelled several young Ngumpit and Warlpiri trouble-makers from the area.8 
Evidently, the new local government structure bolstered the Gurindji leaders’ 
‘traditional’ power, as evidenced by their termination of incompetent and underperforming 
staff. Effectively evicting troublesome kartiya and Warlpiri from Kalkaringi also confirmed 
to the Gurindji gerontocracy the extent of their agency under the new policy regime. For the 
elders, these experiences—and DAA Community Adviser John Millhouse’s dedicated 
encouragement of Aboriginal assertiveness—presumably gave practical meaning to the 
rhetoric of governments in previous years about self-determination and self-management. 
The elders’ newfound agency was heavily circumscribed, however. 
While the new Daguragu Council vested local elders with a greater ‘say’ about some 
managerial aspects of local affairs than in the past, their voluble assertions of their own 
authority require contextualisation. Firstly, the power of the board was evidently limited and 
complicated by government-imposed legislative and financial strictures, not to mention its 
dependence on non-Indigenous staff to interpret and advise on these. While the Gurindji 
leaders’ cultural authority was no longer overtly ignored or contested by the government 
agency tasked with responsibility for Aboriginal Affairs, Aboriginal cultural authority itself 
was being increasingly subject to interrogation from other sources, as I have outlined in 
Chapter Four. The two fronts on which this attack operated I have explained: one was via 
the dissociative rebellion of many, mostly younger, Gurindji residents. The other challenge 
to Aboriginal cultural authority—which the younger generation had adopted and co-opted 
in part themselves—was that created by the unprecedented exposure of Wave Hill’s 
residents to westernising influences and cultural normativism. One instance of this was (for 
instance) the usurpation of Aboriginal punitivism via the inclusion of Aboriginal criminality 
into the settler legal system, not least due to the ‘equality-before-the-law’ modus operandi 
of new Aboriginal Legal Aid agencies. As my account of Rowse and Watts’ ‘trusteeship’ 
                                                 
7  ‘Report on Current Situation […]’, 21 February 1978, NAA, E460, 1978/242. 
8  ibid.  
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function of co-opted self-determination policy also articulates in Chapter Three, other 
aspects of ‘self-determination’ policy impacted inimically on the authority of Aboriginal 
gerontocracies. The policy’s practical requirements tended to enfranchise a younger 
leadership whose power derived from extrinsic sources.9 In light of these and other dynamics 
then impacting upon Aboriginal gerontocratic power, the exhortations of the Gurindji elders 
about the authority of Daguragu Council may be seen more as assertions, rather than 
expressions of, their authority. In other words, repetitive refrains by Long Johnny 
Kijngayari, Jerry Rinyngayarri, Mick Rangiari and others about the strength of the Daguragu 
Council can be understood as entreaties designed to help the elders re-establish greater 
control. When the Council began operating in 1977, it remained to be seen whether the 
alignment of ‘traditionally’ powerful Gurindji individuals with the new forms of authority 
bestowed by government-created organisations at Wave Hill would protect the elders’ 
cultural authority from Aboriginal and governmental deconstruction. 
From a retrospective governance/policy perspective, Daguragu Council’s ability to 
assert its authority over both Wave Hill’s communities via an amalgamated council also 
appears tenuous. Although there was truth in the claim of DAA Community Adviser John 
Millhouse that ‘any form of leadership that exists [at Kalkaringi] does so only with the 
blessing of Wattie Creek’, it remained the case that the official extension of the Daguragu 
elders’ political authority to Kalkaringi was without precedent. While the achievement of an 
amalgamated council with the locus of its authority at Daguragu can itself be regarded as a 
milestone—perhaps the apex—of the Gurindji’s power as an independent ‘self-determining’ 
group, it not only required the elders to extend their power in unprecedented ways, but also 
represented an improbable governance proposition. This is apparent when the situation is 
viewed in terms of the governance model of ‘decentralisation’ then commonly operating 
among remote Aboriginal communities and their satellites.  
‘Decentralisation’ was the term used by policy-makers in the 1970s to refer to the (then 
officially supported) historical dynamic whereby Aboriginal people established permanent 
                                                 
9  Rolf Gerritsen, ‘Blackfellas and Whitefellas: The Politics of Service Delivery to Remote Aboriginal 
Communities in the Katherine Region’, in Service Delivery to Remote Communities, ed. by Peter 
Loveday (Darwin, North Australia Research Unit, Australian National University, 1982) pp. 16–31; 
AIATSIS, Jeremy Long Papers, BG Dexter, ‘Community Control’, Local Councils, MS 2534, Box 6, 
Folder 57. 
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shelter and basic amenities on (or closer to) their traditional country.10 Accommodation and 
infrastructure from that befitting a large permanent homestead to a bush ‘holiday camp’ was 
increasingly desired by Aboriginal people in the 1970s as a reaction to both their recent 
aggregation in large government or church-created settlements and to the chaos wrought by 
the government’s new liberal policies.11 In light of Daguragu’s infamous origins as an 
experiment of Gurindji autonomy, its status as a smaller settlement dependent on the larger 
town of Kalkaringi perfectly matched the decentralised model of service delivery. Prior to 
the amalgamation of the councils of Daguragu (arguably a satellite ‘homeland’) and 
Kalkaringi (its service and support centre) this model had unofficially applied to the 
Kalkaringi-Daguragu relationship. With a new single council operating from Daguragu 
however, it seemed understood that the small ‘outstation’ community was to provide 
leadership and local governance to the central settlement from its satellite. How Kalkaringi, 
with its concentration of functional government agencies, resources and services, its 
pluralistic Aboriginal population and a rapidly changing population of powerful kartiya 
would be externally managed by a small group facing the significant challenges I have 
described, remained to be seen.  
To support Daguragu’s new role as the centre of local governance, in February 1978, 
the new council began holding meetings (and elections) in that community for the first time. 
The council expected that kartiya employees would commute from Kalkaringi to the newly-
built council office in Daguragu.12 Despite or because of the board’s reliance on ‘well-
intentioned Europeans’ whom they were unwilling to live amongst, its members refocused 
their attention on the un-remedied issue now standing between them and Daguragu’s 
sustained independence: the inculcation of a new generation of more appropriately-skilled 
Gurindji leaders. In one of Daguragu Council’s early meetings on 1 March 1978, councillor 
Donald Nangiari announced his priorities:  
This council is going on forever. Not with the old people but with the younger people. 
We old people are just about gone. You mob have to start picking it up. We have ten 
men on the council now. This is the Gurindji area, we all stood up to Lord Vestey, but 
                                                 
10  Gerritsen, op. cit., p. 58. 
11  ‘The Outstation Movement’, Aboriginal News, Vol. 3, No. 9 (Canberra, Australian Govt. Publishing 
Service for the Department of Aboriginal Affairs, 1980), p. 28. 
12  Darwin, NAA, ‘Situation Report—Wave Hill […]’, 6 March 1978 and ‘Current Situation—Wave Hill 
[…]’, 26 February 1979, E460, 1978/242. 
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that was when I was younger. You people have elected this council. It’s all under 
Daguragu, you all understand that. You know that foreman, leading hand. He’s your 
boss.13  
The Council board’s rhetoric then shifted to creating more disciplined work habits among 
younger men, presumably in the hope that they would eventually replace both the kartiya 
employees of the Council and other organisations, and the aging councillors themselves. 
During Daguragu Council’s early meetings, the councillors spoke clearly of their 
expectations of younger residents and also the good behaviour they expected from staff. It 
was explained that the Council would not tolerate drinking at Daguragu and that it expected 
workers to prevent begging by managing their own finances better. The misuse of council 
vehicles was also to cease. Councillor Banto captured the new hard-line attitude of the board: 
‘We have a Council here now, and a policeman’.14 The Council’s threats were not mere 
hyperbole: local elders had a reputation for severity when it came to the punitive treatment 
of miscreants.15  
Affected and motivated as they were by their broader dissociative project then 
underway, few younger people paid any heed of these challenges. One of those who ignored 
this trend was a young Warlpiri man, Billy Bunter—to the extent that he had recently been 
compelled to resign from many of his positions due to overwork.16 As something of an 
‘intimate outsider’ to the Daguragu leaders, Bunter perhaps had fewer disincentives to ‘step-
up’ in the way unsuccessfully demanded of the young Gurindji men. This status also granted 
him the freedom to candidly point out a troubling but no doubt common perception that went 
to the heart of the gerontocracy’s concerns: not only were local young adults failing to take 
up the challenges offered by the DAA and their elders, by disrespecting or ignoring the 
elders’ opinions, ‘high’ Gurindji language and cultural authority, they were also ‘pushing 
                                                 
13  See Darwin, NAA, ‘Minutes—Community Meeting […]’, 1 March 1978, Community Adviser—Wave 
Hill, E460, 1974/1028. 
14  ibid.  
15  Elaine Reeves, ‘Law Reformers at Work—Turning White into Black’, National Times, 4–9 July 1978, 
p. 18. 
16  See Appendix A, which ostensibly reveals the commitments of community leaders to the governance 
of local organisations.  Darwin, NAA, ‘Retirement of Mr. B Bunter […]’, 24 February 1977, Wave Hill 
Community Development, E460, 1978/242. 
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down old people’.17 The only other younger person occupying leadership roles in community 
organisations at the time was Vincent Lingiari’s son, Victor Vincent. While a board member 
of the Muramulla Company, Victor soon took the place of his father as president of the newly 
amalgamated Daguragu Council.18  
Regardless of the elders’ threats of imposing high professional standards and harsh 
workplace discipline, the newly-amalgamated council’s operation as a vehicle enabling 
collective Gurindji independence was soon revealed as a failure by any immediate measure. 
In part this was due to its staffing and governance issues, as I shall now illustrate.  
10.2 Internal dysfunction and staffing 
Many of the problems that had characterised the former Libanungu Council persisted in the 
new Daguragu-based body. By December 1978, officials had recorded a long list of the new 
Council staff and board’s misdemeanours, indiscretions and oversights. It would appear from 
DAA files that while Daguragu’s elders did plan to police the behaviour of staff strictly, they 
were less concerned or less able to forestall their fellow Councillors’ misuse of Council 
assets and work time. From the perspective of the DAA, ‘severe faction fighting’ developed 
among councillors about access to council vehicles, which were being used for non-Council 
purposes. According to regional DAA officer Neil Westbury, Daguragu Council’s work 
output was poor, and neither were its vehicles under control: ‘Two council trucks 
unaccounted for—apparently on a trip somewhere near Alice Springs’.19 Westbury believed 
that the leadership of the Council, especially its Kalkaringi representatives, was particularly 
lacking, except when ‘it came to being paid, or using council vehicles for their own 
purposes’: 
[…] Notorious characters, namely Mick Inverway, Banto Banto and Wonga Bill [have 
been] jockeying for positions of influence and using council trucks for their own 
                                                 
17  Darwin, NAA, ‘Minutes of Daguragu Council Meeting […]’, 30 April 1979, Wave Hill—Review of 
Projects, Part 2, E460, 1981/89.  
18  Darwin, NAA, ‘Situation Report […]’, 6 March 1978, Wave Hill Community Development, E460, 
1978/242; Department of Aboriginal Affairs, Kalkaringi—Book of the Community (NT Division of the 
Department of Aboriginal Affairs, 1977, p. 8. 
19  See Darwin, NAA, Westbury to Casey [DAA], ‘Daguragu Council’, 14 December 1978, Wave Hill 
Community Development, E460, 1978/242. 
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purposes such as visiting promised wives, exhibiting promised wives, grog runs to Top 
Springs and various other jaunts around the VRD [region].20  
Even Gurindji councillor Wonga Bill—himself the subject of allegations about vehicle 
misuse—claimed that council vehicles were used to illegally ferry grog into the communities 
at times.21  
Regional DAA officers also quickly found that little work was being performed by 
Council staff—a view that was supported by John Edey of the Muramulla Company.22 Victor 
Vincent, the young President, seemed reluctant or unable to channel the authority of the 
Council against its workforce and his fellow, mostly older, board members. Instead, DAA 
staff considered a range of remedies to improve the Council’s work performance, and as a 
result decided to reduce its fortnightly payroll from $12,000 ($60,000) to $7,500 ($37,000) 
in September 1978.23 Neil Westbury believed that the new Council’s indulgent operating 
style had set back the entire self-management project at Wave Hill by making it very difficult 
for other large employers, namely the Muramulla Company and Wundamarie Housing 
Association, to force more exacting requirements upon their own staff than those required 
of Daguragu Council’s. Conversely, Council members felt that if they were to force more 
labour from their employees, Wundamarie Housing Association and other organisations 
would have to do the same.  
In light of the ‘professional’ misconduct of some local councillors, it would appear 
that they did not understand or value the concept of a government-imposed mandate to act 
in the ‘common good’ in a local government/municipal service delivery context—or equally, 
the nature and extent of the work necessitated by this interpretation of a representative role. 
This is not surprising: the financial, legislative and organisational concepts inherent in the 
model of local ‘self-management’ presented to the Gurindji and other Aboriginal groups by 
the DAA were the product of centuries of accumulated European political thought and social 
                                                 
20  ibid.   
21  Darwin, NAA, ‘Daguragu Council Meeting […]’, 15 May 1978’, Wave Hill Social Club, E460, 
1981/100. 
22  Edey felt that the Muramulla Company was restrained by its limited funding to employ only assiduous, 
hard-working staff, yet the Council was extremely tolerant of underperforming workers. Darwin, NAA, 
‘Muramulla Gurindji Co P/L Report […]’, 14 August 1978, Muramulla Gurindji Cattle Company Part 
2, E460, 1981/256. 
23  Darwin, NAA, ‘Message No. 63’, 20 August 1978, Wave Hill—Review of Projects, Part 2, E460, 
1981/89. 
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development—epistemological histories of which the Gurindji were oblivious. Neither had 
Wave Hill’s Aboriginal residents generally lived in a town in which local government 
functioned, let alone had training in its history or workings. Similarly, they also lacked their 
own social conventions regarding the management of non-sacred material property.24 In 
assessing Gurindji people in their roles as Council office-bearers and employees by applying 
western social mores regarding financial management, punctuality, sobriety and leadership, 
DAA staff overlooked (or chose to ignore) the possibility that the meanings and motivations 
they themselves attached to Daguragu Council differed markedly from those of its 
Aboriginal board and employees.25  
To create a plausible account of the Gurindji’s likely concepts of representation, 
responsibility and authority, and how they may have viewed the political processes and 
organisational structures in which they were enmeshed in the late 1970s, we shall turn again 
to ethnographic, anthropological and political scientific literature regarding other remote 
Indigenous groups in the period. As I have argued in Chapter Four, the importance traditional 
Wik people placed on personal autonomy, as described in the work of anthropologist David 
Martin, was also characteristic of Gurindji individuals. Martin describes the values Wik 
ascribed to and vested in their social relations thus:  
Assertions of uniqueness and personal autonomy […] were an omnipresent feature of 
Wik life. Yet, also distinctive was a strong ethos of equalitarianism, a manifest 
pressure to conform, and an emphasis on reciprocity and on equivalence in social 
transactions.26 
Writing of Aboriginal Australia more generally, anthropologist Les Hiatt found autonomy 
and authoritarianism formed the dialectic of value and cultural meaning between which 
traditional groups formed their social existence.27 Similarly, anthropologist Fred Myers 
                                                 
24  Robert Tonkinson, ‘Outside the Power of the Dreaming: Paternalism and Permissiveness in an 
Aboriginal Settlement’, in Michael Howard (ed.), Aboriginal Power in Australian Society (St Lucia, 
Queensland: University of Queensland Press, 1982) 115–130 (p. 118). 
25  For a full elaboration of equivalent potential differences in nearby Bulman, see Gillian Cowlishaw, 
'Erasing Culture and Race: Practising “Self-Determination”', Oceania, 68 (1998), 145–169. 
26  David Martin, ‘Autonomy and Relatedness: an Ethnography of the Wik people of Aurukun, Western 
Cape York Peninsula’ (Unpublished PhD thesis, Australian National University, 1993), p. 9. 
27         Cited in Tim Rowse, Remote Possibilities: the Aboriginal Domain and the Administrative 
Imagination, (Darwin, North Australian Research Unit, 1992), p. 23. 
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described the Pintupi social polity as ‘a temporary jurisdiction of relatedness among 
autonomous equals’, and elsewhere as a ‘society of autonomous, egalitarian actors’.28 Seen 
in this light, the indulgent behaviour of individuals on the Daguragu Council board, and the 
board’s collective apparent indifference to that behaviour, are rendered comprehensible by 
their shared perception of that forum as an egalitarian coalition among autonomous, 
culturally entitled equals.   
The valorisation of these attributes by Daguragu Council board members may go some 
way towards explaining the behaviour described by DAA Community Adviser Neil 
Westbury and other interlocutors of the Gurindji at the time. Another factor to consider 
though must be the group’s attitudes towards ‘government’, the complex of European power 
which the Council both peripherally embodied, and was in some sense sustained by. In a 
broad sense, the European convention of political representation was relevant to these 
attitudes of the Gurindji leaders, and their understandings of political representation can 
hence be profitably evaluated for insight into how the Daguragu Council board may have 
seen its responsibilities to government and its constituents. According to political scientists 
Peter Loveday and John Summers, this accords with the common opinion of Aborigines in 
the NT at this time: ‘the notion of representation, even if foreign to traditional culture, is 
understood by many people’ [emphasis mine].29  While the European concept of political 
representation itself was readily adopted by the Aboriginal population at Wave Hill, 
councillors’ and staff misuse of Council resources suggests, among other things, that they 
were unfamiliar with notions of the public good, professional performance and public 
accountability: the cultural meanings with which political representation is linked in 
mainstream society. Notwithstanding Vincent Lingiari’s elevation above his peers (which 
was contested by the late 1970s in any case), it is more likely that Gurindji elders saw their 
political responsibilities in similar terms to the Pintubi people of the Western Desert. 
Anthropologist Fred Myers describes that among the Pintubi: 
                                                 
28  Fred Myers, Pintupi Country, Pintupi Self: Sentiment, Place, and Politics among Western Desert 
Aborigines (Washington, Smithsonian Institution Press, 1986), p. 256; Fred Myers, ‘A Broken Code: 
Pintupi Political Theory and Temporary Social Life’, Mankind, Vol. 12, No. 4, December 1980, 311–
326 (p. 311). 
29  Peter Loveday and John Summers, ‘Mobile Polling’, in Dean Jaensch and Peter Loveday, ed., Under 
One Flag: The 1980 Northern Territory Election (North Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1981), p. 55. See also 
Tim Rowse, “Democratic Systems are an Alien thing to Aboriginal Culture”, in Speaking for the People: 
Representation in Australian Politics, M. Sawer & G. Zappala (eds) (Melbourne University Press, 2001) 
103–133, p. 110. 
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There were no individual leaders, no single “bosses”, who could be said to represent a 
whole group. This, it seems to me, was the basis of the remarkably “egocentric” quality 
of Pintupi social thought, in which the concept of “community welfare” is 
conspicuously absent.30 
Myers also notes that when Pintupi people involved themselves with local governance in the 
1970s: 
The expected duty of the Councillor […] is essentially ambiguous in the absence of 
agreement about what constitutes appropriate action, the “common good”, or even “the 
community” itself’.31   
As Myers alludes, making sense of the behaviour of Daguragu Council’s board requires us 
also to consider the group’s understandings of the power relationship with the Australian 
state in which, as council board members, they had become enmeshed. Myers’ analysis of 
the Pintupi’s notion of kanyininpa, or ‘holding’, is of relevance here. Kanyininpa forms the 
basis of the Pintupi’s mode of hierarchical social relations, as anthropologist Robert 
Tonkinson summarises: 
Just as the elders mediate the power of the Dreaming in looking after their people and 
protecting the integrity of their social order, so [they believe] should local whites (who 
are likewise not sources but mediators of power) look after Aborigines in all matters 
pertaining to the impingement of alien society on Aborigines’ lives.32   
In its classical Aboriginal conception then, kanyininpa obligates those of more advanced 
standing in their acquisition of ceremonial knowledge to provide for those who ‘come 
behind’. Relative novitiates are thus in a position of subservient dependence upon those who 
are obligated to support the novitiates’ social advancement and provide for their physical 
wellbeing. In the context of ‘Aboriginal’ organisations like Daguragu Council, similar 
perspectives held by those organisations’ Aboriginal staff and board members gave them 
reason to ascribe to their employers a welfare-oriented purpose in addition to their 
                                                 
30  Myers, 1980, op. cit., p. 314. 
31  Myers, 1980, op. cit., p. 315. 
32  Tonkinson, op. cit., p. 129. 
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governmental functions. From the perspective of Gurindji staff and board members, the 
Council’s obligation to support them was a function arising from their kinship-based identity 
and relationships, rather than their professional performance. 
As factors explaining the Daguragu Council board’s misuse of resources, the 
councillors’ nurturant model of social hierarchy and their individualistic (albeit collectively-
oriented) model of social relations are partial but inadequate. For its councillors, their own 
incipient perspective of Daguragu Council was informed not only by their perspectives of 
their rights and responsibilities regarding each other and their position as citizens of a 
postcolonial nation state, but also the rights and responsibilities accruing from the ‘project’ 
initiated by Lingiari and his coterie at Daguragu. Their allegiance to this project varied 
though. While the Gurindji elders’ acceptance of a Daguragu-based, government-funded 
local council showed their willingness to experiment in their attempts to realise an 
independent Gurindji-run community, such collective ambitions were less important for the 
Kalkaringi-based councillors whom Neil Westbury described misusing Council resources 
soon after its incorporation. For the Kalkaringi-based councillors, the primary function of 
Daguragu Council was one of ‘holding’ its board members.  
By the time of Daguragu Council’s incorporation, the track mob’s ‘consensus’, or even 
clarity, around the elders’ vision had been further problematised by Gurindji dissociation 
and the politics of self-determination policy. Both Daguragu’s transformation into an 
increasingly European-influenced and managed ‘community’ in the 1976–79 period and its 
new council’s expansion as an extraneously-resourced agency with responsibility for 
Daguragu and Kalkaringi had given the elders cause to question whether the Council was as 
representative of their interests as they had initially hoped. With the cohering influence of 
the Daguragu elders’ ‘collective’ interest waning along with their sense of control over 
Daguragu, by the lights of their own egalitarian apparatus of meaning and authority, the 
councillors lacked any right to exercise a moderating or restraining influence over each 
other’s actions. The extraneous origins of Daguragu Council’s authority—and the 
limitations of the councillors’ ability to exert a decisive influence over it in the interests of 
‘their community’—were increasingly overshadowed for them by their model of hierarchical 
power. Accordingly, the elders increasingly saw the government-resourced Council—
representing and putatively able to mediate the kartiya knowledge that the elders ultimately 
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sought for their people—as obligated to nurture, look after or ‘hold’ their extended families 
and provide for their own physical needs and wellbeing.  
For the reasons outlined above, within a few years, some of the Daguragu-based 
councillors of Daguragu Council had also adopted a lax and exploitative attitude to Council 
resources.33 Their firsthand observations and experience of governance and resource 
(mis)management during 1978–80 also gave them cause to reconsider their earlier 
assessment that their role as councillors might be to ‘hold’ the Council for ‘their’ community. 
By the early 1980s, it seems that like their Kalkaringi counterparts, Daguragu’s councillors 
frequently decided that their Council’s function was rather to ‘hold’ them and their 
dependents. With such unresolved dilemmas plaguing its leadership, similarly afflicted 
council staff were left with little guidance. As a result of these issues, Regional DAA Officer 
Neil Westbury noted that the young Daguragu Council President Victor Vincent took ‘a low 
profile and considers the problems of the council workforce […] a burden he could well do 
without’.34   
The role of non-Indigenous staff in the Gurindji leaders’ reassessment of their Council’s 
function should not be overlooked. As we have seen, the Council’s lack of skilled 
management was inimical of a sense of corporate responsibility among its other staff and 
board members. If Gurindji councillors were to make practical association between the 
achievement of their social vision and the (to them) esoteric processes of decision-making 
and resource allocation promoted by Daguragu Council, it would seem their best chance 
might have been to learn from the kartiya staff it employed. Yet this approach—if it had 
been seriously attempted—was massively flawed. During 1978–81, it appears that Daguragu 
Council lacked managerial staff entirely. The paucity of adequately trained kartiya staff is 
highlighted by the provisional re-employment of the Daguragu Council mechanic as its 
Works Supervisor.35 Appointments to senior positions were made in unfavourable 
circumstances and poorly considered. Many—if not most—of the kartiya staff employed by 
the Council in the late 1970s were exponents of the unmotivated, incompetent and/or 
                                                 
33  Jan Richardson [former Daguragu Community Government Council Clerk], Personal Communication, 
12 January 2015. 
34  See Darwin, NAA, Westbury to Casey (DAA) ‘Daguragu Council’, 14 December 1978, Wave Hill 
Community Development, E460, 1978/242. 
35  ibid.  
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avaricious approach to ‘self-management’ that the DAA wished to prevent the Gurindji from 
pursuing.  
Brazen thefts of government and/or Daguragu Council property by kartiya employed 
to ‘help’ the Wave Hill communities dwarfed the indiscretions of Gurindji councillors. At 
Daguragu and Kalkaringi, government expenditure in the late 1970s remained at a level 
conducive of significant growth and development. A plethora of poorly-coordinated 
organisations operating with high levels of staff turnover provided significant opportunities 
for unscrupulous individuals to capitalise on poorly-monitored government largesse. 
Examples included the theft of a DAA barge which had been purchased to make Daguragu 
accessible during the wet season and the unmonitored sale of new, slightly damaged DAA-
purchased 4WD vehicles and new kit homes by locally employed kartiya contractors and 
others.36  
Unfortunately, individuals with such character traits were far more common than those 
required by the ‘ideal’ form of self-management policy. In reality, the skill-set required to 
successfully elicit Aboriginal-managed community organisations was, and has remained, 
exceptionally rare. Even if there had been a pool of honest staff at Wave Hill proficient in 
municipal service delivery who were also willing to train Aboriginal employees, it is 
unlikely that they would have had English-as-a-Second-Language (ESL) and Adult 
Education skills and/or fluency in Gurindji and expertise identifying (let alone describing) 
the concepts and administrative and legal practices which local government operationalised 
elsewhere in the country. The DAA’s Community Advisers were perhaps the candidates 
best-qualified for the job, though it is unlikely that one Adviser per community (as the 
Department commonly apportioned) would be able to meet the training needs of its residents, 
let alone fulfil the other requirements of their position. Aboriginal individuals with this 
combination of skills and knowledge were unheard of, and there was no broad-scale effort 
by authorities at Wave Hill in the late 1970s to create such a group through training. Instead, 
local people were elected to ‘lead’ organisations which were poorly understood by them and 
their white intermediaries. Co-opted Aboriginal self-determination and trusteeship became 
the norm. 
                                                 
36  While the abundance of such tales retains an aura of bush mythology, these accounts were relayed by 
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10.3  Intergenerational pressures 
I have described in this thesis how the cumulative effects of liberal social policies and 
westernisation created an environment in which social tensions among the Gurindji group 
were given greater opportunity for expression. The rift in collective purpose that this 
dissociation caused does not wholly explain the common failure of young Gurindji adults to 
engage in managerial work in the new community organisations of the 1970s, however. The 
effect that all Gurindji people’s inculcation in their ‘domestic moral economy’ (as described 
in Chapter Two) had on their employment also demands consideration. According to the 
dictates of Gurindji demand sharing, when kin of employees of Daguragu Council were 
asked by their relatives to provide them with preferential treatment such as advancement on 
a waiting list for housing, they were placed in a position that could only result in their loss 
of favour—or worse—with either their employer or their families.  
Aboriginal staff holding positions that mediated access to goods or services in local 
organisations were thus faced with an almost unresolvable conundrum: on the one hand, if 
such employees conceded to the demands of their relatives, aside from the likelihood of 
losing their jobs, they would lose their standing among the coterie of kartiya managers at 
Kalkaringi and beyond. It was likely that this course of action would compound their extant 
frustrations and difficulties with negotiating and advancing in the entire Eurocentric, kartiya-
dominated realm of paid labour. Nonetheless, for reasons I will describe, when placed in this 
unenviable situation, Aboriginal employees’ concession to the demands of their relatives 
was in fact the most commonly chosen option. By the mid-1980s, the kinship-mediated 
effects of ‘demand sharing’ on those Gurindji working in local organisations were thus the 
bane of the bureaucrats and other kartiya staff tasked with fostering self-management in the 
Gurindji’s communities.37  
From the perspective of Gurindji staff in the period, it is likely that the ‘costs’ of 
rejecting the requests of their kin were far greater than those incurred by their non-
participation in, or exclusion from the paid workforce. Anthropologists such as Les Hiatt 
have described generosity (as mediated by kinship sharing systems once prevalent 
                                                 
37   Darwin, NAA, ‘Tonkin to Wright’, 11 February 1982, Wave Hill Social Club, E460, 1981/100; 
Darwin, NTAS, Interview with Bev Andrews, recorded by Charlie Ward, November 2012, NTRS 
3609, BWF 40; Muir Interview op. cit. 
  Ch. 10 Gurindji Independence II 
                                                287 
 
throughout Australia) as the primary measure of Aboriginal social value.38 For this reason, 
if young Gurindji staff attempted to ignore their kin/relationship-defined responsibilities to 
their extended family members—even in a largely European work context—anthropological 
literature indicates that the likely outcomes of ostracisation and isolation from their families 
would impact fundamentally on their sense of identity. In other words, refusing the requests 
of relatives could not only alienate Gurindji staff from their families but might also threaten 
their sense of personhood, and this was therefore to be strenuously avoided. It is unlikely 
that Gurindji elders initially had much idea that their young people’s staffing of Wattie 
Creek’s organisations would require those staff’s withdrawal from, and hence the 
deconstruction of, their society’s fundamental socioeconomic order.39 
10.4  Daguragu Community Government Council, 1982– 
The Gurindji’s relationship with authorities in Darwin and Katherine deteriorated after 
Northern Territory Self-Government in 1978. The ‘forfeiture notice’ issued to the 
Muramulla Company by the NTG in 1979 marked a new low in the elders’ the post-Walk-
off attitudes towards the bureaucracy. Instead of improving in 1980–81 as the effects of the 
staged transferral of powers under the terms of Self-Government were implemented 
however, the functionality of Daguragu Council and its relationship with authorities 
continued to decline. 
The transferral of responsibility for the Gurindji and ‘their’ organisations under the 
terms of Self-Government from the DAA to another government entirely surely impressed 
further upon the leaders of Kalkaringi and Daguragu the fact that their relationship with the 
Australian state was one of dependence over which they had no control. Dispiritingly, neither 
did the political disposition of the first NT Government bode well for remote Aboriginal 
people. Although Chief Minister Paul Everingham’s Country Liberal Party ostensibly 
supported the principle of Aboriginal self-management, the concept was so ill-defined by 
                                                 
38   L. R. Hiatt, ‘Traditional Attitudes to Land Resources’ in Aboriginal Sites, Rites and Resource 
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1981 that he was able to downplay his government’s responsibility for funding organisations 
like Daguragu Council:  
What slice of the budgetary pie should be given to the population minorities that 
choose to live well away from the main centres? To what extent should the rest of the 
community subsidise those who live in inconvenient areas where distance, terrain and 
diseconomies [sic] of scale make the provision of services such a costly affair? [...] Of 
course, there are times when government is guilty of being overzealous in its 
responsibilities to remote communities. We ought not to be chasing after people with 
services from which they are running away […].40   
Coinciding with this promulgation of uncertainty, the Gurindji’s interface with government 
had splintered. As a result of Self-Government, most of the DAA’s responsibilities in remote 
communities had been devolved to the NT Departments of Community Development and 
Transport and Works, both of which Daguragu Council was now beholden to for funding. 
The Kalkaringi school and clinic were also caught up in the changes: responsibility for them 
had been transferred to the NTG’s new education and health departments. According to 
geographer Jackie Wolfe, each of these agencies in Darwin and Canberra marched to its 
own, not the Gurindji’s tune: ‘on the all-important question of coordinating agencies of 
administration, the [local] councils had no power whatsoever’.41 Amongst all this, Daguragu 
Council was caught on the back foot, unable to attain equilibrium.  
Under the name of ‘community government’, the Gurindji’s new Northern Territory 
Government intermediaries in the Department of Community Development (DCD) were 
intent on completing the latest in a succession of government-led reforms which had created 
and subsequently restructured a number of local, community council-type representative 
bodies in Aboriginal communities. For these reasons, NT DCD staff worked with Daguragu 
councillors in 1982 to reincorporate their council under the Northern Territory Associations 
Incorporation Act (1978). Although the Whitlam Government’s Aboriginal Councils and 
Associations Act (ACAA) had nominally been designed for this purpose, incorporation of 
                                                 
40   Chief Minister Paul Everingham, 'Opening Address', in Service Delivery to Remote Communities, ed. 
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Daguragu Council under the ACAA was not considered at Wave Hill: the NTG overtly 
discouraged Aboriginal communities from adopting it, and as the federal Act only allowed 
for Aboriginal membership and representation, it would also have been problematic for a 
council incorporated under the ACAA to exercise its authority within the ‘mixed’ town of 
Kalkaringi. Instead, while the Territory government itself described the Associations 
Incorporation Act (AIA) the DCD was touting at Wave Hill as ‘more closely related to 
commercial enterprises’ than ‘council-type bodies’, it saw it as an intermediate step towards 
‘full’ community government.42  
Although the NTG had touted its community government agenda (and the Associations 
Incorporation Act) as designed for local adaptation, at Kalkaringi the generic government-
created constitution provided for Daguragu Council by the Act was adopted largely without 
amendment, signifying the disengagement of Gurindji leaders and the officers of the DCD. 
The council’s lacklustre engagement with the first phase of the DCD ‘community 
government’ reforms marked the first time at Wave Hill that public servants had been unable 
to rouse anything more than the most cursory Aboriginal response to their initiatives. Given 
that the Daguragu Councillors were struggling to cope with the Council’s existing 
responsibilities, it was unsurprising that their enthusiasm was muted while the Everingham 
Government sought to divest more functions upon the tiny council office at Daguragu.43 
The reforms forced upon Daguragu and other remote councils as a result of NT Self-
Government showed that communities’ attempts to give policies of self-determination and 
self-management operational meaning were incidental to the exigencies of government in 
Canberra and Darwin. It was therefore ironic that although all the towns and smaller 
communities in the Territory were subject to the NTG’s mooted ‘community government’ 
reforms, in settlements with a high Aboriginal population such as Kalkaringi, the new policy 
was promoted under the rubric of Aboriginal ‘self-management’. The justification for this 
conflation of self-determination’ with ‘community government’ provided by the NTG was 
                                                 
42   Conference of Council Presidents and Community Advisers (Kormilda College, Darwin, January 
1980), p. 16. 
43   In this, the Gurindji had much in common with other small populations faced with the development of 
local government ‘from above’. Ruth Atkins, ‘Local Government’, in Public Administration (ed. 
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that under the reforms, community councils hitherto administered by the DAA would accrue 
a far greater number of responsibilities.44  
When the newly-named Daguragu Community Council was incorporated under the 
Associations Incorporation Act  on 1 March 1983, it claimed functional responsibility for 
many roles and services typically provided by local government, for example the supply of 
services and amenities to local residents, the drafting of by-laws, rules and regulations, and 
the provision of sewerage and drainage facilities.45 While the NTG’s motivation for its 
community government reforms may be debated, the reforms incontestably delegated more 
power and responsibility to the local level. After its incorporation under the AIA, in addition 
to a number of ‘soft’ welfare, cultural and financial functions, the Daguragu Community 
Government Council was able to undertake any and all of the following on behalf of local 
residents:  
[…] To develop the communities’ buildings and works; to supply services and 
amenities; to establish parks and gardens and recreational areas; to make by-laws; to 
operate communication facilities and a mechanical workshop; to operate sewerage 
[and] to operate drainage facilities.46  
As a result of the reforms, Wave Hill-based federal or NT government officers responsible 
for community development and/or governance would potentially no longer be needed. 
Instead, the new council clerk positions provided for under the Associations Incorporation 
Act and later the Local Government Act NT effectively subsumed the previous roles of both 
Kalkaringi’s old DAA community advisers and those of the old Libanungu and Daguragu 
Councils’ municipal officers.47 As a result of this restructuring and the new council’s 
increased number of functional responsibilities, the ‘local’ power potentially wielded by the 
                                                 
44   Wolfe, op. cit., p. 38. 
45   This postulate is supported by the prominence of the following ‘object’ of the Council’s 
incorporation: ‘to establish, assist or support the establishment of any institution or Council 
established for the object of or having similar powers to the council […]’. ‘Notice of Intention to 
Apply for the Incorporation of an Association’, Public Notice, NTN, 1 March 1983. 
46   ‘Notice of Intention to Apply for the Incorporation of an Association’, Public Notice, NTN, 1 March 
1983. 
47   It has been argued that despite this appearance of greater local autonomy, the NTG’s grants system 
accompanying the reforms actually increased the power of the NTG over community decision-makers. 
See Martin Mowbray and Kathryn Shain, ‘Self-management: One Northern Territory Experience’, 
Legal Service Bulletin, June 1986, pp. 106–111.  
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new council clerks—although heavily constrained by the NTG’s strict financial 
requirements in the new community government legislation—increased significantly.  
Regardless of these changes, by 1982, the Gurindji elders had largely withdrawn from 
Daguragu Council. Council meetings were rarely held, and the organisation lacked effective 
kartiya management.  Billy Bunter was struggling to cope with the duties thrust upon him 
as president, and in a major blow to the elders, the council’s accounts had been transferred 
to a new DAA-created resource agency, the Yulngu Association in Katherine.48 I have 
described this situation and the concomitant loss of control perceived by Gurindji elders in 
my book A Handful of Sand.49 Daguragu’s leaders were by this point so disillusioned by the 
development of Kalkaringi and the corruption of its non-Indigenous staff that those among 
them holding positions at Kalkaringi initiated a protest ‘Walk-off’. In A Handful of Sand, I 
described it thus:  
With their activist supporter friends long gone and few ‘mates’ among the government 
mob then (it seemed) pushing them around, they decided that their best option lay in 
the type of demonstrative disobedience that had shaped their past: industrial action. 
Who took part in this protest is unknown, but in 1982 an exodus of Gurindji from the 
settlement to ‘sit down’ at Daguragu occurred. It was seen by its participants —like 
the Gurindji’s spectacular protest of 1966—as a ‘Walk-off’ or ‘stop work’.50 The scale 
of the strike is hard to gauge: numbers were artificially swollen as a result of new 
housing at Daguragu. According to Baptist missionary Gordon Moore however, the 
people of ‘all but two houses’ left Kalkaringi. From Moore’s perspective, the people’s 
move to Wattie Creek and quitting their jobs was purely a protest against Frank 
Dalton’s Bar and Grill [a bar at Kalkaringi popular with kartiya].51 The move displayed 
more than petulance about the behaviour of Dalton’s patrons though; it was an 
expression of many Gurindji people’s frustration and despair about the domination of 
                                                 
48   NTAS, Darwin, Transcript of Interview with Stan Davey, October 1986, NTRS 226, TS 462, p. 13. 
49  Charlie Ward, A Handful of Sand: The Gurindji Struggle, after the Walk-off (Clayton, Victoria, Monash 
University Publishing, 2016), pp. 283–84. 
50   Will Sanders, Personal Communication, 19 November 2013. 
51   Gwen and Gordon Moore also believed the death of the local church leader, Pastor Clancy Barlanga, 
fomented the ‘unrest’ they observed in the community. Rev Gordon Moore, ‘Wave Hill—Annual 
Report, 1982’, Personal File, Global Interaction. 
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kartiya and their opaque institutions at Kalkaringi: a fact synonymous with the 
community’s development over the last decade.52 
This protest by the track mob was arguably the nadir of their relationship with 
government, and formed the recent background to Daguragu Council’s reincorporation as a 
‘community government’ entity. Rather than provide a detailed account of Gurindji people’s 
efforts to engage with and/or exert influence over the ‘new’ DCGC as I do in A Handful of 
Sand, I will offer a truncated summary here.53  
With the majority of younger Gurindji still proving uninterested in long term training 
and education, Daguragu’s leaders made their last attempt to obtain control. Pincher 
Nyurrmiarri and others played a decisive hand in recruiting Stan Davey, a capable 
community development worker they had known since their 1966 Walk-off, as DCGC’s first 
town clerk. With Davey and his wife Jan Richardson, the elders instigated a ‘nine skin’ 
system of representation for council board elections, ensuring democratic representation 
apropos of gender and local demographic particulars.54 During 1983–86, Davey and 
Richardson created a professional environment in which young Gurindji adults, mostly 
women, were able to obtain some proficiency in administration and basic book-keeping.55 
These individuals were employed by DCGC, and some were repeatedly elected to its board, 
including to the role of president. These events can be construed as the ‘initiation’ of a small 
group of ‘next generation’ Gurindji leaders as holders of some of the kartiya knowledge 
which had long been desired for them by Daguragu’s old men. They did not, however, 
include the employment of Gurindji individuals in Daguragu Council’s managerial roles, or 
lead to those individuals’ employment in those roles in other organisations. Nor did the 
greater engagement of Gurindji people with DCGC lead to a quotidian version of ‘Gurindji 
independence’, as envisaged by either Gurindji elders or self-determination policy’s earlier, 
ideal formulation. Rather than an enfranchised Gurindji polity exerting broadly observable 
influence on Daguragu and Kalkaringi’s politics, the interdepartmental and interpersonal 
                                                 
52  Ward, op. cit., pp. 283–84. 
53  Ward, op. cit., pp. 285–97, pp. 305–308. 
54  ‘Daguragu Vote’, 7.30 Report Northern Territory, Australian Broadcasting Commission (ABC TV), 21 
November 1988; NTAS, Davey Interview, op. cit., p. 16. 
55  Darwin, NTAS, Roslyn Frith, Interview Recorded by Charlie Ward, October 2011, NTRS 3609, BWF 
33. 
  Ch. 10 Gurindji Independence II 
                                                293 
 
politics of government agencies and their non-Indigenous staff and other private residents of 
Kalkaringi proved the decisive factor in local developments. 
10.5  Legal and governmental limitations 
To this point I have mainly discussed the quirks and operational failures of Daguragu 
Council and DCGC arising from what were essentially council staffing issues. The other 
reasons for the failure of a Daguragu-based council as an instrument of Gurindji 
independence were legal-governmental and situational: the Council’s ‘external’ operational 
context. In essence, the authority of Aboriginal council bodies incorporated at Wave Hill 
regarding the ‘open town’ of Kalkaringi was limited, and the influence there of Daguragu 
Council and the Daguragu Community Government Council were further curtailed by their 
relocation to Daguragu. Neither of these bodies was able to intervene effectively when they 
assessed activities of government agencies and/or self-supporting Europeans at ‘the 
Settlement’ to be inimical of the track mob’s interests.56 Any influence they might have 
exerted over Kalkaringi’s other ‘stakeholders’ relied more on effective negotiation and 
mutual good will, which were frequently lacking, than the Council’s legal mandate. These 
environmental or situational parameters were little affected by Daguragu Council’s 
(dys)functionality, or even that Council’s re-incorporation after several years’ operation. 
Such matters were largely incidental to the operations of other government agencies at 
Kalkaringi, and the conduct of its residents.  
While the aims of the Gurindji elders remained out of reach, as we have seen, in the 
open town of Kalkaringi, European-Australian residents commonly pursued their own 
interests with notable success. As per self-determination policy’s ‘co-opted’ form and Rowse 
and Watt’s ‘trusteeship’, whites and others commonly arrived in the community to take up 
positions of power in local organisations. While authorities recommended that various 
government advisory services should take control of the management of Wave Hill’s 
government-subsidised enterprises, a small European entrepreneurial class also established 
itself and flourished on a largely Aboriginal customer base. As the result of competition from 
a fuel and takeaway shop opened in Kalkaringi by a kartiya resident for instance, the 
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Northern Territory education bureaucrats not to provide a government school at Daguragu. See Chapter 
Eight. 
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Gurindji’s Karu Bulangkarni store suffered financially.57 Similarly, Daguragu Council’s 
mechanical workshop lost business to its commercial, kartiya-owned competitor, and former 
Kalkaringi police officer Denis Watson operated a bus service driving local customers to 
and from Katherine.58 More controversially, an establishment serving alcohol opened at 
Kalkaringi in 1981, and became hugely popular among kartiya residents, tourists and the 
region’s pastoralists. As the amount of alcohol sold and consumed at Wave Hill increased, 
the attention of disaffected and disengaged Daguragu residents shifted increasingly towards 
Kalkaringi’s licit and illicit liquor trades.59 That a licensed club could operate at Kalkaringi 
regardless of most local leaders’ staunch opposition illustrates again how little influence they 
exerted there—a point I shall illustrate by describing alcohol consumption’s management at 
Wave Hill in the early 1980s.  
For many of Kalkaringi’s kartiya residents, ascertaining their ‘right’ to drink was a 
pre-condition of seeking employment in frequently ‘dry’ Aboriginal communities. To those 
so motivated, the alcohol-mediated process of social dissociation being fought between 
generations of Gurindji was of little concern. Kalkaringi’s white drinkers displayed their 
priorities in late 1984, when notwithstanding the easy availability of alcohol at Kalkaringi’s 
popular bar, they petitioned the NT Liquor Commission to revise the town’s by-laws so that 
they might also apply for individual permits to drink privately in their own homes.60 
Although the great majority of senior Aboriginal women and most of their male 
counterparts had lobbied for alcohol to be banned entirely from Kalkaringi (as it was in 
Daguragu), the Europeans’ application for personal liquor permits to be issued was 
successful. When the legalised consumption of alcohol by whites at Kalkaringi increased 
as a result, then language worker Helen McNair recalled the effect on the Gurindji people’s 
attitudes to grog: 
                                                 
57   Elspeth Young, Outback Stores: Retail Services in North Australian Aboriginal Communities 
(Darwin, North Australia Research Unit, Australian National University, 1984), p. 24. 
58   Richard Pullin, ‘Frank Hardy revisits Gurindji to Help with New Problems’, Unknown Source, Date 
Unknown [c. 1985]; Will Sanders, Personal Communication, 19 November 2013. 
59  Darwin, NAA, NT Liquor Commission Chair to DAA, 23 December 1982, Wave Hill Centre: Policy 
and Development, E460, 1981/306; Rev Gordon Moore, ‘Wave Hill—Annual Report, 1982’, Personal 
File, Global Interaction. 
60   Norm and Helen McNair, Interview Recorded by Charlie Ward, March 2010, in possession of the 
author. 
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Straight away some of the influential Aboriginal people said ‘we want permits too’, 
so it was useless, basically. Kalkaringi was so-called ‘dry’, but with permits. That 
was used and abused like anywhere. Once again, what [the core of the Gurindji 
leadership] wanted didn’t happen, because whites over-ruled.61  
Many Daguragu Councillors and most Gurindji women wanted Kalkaringi’s status as 
a ‘restricted area’ to be reinstated, and the licence of Kalkaringi’s new bar to be revoked. In 
the public meeting they called for with the NT Liquor Commissioner, the Commissioner 
found that most of those present ‘did not understand the purpose of the meeting, or did not 
care whether the restricted area was restored or not’.62 Rather than banning grog from 
Kalkaringi as the council desired, the Commissioner bemoaned the community’s failure to 
curb its demand for alcohol. Ironically, he criticised DCGC for its weakness on the issue, 
and left.63  
The weakening of unanimity among local male elders’ and the ineffectiveness of their 
political leadership regarding alcohol serves to illustrate the complexity and scale of the 
challenges which the Gurindji elders faced in their efforts to realise Daguragu’s 
independence and the limitations of their power. It is consequently difficult to regard the 
adverse environment that Kalkaringi and Daguragu’s entwined economic and social interests 
created for the DCGC as a ‘success’ of Aboriginal self-determination. On the frequent 
occasions that Daguragu Council took a stance supportive of Aboriginal enablement on local 
issues, the majority of Kalkaringi’s kartiya residents saw this as incidental, or even 
antithetical to their own interests. Among them, their own self-interest or quality of life and 
local financial and political power were mostly of greater importance.64 For these reasons, 
many of the kartiya residing in Kalkaringi were resistant to Stan Davey and Jan Richardson’s 
efforts to ‘empower’ the Daguragu Community Government Council, or even to 
‘Aboriginalise’ its operations.65 
                                                 
61   ibid.  
62   Darwin, NAA, NT Liquor Commission Chair to DAA, 23 December 1982, Wave Hill Centre: Policy 
and Development, E460, 1981/306. 
63   ibid; Moore, 1982, op. cit. 
64   Jan Richardson [former Daguragu Council clerk], Personal Communication, 2 April 2010. 
65   Darwin, NTAS, John and Elaine Bullock, Interview Recorded by Charlie Ward, October 2012, NTRS 
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By 1986, when the period of this analysis ends, Davey believed that the government’s 
espoused aim of Aboriginal self-management was a chimeric impossibility at Kalkaringi and 
Daguragu. Aside from the dearth of competent and committed local Aboriginal staff Wave 
Hill’s organisations faced, he believed that the requirements of the government (or the 
‘pressures of the bureaucracy’, as he termed it) precluded Aboriginal control.66 In Davey’s 
reckoning, these pressures amounted to a situation in which governments ‘controlled, stifled 
and suppressed’ Kalkaringi and Daguragu via their ‘self-determination’ policies.67 Equally 
significantly, he also thought that given the difficulties and work involved, the Gurindji—or 
a critical number of them—lacked the will to manage Kalkaringi and Daguragu 
independently. If the ‘elders [had] supported their trainees, Gurindji [people] would have 
taken over the roles’, he said.68  
10.6  Conclusion 
As I have argued in Chapter Two, when Gurindji elders formulated their vision of an 
independent Daguragu society in the 1950s and 60s, they conceptualised this as a project to 
be conducted within the Gurindji realm. Their intention was to create a large self-managed 
pastoral station homestead, which would eventually be operated by their young relatives. 
From the outset, the productive engagement of their youth with the ‘community’ that the 
elders wished to form was critical to the Gurindji elders’ plan. The elders acknowledged that 
aspects of these things would require a small amount of non-Indigenous assistance, mostly 
in the form of training and education. When increased funding for remote Aboriginal groups 
by the Whitlam and Fraser Governments resulted in Kalkaringi’s rapid expansion and 
development however, it caused Daguragu’s elders to reconsider the modesty of their 
separatist vision, and the role they thought that government might play in their affairs. When 
those elders enthusiastically accepted the notion of a Daguragu-based council, on the board 
of which they would sit, they showed their willingness to experiment with utilising self-
determination policy’s extraneous forms of governance for their own ends. It was not until 
the mid-1980s that the terms of this experiment were settled upon: a small number of ‘new 
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generation’ individuals operating as board members and in positions of midlevel 
responsibility in local organisations would comprise Gurindji professional leadership in the 
kartiya domain. Elders would, at times, also occupy positions on the boards of those 
organisations. The broad uptake of managerial roles by young and middle-aged Gurindji 
once anticipated by the elders and self-determination’s government proponents did not 
occur. 
Experience quickly revealed to the elders that the administrative complexity of the 
new council was beyond the resources of younger Gurindji individuals to manage, and that 
their young people were unwilling to do so. At the same time, the elders’ unwillingness to 
constrain the behaviour of their fellow councillors also limited their ability to control Council 
resources. These two developments within Wave Hill’s Aboriginal domain created an 
incentive for the elders’ government interlocutors to employ non-Indigenous staff to perform 
key roles in ‘Gurindji’ organisations and other agencies operating there. This had a twofold 
effect on the elders’ vision of independence. Firstly, it marginalised Gurindji people within 
‘their’ organisations, creating further disincentives for them to participate. Secondly, it 
increased the number of kartiya living at Kalkaringi. For reasons I have described, in many 
instances those individuals and their employers were little concerned with Gurindji self-
determination, and their interests tended to win out over both those propounded by 
Daguragu’s elders and those put forward by the elders’ interlocutors in the Gurindji’s name.  
 As I have described, the cumulative effect of these developments on the elders’ vision 
was transformative. Kalkaringi’s (and to a lesser extent, Daguragu’s slower) growth and 
transformation during the 1970s caused the elders to revise their initial, modest view of 
Daguragu in the future. It became apparent to them that managing the community which 
Daguragu had become would be a complex undertaking with multiple layers of 
responsibility vested in individuals managing a broad number of agencies, all reliant on 
extraneous kartiya knowledge. The Australian state’s experiment in Aboriginal self-
determination assumed that kartiya knowledge could be judiciously employed in key areas 
by Gurindji youth, augmenting extant Gurindji work practises and cultural behaviours. In 
actuality though, it showed the leaders of the Wave Hill Walk-off that for Gurindji 
individuals to manage facilities and service provision on behalf of a Gurindji public, their 
own society’s demand-sharing kinship responsibilities would have to be forsaken by the 
Gurindji individuals employed in those endeavours, and by the Aboriginal people who dealt 
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with them. This task was one that few Gurindji people had enthusiasm for, and one which 
the elders’ themselves apparently lacked sufficient motivation to support.  
Two parts comprised the independence that Lingiari’s generation of elders sought: 
freedom from intervention and control at Daguragu, and autonomy and independence 
through Gurindji self-management. As an exercise in Gurindji self-determination of the type 
initially conceived by self-determination policy proponents in the early 1970s, Kalkaringi 
and Daguragu’s ‘Aboriginal’ organisations were a failure. As the diversity and 
contradictions of Gurindji political opinion evolved and became apparent to officials in the 
1970s–80s, co-opted self-determination emerged as a practical means of filling the shortfall 
between government ideals, policy requirements and local Aboriginal priorities. The 
developments I have described in the previous two chapters show that the onerous 
requirements of local organisational management delivered by the Whitlam and Fraser 
Governments’ devolution of power caused many Gurindji individuals to choose freedom 
from intervention via non-participation or ‘disappearance’, over accepting the 
responsibilities of self-management. As I have shown also, Daguragu’s generations became 
clearly divided about what, if any ‘freedom from intervention’ they sought in actuality. 
Without clarity on this issue among Gurindji individuals, it is likely that the decisions of 
kartiya residents and functional government departments based in Kalkaringi had a greater 
inimical impact on the ability of Gurindji elders to realise their sought-after independence 
and freedom from intervention.   
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Conclusion 
 
 
 
 
Members of the Aboriginal group which left Wave Hill Station in 1966 are rightly known as 
proponents and beneficiaries of Aboriginal Land Rights, however the progress of Gurindji 
people and their government interlocutors towards Gurindji self-determination in the period 
after the Walk-off was characterised by concession and dissolution of Aboriginal and 
governmental ideals. Particularly in terms of the idealistic goals espoused by the Department 
of Aboriginal Affairs during 1972–73, the ‘journey’ of self-determination those parties 
undertook during the 1970s–80s was a declension. Broadly, the causes of ‘ideal’ Gurindji 
self-determination’s failure were binary. On one hand, the group upon whose unity Gurindji 
self-determination depended underwent its own disaggregation, driven by internal tensions 
and greatly facilitated by changes in external circumstance. Ironically, many of the most 
significant circumstantial shifts the Gurindji experienced in the 1960s–70s came about 
largely as a result of the federal policy of Aboriginal self-determination and its liberal, rights-
focused predecessors. On the other hand, after 1973, self-determination policy was adapted 
(and in terms of its initial ideals, compromised) by its bureaucratic protagonists to 
accommodate extant governmental and political considerations, and in the Gurindji’s case, 
the professional limitations and/or lack of interest of the policy’s Aboriginal subjects. As we 
have seen, the broad-scale employment of non-Indigenous people to ‘manage’ the Gurindji’s 
affairs was the practical outcome of this adaptation, resulting from the inability of the 
bureaucracy to accommodate the professional limitations and/or lack of interest of many 
Gurindji people regarding their participation in the organisations created in the name of 
Aboriginal self-management in any other way.  
In light of the radical adaptation of self-determination policy’s implementation in this 
way, the work of the Gurindji people’s DAA interlocutors towards Gurindji self-
determination may be seen in its wider context: as necessitated by the Whitlam 
Government’s intention to ‘devolve’ much of its responsibility for directly maintaining the 
affairs of Aboriginal Australians by creating a plethora of government-funded Non-
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Government Organisations comprising a large ‘Aboriginal domain’. This ambition was 
shared by the Fraser and Everingham Governments, and became a significant aspect of those 
governments’ policies of Aboriginal self-determination and self-management. As explained 
in Chapter Three, the program of devolution intended by Commonwealth and later NTG 
authorities required them to prioritise the incorporation, operation and accountability of 
government-funded Aboriginal organisations over the participation of local Aboriginal 
people in those organisations’ management and governance. In accordance with Rowse and 
Watts’s ‘trusteeship’ and Batty’s intercultural partnerships, the latter project was commonly 
compromised as a result. Arguably, practices of ‘trusteeship’ and ‘intercultural partnership’ 
were adopted by the Gurindji’s government interlocutors in response to young Gurindji 
adults’ abnegation of their responsibility for official forms of collective advancement. As a 
result, despite self-determination policy’s delivery of a new class of ‘community’ 
organisations at Wave Hill, the policy’s stated aim of Gurindji management of those 
organisations (and thus Gurindji people’s supposed independence) was rarely if ever 
realised. Instead, the apparently permanent addition to the local population of a large 
managerial clique of non-Indigenous functionaries resulted, and the Gurindji people’s 
dependence on that clique for the operation of those organisations and the services they 
provided. In their broad effect at Daguragu and Kalkaringi, ‘trusteeship’ and ‘intercultural 
partnerships’ thus forestalled the achievement of the Gurindji elders’ aims.  
Another significant theme of this thesis has been the many inherent discrepancies 
between the assumed and actual modes of operationalisation which Gurindji elders and their 
government interlocutors brought to the project of Gurindji self-determination. These 
discrepancies were not static but responsive and changed over time. For instance, we have 
seen that as the requirements of ‘self-determination’ revealed themselves to Gurindji people 
during the period under review, ‘next generation’ individuals (and from the end of the 1970s, 
their older generation of leaders) revised their ambitions regarding Gurindji ‘governance’ 
and management downward. That is to say that once the (to them) largely alien nature of 
participation in the policy’s projects and organisations and the potential impact of that 
participation on their kinship bonds and lifestyle became apparent, some Gurindji 
individuals relinquished their intention or desire to occupy the roles initially expected of 
them by the leaders of the Wave Hill Walk-off and self-determination policy’s protagonists. 
Similarly, the more highly developed housing and infrastructure which became available in 
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the remote NT in the 1970s also caused Gurindji leaders to revise their expectations. This 
thesis contends that Lingiari and the old Gurindji men had modelled the independent 
homestead they envisioned at Daguragu on their observations of large pastoral homesteads 
during and prior to the 1960s. As such, when the scale and complexity of government-funded 
housing and infrastructure at Kalkaringi and Daguragu became apparent to Gurindji elders, 
their entreaties to young Gurindji adults largely failed to generate the managerial and 
administrative activity among subsequent generations that ‘Gurindji self-determination’ 
required to succeed. As I have argued, the elders’ vision also largely failed to recognise the 
significant extraneous requirements of administration which the provision and maintenance 
of government housing and infrastructure would eventually require of them. For these 
reasons too, Gurindji people and Aboriginal self-determination policy failed to find a shared 
means of achieving their common goals.  
In this thesis, I have asked: was the Australian government’s vision of a self-determining 
Aboriginal constituency realised by the Gurindji? Caught in a matrix of self-perceived 
inadequacy and/or lack of interest regarding their participation in the communally-focused 
projects of Gurindji elders and their DAA intermediaries, many Gurindji people chose 
instead to redefine their relationships with both Gurindji gerontocratic and non-Indigenous 
authority along individualist lines. Quotidian actions of Gurindji individuals were 
autonomously undertaken for purposes that while inchoate to outsiders, can be seen as 
constitutive of a collective form of socio-political resistance against the ‘community’ 
priorities of authorities. The resultant form of social closure which Gurindji people 
developed in this period I have termed one of ‘disappearance’. By such means, individuals 
were readily able to avoid the demands of DAA officials and Gurindji elders alike. By doing 
so, they thwarted the efforts of those authorities to identify or define a self-determining 
Gurindji subject.  
I have also asked in this thesis: how influential were changes within Gurindji society 
on the outcome of interactions between Gurindji people and their DAA and other self-
determination-focused interlocutors? I have devoted a large part of its analysis to showing 
that the Gurindji social order underwent its most significant transformation specifically 
during the period under review. Gurindji people’s dissociative, individualist renegotiation of 
social responsibilities and kinship-based relationships in the 1970s–80s militated against 
their ongoing participation in the communally-oriented social programs of both Gurindji 
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elders and self-determination’s bureaucratic proponents. As I have shown, this disinclination 
had longstanding causes, and its expression was catalysed by virtue of Gurindji society’s 
changing economic, political and cultural position vis-à-vis settler society in the 1950s–80s. 
Of all those changes which occurred, the most significant in terms of the Gurindji’s self-
determination was the increased receipt of cash incomes by Gurindji adults—a trend that 
climaxed in the 1970s as a result of the Whitlam (and later Fraser) Governments’ 
universalist, Keynesian social welfare policies, and the increased and better paid 
employment opportunities created at Wave Hill by Aboriginal self-determination policy 
itself. As we have seen, the resultant reorientation of Gurindji people regarding their 
society’s endogenous political and social power and moral authority frequently had a 
profoundly inimical effect on their participation in the collectively oriented projects 
proposed by both Gurindji leaders and non-Indigenous authorities at Wave Hill.  
Readers will also have noted the third question focusing this doctorate: was the 
realisation of the Gurindji vision regarding their independent homestead, school, land rights 
and cattle enterprise thwarted or supported by the actions of the public service charged with 
operationalising self-determination? Dozens of public servants (and equally, the short-to-
medium term employees of Wave Hill’s Aboriginal organisations) endeavoured to engender 
the participation of Gurindji individuals in the ‘community’ projects and programs which 
the bureaucrats had initiated. In most instances however, local people were unaware of the 
rationales underpinning these projects or their intended outcomes. With the concomitant 
scale and pace of development at Kalkaringi and then Daguragu increasing in the 1970s as 
a result of those and other projects, the Gurindji people’s sense of ‘ownership’ or control of 
their new communities was substantially eroded. We may thus conclude that at an individual 
level, while public servants within the DAA expended great energy in their efforts to 
engender Gurindji self-determination, the net progress made by the Department itself to 
realise the Whitlam Government’s early ideal of Aboriginal self-administration at Wave Hill 
was negligible. The efforts of individual DAA officials, while productive of Gurindji 
engagement at best or ineffective at worst, were cumulatively detrimental to Gurindji self-
determination, in that they ultimately engendered indifference and/or dependence among 
many Gurindji people regarding the management of their own affairs. 
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As we have seen, one of the main components of the Gurindji elders’ program for the 
development of their own independent society—a school offering bicultural and bilingual 
primary and secondary education—was never initiated, even in an ‘adapted’ or compromised 
form. Let us reconsider the reasons for the failure of governments during the Aboriginal self-
determination policy era to provide such a school at Daguragu. Initially, the expansion of 
the Kalkaringi school during 1974–76 reflected the inability of centralised governments to 
anticipate and accommodate local circumstances during the implementation of broad scale 
policy initiatives. The reasons for the subsequent failure of governments to reverse or 
ameliorate the school’s expansion, and thus accommodate clearly held local desires, are also 
characteristic of governmental power. Such power is indicated by, among other things, its 
own tendencies of self-maintenance and self-justification, which draw upon positivist and 
economic rationales to deflect criticism and justify the status quo. At Kalkaringi and 
Daguragu, these qualities resulted in Education Department staff’s ongoing support of the 
Kalkaringi Community Education Centre, and the absence of any equivalent facility in the 
community established by the track mob. As noted, the effect this had on Gurindji self-
determination may have been profound, but is ultimately immeasurable.  
In contrast to the Australian state’s inaction regarding a Gurindji school, successive 
governments took significant steps to ensure that the Gurindji’s receipt of significant 
property rights occurred. As I have shown, the Gurindji elders’ receipt and subsequent 
retainment of both pastoral lessees’ rights and those conferred to them under ALRA may be 
regarded as a pronounced success of Gurindji self-determination, albeit one rich with 
unintended outcomes. The Gurindji Land Trust’s consistent decision to sublease the entirety 
of the Gurindji’s land in the decades since the elders’ land rights victory can be construed as 
‘ideal’ Gurindji self-determination in action, yet when considered in its broader context, it 
is notable that Gurindji subleasing obviously precluded (and still precludes) attainment of 
their former elders’ main goal, that of operating a cattle business on their own land.  
As an index of their own self-determination, the independence of the track mob’s 
Daguragu homestead is one I have adopted in this thesis as a key measure of Gurindji self-
determination. Yet independence was perhaps never achievable by Gurindji people in any 
ultimate sense. Even the elders’ vision of self-managing a financially profitable cattle 
enterprise would have required their subjection to the land management and stock control 
laws and regulations of the Australian state, as well as rendered Daguragu families 
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dependent upon the national and/or international cattle markets and their vagaries. Similarly, 
the ‘independence’ potentially conferred by Aboriginal self-management policy may be 
retrospectively considered as the freedom to operate organisations, corporations and councils 
within the terms prescribed by settler society governments. In this regard, self-determination 
policy’s potential for the Gurindji was always one which would conscript them further into 
the governmental project of settler society. The question the policy posed for Gurindji people 
was whether their participation in the governmentality of the Australian state would be as 
proactive political administrators or passive citizen consumers. In the period under review, 
the choice between these two options was one which confronted a large number of Gurindji 
individuals. The answer they commonly arrived at was one which preserved a measure of 
freedom of choice over their individual circumstances, even as it habituated them to their 
disengagement from and dependence upon the governmental processes of the Australian 
State.  
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Glossary 
 
Arbitration Commission: the central institution of Australian labour law, the 
Commonwealth Conciliation and Arbitration Commission is a tribunal with powers under 
the Workplace Relations Act. 
Daguragu: the Gurindji name for the place by Wattie Creek where they chose to build the 
Daguragu community. 
Droughtmaster: a tropical breed of beef cattle developed in North Queensland by crossing 
Brahman and British breed cattle such as Beef Shorthorns during the early 1900s. 
Dry Season: Northern Australia’s cooler season (typically 18–32 degrees celsius); usually 
from March to September. 
Gurindji: an Indigenous language group whose country centres around the upper Victoria 
River in the Northern Territory of Australia. The Gurindji and neighbouring groups such as 
Bilinarra, Nyininy, Mudburra, Malngin, and Ngarinyman groups are part of the Ngumpin 
language family. Intermarriage and close relations between Ngumpin people have increased 
since European settlement and have been facilitated by the development of a regional Kriol. 
In the text, the term ‘Gurindji’ is used to refer to the Indigenous people who lived on Wave 
Hill Station and who subsequently re-located to Wattie Creek. This group includes members 
of all of the above. 
Kalkaringi/ Kalkarindji: name(s) given to the former Wave Hill Welfare Settlement, which 
is still often referred to as ‘Settlement’ by the Gurindji. As befitting the ‘Settlement’s’ 
contested history, according to linguist Patrick McConvell: 
For a few years the ‘township’ was known as Libanangu which was as close as people 
who wrote the name could get to the traditional name of the Wave Hill area—
Lipananyku. However, following the upgrading of the airstrip, which was between 
Libanangu and Daguragu, it was decided (by whom is not clear) that the airstrip should 
have a new name; and soon after the township itself was assigned that name (without 
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consultation with Aboriginal people as far as I know). The airstrip was named 
Kalkurung but variations, with a -ji ending unknown among the Gurindji, also 
circulated at the time. The town is now known as either Kalkaringi or (since 1986, 
officially) Kalkarindji. This was named after the waterhole on Wattie Creek 
downstream from Daguragu which was closest to the airstrip Kalkarriny.1 
Kartiya: white person, white people. 
New Generation: the people of Kalkaringi and Daguragu refer to people born during or after 
the 1960s as ‘new generation’. The ‘new generation’ stands in contrast to the old people of 
the station era, now mostly deceased. It is commonly understood that ‘new generation’ have 
different values and interests than previous generations, the most obvious being a much 
greater appreciation and knowledge of mainstream cultures and technologies. 
Ngumpit (Gurindji): Gurindji word meaning ‘Aboriginal person; people’; the Gurindji’s 
name for themselves and neighbouring Indigenous groups (See ‘Gurindji’). 
Skin Name/Group: eg. ‘Jungurra skin’: ‘Skin’ names refer to a classificatory system in 
which all ngumpit are members of one of sixteen ‘skin groups’ at birth. One’s ‘skin’ is 
determined by maternity and dictates the roles and relationships a person is able or obligated 
to form with others. 
Track mob: the Gurindji’s English name for those who took part in the Wave Hill Walk-off 
and ‘tracked’ to Wattie Creek. 
Warlpiri: a large Aboriginal language and cultural group whose traditional land includes 
the Tanami Desert, to the south of Gurindji land. 
Welfare Branch: the Welfare Branch was a branch of the the Northern Territory 
Administration, which sat within the Commonwealth Department of the Interior. The Branch 
was established in 1953 with the passage of the Welfare Ordinance, which designated 
Aboriginal people deemed to require ‘special care’ as government ‘wards’ and gave 
                                                 
1  ‘Changing Places: European and Aboriginal Styles’, in The Land Is a Map: Placenames of Indigenous 
Origin in Australia, ed. by F. Hodges, J. Simpson and L. Hercus (Canberra, Pacific Linguistics and 
Pandanus Press, 2002), pp. 50–61 (p. 52). 
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significant powers over them to a ‘Director of Welfare’. This arrangement continued until 
1963, when the Social Welfare Ordinance was passed. The Welfare Branch (or later, the 
Welfare Division) was disbanded in 1972 by the Whitlam Government. The Branch/Division 
was replaced by the DAA. 
Wet Season: usually from January to February, much monsoonal rain can fall in this time 
in the north Australia, causing significant floods and isolation of remote areas. 
Woodward Commission: the Whitlam Government’s 1973–74 Royal Commission into 
Aboriginal Land Rights, led by Justice Edward Woodward. The Commission’s findings were 
used to draft the Aboriginal Land Rights (Northern Territory) Act 1976. 
Yolngu: the collective name for the Indigenous people of north-east Arnhemland.  
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Appendix A: Board Memberships and 
Office Holders of Local Organisations, 
September 1976. 
The individuals who were board members of more than one organisation have the number 
of organisations of which they were a board member denoted in brackets after their name. 
Mick Rangiari was also the communities’ representative on the National Aboriginal 
Consultative Committee. Karu Bulangkarni Co. Ltd was a wholly owned subsidiary of 
the Wave Hill Social Club, which owned and managed the Libanungu/Kalkaringi store. 
The membership of both entities was the same. All memberships are obtained from 1976 
sources except Karu Bulangkarni Co. Ltd (1977). 
 
Libanungu Council (1974–78) 
President: Billy Bunter (3) 
Mick Inverway (4) 
Bessie Yimara 
Victor Vincent 
Splinter Igairi 
Ronnie Booth 
 
Daguragu Council (1977–2008) 
Banjo Long 
King Langardi 
Pauline Banto (3) 
Marie King  
Agnes Dodd 
Rodney 
President: Vincent Lingiari (3) 
Donald Nangiari (3) 
Jerry Rinyngayarri (3) 
Pincher Nyurrmiyarri (2) 
Wonga Bill 
Long Jack 
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Starlight 
Hobbles Danayarri (3) 
Mick Rangiari (5)  
Long Jonny Kijngayari (5) 
 
Muramulla Gurindji Cattle Company (1970–?) 
Director: Vincent Lingiari (3) 
Long Johnny Kijngayari (5) 
Pincher Nyurrmiarri (2) 
Mick Rangiari (5) 
‘Captain Major’ (Lupgnagiari),  
Jerry Rinyngayarri (3) 
George Manyo  
Donald Nangiari (3) 
 
Wundamarie Housing Association (1973–?) 
Joint President: Billy Bunter (3) 
Joint President: Long Johnny Kijngayari (5) 
Frank Frith (3) 
Robert Crowson 
Mick Palasco 
Mick Rangiari (5) 
Billy McCann 
Mick Inverway (4) 
 
Wave Hill Social Club (1967–?) 
President: Billy Bunter (3) 
Mick Inverway (4) 
Alan Thorpe 
Pauline Banto (3) 
Frank Frith (3) 
Long Johnny Kijngayari (5) 
Carol Nungala 
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Hobbles Danayarri (3) 
Mick Rangiari (5) 
 
Karu Bulangkarni Co. Ltd (1972–present) 
Mick Inverway (4) 
Alan Thorpe 
Pauline Banto (3) 
Frank Frith (3) 
Hobbles Danayarri (3) 
Mick Rangiari (5) 
Long Johnny Kijngayari (5) 
Carol Nungala (2) 
 
Muramulla Gurindji Cattle Company Social Club (1976–?) 
President: Donald Nangiari (3) 
Assistant Secretary: Jerry Rinyngayarri (3) 
Treasurer: Vincent Lingiari (3) 
Secretary: Stan Andrews (European) 
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Appendix B: Special Terms of Pastoral 
Lease 805 (Truncated) 
To excise land for the Gurindji in 1974/74, Wave Hill Station (PL 529) was subdivided 
under the provisions of section 25C of the Northern Territory Crown Lands Ordinance 
(1971). Section 25 C allowed for a lessee (in this case the Wave Hill Pastoral Company, 
a Vestey Company subsidiary) to apply to the Administrator of the NT to subdivide their 
lease. This the Wave Hill Pastoral Company did. The Administrator’s approval was 
subject to the consent of the Minister (in this case, the Minister for the Northern Territory, 
Dr Rex Patterson). Section 23 and Section 37 of the Crowns Land Ordinance were 
especially salient. These and the main covenants to which PL805 was subject are 
reproduced below.  
Section 23.  Leases under this  Ordinance  (other  than  miscellaneous  leases)  shall  
contain  reservations,  covenants,  conditions,  and  provisions,  as  follows:-  
(a)  a reservation of a right  of  entry  and  inspection;   
(b)  a reservation of all minerals;   
(c)  a reservation of a power  of  resumption;   
(d)  a covenant to pay  the  rent  annually  in  advance;  
(e)  a provision  that  if the  rent  is  not  paid  on  or  before  the  expiry  of  three  
months  from  the  date  on  which  it  becomes  due  an  addition  of  five  per  cent.  
per annum may  be  made  in  respect  of  the  rent  overdue;   
(f)  a covenant by the  lessee  that  he  will  use  the  land  only  for  the  purposes  
for  which  it  is  leased;   
(g)  a provision that  the  lessee,  having  paid  all  rent  due  by  him  may  at  any  
time,  in  manner  prescribed,  surrender  the  lease;  
(h)  a provision that  the  lease  shall  be  liable  to  forfeiture  if  the  rent  is  unpaid  
for  six  months  or  more;   
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(i)  a  provision  that  the  lease  shall,  subject  to  this  Ordinance,  be  liable  to  
forfeiture  for  non- compliance  on  the  part  of  the  lessee  with  any  covenant  
or,  condition  of  the  lease;  and   
(j)  any other  reservations,  covenants,  conditions,  and  provisions  which  are  
prescribed,  or  which  are  considered  by  the  Administrator  to  be  necessary  
under  the  circumstances  of  any  particular  case,  and  are  specified  in  the  
Gazette  notice  that  the  lands  are  available  for  leasing.   
Section 37.  In addition  to  the  matters  provided  for  in  Division  1 of  this  Part,  
pastoral  leases  shall  contain  reservations,  covenants,  conditions,  and  provisions  as  
follows:-  
(a)  a reservation of all  timber  and  timber  trees  and  of  all  trees  producing  
bark,  resin,  or  valuable  substances;   
(b)  a reservation in  favour  of  the  aboriginal  inhabitants  of  the  Northern  
Territory;  
(c)  a covenant  by  the  lessee  that  he  will  stock  the  land,  and  keep  the  land  
stocked,  in  accordance  with  the  provisions  of  the  lease  but  that,  if  a notice  
is  served  on  him  under  section  thirty-nine  A  of  this  Ordinance,  he  will  
comply  with  the  requirements  of  that  notice;  
(d)  a covenant  by  the  lessee  that  he  will  comply  with  the  laws  in  force  
relating  to  the  destruction  of  vermin  and  noxious  weeds;   
(e)  a covenant  by  the  lessee  that  he  will  not.  without  the  consent  of  the  
Administrator,  cut  any  timber  trees  on  the  leased  land  except  for  use  on  or  
ID  connexion  with  the  land;   
(f)  a covenant  by  the  lessee  that  he  will  not  in  clearing  the  land  destroy  any  
timber  or  timber  trees  or  trees  producing  any  valuable  bark,  resin,  or  other  
valuable  substances,  except  as  allowed  by  the  regulations;   
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(g)  a covenant  by  the  lessee  that  he  will  not  obstruct  any  public  roads,  paths,  
or  ways,  or  interfere  with  the  use  thereof  by  any  person,  and  will  not  
interfere  with  travelling  stock  lawfully  passing  through  the  leased  land;   
(h)  a covenant  by  the  lessee  that  he  will  not  pollute,  divert,  or  obstruct  any  
water  flowing  in  a defined  natural  channel  unless  by  consent  of  the  
Administrator;  
(i)  a covenant  by  the  lessee  that  he  will  observe  and  comply  with  the  
regulations  under  this  Ordinance  for  the  time  being  in  force;  and   
(j)  a covenant  by  the  lessee  that  he  will  comply  with  the  requirements  of  
the  lease  as  to  developmental  work  and  improvements,  and,  during  the  
continuance  of  the  lease,  maintain  developmental  work  and  improvements  on  
the  land  comprised  in  the  lease  to  the  satisfaction  of  the  Administrator.   
Particular Conditions (Covenants) 
In addition to the special reservations and conditions as set down under Section 23 of the 
Crowns Land Ordinance and in addition to the reservations, covenants conditions and 
provision as set down in Section 37 or the CLO as applying to Pastoral Leases, the 
following particular conditions will apply: 
Term. The term of the lease to commence 1 July, 1975.  
Rental. Annual Rental of $1.07 per square mile until 30 June, 1985.  
Stocking. The lessee shall stock the land with a minimum of two head of branded cattle 
per square mile within two years from the commencement of the term of the lease and 
five head of branded cattle per square mile within five years from the commencement of 
the term of the lease and thereafter keep the land so stocked.  
Buildings. The lessee shall within three years from the commencement of the term of the 
lease erect a homestead with usual and necessary outbuilding to the value of $20,000. 
Dip and Yard. The lessee shall within two years from the commencement of the term of 
the lease erect a cattle drafting yard capable of working at least 500 head of cattle with a 
cattle dip or spray attached.  
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Fencing. In addition to any fencing existing at the commencement of the term of the 
lease, the lessee shall— 
1. Within two years erect at least 25 miles of internal stockproof fencing.  
2. Within five years erect a further 25 miles of internal stockproof fencing.  
3. Within seven years erect a further 50 miles of internal stockproof 
fencing 
4. Clear a vehicle inspection track along the full length of all fencing. 
Water. In addition to any bores or made waters existing at the commencement of the 
term of the lease, the lessee shall— 
1. Within two years equip the three existing bores situated in the north 
western portion of the lease.  
2. Within five years sink and equip three additional bores or provide some 
other made water each capable of watering at least 500 head of cattle. 
3. Within ten years sink and equip a further three bores or provide three 
other made waters each capable of watering at least 500 head of cattle  
Maintenance. The lessee shall maintain all improvements existing on the lease and all 
improvements erected during the term of the lease to the satisfaction of the Administrator. 
Extant improvements shall include:  
1. Fencing— Names fencing  
2. Water—Burtawarta Bore 
3. Yards—those located at Mountain Springs, McDonald, Neave Creek, 7 
mile, Seales, Gill Creek and Bobs Gully. 
 
Conservation. The lessee shall at all times take reasonable precautions to the satisfaction 
of the NT Commissioner of Soil Conservation in order to prevent accelerated soil erosion 
occurring as a result of stocking, clearing or cultivation of any of the land or the 
construction of fixed improvements including fences, firebreaks, roads and airstrips.  
 
 (Source: Darwin, NTAS, NTRS 246/P1, Box 66, PL 805 Pt 2).  
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Appendix C: Terms of Gurindji Special 
Purpose Lease 353 
 
As noted in Chapter Five, the Muramulla Company applied for a Special Purpose Lease 
to obtain some form of tenure over the land at Daguragu. This was nominally approved 
by the McMahon Government and finally awarded under the Whitlam Government.  
Date of Issue: 6 April 1973. 
Land: Approximately 8 square miles, subject to survey. 
Term: Fifty years. 
Purpose: To establish and maintain a communal settlement and 
purposes ancillary thereto. 
Rental: One half of one per cent of the unimproved capital value of 
the land to be assessed by the Valuer General. 
Re-appraisement: Nil. 
Survey Fee: $148 
Conditions: (I) The lessee to complete by 30 June, 1975 the erection of 
buildings to the value of at least $25,000 and thereafter 
maintain. 
 (II) The lessee to fence the southern boundary of the lease by 
30 June 1975 and the eastern and northern boundaries by 
30 June 1976 and thereafter maintain all such fencing in 
stockproof condition.  
 (III) The lease to be subject to any easements required by the 
Commonwealth for water tanks and pipelines.  
 (IV) The lease area to exclude all recognised roads passing 
through the area.  
 
Source: Muramulla Gurindji 825 Portion 1459—Wave Hill, Part Two. Central 
Records Unit, Northern Territory Government. 
